Yusuf Aslan
The recent events in Syria’s Latakia and Tartus bring to mind the ISIS/DAESH attacks in northern Syria during September and October 2014, the siege of Kobani, and the repercussions these developments had in Türkiye. As will be remembered, ISIS/DAESH, which was later understood to have been used as a tool by major powers—particularly the United States—to shape the region in line with their interests, launched a massive assault on northern Syria in 2014. This included an intense offensive against Kobani, located just a few kilometers from the Turkish border. These attacks resulted in the brutal massacre of thousands of people and the displacement of millions.
The PYD/YPG administration, unable to defend itself against ISIS/DAESH, appealed to the international community for help and requested Türkiye to open a corridor for support to reach Kobani. Türkiye partially responded to this request by allowing some assistance, including forces from the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, to pass through to Kobani. However, this process turned into a major political dispute within Türkiye. Clashes between protesters—mobilized by shortsighted political calls—and security forces led to the deaths of around 50 people.
Amid the intense Kobani crisis and its domestic repercussions in Türkiye, a striking interview was given by Professor Dr. Halil Berktay at the time. Unlike mainstream media narratives, Berktay argued that Türkiye should intervene directly against ISIS/DAESH in Syria and protect Kobani. However, in the context of 2014—when Türkiye considered the PYD/YPG a terrorist group due to its links with the PKK, and when some segments of Turkish society saw the YPG-ISIS conflict as a case of “let them destroy each other”—this view was unfortunately not given much attention. While the exact motivations and decisions of various state actors during that period remain unclear, subsequent developments have shown that had Berktay’s proposal been implemented, Türkiye could have gained a strategic advantage.
Following the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, Türkiye purged FETÖ elements from its military and was compelled to launch successive military operations in northern Syria—Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring—to establish a secure buffer zone. If these operations had been conducted while ISIS was threatening Kobani, the positive impact on the region’s Arab and Kurdish populations could have provided Türkiye with far greater advantages in both Syria’s reconstruction and its counterterrorism efforts today.
Now, however, a different threat is emerging in Syria. In Latakia and Tartus, efforts are being made to create a conflict along sectarian lines, targeting the Alawite population. According to reliable sources, both soldiers from the New Syrian Army and Alawite elements who defected from Assad’s forces and rebelled against the new administration are at the forefront of these clashes. Innocent civilians, who have nothing to do with the conflict, are becoming victims of the sectarian hatred being fueled. Current data suggests that the number of people killed in these attacks has already surpassed several thousand.
For Syria, which is just emerging from a 13-year civil war that claimed nearly a million lives and displaced tens of millions, such conflicts pose a severe threat to reconstruction efforts. Even worse, the repercussions of a sectarian war will not remain confined to Syria; they will spread across the region, affecting Türkiye in particular. The only beneficiaries of such chaos will be actors like Israel and Iran, who thrive on regional instability. Israel has already declared its intent to protect the Druze minority near its border and Kurdish population near Türkiye’s borders, while Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has made statements implicitly praising the groups in Latakia and Tartus that refuse to lay down their arms.
All armed groups across Syria have dissolved and surrendered their weapons. The agreement signed on March 10, 2025, between the YPG and the new Syrian administration ensured that YPG-affiliated forces integrated into the new national army. However, some armed factions in Latakia and Tartus continue to resist and refuse to surrender their weapons. Putting aside the provocations by external actors like Israel and Iran, the root cause of these groups’ resistance appears to be the fear among former Assad-era soldiers and their families that they will face extrajudicial executions rather than fair trials under the new administration. Rather than waiting for their fate to be decided, these individuals are rallying like-minded people and launching armed resistance with external support.
For now, they seem to be paying a heavy price for this course of action. However, unless the new Syrian administration establishes a fair judicial system and takes effective measures to prevent lynchings, there will be no guarantee that such conflicts won’t erupt again in the future.
Just like in Kobani, the events in Latakia and Tartus have sparked significant reactions in Türkiye. However, the discussions in Türkiye have largely been shaped by deep political polarization rather than an objective assessment of the situation. The Alawite issue has been framed in a narrow sectarian context, presented in a way that discourages any serious inquiry into what is actually happening on the ground. As tensions have somewhat subsided, a clearer picture of the situation has started to emerge. Although the Turkish government has maintained a cautious approach, it is difficult to argue that a firm stance has been taken. Yet, Türkiye needs to learn from the lessons of Kobani and take a decisive position—both in rhetoric and action—regarding the situation in Latakia and Tartus.
For Türkiye’s own national security and the stability of the new Syria, it is crucial to draw a sharp distinction between the Alawite civilian population and the armed factions in Latakia and Tartus. Türkiye must ensure the safety of this civilian population in such a way that no foreign power can exploit them under the guise of protection. At the same time, Türkiye can support the new Syrian army in its fight against these militant groups by helping to discipline rogue elements that engage in sectarian attacks against innocent civilians.
Beyond what is reported in the media, it is unclear what exactly is being discussed behind closed doors between Türkiye and the new Syrian administration. However, so far, no strong policy position has emerged apart from cautious statements. Perhaps this hesitancy will shift toward a more assertive policy following the March 10 agreement between the YPG and the new Syrian government. After all, the most critical issues for Türkiye in Syria have been the fate of YPG-affiliated armed groups and the status of the areas under their control. Barring any major setbacks, this agreement appears to be a significant step toward resolving these uncertainties.
Despite all the uncertainties, the period following the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, has been seen as the dawn of a new and hopeful era for countries like Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Much has been written and debated about the potential political and economic alliances that could emerge in the region and their implications for global politics. However, realizing such ambitious visions requires long-term commitment and carefully planned steps.
The key to success in this process lies in building a unified structure with the broadest possible participation and sense of ownership. In other words, regardless of size or influence, all groups must feel included in the new political framework. The Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and all other ethnic or sectarian communities in Syria must not be marginalized under the pretext of dealing with remnants of the old regime. Instead, they must be integrated into the new Syrian state through an inclusive and protective approach.
For over a century, critics have lamented the artificial borders drawn by Western powers—particularly Britain—that have fueled conflict in the region. Now, they have an opportunity to remove these geopolitical landmines and act with a vision that minimizes future risks. This issue is directly linked to the ideals of a “Terror-Free Türkiye” and “The Century of Türkiye” because Türkiye is much larger than just Türkiye itself.