Yusuf Aslan
By standing on the right and humane side of history, Turkey has hosted millions of people who sought refuge in its territory from Syria since 2011. Moreover, it has accomplished this with a success that has been regarded as exemplary in many aspects worldwide. Of course, throughout this long process, some unpleasant and negative incidents occurred; however, these incidents never escalated to a mass or societal level.
Now, as Syrians are beginning their return journey—albeit more slowly than expected—it is appropriate to evaluate Turkey’s experience with this massive migration. This experience is not only crucial for Turkey but also represents an unprecedented case for the rest of the world.
Of course, Turkey’s experience with mass migration did not begin with the arrival of Syrians in 2011. The Balkan and Caucasian migrations during the late Ottoman period and after World War I, the population exchanges, and the waves of migration from Bulgaria during different periods of the Republic are all valuable examples that demonstrate Turkey’s prior experience before the Syrian migration.
With the help of this historical background and experience, Turkey has successfully approached the influx of Syrians, which exceeded millions after 2014, from a humanitarian perspective and managed it with this approach for a relatively long period.
At first, Turkey embraced millions fleeing war with its open-door policy, quickly building temporary shelters and providing essential needs such as food. However, as the number of refugees soon exceeded the capacity of temporary accommodation centers, Syrians were allowed to settle in cities alongside Turkish citizens. Later, they were granted various rights in areas such as social assistance, education, healthcare, and employment. Turkey not only acted swiftly but also demonstrated an exceptional performance rarely seen worldwide.
Although emergency humanitarian aid was delivered through AFAD, the Turkish Red Crescent, and NGOs, Turkey’s institutional structure in migration management was not prepared to handle this new situation. Therefore, in 2013, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection was enacted, providing a legal foundation. In 2014, the Directorate General of Migration Management (now the Presidency of Migration Management) was established under the Ministry of Interior. In 2015, the General Coordination Unit under the Prime Ministry was created to establish a more structured intervention framework domestically and to prepare for negotiations with international counterparts, primarily the European Union. The 2016 regulation on work permits allowed steps toward integrating Syrians into social and economic life.
Through agreements with the EU, a total of €6 billion in financial support was secured, which enabled the implementation of projects in humanitarian aid, health, education, socio-economic support, and infrastructure for Syrians.
While Turkey continued these multidimensional interventions for Syrians within its borders, it also launched military operations in northern Syria to clear terrorist organizations threatening national security. As a result, many Syrians—primarily those who had fled from these areas—began to return voluntarily and settle in these newly secured regions. Since 2017, Turkey has taken facilitating steps within the framework of voluntary return principles established by the United Nations to encourage the return of Syrians to these regions and other conflict-free areas.
Looking back from February 2025, it must be acknowledged that Turkey has successfully managed a massive migration movement for over a decade. Therefore, due credit must be given to Turkey—both as a state and as a nation—for this remarkable achievement.
After recognizing this well-deserved success, it is also important to analyze this significant and historic migration experience by asking, “What could Turkey have done better?” In doing so, while celebrating its achievements, Turkey can also extract valuable lessons for the future.
One of the major shortcomings of Turkey’s response was the lack of a well-planned settlement and housing process. Initially, Syrians were placed in temporary accommodation centers, but later they moved into cities without a structured plan. This lack of planning led to population congestion, first in border provinces and later in major cities, particularly Istanbul. This congestion caused difficulties in providing public and municipal services and created challenges for social cohesion, leading to dissatisfaction among the host communities. It could be argued that the uncertainty surrounding the duration of the Syrian crisis prevented long-term settlement planning. However, regardless of whether the migration was short-term or long-term, the consequences of unplanned resettlement posed greater risks and burdens on Turkey than a well-organized settlement strategy would have. Even when resettlement plans were reconsidered later, authorities avoided mass relocations due to the potential risks associated with moving already-settled populations.
Turkey also failed to effectively utilize the skilled Syrian workforce that came with migration. The country either took too long to establish processes for integrating qualified professionals into the labor market or did not develop them at all. Syrian doctors, engineers, academics, and businesspeople either spent years trying to verify their credentials to work in their respective fields or, exhausted by bureaucratic hurdles, left for third countries, mainly in Europe. Had Turkey quickly implemented reforms in areas such as professional profiling, accreditation, and recognition of foreign qualifications, thousands of skilled individuals could have been retained in the country. Although some progress was made in the education and healthcare sectors, these efforts came too late and remained insufficient.
Another major shortcoming was the failure to establish an integrated information and data system for migration management. While registration and data collection efforts were carried out in areas such as education, healthcare, social assistance, and employment, there was no comprehensive system that integrated these sectors, facilitated coordination, and allowed evidence-based policy development. This gap, combined with Turkey’s bureaucratic inefficiencies in coordination, process management, and data sharing, led to duplication in the use of national and international funds, resulting in resource waste, delays, and operational fatigue. Considering that Turkey has successfully implemented a unified e-Government system for public services, its inability to develop a similar system for migration is seen as a significant shortfall in its migration experience.
Turkey’s communication strategy regarding migration also fell short. Apart from President Erdoğan’s consistent humanitarian stance and strong advocacy on all platforms, migration-related communication was poorly managed. The security-oriented approach that emerged within the bureaucracy from the outset overlooked the humanitarian and sociological aspects of the issue. This shortcoming allowed exclusionary and xenophobic rhetoric against Syrians to take root, especially during election periods. In some cases, the anti-migrant sentiment within the bureaucracy itself led to unpleasant practices in the name of combating irregular migration.
The temporary protection status, initially designed with the expectation that the Syrian crisis would be short-lived and people would soon return home, eventually turned into a status of uncertainty and inconsistency as their stay extended. While temporary protection was a strategic solution in the beginning, over time, it created an ambiguous situation for Syrians trying to integrate into socio-economic life. If the temporary protection status had been gradually restructured to align with normal residence and work permits over time, it could have significantly strengthened socio-economic integration. This would have enabled Syrians to benefit from the social security system, fulfill requirements for eventual citizenship, and gain access to other rights. However, as social tensions increased, particularly after 2017-2018, the focus shifted toward voluntary return policies, and temporary protection continued unchanged. Incentive-based policies, such as granting citizenship to those who completed vocational training and worked for a certain period, could have been developed.
Finally, Turkey missed the opportunity to institutionalize its migration experience as a platform or project that could be shared with other countries facing similar challenges. While aspects of this experience have been shared in international forums, sometimes by Turkish representatives and other times by foreign analysts who studied Turkey’s case, this knowledge has not been structured as a formal “Turkey Model.” Establishing an excellence center in collaboration with international partners and developing a curriculum to share this experience could still be pursued.
Some Syrians will return to their homeland. However, a significant number will continue to live alongside us, interacting with and influencing social, economic, and cultural life in Turkey. If we can identify our shortcomings today, we will lay a solid foundation for better policies in the years to come. Migration, as always, will continue. Hopefully, this brief evaluation will serve as a starting point for more comprehensive discussions.