Eric Alter
While still a threat to regional stability, Sudan’s ongoing civil war nonetheless forces external interference and engagement.
Sudan’s ongoing civil war, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has recently drawn comparisons to Afghanistan’s protracted instability after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. While both nations grapple with humanitarian crises and fragile statehood, there are reasons to believe that Sudan does not risk repeating Afghanistan’s descent into diplomatic isolation, ideological extremism, and global pariah status. This distinction arises from differing geopolitical contexts, conflict natures, and international engagements. Nonetheless, without targeted interventions, Sudan faces the risk of further degradation through economic collapse, mass displacement, and partition.
First, the geopolitical landscapes of Sudan and Afghanistan fundamentally differ, reducing Sudan’s likelihood of becoming a permanently failed state. Afghanistan’s central, if landlocked, position has invited repeated foreign invasions and proxy wars, from Soviet occupation to US-led intervention. This created a vacuum for extremist groups, turning the country into a haven for transnational jihadism. In contrast, Sudan’s location in Northeast Africa, bordering seven countries including Egypt, Ethiopia, and Chad, embeds it in a web of regional interdependencies that would make total political disintegration unlikely.
Neighbors like Egypt rely on Sudan for Nile water security and border stability, while the African Union (AU) and Arab League maintain vested interests in preventing fragmentation. The RSF’s capture of El Fasher in October, which consolidated its control over Darfur, has heightened partition fears. However, this has prompted immediate regional responses, such as Chad’s absorption of refugees and AU mediation efforts, unlike Afghanistan’s isolation post-U.S. withdrawal. Sudan’s Red Sea coastline also attracts economic investments from Gulf states, providing leverage for stabilization that Afghanistan lacks due to its rugged terrain and opium-dependent economy.
Moreover, the ideological underpinnings of the conflicts set them apart. In the Afghanistan of the 1990s, the Taliban’s imposition of strict Sharia law alienated global powers and stifled internal dissent. This led to Afghanistan’s de facto division into Taliban-controlled areas and pockets of resistance, resulting in a frozen conflict with minimal reconstruction. Sudan’s war, which erupted in April 2023, stems from a power struggle between former allies—SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)—over control of transitional governance following Bashir’s ouster.
While ethnic dimensions exist, particularly in Darfur, where atrocities echo past crimes, the conflict lacks the unified ideological fervor of the Taliban. Instead, it’s a pragmatic contest for resources and territory, making negotiation more feasible. Historical parallels, such as the nineteenth-century Mahdist revolt, mirror the Taliban’s fundamentalist ethos and anti-colonial zeal. Yet, modern Sudan also features a vibrant civil society from the 2019 revolution that could broker peace, unlike Afghanistan’s suppressed opposition.
International involvement further insulates Sudan from Afghanistan’s path. Afghanistan’s fate was sealed by the 2021 US withdrawal, leaving a governance void amid frozen assets and sanctions. Sudan, however, benefits from sustained global scrutiny. The UN’s recent greenlighting of mass killings investigations in November signals a step toward accountability, contrasting with Afghanistan’s impunity. Bodies like the UN Human Rights Council have decried the “cost of silence,” urging action against atrocities, while the EU explicitly rejects partition.
Regional powers have incentives to push for de-escalation. This will likely prevent complete international abandonment. Additionally, Sudan’s prior partition in 2011 serves as a cautionary tale, fostering international consensus against a replay. Afghanistan’s internal divisions, on the other hand, lack a secessionist edge.
Despite these safeguards, Sudan’s trajectory could worsen without intervention. The war has displaced nearly 12 million people and triggered famine. The current balance of forces risks a de facto partition akin to Libya. The RSF parallel government’s declaration in September exacerbates this, potentially entrenching the RSF in the west and SAF in the east. Colonial legacies and the marginalization of peripheries, such as Darfur, amplify fragmentation risks.
To avert further degradation or partition, a multi-tiered approach is essential. Domestically, it means reviving the civilian-led political transition of the 2019 revolution, empowering neighborhood committees to facilitate local ceasefires and aid distribution, building grassroots trust eroded by war, integrating ethnic groups through inclusive dialogues, and addressing Darfur’s grievances to prevent secessionist movements.
Regionally, external backers could be further pressured via diplomacy. The AU and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) could help in enforcing arms embargoes. The Quartet on Sudan, formed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, could host renewed talks, conditioning aid on de-escalation, as partial ceasefires in humanitarian corridors have shown promise.
Internationally, UN-led efforts need to be amplified to deter further violence. Current levels of humanitarian funding meet only 25 percent of the total need. Much more is urgently needed to combat famine and displacement. Economic sanctions on war profiteers, coupled with debt relief, could incentivize peace by drawing on lessons from post-conflict recoveries elsewhere.
There is no immediate reason for Sudan to live out Afghanistan’s fate and become a new jihadi foothold. However, realism demands urgent action: integrated diplomacy, humanitarian surges, and inclusive governance. The window for prevention narrows every day. Only a concerted and decisive push led by US president Donald Trump can bring Sudan to stability and avert a generational catastrophe.
*About the Author: Eric Alter
Eric Alter is the dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi and a professor of international law and diplomacy. He is a former United Nations civil servant and a senior consultant.
Source: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-sudan-wont-become-another-afghanistan
