Necmettin Acar
The nearly quarter-century uninterrupted rule of the AK Party has led to significant transformations in Turkish political life. One of the most visibly affected areas has undoubtedly been foreign policy. Compared to the past, Türkiye has adopted a more assertive and proactive approach, becoming more involved in regional and global issues, increasing its humanitarian aid efforts, and diversifying its foreign policy beyond a Western-centric axis.
This period, marked by a more autonomous foreign policy, has drawn criticism from various circles both domestically and internationally. Critics argue that Türkiye has deviated from its traditional rational foreign policy and taken on a utopian orientation, particularly pointing to its Syria policy and the refugee crisis. Externally, many have criticized Türkiye for allegedly distancing itself from the Western bloc and NATO.
However, the recent Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that Turkish foreign policy has been shaped on a rational basis and that this approach has provided the country with significant strategic gains. Unlike Ukraine, Türkiye did not rely on the security guarantees promised by its Western allies when tensions with Russia escalated after 2015. Instead, it considered the risk of direct confrontation and opted for reconciliation with Russia. In a similar situation, Ukraine trusted the support of Western countries, pursued a riskier policy against Russia, and is now forced to bear heavy consequences.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the policies of Türkiye and Ukraine, both allies of the West, in their stance against Russia. By analyzing the different policies of Türkiye and Ukraine, the article will argue that adhering to one of the fundamental principles of classical realism, self-help, has provided Türkiye with a significant foreign policy advantage.
State Security: Independent Strength or Reliance on Allies?
Although classical realism is often considered a highly pessimistic approach in international relations, it can at times be useful in explaining inter-state dynamics. One of the best examples of this is the recent debate between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House. This incident once again brought the core arguments of classical realism to the forefront, reaffirming its relevance in international relations.
Classical realist thinkers define international relations as a continuous struggle for power and conflict. Based on the anarchic nature of the international system, this perspective emphasizes that the primary goal of states is survival. In order to ensure their survival, states must enhance their military strength and continuously invest in defense expenditures. According to classical realism, since there is no central authority in the international system, there is no mechanism to come to the aid of states in the face of a threat.
In this context, classical realists argue that states cannot entrust their security and survival to another actor. If a state relies on international organizations or other states for its security, its chances of survival in the long run will be significantly weakened. This is because no state can be completely certain about how another will act in the future or whether it will remain committed to its promises.
Realists emphasize that states, as rational actors in international relations, prioritize their own interests. They argue that when strategic interests require it, states may backtrack on previous commitments and even withdraw from agreements they have signed. Therefore, when it comes to security and survival, states have no choice but to rely on their own national capabilities.
If a state makes the mistake of relying on the military power of other states instead of its own military capacity, classical realism argues that this will lead to strategic dependence and ultimately weaken the state. This is because, despite alliance commitments and security guarantees, states primarily prioritize their own national interests, and when these interests change, they may reconsider their alliances.
Throughout history, many states have paid a heavy price for placing too much trust in their allies. For instance, Poland’s failure to receive the military support it expected from its Western allies in 1939 or various countries’ reliance on U.S. security commitments in the post-Cold War period—at the expense of developing their own military capacity—serve as concrete examples of this argument.
Within this framework, classical realism asserts that a state’s most reliable guarantor is its own strength and that it should not depend on external actors for its security. Only by maintaining a strong military capacity and enhancing deterrence can states restrain the aggressive intentions of other actors and safeguard their national interests.
The Ukraine Crisis: The West’s Security Test and Shifting Balances
At the beginning of the 2000s, the crisis between Russia and the West began to deepen, escalating further with Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Crimea in 2014. The failure of de-escalation mechanisms and Western policies that inadvertently encouraged Russia to take military action against Ukraine ultimately led to Russia’s invasion attempt in early 2021. Targeting areas in eastern Ukraine with a high ethnic Russian population, Russia launched a military incursion.
During this period, the Ukrainian leadership strengthened its cooperation with the Western bloc, pursuing various diplomatic initiatives to contain Russia and reclaim its lost territories. As a result, the Western bloc fully backed the Ukrainian government, adopting a firm stance against Russia. At the highest levels, it was declared that Ukraine would receive comprehensive military, economic, and diplomatic support to deter Moscow, force it to withdraw from occupied territories, and eliminate it as a threat to the West.
These security assurances fostered an atmosphere of excessive optimism within the Kyiv administration. Aware that it could not confront Russia alone but overly confident in the promises of its Western allies, President Zelensky launched a large-scale defensive war against Russia, which also included provocative attacks.
It is an expected, even necessary, reflex for a state to resist when its territory is invaded and it faces a military threat. However, the Kyiv administration’s excessive trust in the promises of the Western alliance and its optimism led it to overestimate its own strength against Russia, preventing it from acting with sufficient flexibility in diplomatic negotiations. In particular, during the Istanbul talks mediated by Türkiye, when peace was within reach, the Kyiv government, encouraged by Western countries, did not give the negotiations the attention they deserved. Instead, believing that it could defeat Moscow through Western military support and sanctions imposed on Russia, it decided to continue the fight.
Ultimately, with Trump’s return to power in the United States, the balance shifted. For a long time, Trump had criticized the aid provided to Ukraine, arguing that it was unnecessary and did not bring any financial return to the U.S., frequently targeting the Biden administration over this issue. Once in office, he meticulously reviewed past policies, almost with an accountant’s precision, and demanded the return of all the funds given to Ukraine—if not more. Moreover, he avoided providing Kyiv with any security guarantees against Russia.
As a result, Ukraine found itself trapped in a diplomatic deadlock, facing both the risk of losing a significant portion of its territory to Russia and the danger of surrendering its valuable underground resources to the United States.
Türkiye’s Rational Policy Against Russia: Western Guarantees and Strategic Balance
It is now clear, given Ukraine’s current predicament, that Türkiye, despite being a country within the Western bloc like Ukraine, made a highly rational choice by adopting a different policy toward Russia. When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, Türkiye suddenly found itself in a position where it faced the risk of direct military confrontation with Moscow. Russian warplanes occasionally violated Turkish airspace, and tensions escalated further when a Turkish jet was shot down by the Syrian Air Force, creating serious military challenges for Türkiye.
During this period, Türkiye’s NATO allies strongly condemned Russia’s violations, emphasizing that Turkish airspace was also NATO airspace. They asserted that Russia should take this fact into account and provided strong assurances that if Türkiye shot down Russian aircraft, NATO would defend Ankara. After all, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty explicitly states that an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all, obligating all members to mobilize in defense of their ally. During this time, some NATO members deployed Patriot missile systems in Türkiye, while the United States repeatedly renewed its commitments to the F-35 project, pledging to enhance the deterrent capability of the Turkish Air Force.
However, after the downing of the Russian jet, Türkiye’s decision-makers did not place full trust in these Western assurances and chose reconciliation with Russia rather than escalating tensions. At the same time, Türkiye adopted a strategy of balancing Russia with its own national resources by launching extensive investments in its defense industry.
During this period, some domestic circles and particularly Western countries accused Türkiye of aligning too closely with Russia, distancing itself from the West, and creating a rift within NATO. Moreover, during the Ukraine war, Türkiye faced intense pressure to increase sanctions and exert more pressure on Russia. Nevertheless, Türkiye remained steadfast in maintaining balanced relations with Russia. Instead of complete dependence on the West and its security guarantees, it deliberately chose to avoid a confrontational and escalation-driven policy toward Russia.
The past decade has shown that when a state faces an existential threat, its survival depends primarily on its own resources. Ukraine, relying on Western security guarantees, escalated tensions with Russia and, at the height of these threats, painfully experienced that such assurances were insufficient to safeguard the state’s survival. Today, Ukraine not only faces the risk of losing a significant portion of its territory to Russia but is also forced to cede control of its valuable mineral resources to the United States.
Türkiye, on the other hand, did not place its faith in Western security guarantees. Aware that it could not counterbalance Russia alone, it maintained a carefully calibrated relationship with Moscow. At the same time, through substantial investments in its defense industry, it strengthened its own deterrence capabilities. Today, Türkiye perceives no direct threat from Russia while maintaining good relations with Moscow and has successfully elevated its profile as an influential actor in both regional and global affairs.
These developments have not only invalidated domestic criticisms claiming that the government’s policies are irrational but have also undermined the arguments of those who advocate escalating tensions with Russia based on reliance on Western security guarantees.