Kemal Öztürk
Three prominent figures from Türkiye staged what could be described as a bold demonstration in Damascus, asserting their presence in the region. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of Defense Yaşar Güler, and National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Director İbrahim Kalın traveled together to Damascus and delivered a firm message.
This visit came with fewer than ten days remaining before the deadline for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to comply with the March 10 agreement. During the visit, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan explained the SDF’s failure to fulfill the agreement as follows:
“The fact that the SDF is conducting certain activities in coordination with Israel is, in fact, a major obstacle in the ongoing negotiations with Damascus.”
In a region where Israeli forces had advanced to within 30 kilometers of Damascus, Fidan began to express this assessment—directly implicating Israel—for the first time with such clarity. Not long ago, in a television interview, he had also linked the SDF’s integration problem to Israel.
However, this was the first time such a clear and powerful message had been delivered from Damascus. He added another sentence:
“Stability in Syria means stability in Türkiye. This is extremely important to us.”
Israel’s Move Against Türkiye
The planes carrying these three figures had barely taken off from Damascus before landing at Ankara Airport when Israel declared its countermove against Türkiye’s initiative in Damascus. Images of the Greek Prime Minister and the President of Southern Cyprus—both dressed in coordinated blue outfits—were released to the media from Tel Aviv, signaling the formation of a new alliance in the Mediterranean.
Greece and Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye ranks among its top national security threats, held warm, close-door meetings with Netanyahu in Tel Aviv to foster closer cooperation with Israel in the Mediterranean. The intention of all three countries was clearly to send a message to Türkiye.
At a joint press conference, Netanyahu addressed Türkiye with the following words:
“To those who dream of rebuilding their empires on our lands, I say this: Forget it. It’s not going to happen. Our cooperation only further strengthens our ability to defend ourselves.”
This message was aimed not only at the Greek public but also at awakening a Western-driven narrative embedded in the subconscious of the Arab world. Just as Greek politicians have sought to stoke fear by saying, “The Turks are coming back,” similar fear-mongering efforts have been made in the Middle East with claims that “The Turks are reviving the Ottoman Empire.” By bringing the leaders of Greece and Cyprus to his side, Netanyahu issued a message intended to provoke that same baseless and deliberately manufactured fear.
As Tensions Between Israel and Türkiye Escalate
Greece and Southern Cyprus have made similar symbolic political moves in the past, but they were often hollow in substance. This time, however, cooperation with Israel against Türkiye does not seem to be just another populist stunt—at least not from Türkiye’s perspective.
Efforts to reduce Türkiye’s sphere of influence in the Mediterranean—where it holds a strategically powerful position—and to legitimize an Israeli presence on islands just off its coast are not developments to be taken lightly.
Israel is now enhancing cooperation with any country that has a troubled relationship with Türkiye. It is seeking stronger ties with India, which has been notably resentful of Türkiye’s stance in the India–Pakistan conflict. Behind the scenes, Israel has also deepened its contact with Arab states uneasy about Türkiye’s rising power in the region. In the United States, it has ramped up its anti-Türkiye activities by leveraging the influence of the evangelical movement.
Israel is engaging in intense lobbying to block Türkiye from acquiring F-35 fighter jets, from deploying soldiers to the peacekeeping force in Gaza, and from becoming a central actor in humanitarian missions. U.S. senators and members of Congress under Israeli influence issue statements on a regular basis.
In open defiance of statements made by Foreign Minister Fidan—who recently visited Iran and condemned Israeli aggression—Israel is conducting a fierce communication campaign against Türkiye’s highly valued “Terror-Free Türkiye and Region” initiative, and is now trying to persuade Trump to strike Iran once again.
Among all these fronts, the fiercest showdown is taking place in Syria. Türkiye is carrying out serious military operations on the ground to counter Israel’s push for a tripartite division of the country, which stands in direct opposition to Türkiye’s thesis of a single army, a single state, and a unitary territory. Turkish ministers’ planes have flown close enough to Israeli positions near Damascus to be spotted with binoculars. Israel bombed the vicinity of Ahmed Shara’s presidential residence, threatening what would happen to him if he did not comply.
Syria has effectively become the arena where Israel and Türkiye are locked in a power struggle. While Türkiye, working with the Damascus regime and other military elements, is tightening the pressure on the SDF and attempting to convince Trump of its position, Israel is countering by destabilizing the region—activating certain Druze elements, Kurdish groups within the SDF (particularly the Fehman Hussein faction), segments of the Alawite population, and covert networks within ISIS under its control.
Will Israeli Occupation Increase If There Is an Operation Against the SDF?
The deadline for the integration of the SDF—which has come under Israel’s wing—is fast approaching. Türkiye is hinting that it may launch a military operation if the SDF refuses to comply, but at the same time, it is carefully considering the potentially dangerous consequences of such an action.
If a serious military operation is launched against the SDF, Israel is likely to seize the opportunity presented by the resulting chaos to expand its occupation of Syrian territory. It could even bomb Damascus, targeting not only military facilities but also vital communication lines, transportation routes, and economic infrastructure. Israel is confident that no one will step in to stop it.
Israel has no intention of allowing the YPG—which it uses as a buffer zone against Türkiye and sees as a thorn obstructing Türkiye’s movements—to be completely eliminated. Should it lose this strategic asset, groups such as the Druze, the Alawites, and other minorities under its influence would likely begin to distance themselves from Israel, fearing that they might be next.
For this reason, Israel will go to any length to preserve its leverage over the SDF/YPG.
Whether it has the strength to succeed remains to be seen.
Will Türkiye Launch a Military Operation Against the SDF?
Türkiye does not believe that the SDF, which is both geopolitically and geographically cornered, can sustain itself for much longer. For this reason, Türkiye currently holds the upper hand on the ground.
In my view, a direct military operation involving the Turkish Armed Forces would be the last resort.
Seventy-five percent of the armed groups within the SDF consist of Arab tribes, and like the others, their salaries are paid by the United States. One of the first strategic moves will be to prompt these tribes to withdraw from the SDF—leaving the YPG exposed, relying solely on its own armed wing.
Although Mazloum Abdi has claimed that the SDF’s military strength totals “100,000,” data held by the Turkish state suggests otherwise. The actual number of armed personnel is estimated to be around 45,000—of which 30,000 are Arab tribes, and the remaining 15,000 belong to other groups.
According to Turkish intelligence, the YPG—considered the Syrian branch of the PKK—has between 10,000 and 15,000 armed fighters. Of these, 8,000 to 10,000 are believed to be combat-ready, with the rest assigned to internal security duties.
In the event of a conflict involving the SDF, it is unlikely that Arab tribes would take up arms against either the Damascus regime or Türkiye. Nor is it likely that the YPG’s 10,000-strong force could mount effective resistance against both Damascus and Türkiye simultaneously.
As a result, the YPG has placed all its hopes in Israel.
Türkiye’s approach will be to first separate the SDF from its Arab components, and then to physically isolate and encircle the YPG on the ground. Rather than deploying its own military directly, Türkiye plans to utilize forces integrated into the Syrian army for this operation.
Could a War Break Out Between Israel and Türkiye?
Given the frequency of statements by Israeli ministers, writers, and think tanks that target Türkiye and frame it as their foremost “enemy,” Israel is steadily paving the way for Türkiye to be perceived as a primary threat.
Whenever Türkiye buys aircraft, builds military ships, or develops missile systems, Israel immediately evaluates how these capabilities might impact its own security. If Turkish soldiers are stationed in Gaza, if aid organizations enter the area, if Turks participate in negotiations with Hamas, or if military exercises are conducted in the Mediterranean—Israel perceives all of it as a threat. And it is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to counter it. The recent Greece–Cyprus alliance is just the latest example of this attitude.
The real front, however, lies within the United States. Israel is waging an aggressive campaign—through both overt lobbying and covert influence—to block any economic, military, or political initiative that could work in Türkiye’s favor, including efforts to derail the F-35 program.
Türkiye, at this stage, is not as paranoid as Israel. The perceived Israeli threat has not yet triggered an official shift in Türkiye’s national security doctrine. Its security architecture is still not built on viewing Israel as the primary threat.
That said, voices within Türkiye’s security and political intelligentsia are increasingly describing Israel as a growing threat. Over the past ten days, Hakan Fidan has begun equating the SDF with Israel—an indication that official recognition of Israel as a threat may soon follow.
Of course, a conflict between Türkiye and Israel would be unlike any other. A war involving Türkiye—a NATO member, a close U.S. ally, and a country with the region’s largest army, defense industry, and economy, as well as a population of 85 million—would unleash a geopolitical shockwave capable of reshaping the course of world events.
For that reason, those who even speak of “war” must do so with the utmost caution.
Source: https://www.aljazeera.net