James Durso
Azerbaijan’s Entry Turns Central Asia’s C5 Into a Geopolitical Heavyweight
- Azerbaijan’s addition to the Central Asia bloc transforms the “C5” into a “C6,” strengthening regional trade routes and giving the group direct access to Europe and Türkiye via the Middle Corridor.
- The move deepens energy and infrastructure cooperation, but introduces geopolitical risks tied to Iran, Israel, and Ankara’s growing influence.
- While the C6 could evolve into a powerful Eurasian alliance, challenges include identity dilution, potential rivalries with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and balancing relations among Russia, China, and the West.
On 16 November 2025, at the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, the presidents of the “C5,” the Central Asia republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, announced the Republic of Azerbaijan would join the group, now christened the “C6.”
In October 2023, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan attended the Fifth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and noted, “Azerbaijan is a reliable transit country along the route to the markets of Türkiye and Europe. Not least significant is the transit in the opposite direction. Our brothers in Central Asia know that Azerbaijan’s entire transportation and logistics infrastructure is available to them.”
Central Asia’s GDP is USD570-580 billion and Azerbaijan will add USD79 billion, and it will be the third largest economy in the group, behind Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The C5 population is about 84 million, and Azerbaijan will add over 10 million.
What are the advantages of Azerbaijan joining the C5?
Strategic connectivity: Azerbaijan sits on the Caspian Sea and is a key hub in the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route). Its inclusion would give Central Asia direct access to European and Turkish markets without relying on Russia or Iran.
In March 2025, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to a peace treaty so tensions and geopolitical risk will decline, though Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, may attract retaliation from Iran in a conflict.
Energy & infrastructure synergies: Azerbaijan’s oil, gas, and pipeline networks (e.g., Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (oil) and the South Caucasus Pipeline (natural gas) complement Central Asia’s energy exports, creating stronger bargaining power in global energy markets.
Turkmenistan, with the fifth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, will be able to expand natural gas shipments to Europe and Türkiye, reducing its reliance on sales to China.
Geopolitical Balance: Azerbaijan maintains equidistance between Russia, the West, and China. Now that the Karabakh conflict is resolved and its territorial integrity is restored, Baku’s participation in the C6 could help Central Asia diversify partnerships and reduce overdependence on any single external power.
The C5 have healthy relations with China and in the first half of 2025 received USD25 billion in loans and investments from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They are also interested in transit corridors through Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran to avoid over-reliance one export route.
Russia is still a top trade partner, though it has been displaced by China. Vladimir Norov, the former foreign minister of Uzbekistan, observes Central Asia’s relations with Russia have continued to evolve since independence in 1991 and today “Russia is no longer the “big brother” but one of several major partners.” And Uzbekistan is investing in Afghanistan and is supplying electricity and building transmission lines.
In November 2025, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan joined a 6-nation rail-transit agreement that will “shift a larger share of the 60 million tons of annual China–Europe rail freight through Iran.”
Turkic solidarity: Azerbaijan is active in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Joining the C5 would deepen cultural and linguistic ties, reinforcing a Turkic identity across Eurasia, though the C6 states will want to minimize interference by the “big brother” in Ankara.
Diplomatic elevation: Expanding to a “C6” would give the bloc more weight in negotiations with external powers (e.g., United States (US), Europe, Russia, China), making it a more resilient regional structure. The group will have to decide how it should organize its affairs, perhaps as an Association of Central Asian States as proposed by Ambassador (Ret.) Richard E. Hoagland.
What are the disadvantages and challenges of inviting Azerbaijan to the group?
Identity dilution: The C5 is defined as the five Central Asian republics. Azerbaijan is geographically in the South Caucasus which is commonly regarded as part of Europe, and is currently part of the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Council of Europe, so Baku’s inclusion could blur the group’s identity and complicate its branding. One solution is for the C6 to rebrand as a bloc of Eurasian republics.
But recently Azerbaijan has looked to the East, and Eastern-oriented groups – the OTS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization – as well as strategic partnerships with China and Vietnam.
Balancing external powers: Azerbaijan’s close ties with Türkiye and its role in Western-backed corridors may create friction with Central Asian states wanting to avoid appearing aligned against Russia or China, especially as the Middle Corridor is usually promoted as avoiding Russia, not because it is more economical than the Northern Corridor through Russia (it isn’t) The Central Asian states have been part of someone else’s empire since the first Russian explorers appeared in the early 1700s and place a priority on non-alignment and friendly relations with all, though “all” includes Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia, Washington’s favorite sanctions targets. And the Azeris, who were also colonized by Tsarist Russia, are justifiably proud for founding the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920), the first secular, democratic republic in the Muslim world, and are keen to avoid the embrace of the big powers.
Azerbaijan may have allowed Israeli aircraft to use its airspace to attack Iran in June 2025. Israel supplies Azerbaijan with advanced drones, loitering munitions, and missile system, and the countries cooperate on intelligence and security matters. The C5 have diplomatic relations with Israel and Iran and won’t want to be drawn into a conflict if Baku’s close relations with Tel Aviv may cause retaliation from Iran in a conflict, distracting from Central Asia’s own agenda.
Institutional complexity: Adding Azerbaijan could slow decision-making, as the bloc would need to reconcile different priorities (e.g., Azerbaijan’s focus on the South Caucasus vs. Central Asia’s internal integration.)
Potential internal rivalries: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan already compete for leadership in Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s entry might introduce another ambitious player, complicating regional leadership dynamics.
Possible ways a C6 might evolve are:
A transport corridor alliance focused on infrastructure, logistics, and trade routes. Azerbaijan will be the western anchor of the Middle Corridor, linking Central Asia to Türkiye and Europe. Benefits include streamlined Caspian Sea transport agreements; coordinated investment in rail, ports, and pipelines; and reduced reliance on Russian transit routes. Risks include competition with alternative corridors (e.g., via Iran or Russia); heavy capital investment that depends on and political stability.
As China’s BRI is a major funder of infrastructure, the republics may have to avoid antagonizing Beijing should the faraway US or Europe promote a project the isolate China or sharply reduce its role in the region.
A Turkic cultural and political bloc focused on shared identity and soft power as the C6 aligns more closely with the Organization of Turkic States, emphasizing language, culture, and diplomatic solidarity. The bloc would have a stronger collective voice in global forums; easier coordination on education, media, and cultural exchange; and reinforced ties with Türkiye as the bloc’s patron. However, this may alienate Tajikistan (ally of Iran, Persian-speaking, non-Turkic), and may be perceived by Russia and China as a bloc leaning toward Ankara and the West.
A geopolitical counterweight focused on security and strategic autonomy, as the C6 positions itself as a neutral but cohesive bloc balancing Russia, China, Europe, and the US. The group will enjoy greater bargaining power in energy and security deals; collective resilience against external pressure; and the ability to mediate between Eurasian powers. However, it will be difficult to maintain neutrality if members’ foreign policies diverge, and if Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel, and vulnerabilities of the TRIPP, drag the bloc into unwanted disputes.
The republics would best focus on the economic benefits of more and more resilient transit corridors. Then, their economies reinforced, they will be better able to build more security and strategic autonomy.
