Necmettin Acar
The opportunities that Gulf countries and Türkiye can offer to the new Syrian administration differ significantly in both economic and diplomatic terms. Gulf countries have advantages in providing financial support for Syria’s reconstruction and mending international relations, whereas Türkiye’s influence in these areas is more limited. Although Türkiye provided substantial military support during the Syrian revolution, there are some doubts in Damascus regarding the expected benefits of Türkiye’s military capabilities in the post-revolution reconstruction of Syria. In this context, collaboration with the Gulf countries emerges as a more attractive option for the Syrian administration.
Following the overthrow of the Assad regime in Damascus on December 8, Türkiye swiftly adapted to the new era in the region and became the first country to conduct an official visit to Damascus. Within this framework, the historic visit of İbrahim Kalın, the head of Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), garnered attention. Shortly after, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Damascus was seen as a significant indication of the strong foundation for cooperation between Türkiye and the New Syrian Government.
It had already been widely acknowledged and accepted by all parties, in light of regional power dynamics and on-the-ground realities, that the Syrian revolution would not have been possible without Türkiye’s military support.
Despite all these realities, the fact that the first official visit from Damascus was to Riyadh has raised some questions. The visit of Esad Hasan Shaybani, the Foreign Minister of the New Syrian Government, to Saudi Arabia could be interpreted as a significant sign that Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will play a critical role in shaping the region’s new dynamics and balances.
In addition to this visit, reports about certain senior figures from the Syrian National Army (SNA) being excluded from the New Syrian Government, along with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement, “Türkiye will act as a guardian for anyone in Syria who feels troubled,” have sparked concerns about the formation of the new administration in Syria.
This article aims to analyze the recent foreign policy orientation of the New Syrian Government through the concepts of “realpolitik” and “riyalpolitik.” The term “realpolitik” will be used to refer to a pragmatic approach in international relations, emphasizing political realities and the use of military power and capabilities as strategic tools. In contrast, “riyalpolitik” will describe the use of petrodollars or checkbook diplomacy by oil-rich Gulf countries as a means to achieve their foreign policy objectives.
In this context, the article will examine Türkiye’s strategies in Syria during the post-crisis period, arguing that military capabilities unsupported by financial resources struggle to deliver the desired outcomes for Turkish foreign policy in the Syrian arena. It will particularly emphasize the need to evaluate Türkiye’s influence in the Syrian conflict zone by considering not only military capabilities but also the economic dimensions of regional power dynamics.
The Syrian Revolution: At the Threshold of Historical Legacy and a New Beginning
The origins of the calamities Syria has faced over the past century trace back to events during World War I and the post-war status quo. The devastating losses caused by disease, famine, and intense conflicts during the war inflicted irreparable wounds on the country’s demographic structure. Additionally, the French mandate established in Syria after the war initiated a period that hindered recovery and further deepened crises. The flawed policies and mismanagement of the French administration significantly weakened Syria’s social, economic, and political fabric.
This heavy historical legacy failed to transform into a new era under the Baath regime established after World War II. Instead of opening a new chapter in the country’s challenging history spanning over forty years, the Baath regime’s actions exacerbated existing damages, leaving Syria in an increasingly difficult position. The dire situation Syria finds itself in today should be understood as the cumulative outcome of historical disasters and consecutive mismanagement.
On December 8, the revolution in Syria, enabled by Türkiye’s support on the ground, should be regarded as a historical turning point that propelled the country from 1914 to 2024 in just two weeks. The most critical actor in this revolution was Türkiye, which provided significant support through its military-industrial capabilities. Without Türkiye’s military assistance to the opposition forces, the overthrow of the Assad regime would not have been possible.
Post-revolution, the focus must now shift to building a New Syria. In this context, the actors who realized the Syrian Revolution must confront the debris accumulated over more than a century and work to overcome this legacy. Among the pressing challenges for the new government are addressing the geopolitical and cultural divisions caused by the colonial era and the sectarian policies exacerbated by the Baath regime.
When the destruction caused by the more than thirteen years of civil war is added to this heavy legacy, the challenges facing the new government become even more evident. The economic, social, and physical devastation resulting from the civil war will compel the government to take bold and risky decisions not only domestically but also in foreign policy. In this regard, the fact that the first official visit at the Foreign Minister level was made to Riyadh stands out as a concrete indicator of the strategic risks of this new era.
The Vision of Türkiye and Gulf Countries for Syria: Competition and Differences
During the Arab Spring, the visions of Türkiye and the Gulf countries regarding Syria showed significant differences based on regional strategies and interests. The Gulf countries’ stance in favor of preserving the status quo and maintaining the stability of autocratic regimes led them to adopt policies supporting the existing order against the wave of democratization triggered by the Arab Spring. Prominent Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), viewed democratic demands as threats to their governing systems and regional influence, prompting them to engage in active diplomacy and military strategies to counter such changes.
Moreover, the Gulf countries maintained a cautious approach toward the involvement of Türkiye and Iran in Arab affairs during this period. As the two non-Arab actors in the region, Türkiye and Iran’s engagement in Arab issues was seen as a factor that could marginalize the Gulf countries. Consequently, the Gulf states undertook extensive diplomatic and economic measures to limit the influence of Türkiye and Iran in the region.
In contrast to the Gulf’s status quo-oriented approach, Türkiye’s Syria policy has been shaped by a vision prioritizing the demands of the people and democratic transformation. Since the onset of the Arab Spring, Türkiye has supported democratization efforts in the region and advocated for these demands on international platforms. Specifically in Syria, Türkiye aimed to implement a democratic transition process and establish a governance structure that prioritized the interests of the people. To achieve this goal, Türkiye both directly intervened militarily in Syria and provided substantial military support to opposition groups.
Türkiye’s Syria policy is connected to economic, security, and geopolitical interests, making it a realist foreign policy. Within this framework, Türkiye’s national security policies emphasize preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and preventing the establishment of a “terror state” along its southern border as strategic priorities. The proposed “corridor,” extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Iranian border, represents not only a security concern for Türkiye but also a critical issue for regional stability and national sovereignty.
Ankara seeks to establish relations with a Syrian government capable of cooperating in areas such as trade, energy, and economics. Strong economic integration with Syria would contribute to Türkiye’s economic growth while supporting regional stability. Furthermore, Syria’s geographical position serves as a gateway for Türkiye to the Arab world. Therefore, the presence of a stable government in Syria that fosters good relations with Türkiye is crucial for Türkiye’s national security and regional strategies.
An additional dimension of Türkiye’s vision for Syria is its strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the energy competition with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, positive relations with Syria would strengthen Türkiye’s position. In this context, the establishment of a government in Syria aligned with Türkiye’s interests could enhance its role in managing maritime jurisdictions, energy resources, and the transportation of these resources to consumption centers. These factors demonstrate that Türkiye’s Syria policy is based on realist considerations, contrary to the critiques of some who label it as idealistic foreign policy.
The differences in vision between Türkiye and the Gulf countries regarding Syria will be one of the key factors shaping the future of regional politics. While Türkiye continues to act as a proponent of democratic transformation and regional integration, the Gulf countries persist in their efforts to maintain the status quo and limit Türkiye’s regional influence. This dynamic will create a competitive environment between the visions of the Gulf and Türkiye in determining Syria’s future.
The tools used by both actors in foreign policy also differ significantly. For instance, while the Gulf countries have shown limited involvement in regional crises requiring military capacity, Türkiye, with its strong military capabilities, has positioned itself as a significant actor capable of leveraging force when necessary to achieve outcomes. In contrast, the Gulf countries rely on their petrodollars, fostering a “checkbook diplomacy” approach in their foreign policy. This strategy, often referred to as “riyalpolitik,” has proven effective both in the Gulf’s relations with the West and in expanding its regional influence. For example, the regime established in Egypt after Morsi’s removal gained international legitimacy and overcame domestic challenges largely due to the Gulf’s “riyalpolitik” strategy.
Realpolitik or Riyalpolitik?
The opportunities presented to the Damascus administration following the Syrian civil war reveal stark differences between Türkiye and the Gulf countries. These differences, in terms of economic resources as well as diplomatic and military approaches, are key factors shaping the influence of both sides over Syria.
The Gulf countries possess significant diplomatic advantages that could help the New Syrian Government rebuild its relations with the U.S. and regional allies. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) of the UAE projected a strong international profile during Trump’s first term, and this influence is expected to persist during his second term. The Gulf monarchies’ close relationships with Western countries, particularly the U.S., cultivated through “riyalpolitik,” may provide critical support for Damascus’s quest for international legitimacy.
In contrast, Türkiye faces challenges in this regard due to its strained relations with the West and its openly critical stance toward Israel. These factors may hinder Damascus’s efforts to gain international recognition under Türkiye’s influence.
Türkiye’s military strategy in Syria, particularly in the post-Assad period, appears to lack clear direction. While Türkiye has articulated strong rhetoric regarding the eastern Euphrates and the YPG, it has shown hesitation in decisively acting to eliminate the YPG’s presence in the region. Similarly, Türkiye’s military deterrence against Israel does not appear sufficiently robust. At this stage, Türkiye is unlikely to directly confront Israel militarily over its occupation of parts of Syrian territory in defense of the New Syrian Government.
The Gulf countries, meanwhile, avoid direct military interventions or providing overt military support to the Syrian government. Instead, they develop strategies to expand their influence indirectly. Their close ties with the West could facilitate diplomatic solutions, such as integrating the YPG into the new government or curbing Israeli aggression. This dynamic emerges as another factor limiting Türkiye’s influence over Syria.
The Most Critical Element: Financial Resources in Syria’s Reconstruction
Most importantly, the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, possess the financial resources needed for Syria’s reconstruction. The destruction faced by Syria during the civil war has made external financial contributions essential for initiating the rebuilding process. In areas such as post-war infrastructure renewal, economic development projects, and meeting the population’s basic needs, the Gulf countries can provide substantial monetary support to the Syrian administration. In contrast, Türkiye lacks the economic resources to offer such a level of support.
Türkiye’s current economic challenges, including high inflation rates, limit its capacity to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction. Expanding the societal legitimacy of the New Syrian Government is closely tied to maintaining uninterrupted public services and rebuilding the country. The protests in Egypt during the Morsi administration, largely fueled by economic hardships faced by the Egyptian people, provide a relevant case study. Thus, the stability of the Syrian revolution heavily depends on significant financial aid.
In conclusion, the opportunities offered by the Gulf countries and Türkiye to the new Damascus administration show distinct differences in both economic and diplomatic terms. While the Gulf countries have advantages in providing financial support and repairing international relations, Türkiye’s influence in these areas is more limited. Although Türkiye provided substantial military support during the Syrian revolution, there are doubts in Damascus regarding the expected benefits of Türkiye’s military capabilities in Syria’s post-revolution reconstruction.
As a result, collaboration with the Gulf countries emerges as a more attractive option for the Damascus administration. The fact that the first official visit was made to Riyadh underscores that the Gulf has taken a step ahead of Türkiye in Syria’s reconstruction process. This situation highlights the parallel between economic capabilities and success in foreign policy. If we aim to achieve specific outcomes in our foreign policy, it is essential to complement our military capabilities with economic strength.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necmettin Acar, Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Mardin Artuklu University, [email protected].