Muhammed Ali Acar
United Nations peacekeeping missions have emerged as the most visible manifestations of the international community’s will to limit conflicts, protect civilians, and create space for political solutions. In theory, these missions assume a temporary but critical role in the post-conflict reconstruction of societies. However, when examining the historical experience of such missions in the context of the Arab–Israeli conflicts involving Israel, a pattern becomes evident: instead of lasting stability, a state of controlled uncertainty has become the norm. Therefore, the current discussions surrounding the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) proposed for Gaza should be regarded not only as a forward-looking security initiative but also as a natural continuation of models previously implemented.
The starting point of this historical process is the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established immediately after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. UNTSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states, yet its powers were confined to reporting rather than preventing violations on the ground. Israel’s border incursions, military movements, and actions aimed at creating faits accomplis were regularly recorded by the UN; however, these records did not lead to any binding consequences in practice. From the very outset, this situation positioned UN peacekeeping missions in the region not as active architects of order, but rather as observers tasked with managing conflict.
The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established in the Golan Heights in 1974, represents a more institutionalised example of this approach. UNDOF effectively froze the conflict between Israel and Syria, preventing direct military contact between the parties. However, this success was not complemented by an end to the occupation or the promotion of a political solution. On the contrary, the de facto situation in the Golan Heights has been preserved for decades in a state of stable uncertainty, with the UN’s presence indirectly contributing to the normalisation of this status quo. This experience clearly reveals that stability gains meaning not merely through the reduction of violence, but through sovereignty and political resolution.
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), based in southern Lebanon, stands as one of the most instructive examples of the relationship between Israel and UN peacekeeping forces. Established in 1978, UNIFIL was primarily tasked with confirming Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and limiting the activities of armed groups in the region. However, over time, it evolved into a structure incapable of preventing Israeli airspace violations, cross-border operations, and targeted attacks. Israel did not entirely reject UNIFIL’s presence; rather, it tolerated it because the force demonstrated an international presence on the ground without effectively restricting Israel’s ability to act based on its own security assessments. As a result, UNIFIL functioned less as a stabilising actor and more as a mechanism for the internationalisation of a buffer zone into which Israel could intervene when deemed necessary.
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), though non-military and focused primarily on humanitarian aid, is also an integral part of this historical framework in Gaza and the broader Palestinian context. For decades, UNRWA has prevented social collapse by addressing Palestinians’ basic needs in education, healthcare, and food. However, this role has also contributed to the inability of Palestinian society to establish a permanent political and institutional structure. The fact that UNRWA has at times been targeted, criminalised, and subjected to efforts aimed at rendering it ineffective, reinforces the strong impression that Israel prefers working with a fragile, aid-dependent framework over a stable and autonomous Palestinian civil order.
In light of this historical background, the role envisioned for the proposed ISF in Gaza becomes a critical question. From Israel’s perspective, a truly authoritative and deterrent security mechanism—one subject to international oversight of military interventions—would require a significant shift in its current security doctrine. Therefore, Israel’s cautious stance regarding the scope and powers of the ISF can be interpreted as a consistent position when viewed through the lens of past experience. As observed in previous UN missions, Israel has typically not favoured the complete exclusion of international structures, but rather preferred their presence in ways that do not restrict its freedom of intervention.
At this juncture, Türkiye’s inclusion in the ISF stands out as a potentially transformative element in the debate. Türkiye’s participation entails not merely a military or technical contribution; it also carries the potential to reinforce the UN’s eroded legitimacy in the region. The involvement of an actor like Türkiye, with considerable regional weight and extensive field experience, could help shift the ISF from a symbolic arrangement to a more functional and effective mechanism.
Moreover, Türkiye’s role within this structure could pave the way for more realistic and feasible steps to be taken in the Palestinian arena. Addressing security not solely through military oversight but also by protecting civilians, strengthening local administrative capacity, and supporting the political process could open the door to a sustainable conception of stability in Gaza. This approach holds the potential to shift security from being a justification for intervention to becoming a supportive component of the political resolution process.
In conclusion, the debate surrounding the establishment of the ISF in Gaza reflects a fundamental choice about how stability in the region is to be defined—beyond a purely technical security arrangement. Historical experience demonstrates that stability can be achieved not only through international presence, but through authority, legitimacy, and political will. Türkiye’s involvement in this process may prove to be a critical factor in enhancing the UN’s effectiveness on the ground and in contributing to the development of a more balanced and realistic roadmap for the Palestinian issue. Within this framework, the ISF can only represent a meaningful step toward lasting stability in Gaza if it is designed with lessons from the past and a truly inclusive approach.
Finally, it should not be overlooked that excluding Türkiye from the ISF would not merely render this force similar to previous UN examples with limited effectiveness. Such a decision could also pave the way for peace and stability efforts to shift towards alternative and complementary initiatives developed outside the UN framework—under Türkiye’s leadership or influence. New diplomatic and security cooperation mechanisms established with regional actors could, over time, evolve into structures that effectively replace the UN’s role on the ground. This would further erode the United Nations’ already diminishing influence in the Middle East and could lead to a shift in the institutional centre of the principle of multilateralism in the region. Therefore, Türkiye’s inclusion in the ISF should be seen not merely as an operational preference, but as a strategic necessity for maintaining the UN’s legitimacy, inclusiveness, and guiding role in the region.
