Adnan Boynukara
Interpreting the PKK’s disarmament and dissolution solely through the everyday concepts of domestic politics would be analytically incomplete and strategically misleading. The current picture is not merely an attempt to ‘resolve a problem,’ but rather the product of a strategic transformation emerging within the reshaping security architecture of Türkiye and the broader region. For this reason, when the issue is viewed through the lens of interparty competition, electoral balances, or short-term political calculations, it becomes impossible to understand why so many actors have simultaneously become engaged in the process, or why different centers converge on a similar ground despite having opposing motivations. The emerging picture points to a strategic threshold at which Türkiye’s internal security directly intersects with regional balances of power.
The primary motivation behind previous resolution processes was systemic transformation. Objectives such as democratization, the expansion of the sphere of civilian politics, the rollback of military tutelage, and the restructuring of the security bureaucracy were decisive. These objectives provided AK Party governments with significant room for maneuver both domestically and internationally. The current process, however, is unfolding on a different ground. Previous initiatives were the product of a reformist will, whereas the current process reflects a strategic transformation shaped by changing conditions. The concept of the “ripe moment” suggests that a problem can only be resolved once the cost of maintaining existing positions exceeds the cost of deadlock. Consequently, the issue is no longer merely one of political reform or social normalization, but has instead become a question of Türkiye’s resilience amid questions of state capacity and regional fractures.
Existential Concerns and the Regional Equation
The collapse of the Baath regime in Syria, the erosion of Iran’s regional influence, and the weakness of authority in Iraq have created a deep power vacuum across the region. Combined with the United States’ tendency toward partial withdrawal and Israel’s approach of controlling the region through proxy forces, Türkiye’s security strategy has undergone a fundamental transformation. From Ankara’s perspective, the central question is now this: while the struggle against a chronic domestic security issue continues, can the multilayered geopolitical fractures beyond Türkiye’s borders be managed simultaneously? This picture demonstrates that the PKK issue extends beyond a terrorism problem and has become a structural challenge affecting Türkiye’s defense capacity, foreign policy flexibility, and economic resilience. An unresolved issue on the domestic front narrows the strategic maneuvering space against external threats. Consequently, the new process is taking shape within a security rationale defined by harsh geopolitical realities, alongside an idealistic and genuine desire for social peace.
The State’s Strengthening Capacity and the Organization’s Deadlock
The transformation within the security architecture over the past decade has significantly strengthened security capacity. Factors such as clearing urban centers of terrorism following the trench incidents, establishing field dominance, expanding cross-border operational capacity, and the extensive use of technical intelligence and unmanned aerial systems have severely narrowed the organization’s operational space. The operational capabilities of unmanned aerial systems, in particular, forced the organization’s logistical lines and command structures out of their geographical safe havens. For the first time in the history of the Republic, intelligence capacity merged with cross-border operational capability on such a scale.
The resulting picture has not only produced military superiority, but has also eroded the organization’s logistical capacity, manpower, and mobility. The state’s expanding capacity through instruments of socioeconomic integration has further cornered the organization by offering alternatives to its own social base. For the organization, the core issue lies in the erosion emerging within the political and sociological base through which it can sustain its current position, alongside mounting security pressure.
The Sociological Base Is Changing
The social base upon which the PKK has relied for decades is undergoing a significant transformation. In particular, among Kurds who are becoming increasingly urbanized, attaining higher levels of education, and being shaped by the experiences of newer generations, the distance from the use of armed violence is growing. Interpreting this rupture solely through the lens of identity politics would be insufficient. Processes of economic integration, along with employment opportunities and trade networks, have transformed urbanized Kurds. Armed struggle no longer offers these segments either a sense of identity or tangible gains. The transformation of cities into arenas of conflict has created a lasting psychological rupture between the organization and urban Kurdish voters.
Today, a broad segment of society seeks to preserve its Kurdish identity while simultaneously refusing to identify with the PKK. This phenomenon represents a concrete manifestation of the separation between identity and organization. While communal identity remains vibrant, organizational loyalty is steadily eroding. The belief that a solution should be pursued through politics rather than armed struggle is gaining stronger resonance. One of the organization’s deepest dilemmas emerges precisely within this transformation: it has failed to produce a new language capable of carrying this changing sociological reality. The erosion of legitimacy among armed organizations takes shape when they become detached from their social base, losing not only their human resources but also the discourse through which they legitimize themselves. The PKK now stands at precisely this threshold.
Reading the process solely within Türkiye’s borders would also be incomplete. The fragility of the structure within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the new equation emerging in Syria have become direct components of the process itself. The KRG’s narrow power-sharing structure indicates that it is unlikely to generate long-term stability and trust. Meanwhile, the PKK’s capacity to penetrate these areas continues to keep the security risk alive from Türkiye’s perspective. Indeed, the Iraqi theater will remain an independent variable within the process. The question of who will establish dominance in the areas of northern Iraq vacated by the PKK also remains unanswered.
The authority transfer agreement signed between Baghdad and Erbil in Sinjar in 2020 has yet to be implemented due to the continued presence of PMF-linked groups in the region. In the vacuum created by the PKK’s withdrawal, the Peshmerga, the Iraqi Army, and armed groups aligned with Iran are advancing overlapping claims. In this respect, the PKK’s dissolution process will also directly affect the KRG.
On the Syrian front, developments are increasingly unfolding in Türkiye’s favor. Although certain issues remain unresolved, the security costs stemming from Syria are strategically declining. The integration process between the YPG, the organization’s Syrian branch, and the Damascus administration is effectively dismantling the PKK’s strategic depth in Syria. The narrowing of the YPG’s maneuvering space has also largely eliminated the organization’s capacity to use this geography as a rear base. This development is creating a favorable external environment that directly affects Türkiye’s domestic political process while reinforcing the external pressure pushing the PKK to regard dissolution as a strategic necessity.
Where Would the Failure of the Process Lead?
Today, the primary strategic question is no longer why the process began, but rather who would bear the costs — and in what way — should it fail. A prolonged conflict fuels economic fragility, weakens foreign policy flexibility, and keeps Ankara’s attention constantly focused inward amid regional competition. Yet the real burden extends beyond these factors: Türkiye cannot simultaneously sustain the role it seeks to play in the emerging regional order while grappling with an internal security problem. A state that exhausts its capacity domestically cannot act externally in a fully effective manner. For the PKK, the picture is even harsher. The strengthening of state capacity has already become a source of pressure on the ground. Failure would also drive the organization into a political deadlock. For parties engaged in identity politics, meanwhile, the situation entails a far more delicate balance.
From the perspective of the regional equation, failure is not merely a bilateral issue. The security calculations of Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and indirectly Iran would all be harmed in different ways by the absence of a resolution to this process. For Iraqi Kurdistan, the issue shifts from one of security to one of governability. The organization’s repositioning in northern Iraq as pressure mounts in Türkiye would place even greater strain on the regional balance of power. The continuation of deadlock in this geography simultaneously narrows the maneuvering space not only for one side, but for all actors involved.
This process cannot — and should not — be understood merely as a matter of domestic politics. The emerging picture forms part of a geopolitical transformation that has long surpassed conventional government-opposition calculations. The question facing Türkiye is no longer whether it can manage a security threat, but whether it can transform its internal cohesion into external capacity within the new regional order. Success would elevate Türkiye into the position of a decisive regional actor. Failure, however, would mean Türkiye stepping back from the role it seeks to play over the next decade. The outcome of this process will determine not the future of the PKK as much as the future of Türkiye itself.