Yusuf Aslan
The complete dysfunction of the global order established after World War II became undeniably clear with Donald Trump’s re-election as President of the United States. Inreality, this order had already started to break down in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, enjoying the dominance of a unipolar world, the U.S. attempted to sustain the system by promoting the global expansion of the techno-capitalist economy and justifying its actions under the pretext of “counterterrorism.” European Union (EU) countries, under the hegemony and security umbrella of the U.S., benefited maximally from this disorder—economically and socially. Even though shocks such as migration movements from Syria and Africa, the Russia-Ukraine war, and China’s near-total dominance in manufacturing disrupted the EU’s comfort, they were not enough to completely awaken it from its slumber. The EU became a cumbersome structure that restricted itself socially, economically, and in terms of security through its exaggerated focus on human rights, gender issues, climate, and environmental concerns. It was reduced to little more than a passive observer, merely approving and reaffirming U.S. policies rather than taking independent initiatives.
Trump’s “America First” approach, which challenged institutions like the United Nations andNATO and reversed traditional U.S. policies, plunged the global system into political, economic, and military chaos. This turmoil ushered in a new era of uncertainty in international relations and brought the European Union to a critical crossroads.
Trump’s policies, centered on American interests, are now leaving Ukraine—pushed into war with Russia under the previous U.S. administration—and its EU allies, who support it militarily and economically, in a precarious position. On one hand, Trump has begun peace talks with Russia, deliberately excluding the EU and Ukraine. On the other, he is pressuringKyiv into agreements that amount to economic subjugation. Meanwhile, he threatens the EU with NATO withdrawal, increased tariffs similar to those imposed on Canada, Mexico, andChina, and demands that NATO member states raise their defense expenditures to at least 5% of their GDP. Following Trump’s public reprimand and dismissal of Ukrainian President Zelensky from the White House, EU leaders hastily convened to reaffirm their support forUkraine. However, it is evident that this commitment is unsustainable without U.S. military and financial backing. The EU now faces an unavoidable need to reassess its own capabilities and formulate a forward-looking strategy.
Trump’s actions seem to have awakened the EU from its long slumber, but this awakening is accompanied by confusion and indecision. While EU leaders maintain a diplomatic front with restrained reactions, they are increasingly aware of their vulnerability without U.S. support. Nevertheless, this awareness has yet to translate into concrete actions. The EU continues to operate within the outdated framework of the now-defunct postwar security and alliance architecture. It still views conflict with Russia as a necessity and structures its policies accordingly. However, as American strategist Jeffrey Sachs has repeatedly pointed out, Russia has long expressed its willingness—through both its current and past leaders, including Vladimir Putin—to establish balanced cooperation with the EU and the U.S. since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This raises the question of why the EU has opted forconfrontation rather than cooperation with Russia. The EU’s stance not only harms its own interests but also underscores a lack of strategic vision.
Since World War II, the EU has almost entirely entrusted its security to the U.S. under NATO and has largely operated in Washington’s shadow in foreign policy. EU policies on counterterrorism, global trade, energy strategies, and regional alliances have always been aligned with American interests. The EU has rarely, if ever, pursued independent policies in regions such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, North Africa, China, Turkey, and the Balkans. The rhetoric of the “War on Terror” and the EU’s stance on Israel’s expansionist policies clearly illustrate Washington’s overwhelming influence on EU foreign policy. However, this dependency is now being severely tested. The U.S. retreat from its global commitments is forcing the EU to develop its own defense and foreign policy paradigms—an imperative for the bloc’s survival.
For the EU to navigate this new era successfully, it must redefine its relationships with key regional and global actors such as Russia and Turkey. Instead of viewing Russia as a rival or adversary, the EU should develop a cooperation model based on mutual interests. A partnership in energy and trade, for instance, would yield significant benefits for both parties. However, the EU faces considerable obstacles in this regard. Its bureaucratic and diplomatic framework—built upon the principles of human rights and democracy that it has long championed—complicates such cooperation. To overcome these challenges, the EU must remove Russia from its “state sponsor of terrorism” list, ease economic sanctions imposed on human rights grounds, and abandon the unrealistic goal of integrating Ukraine into NATO and the EU. If these steps are taken, Russia would likely reciprocate by prioritizing economic collaboration with the EU. Trump’s approach is essentially driven by the same logic—prioritizing American interests—but he is implementing it by sidelining the EU, leaving it vulnerable to Russian pressure. Had the EU developed such a strategic vision before Trump’s re-election campaign gained momentum, it would be in a far stronger position today. Even now, it is not too late. Russia is far more likely to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with its European neighbors than to reach a unilateral agreement with the U.S., given the economic, logistical, and political realities at play.
A similar scenario applies to EU-Turkey relations. The EU’s approach to Turkey, much like its stance toward Russia, has largely been dictated by U.S. policies. While Washington officially portrays Turkey as a strategic partner, it is no secret that a strong Turkey is perceived as a threat to U.S. interests and Israel’s security in the region. Following America’s lead, the EU has adopted an exclusionary stance toward Turkey. On issues such as military coups, military influnce over civilian politics, economic and military sanctions, and diplomatic engagement, the EU has rarely deviated from the U.S. line, preventing it from establishing a strategic partnership with Turkey based on mutual interests. The six-decade-long EU accession process, disputes over Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, developments in Syria, Israel’s expansionist agenda, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus conflict, competition in Africa, and tensions with Greece all highlight the EU’s tendency to marginalize Turkey rather than engage in strategic cooperation. However, a more inclusive approach—one that recognizes Turkey’s strategic value—would benefit both sides.
Ultimately, Turkey is a country that continuously seeks cooperation and partnerships to enhance its regional and global influence politically, economically, and militarily. If the EU adopts a constructive partnership approach, Turkey is likely to respond positively. Steps suchas establishing a fair, two-state solution in Cyprus, ensuring Turkey receives its rightful shareof Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, lifting sanctions on Syria to facilitatere construction in collaboration with Turkey, taking a firm stance against Israeli expansionism to secure a two-state solution with a viable Palestinian state, resolving disputes with Greecet hrough partnership rather than conflict, shifting from competition to joint projects in Africa, lifting defense industry embargoes and sanctions (as evidenced by successful cooperation between Italy and Turkey), updating the Customs Union, and addressing visa liberalization issues would all yield significant advantages for both the EU and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’sability to maintain diplomatic channels with both Russia and Ukraine—despite ongoing conflicts—makes it a uniquely valuable partner for an EU increasingly abandoned by the U.S. A visionary EU-Turkey partnership could even compel the U.S. to reconsider and integratein to this new framework.
Only such a visionary approach can free the EU from its military, political, and economic constraints. Otherwise, the outdated post-World War II architecture—whose failures werestarkly exposed in the cases of Gaza and Ukraine—will continue to bring disaster rather than solutions. The EU must either resign itself to deeper dependency on the U.S., marked by hightariffs, increased NATO expenditures, and the economic subjugation of Ukraine, or forge a new strategy based on mutual interests and cooperation with key players like Russia andTurkey. The choice is in the EU’s hands, but time is running out. Whether there is leadership within the EU capable of championing this approach remains an open question.