Adnan Boynukara
The process Türkiye has been pursuing with the aim of the PKK’s dissolution and laying down of arms has recently begun to be described by political actors as the “Türkiye Model.” The political framework behind this designation took shape within a process that became more clearly defined with President Erdoğan’s speech in Ahlat on August 26, 2024, and moved into new stages with Devlet Bahçeli’s call, Abdullah Öcalan’s call for dissolution in February 2025, and the PKK’s congress decision in May 2025. In the implementation of this process on the ground, the diplomatic and intelligence coordination established by National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Director İbrahim Kalın played a decisive role. The central claim underlying this designation is that the process has a legal and political architecture that clearly distinguishes it from other examples of conflict resolution around the world.
The expression “Türkiye Model” became particularly prominent in statements by Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) Numan Kurtulmuş and AK Party Spokesperson Ömer Çelik. Three elements stand out in these statements: the absence of an external mediator or guarantor, the preference for a broad parliamentary consensus rather than a referendum, unlike in other countries, and the PKK’s demonstration of its willingness to dissolve and lay down arms before obtaining any political concession. The fact that the concept has not been validated by an independent consensus in the academic literature does not mean that the expression is invalid. It is therefore worth discussing the concept both in terms of the claims it contains and how they correspond to realities on the ground.
The Emergence of the Concept
The expression “Türkiye Model” does not derive from a single source. It has emerged as a shared designation used by political actors in different institutional positions at different stages of the process. One of the clearest political expressions of the term can be found in President Erdoğan’s statement in the TBMM on the day the framework law passed Parliament: “The Türkiye Model has been put into practice.” Devlet Bahçeli, for his part, had outlined a similar framework with the phrases “a working model unique to Türkiye,” “Turkish peace,” and “either terrorism or democracy, either arms or politics.”
In statements made on various dates, Ömer Çelik also described the “Türkiye Model” as a process in which Türkiye does not directly copy the conflict-resolution experiences of other countries. In this context, by saying, “Türkiye does not need a third eye; the third eye is 86 million,” he advocated the idea that society itself, rather than an external mediator, should monitor the process. Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) Numan Kurtulmuş used the expression frequently, particularly in statements following the adoption of the framework law by 467 votes, and emphasized that the fundamental feature distinguishing the process from other examples was that it proceeded without the “third eye” customary in conflict-resolution processes—that is, without an external mediator or guarantor.
One of the most comprehensive assessments aimed at giving the concept a systematic framework beyond political discourse can be found in an analysis by National Intelligence Academy (MİA) Head Talha Köse published by Anadolu Agency. Köse’s assessment draws attention to the importance of legal and institutional arrangements in the next stage of the process, while arguing that the model’s real test will come in that next stage.
There is an important point that should be underscored here. At this stage, the expression “Türkiye Model” should primarily be treated as a self-designation developed by the political and institutional actors involved in the process.
The Model’s Core Elements
Ankara has made previous attempts to bring an end to the PKK’s armed activities. The initiatives undertaken in 2009 and during the 2013–2015 period constitute the prior experiences underlying the current process. However, the current process differs from previous experiences, particularly in terms of the role of third parties and the timing of legal arrangements. The communication and trust problems encountered in previous processes can also be regarded as experiences that helped shape the current approach. In this sense, there is a clear continuity between the initiatives of the 2013–2015 period and the current process. The model’s distinguishing elements can therefore be grouped under five headings.
The first issue that needs to be addressed is the structure of actors. The most fundamental aspect of the model is that the process is being conducted without an external mediator or guarantor. In some conflict-resolution processes, third-party mechanisms are used to facilitate communication between the parties, support negotiations, or monitor implementation. In Türkiye’s case, however, no such third party is envisaged in the official design of the process. Actors involved in the process had used the expression, “both the first and the third eye are the nation itself and its representatives.” For the model’s advocates, therefore, the structure of actors stands out as its first distinguishing element.
The second issue concerns the timing of the process’s initiation and the strategic assessment behind it. The triggering of internal peace processes by regional and global circumstances is a well-known issue in the comparative literature. Particularly with the end of the Cold War, the drying up of external sources of support in cases such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland was an important factor in steering the parties toward negotiations. Although the Türkiye Model bears similarities to this general narrative, its emphasis is different. The framework at the center of official discourse is the assessment that regional and global developments may generate risks for states that have failed to resolve their internal problems. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on “division along ethnic and sectarian fault lines” and Bahçeli’s characterization of “imperialist games” show that this assessment was transformed into an explicit state discourse from the outset of the process. The originality claimed for the Türkiye Model may therefore be sought not in the geopolitical circumstances alone triggering the process, but in the transformation of those circumstances into a central political framework through an understanding of “internal consolidation first.”
The third issue is that the steps in the process proceed in a different sequence from some international examples. The model’s defining priority is for the organization first to dissolve itself without putting forward any preconditions or expecting political gains, and then to bring its armed activities to an end. Compared with the relationships among disarmament, political representation, and legal arrangements in cases such as ETA and the IRA, this sequencing points to the claim of a different approach.
The fourth issue is the source of legitimacy. The basis from which the process derives its legitimacy is also an important element of the model claim. While referendums serve as an important instrument of political legitimacy in some conflict-resolution cases, in Türkiye the process’s basis of legitimacy was established through a broad parliamentary consensus.
The fifth issue is legal design. The nature of the process’s legal framework is also an important element of the model claim. The adoption by the TBMM, with 467 votes, of the Law on National Solidarity and the Strengthening of Social Integration, together with the regulation’s design as a standalone and temporary measure, indicates an intention to manage the process through a special legal framework outside ordinary legislation. In Numan Kurtulmuş’s words, “in no conflict-resolution process anywhere in the world has a state safeguarded itself to such an extent while carrying out its task.” Indeed, MİT Director İbrahim Kalın’s statement that “statecraft is the pursuit of long-term balance and stability rather than short-term solutions” succinctly reflects this cautious architecture of the process.
These three safeguards constitute a new legal architecture comprising, respectively, the determination by security units that the laying down of arms and dissolution have taken place, confirmation of that determination by the National Security Council (MGK), and the examination of individual files by a multi-institutional board chaired by the Vice President. Another distinguishing feature of the regulation is its deliberate avoidance of the concept of “amnesty.” The architects of the process describe the prospective outcome not as a general amnesty, but as a conditional and individual opportunity for a fresh start. Decisions will not be automatic but will be subject to case-by-case review by judicial authorities. In addition, serious crimes (crimes punishable by life imprisonment before 2005 and intentional homicide) are excluded from the scope without any time limit.
The Model’s Architecture
When these five headings are considered together, it becomes clear that the “Türkiye Model” consists not of a single method but of complementary political, legal, and institutional choices. These choices show that the process is based on internal coordination among state institutions, Parliament, and political actors, rather than being managed by external actors. The claim of a “Türkiye Model,” therefore, rests not so much on five independent features as on the joint application of these five choices within the same process. How these claims of the model translate into practice will become apparent in the period ahead. The real criterion here will be not so much whether the model produces results under the current political conditions, but whether the same approach can be sustained under different political and security conditions.
Regardless of the eventual outcome, Türkiye’s claim to resolve a forty-year conflict without an external mediator or guarantor constitutes an experience worthy of examination from the perspective of the conflict-resolution literature. The originality of this initiative lies in its claim to address an issue with dynamics of its own by relying, in turn, on Türkiye’s own political, institutional, and societal dynamics. Should the implementation stage also proceed without problems, the Türkiye Model will be regarded as a positive reference for new conflict-resolution initiatives.
Source: https://perspektif.online/catisma-cozumunde-turkiye-modeli/