Adnan Boynukara
The fault lines that emerged in Syria after the Arab Spring continue to take shape through both internal and external interventions. In this context, developments in Suwayda are not just a local unrest but also a multilayered and dangerous fracture signaling a repositioning of Israel’s regional strategy. The region, which has been conducting passive resistance against the Damascus government for a long time and is led by some figures directly affiliated with Israel, has now entered a new phase with open calls, symbolic demonstrations and striking slogans.
What is happening there will shape the future of both Syria and the region. Suwayda has effectively become a new laboratory for Israel’s regional expansionism and aggression. This will also have a direct impact on Türkiye’s position in both Syria and in the broader region.
It is known that the people behind the Suwayda issue are those led by Hikmet al-Hijri, who took action with the support and weapons provided by Israel. This group is responsible for ambushing the Syrian army, which was sent to stop the conflict in the region, and killing 700 soldiers with Israeli-supplied ammunition. This Druze group is carrying out attacks targeting the country’s fundamental fault lines; it flies the Israeli flag, calls on the SDF to engage, insults the new Syrian government, ambushes the Syrian army, and aspires to be the bearer of Israel’s theological projects. This stance shows that the issue is not merely about local grievances but is part of a broader regional strategy.
Is there an Alliance Between Druze al-Hijri and the SDF?
The Druze community has maintained a complex relationship with the Assad regime for years. The people of Suwayda were neither fully opposition nor fully integrated into the Assad regime. A mutual understanding was reached between the new Damascus administration and the main body of the Druze community. Decisions made to guarantee basic rights, political participation, and representation were significant. However, the position of the al-Hijri group supported by Israel is different. The lifting of sanctions, Donald Trump’s meeting with Ahmed Hussein al-Shara, the EU’s recognition of the Damascus government as legitimate, and steps taken to resolve the country’s issues have all alarmed Israel. Acting under Israeli directives, al-Hijri became more aggressive.
Reading this emerging situation solely as an expression of Syria’s internal problems is insufficient. The situation rests on different foundations. In Syria’s pluralistic structure, there is a tendency to foster ethnic and religious divisions. The conflict dynamics being produced, the terms being used, and the modes of expression point to an ethnoreligious future. A concrete sign of this is that the group’s rhetoric is echoed on the other side.
In this chaos, the immediate response of the SDF, which was founded on the accumulation of Kurdish-Arab tribes and led by ‘PKK cadres’, to the “future projection” shaped by the Israeli mind, and the presentation of vehicle images of armed elements, is enough to show the scale of the trap. This even suggests the events are not spontaneous but part of a planned strategy. This could be interpreted as a group that is at risk of losing its northern position under international pressure trying to establish a new zone of legitimacy in the south.
The SDF’s efforts to integrate Arab tribes into its administration and broaden its ethnic structure are often discussed. However, it is also known that these moves are superficial and have not resulted in real change in decision-making processes. It is no secret how a structure with no Arab representation in its ultimate decision mechanisms was formed. U.S. Special Representative Tom Barrack most recently exposed this. In this context, the SDF’s approach to Suwayda should be seen as an attempt to create new zones of influence under the pretext of ethnic diversity. This position poses risks not only for Syria’s territorial integrity but also for Türkiye’s border security and identity-based fault lines.
Israel’s Intervention and Search for Proxies
While Hikmat al-Hijri and his followers marching with the Israeli flag may often be seen as a radical gesture, in practice it represents much more. The flag is a provocation and a call for “protection and support” from Israel. Israel, already eager in such matters, demonstrates this desire through concrete actions. The terrorist attacks on central Damascus were an example. Israel plans to create a link between the south and the north, taking the two groups under its protection and ‘appointing’ them as proxies.
The “David Corridor” theoretically refers to a line that would unify the Druze in both the north and south. This is not merely an ethnic project. The buffer zone is perhaps the first step towards an alternative political setup to the Damascus regime in the future. However, it is clear that regional states will not permit such a possibility. Israel has long relied on forming ties with monarchies in the region. Perhaps for the first time, it seeks to establish relations with organizations that speak in the name of peoples. The belief that regional peoples will reject the cooperation offer of a terrorist state that has turned the region into a bloodbath, remains strong. However, there is a possibility that the organizations may act differently, and there is hope that this stance can be thwarted by the willpower of the people.
If such a corridor is established, Israel may attempt to extend its northern security belt strategy from the Lebanon-Syria border to the Jordanian border. It is also clear that this corridor can function as a sectarian buffer zone, thus aiming to break Israel’s perception of being ‘surrounded from within.’ The real issue to focus on here is Israel’s project to increase its influence in the region by developing a new definition and scope for “kinship.” With this project, Israel hopes to resolve its security concerns. The current relationship being built with the Druze is the first step in this project.
The Emergence of Tribal Reflexes
Understanding Syria’s social dynamics accurately is crucial. The coexistence of all ethnic and religious groups is valuable. However, the recent events have clearly shown what outcomes await structures that act as instruments of various projects. The most concrete response to the aggressive political steps of Israel-backed al-Hijri and his men came from the Arab peoples of the desert, the tribes. The Arab tribes taking a position and the backpedaling of those who managed the process showed who has the traditional balancing force in the region was and how this forcing process worked. In fact, the picture that emerges is that sociology is taking action. Sunni Arabs have not forgotten what they experienced under Baath rule and now support the new Damascus administration. Those contemplating Syria’s fragmentation in different formats, building alliances, or seeking proxies must acknowledge this sociological reality.
Impacts of the Events on Türkiye
Although these events may appear to be Syria’s internal affairs, the SDF’s desire and moves to become part of them pose a strategic threat to Türkiye. These developments could sabotage the PKK’s disarmament process. It is crucial that this process, which is being carried out with intense effort and sensitivity, is not sacrificed to petty geopolitical games and the interests of Israel, the common enemy of the peoples of the region. It is important and should be taken into consideration that the US is repeating Türkiye’s theses regarding the SDF’s political, military and ideological position as US begins to withdraw from the region. Statements made after the Shara-Mazloum meetings, which were attended by the U.S. special representative, clearly reveal the SDF’s real intentions.
In one such statement, Salih Muslim said: “Who elected the Syrian president (Ahmed Shara)? No one except jihadist groups. This so-called interim government consists solely of Sunni jihadists. There are no Kurds, Yazidis, or others. We do not accept this. We will not comply with it.” These remarks are not only a rejection of the interim government but also a broad denunciation of Sunni Arab representation, containing accusations and implicit messages aimed at external actors.
The SDF and Muslim seem to overlook the fact that the U.S. and the EU have held direct talks with Shara and lifted sanctions. The language used is troubling not only for the domestic public but also for regional and international audiences. The SDF’s portrayal of itself to Western audiences as a secular, democratic, and egalitarian structure is discredited by its divisive sectarian and ethnic rhetoric on the ground. As long as this dual language and covert agenda persist, the possibility for regional actors to engage in dialogue will disappear.
Such statements not only distance the SDF from the Arab-Sunni axis but also reinforce perceptions of its intent to redesign the region based on ethnic identities. It is clear that this position will not be well received by regional countries. With these remarks, the SDF positions itself against Damascus, distances itself from the Arab-Sunni axis that supports the opposition which overthrew the Assad/Baath regime, and signals a willingness to cooperate with foreign elements.
Regional Actors
Syria has been the stage for the longest-running proxy war of the post-Cold War era. Although the positions of actors have changed over time, their main goals have remained largely the same: to gain influence, secure geopolitical interests, and balance rival alliances. Apart from Türkiye, countries whose views on Syria matter include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, and Jordan. Today, Israel stands as the main actor promoting and implementing strategic instability in Syria. It views Syrian stability as a threat to its own national security.
Although Iran has been one of the most powerful external actors in Syria since the Assad era, its relations with the new Damascus administration are limited. It has not officially recognized the Shara government and is observing developments with caution. However, it is clear that Syria’s territorial integrity is of great importance to Iran. Therefore, attempts at division in Suwayda and the possibility of a new regional equation are unsettling to Iran. The prominence of actors like Hikmat al-Hijri, who openly align with Israel, is perceived as a threat to Iran’s regional position. Iran remains silent but concerned.
Russia maintains limited political contact with the new Damascus government. Moscow wants to manage the transition in harmony with the US and the UN. However, the developments in Suwayda pose a new risk of instability for Russia. Israel’s move to establish a proxy structure in the south could disrupt the balance that Russia is trying to establish for itself in Syria.
Jordan, which borders Suwayda, has historical ties with the Druze. It is particularly sensitive about border security and refugee pressure. The rise of armed groups in Suwayda poses a direct threat to Jordan. In particular, the infiltration of this area by external actors through structures like the SDF has put the Amman government on high alert. Thus, Jordan has complemented its diplomatic silence with on-the-ground security measures.
Is a Solution Possible?
The tension in Suwayda is not merely a local issue; it is a regional crisis that could trigger ethnic and sectarian fault lines. Therefore, the solution must be multilayered at the local, regional, and international levels. Locally, a consensus that recognizes the legitimate demands of the Druze community but does not open the door to separatism must be strengthened. It is important for the new Damascus administration to engage directly and transparently with all segments of society. Regionally, neighboring countries such as Türkiye, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon should develop a common platform based on Syria’s territorial integrity. A joint reaction against Israel’s efforts to establish an ethnic encirclement through proxy actors could gain significant traction.
At the international level, the mechanisms of support extended to the SDF by the U.S. and EU should be reconsidered. The contradictions between the organization’s rhetoric on democracy and representation and its actions on the ground should be made clear to its interlocutors. Support for the new Damascus government could strengthen centralization and unity. In short, the solution requires not just a military approach but also a political and sociological one. Responding to provocations with calm but firm action could be the key to lasting peace in Syria.
Old Maps, New Calculations
The field organization of the actions in Suwayda is the responsibility of a Druze sheikh backed by Israel. However, recent developments show that this mobilization is being triggered by several actors at the same time. The first group is the Druze diaspora in Lebanon, Israel, and Europe; the second group consists of underground elements of the Baath regime; and the third includes those willing to engage in tactical cooperation with the SDF. These groups are influential in shaping discourse on social media, creating public opinion against the Damascus government, and manipulating the field. Meanwhile, the SDF’s statements about Damascus and images of military convoys confirm that the issue is not merely grassroots-driven but also the result of professional planning.
Developments in Suwayda demonstrate that the dynamics have moved far beyond those of the early phase of the Syrian civil war. This situation is no longer just a regime-opposition conflict, but points to a process with ethnic, sectarian and international dimensions. The emerging picture represents not only a new instability for the Damascus government but also a new threat to regional countries. While the fuse of Suwayda is burning, shaking the balance of the desert has the potential to affect not only the Syrian regime but all orders in the region. The possibility of Israel expanding the scope of its new “kinship” definition also poses a distinct threat to regional countries.
However, it has become clear that ignoring sociology in calculations can disrupt plans. In this context, it has become essential for regional countries, and especially Türkiye, to develop a diplomatic strategy that prioritizes Syria’s territorial integrity, respects the representation of local populations, and discourages external intervention. As has always been the case throughout history, instability in multilayered societies like Syria is not confined to borders but affects the entire region. Therefore, a multilateral diplomacy strategy is essential.