Adnan Boynukara
The steps taken in Türkiye’s democratization journey after 2003 marked a significant rupture, particularly in the context of the Kurdish issue. The wave of reforms launched through the European Union harmonization packages, the innovations introduced in the field of language and cultural rights, and the regulations that expanded the scope of democratic politics reflected both the spirit of the era and the AK Party’s perspective on democratization. These steps, undertaken under the political leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, were not only a reflection of his foreign policy vision but also of his determination to establish domestic peace.
The most critical initiative of this period was undoubtedly the process initially referred to as the “Opening” and later institutionalized as the “Solution Process” (Çözüm Süreci). The primary motivation behind the process was to silence the guns and bring politics to the forefront. However, the organization’s approach did not align with Türkiye’s expectations. The PKK, emboldened by the territorial control it had gained amid the Syrian civil war, opted not to disarm. If you recall those days, self-administration was declared in many cities upon the organization’s orders. This was an attempt to establish a parallel sphere of power. Trenches were dug to create so-called “liberated cities,” and efforts were made to implement the organization’s strategy of “rural-based urban guerrilla warfare.” These developments were among the most critical events that poisoned the spirit of the Solution Process.
Despite all this, the organization’s role in the collapse of the process was never truly debated. The declarations of self-administration, urban warfare, and interactions with foreign intelligence services were disregarded, and Erdoğan was placed squarely in the crosshairs. Without articulating concrete reasons for the collapse of the process, a one-sided language of accusation came to dominate many domestic and international circles. This laid the groundwork for a lasting perception that questioned Erdoğan’s sincerity regarding the Kurdish issue.
Today, as discussions around a new solution process return to the agenda, the same question continues to echo: “Does Erdoğan truly want a solution, or does he not?”
Erdoğan’s Signals Regarding the New Process
In recent years, amid shifts in the global order, changing regional balances, global developments, and a period in which security risks surrounding Türkiye have intensified, Israel’s occupation and acts of genocide—carried out with U.S. and European support—have made Türkiye’s internal cohesion even more critical. A series of speeches delivered by President Erdoğan since August 2024, along with the conceptual framework he has employed, contain strong emphases that point to this reality.
In his speech in Ahlat in August 2024, Erdoğan did not neglect to deliver a message of unity while addressing global risks:
“As companions of a thousand years, companions in cause, companions in struggle and destiny, we now walk toward the future. Let everyone know… All 85 million of us are one, together, with one heart.”
This statement demonstrates that he views the solution as a form of social mobilization—not merely a “terrorism issue,” but also a matter of strategic security and societal solidarity.
In his Victory Day speech on August 30, 2024, Erdoğan emphasized the strategic importance of national unity and social peace. He underscored that maintaining cohesion on the domestic front is indispensable as Türkiye advances toward its grand objectives.
His speech at the opening of the Grand National Assembly on October 1, 2024, was shaped around the concepts of democratization and internal consolidation. There, Erdoğan sought to lay the intellectual groundwork for the process by conveying the message that “there is no contradiction between democratization and national security” in the new era.
These statements reveal that Erdoğan is the architect of the process currently underway and that he has adopted a sincere approach to finding a solution. However, it is also clear that the process is not confined to rhetoric alone—it is being supported by both institutional and political steps.
First Steps
Indeed, following the opening session of the Grand National Assembly, the handshake between MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli and DEM Party deputies signaled the emergence of a new political language. Bahçeli’s comment in response to a journalist’s question—“The President’s speeches excited me”—indicated that the People’s Alliance had jointly decided to open the door to the process. The presence of AK Party Deputy Chairman Efkan Âlâ in the same image further demonstrated that the party was embracing the process at the institutional level.
Moreover, President Erdoğan did not limit himself to rhetoric. He also mobilized the state’s most critical institution. He authorized the head of the National Intelligence Organization, İbrahim Kalın, to initiate a new Solution Process and instructed him to begin talks. This was a concrete step that went beyond mere intention. The subsequent contacts, negotiations, and signs of political softening constituted the emerging chronology of the process.
Despite this picture, the perception that “Erdoğan doesn’t actually want a solution—he’s just buying time” continues to circulate in public opinion. Yet when Erdoğan’s speeches, his political allies’ moves, and the institutional steps are all taken into account, the gap between perception and reality becomes clearly visible. It is evident that the questioning of sincerity stems largely from political positions and ideological prejudices. These prejudices are so entrenched that some refuse even to acknowledge Erdoğan’s description of the process as “our greatest achievement.”
The Relationship Between Strong Leadership and Solution
History shows that strong leaders are often decisive in resolving deep-rooted societal conflicts. Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams in Ireland, Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, and Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia… All these examples demonstrate that achieving solution requires courage, willpower, and the capacity to take political risks. Weak governments, fragile coalitions, or temporary alliances are often insufficient when it comes to taking such steps.
Therefore, the fact that strong leaders like Erdoğan and Bahçeli have taken the initiative regarding the PKK’s disarmament carries significant meaning in itself. This does not imply that Erdoğan is beyond criticism. On the contrary, the presence of a critical public is essential for the process to proceed in a healthy and participatory manner. However, this also requires giving due credit to the will that initiated the process and not belittling that initiative. Solving a country’s historical problems is not merely a matter of being “well-intentioned”; it is also about being strong and willing to bear the cost when necessary.
A Process Beyond the Perception of Sincerity
Since the early 2000s, Türkiye has crossed several critical thresholds regarding the Kurdish issue. While the steps taken toward democratization paved the way for seeking a solution, they also revealed the fragility of the process. The collapse of the first Solution Process was largely due to the organization’s misguided tactical maneuvers. However, placing the entire blame solely on Erdoğan led to the construction of a narrative that distorted reality.
Today, we are faced with a new moment. Erdoğan’s speeches, Bahçeli’s statements, the state’s institutional initiative, and the successive steps taken regarding the process all indicate that Türkiye is prepared for a new phase. In other words, this is not a development that emerged overnight. Despite this picture, the fact that some circles still promote the perception that “Erdoğan does not actually want a solution” shows that the process remains trapped within debates over personal sincerity. Yet what is needed today is to move beyond this discourse and focus on shared responsibilities. What must be emphasized here is the reality that Erdoğan’s will plays an important role in taking steps toward a solution. However, achieving domestic peace and democratization requires collective responsibility.
The significance of the current process requires us to spend our time and energy not on abstract discussions of “sincerity,” but on giving momentum to the process itself. Efforts must be made to reinforce the political will I mentioned, and this is the responsibility of all of us. It is not right to wait for a signal or instruction from somewhere in order to take a stance. The correct step is to ask the question, “Is what is being done good for our people and our country?”—and if the answer is “yes,” then to take an active role in the process. Let us not forget: the “let’s wait and see” mentality or the prejudices that belittle the process will, as in the past, once again produce fragility. The right approach is to criticize mistakes while also supporting the correct steps—to see the process not as a political matter, but as a social issue that transcends political positions.
Erdoğan’s recent speeches and concrete actions reveal that the will to find a solution is not merely a “discourse,” but also a “strategy” for the future of the country. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked today is: “Can Türkiye, this time, embrace the solution with a common mind?” The establishment of a Grand National Assembly Commission is a strong indication that this question has already been answered largely in the affirmative. It is up to us to cultivate and sustain this attitude.
