Yusuf Aslan
History sometimes brings people, states, and nations to the edge of a historical turning point. This edge is a test that simultaneously contains challenges, opportunities, and choices. At such a moment, the best course of action is to face the difficulties head-on, seize the opportunities as efficiently as possible, and make choices that provide the greatest benefit both in the moment and in the future. However, only those with a visionary perspective, foresight, and discernment-those who can see, understand, and internalize the turning point-can achieve this. Otherwise, individuals, nations, or states merely become subject to events, rather than active agents of transformation and change. In such cases, they lose the ability to influence the new structures and orders that emerge from transformation; shifting from a passive to an active position becomes either impossible or requires immense effort and struggle.
Like many other countries in the world, Türkiye is currently standing at such a transformative turning point as a state and nation. Moreover, this edge is highly dynamic, making it difficult to pause, reflect calmly, develop strategies through deep analysis, and position oneself as a proactive actor at the national, regional, or global level. This rapidly changing, multi-dimensional context demands parallel actions and, at the same time, requires harmonizing or at least neutralizing potentially conflicting or contradictory moves. In such a complex environment, how Türkiye will face its challenges and threats, how it will protect itself from the shocks of this dynamic transformation while capitalizing on the opportunities offered by crises, and ultimately what kind of future it will choose to build with its decisions-what kind of “Century of Türkiye” it will create-becomes critically important.
Since October 2024, Türkiye has been conducting a peace process that has been announced to the public and for which the groundwork appears to have been carefully prepared over a long period. The main aim of this process is to put an end to the terrorism problem that has cost Türkiye tens of thousands of lives and enormous losses for over forty years. Carrying such a burden-an open wound and a strategic leverage point for enemies and rivals-into ongoing global and regional transformation processes could result in far greater costs than ever before. Under these circumstances, Türkiye must go beyond its entrenched traditional approaches to fighting terrorism and, by confronting challenges on national, regional, and global levels, make a strategic choice for a new, inclusive Türkiye that fosters unity and strengthens its internal front. Current indicators suggest that the steps taken so far are aligned with this goal. If the process is carried out with the same care until the end and possible disruptions are prevented, there is no reason why it should not succeed. The current conditions and spirit of the time present a rare opportunity for a comprehensive resolution, despite all the challenges.
A similar analysis applies to Türkiye’s global position. The world order established after World War II, which shaped the reflexes of global powers, has now lost its functionality. Likewise, the liberal and humanist discourse centered on Europe and built upon fundamental human rights and freedoms has entirely collapsed, especially with the recent massacres in Gaza. These discourses not only failed to save humanity from oppression and injustice but also failed to transform even the West and Europe, where they originated. This reality became undeniable with the refugee and migration crisis, further crystallized by the crisis in Gaza. The approaches that disrupted traditional American foreign policy with Trump’s presidency plunged institutions like NATO and the UN into uncertainty, weakening the global security and defense architecture significantly.
In this very context, Türkiye took a principled stance that supported non-conflict between Russia and Ukraine, upheld the rights of both parties, defended opposition groups and a united, stable Syria against the Assad regime, and voiced the rights of Palestinians-especially Gazans-against Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policies, in the strongest and most principled way on every platform. This stance naturally positioned Türkiye as a significant actor on the global stage. The end to Syria’s 13-year civil war with an opposition victory and Assad’s removal, the U.S. withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and Europe being left without American defense under NATO all bring Türkiye to the center of power balances as an indispensable actor. Now, Türkiye must take critical steps on this complex global chessboard to secure its national interests and carve out an active, influential position in the new world order that is taking shape.
Key questions remain: How will relations with Europe-especially as it becomes increasingly fragile in defense and security-be shaped? How will Türkiye’s role in a potential European defense alliance affect its relations with Russia (particularly after Assad’s fall, where a noticeable silence has emerged)? How will it confront Israel, which has grown more aggressive with unconditional support from Trump, even within Syrian territory? These issues have become vital. While Türkiye maintains relative alignment with the Trump-led U.S. on issues like Ukraine-Russia, Syria, NATO defense policies, and Europe, its strong contradiction with Trump on Palestine could influence all its other policies. Therefore, Türkiye urgently needs policies developed and implemented with high sensitivity, wisdom, and foresight. On one hand, it must continue its principled stance across all conflict zones-which is vital for regional and global legitimacy and prestige. On the other hand, this stance must not escalate into new tensions, such as a direct conflict with Israel.
Strategic moves and policymaking are not limited to Europe and the Middle East. Türkiye’s long-standing Africa policy, whose infrastructure has been developing for years, is now disturbing former colonial powers like France. This discomfort is especially visible through Turkey’s activities in Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, and its strengthened ties with countries like Algeria.
Another competitive arena closely linked with Turkey’s strategic moves in North Africa is the Eastern Mediterranean. From the beginning, Turkey has taken a firm stand against exclusionary approaches regarding energy reserves in the region. It must now increase strategic agreements like those with Libya. A new strategic cooperation model that includes Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy, Greece-where bilateral ties have recently improved-and Egypt, which has entered a normalization process, could provide leverage in the Eastern Mediterranean’s resource-sharing disputes. However, Israel-supported by the U.S.-and France in Europe may try to block such cooperation. If France can be persuaded to join such a partnership, it is likely that the U.S. and Israel would also prefer compromise over conflict. In that case, Türkiye, which has already strengthened its regional position under shifting global conditions, would further solidify its hand.
While all these developments unfold in the world and in neighboring regions, and Türkiye plays an active role at the center of events, reinforcing the domestic front in all its dimensions and maintaining political, economic, and social stability becomes essential. The peace process regarding the Kurdish issue mentioned above is seen as the most critical step to strengthen the domestic front. While solving this issue and eradicating terrorism would provide enormous benefits, it is not sufficient on its own.
The developments following Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest have shown that, despite over twenty years of AK Party rule under Erdoğan, Turkish politics and society have not escaped a polarizing and conflict-oriented political discourse, nor can it achieve peaceful political transitions or competition. Although public criticism of long-standing government corruption and favoritism has intensified-as reflected in local election results-the opposition has failed to offer a convincing alternative to the majority. The government, despite waning interest in its large-scale project politics under Erdoğan, continues to push it forward. Meanwhile, the opposition offers little more than stoking anti-Erdoğan sentiment and saying, “If we win, Erdoğan will go,” without any concrete promises.
A large segment of society still views Erdoğan’s leadership as a blessing for Turkey in the face of global issues and disasters like the February 2023 earthquake. Election results clearly reflect this. However, Erdoğan’s big-project politics-once meaningful during his mayoral and early government years-no longer resonate as they once did. A significant portion of the population now struggles with everyday issues, and large-scale projects like Canal Istanbul do not address their daily concerns. Populist policies rolled out during election cycles-such as early retirement, bonuses for retirees, and permanent contracts for temporary workers-garner short-term interest but later become part of the problem due to the burdens they bring. In this context, the government needs a paradigm shift in its overall politics, developing solutions for everyday issues like inflation, income inequality, healthcare, education, trade, culture, employment, housing, and rent. Otherwise, while citizens may overlook their own hardships and support Erdoğan for the nation’s sake in exceptional times, this situation is not sustainable-as evidenced by local election losses.
While the government faces this deadlock, the opposition focuses all its energy on selecting a candidate to defeat Erdoğan. Without offering significant policies on either domestic or foreign affairs, and relying heavily on populist, high-cost promises during elections, it aims to win with a popular candidate and an alliance-but fails repeatedly. I disagree with claims that İmamoğlu’s arrest stems solely from his potential to defeat Erdoğan. Even within today’s political discourse, İmamoğlu’s chances of defeating Erdoğan are not as high as assumed. Let’s not forget that Erdoğan beat a consolidated opposition even after a devastating earthquake and a deepening economic crisis that began before the pandemic. This shows that the opposition, despite entrenched anti-Erdoğan sentiment, still fails to inspire public confidence.
Therefore, I see İmamoğlu’s and his team’s arrest not as a move to eliminate a rival, but as an attempt to restructure the political field in Türkiye. The transformation, restructuring, or complete dismantling of the CHP, which has long dominated the opposition, may now be on the table. The opposition can only become a genuine alternative to power by breaking this deadlock. Otherwise, the CHP’s system of “oppositional governance,” wherein different interest groups rotate leadership, is no longer sustainable. This model, which fails to hold governments accountable while blocking the emergence of genuine alternatives, has indirectly fostered government corruption. It seems Erdoğan’s next major project might be restructuring Türkiye’s opposition.
At this critical historical turning point, Türkiye is facing a unique test in both domestic and foreign policy. Global uncertainties and regional conflicts place Türkiye in a strategic position, while internal political, social, and economic problems make it harder to capitalize on these opportunities. Solving the terrorism issue, maintaining a principled foreign policy stance, and overcoming domestic polarization are key pillars for realizing Türkiye’s “Century Vision.” But this cannot be achieved by the government alone; it also requires the opposition to renew itself and offer the public a trustworthy alternative. Türkiye can emerge from this edge as a true agent of history only through visionary leadership, societal consensus, and sustainable policies-otherwise, history will record a tale of transformation passively endured.