Green energy, old power: Who controls the energy transition in the MENA?

The outcome is a Middle East in which energy no longer guarantees dominance but still enables influence. Power is no longer concentrated solely in resource endowments; it is distributed across infrastructure, technology, finance, and diplomatic agility. States that recognise this shift are actively repositioning themselves, while those that fail to adapt risk strategic marginalisation.
January 2, 2026
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The global energy transition is often framed as a technical and environmental necessity — a gradual shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy in response to climate change. In the Middle East, however, this transition is neither linear nor apolitical. It is a deeply geopolitical process, reshaping power relations, alliances, and diplomatic behaviour in a region where energy has always been inseparable from politics. The critical question today is not whether the Middle East is entering an era of energy transition, but whether this process is, in practice, leading to a redistribution of power.

For decades, energy served as a cornerstone of a Western-centric global order in the Middle East. Oil and gas flows underpinned strategic alliances, security arrangements, and political influence, particularly between the United States and major producers in the Gulf. That model is now under sustained pressure. Rising Asian demand, China’s expanding strategic role, Russia’s persistence as an energy actor, and diversification strategies pursued by regional states are steadily eroding the traditional energy–security bargain.

Despite growing investment in renewables, oil and gas have not lost their geopolitical relevance. Assessments by the International Energy Agency and OPEC consistently indicate that hydrocarbons will continue to shape global energy security for decades, especially in geopolitically sensitive regions such as the Middle East. Recent global crises have reinforced this reality rather than diminished it.

The war in Ukraine provided a stark reminder of how quickly energy can be repoliticised. IEA market reports and European energy policy assessments highlighted how supply disruptions translated directly into geopolitical leverage. Energy once again became a strategic instrument rather than a neutral commodity, exposing vulnerabilities in global markets and political alignments.

What has changed is not the importance of energy, but who controls leverage and how it is exercised. Middle Eastern producers are no longer passive suppliers embedded within fixed security frameworks. They are increasingly autonomous actors using energy as a diplomatic tool rather than merely an export commodity.

Saudi Arabia’s recalibration of its energy diplomacy, the United Arab Emirates’ parallel investment in hydrocarbons and renewables, and Qatar’s long-term liquefied natural gas agreements all reflect a more strategic, interest-driven posture. Analyses by Bloomberg and the Financial Times have pointed to Qatar’s long-term LNG contracts with Asian and European buyers as a deliberate shift away from short-term market exposure toward geopolitical hedging and strategic predictability.

At the same time, the technologies associated with the energy transition are themselves becoming geopolitical assets. Control over critical minerals, renewable manufacturing capacity, hydrogen infrastructure, and energy-related data systems is generating new forms of dependency and influence. Studies by the International Renewable Energy Agency and the World Bank underline how access to critical minerals and clean-energy supply chains is emerging as a new source of strategic power.

These shifts are unfolding within a rapidly multipolar international system. The United States remains a key player in Middle Eastern energy security, but it is no longer the uncontested arbiter. China’s growing footprint has introduced new diplomatic dynamics. Data from BP’s Statistical Review and the US Energy Information Administration confirm that China has become the Middle East’s largest oil importer, reshaping regional energy alignments and reducing the exclusivity of Western influence.

Russia, despite sanctions and political isolation, continues to exert influence through energy coordination mechanisms and strategic partnerships. This multipolar environment offers Middle Eastern states greater room for manoeuvre, enabling strategic balancing and diversification of external relations. At the same time, it exposes them to intensified great-power competition, where energy intersects with sanctions regimes, technological rivalry, and security dilemmas.

Contrary to optimistic assumptions, the energy transition does not depoliticise energy; it repoliticises it in new ways. Renewable projects are embedded in financing structures, technology transfers, and geopolitical alignments. Energy corridors intersect with maritime security, regional conflicts, and diplomatic competition. Even climate diplomacy has become contested terrain.

The concept of a “just transition” illustrates this tension clearly. UN climate frameworks and UN development reports reveal deep disagreements between developed and developing economies over responsibility, timing, and cost-sharing. For many Middle Eastern states, rapid decarbonisation without economic diversification risks social instability and political backlash. As a result, energy diplomacy increasingly focuses on managing the pace of transition, securing investment, and preserving state capacity rather than embracing abrupt transformation.

This dynamic is particularly salient for states facing sanctions or sustained geopolitical pressure. For such actors, energy remains one of the few viable channels for international engagement. UN monitoring reports and policy analyses by international think tanks show that energy continues to function as a diplomatic interface through which states negotiate relief, build alternative partnerships, and maintain strategic relevance outside traditional Western frameworks.

The outcome is a Middle East in which energy no longer guarantees dominance but still enables influence. Power is no longer concentrated solely in resource endowments; it is distributed across infrastructure, technology, finance, and diplomatic agility. States that recognise this shift are actively repositioning themselves, while those that fail to adapt risk strategic marginalisation.

Ultimately, the region’s future will not be determined by the success or failure of the energy transition alone, but by how effectively Middle Eastern actors navigate its geopolitical consequences. This transition is not a linear march toward a post-energy political order. It is a contested process shaped by power struggles, strategic calculations, and uneven global governance.

Seen through this lens, the energy transition in the Middle East is less about abandoning old fuels and more about rewriting the rules of influence. It is not merely a technological shift; it is a redistribution of power in a region where energy has always been political.

Source: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251218-green-energy-old-power-who-controls-the-energy-transition-in-the-mena/