Taha Özhan
No matter how far-fetched the analyses may be, Trump and his team, with their lack of alignment to any value system or ideological axis, do not offer a vision for either America orthe world. The first scenario that emerges is a state of chaos, even stronger than during his first term, taking hold in Washington, with American political instability and economic imbalance spilling over onto the world.
In soccer, the last 10 minutes of a match, especially the final five, are the most dangerous. A study examining this phenomenon analyzed international matches since the late 19th century, encompassing 40,000 goals. The results revealed that more goals were scored during theclosing stages of the game. On a global scale, after many years, more than 60 countries, representing a large portion of the world’s population, went to the polls, creating a political wind in 2024 that would shape the fate of global geopolitics and economics. The 2024 elections marked a first since the 1910s. In developed countries, all governments experiencedan average vote loss of 7 percent. However, the outcome of the American elections also raised the possibility of these electoral winds turning into a global geopolitical storm. As a strong conviction emerged regarding who would occupy the White House even before the Novemberelections, the atmosphere of the final 5-10 minutes of a game deeply settled into the global geopolitical and economic landscape. Many actors began making consecutive moves as earlyas October, aiming to secure their positions in these final moments before Trump’sinauguration on January 20.
In economics, a “technical recession” is defined as a country shrinking for two consecutive quarters. With political instability in the United States and the emergence of Trump’s re-election as a near certainty by early summer 2024, it was widely accepted that the U.S. washeading toward a “technical political recession.” The political stress generated by thisprojection created both tension and opportunities. The period between the announcement of the American election results and Trump’s inauguration on January 20 cemented the global perception of experiencing the final five minutes of a geopolitical game. Moreover, Washington played a significant role in shaping this political atmosphere. Biden’sauthorization for Kyiv to use long-range missiles against Russia, his acquiescence to Israel’s direct attack on Iran, and his steps to escalate the trade war against China confirmed the final geopolitical vacuum before Trump.
During the same period, the Syrian opposition, with precise timing, achieved in 11 days whatit had failed to accomplish during 11 years of armed struggle. Governments in the two majoreconomies driving Europe collapsed. South Korea experienced a major political crisisresembling a coup. In Türkiye, movement was observed in the long-frozen PKK issue. Ceasefires were reached in Lebanon and Gaza.
The geopolitical “final five minutes” centered on Trump is likely to bring significant costs in 2025 and beyond. The instability now inevitably emanating from Washington has left theentire world grappling with an “American problem.” The U.S. president is promising his electorate radical steps, ranging from altering America’s physical borders to upending theglobal trade system. In the coming years, it is clear that global geopolitical and economicflows will be shaped around and within this “American problem.”
The significant transformation, or even ruptures, of the post-1945 global order—established under and often imposed by American leadership—was not entirely unexpected. However, it was unforeseen that the very architect of this U.S.-centric order, fiercely upheld by 14 American presidents before him, would unilaterally decide that its usefulness had run itscourse. The heavy global costs of dismantling the current system through heated trade warswould pose a highly risky step for the United States.
For now, the cartoonish geopolitical outbursts of Trump—chasing Greenland, Canada, Mexico, and Panama—may seem amusing. However, when these antics give way to the global inflation and trade crises that the “world of tariffs” will inevitably produce, the trueprice will become apparent.
Trumpism from 2017 to 2025
The world is entering Trump’s second term on a vastly different plane from his first. Comparing 2017 to today’s world reveals significant structural fractures. While 2017 marked the beginning of a shift toward protectionism and unilateralism, Trump’s second term in 2025 may bring much deeper geopolitical and economic divergences in a more fragmented, multipolar world grappling with inflation, energy insecurity, and climate challenges. A Trump administration born into a stagnant and dysfunctional global economic and geopolitical framework is likely to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities even further.
Examining the cabinet assembled by the U.S. president reveals the gravity of the situation, as Trump appears to be the most “reasonable” figure within it. The overwhelming majority of the cabinet consists of media-driven, racist, and Christian Zionist figures appealing to populist political tendencies. As Reagan’s administration once conceptualized, “personnel is policy”—a notion that equally applies to the Trump administration. The new government is set to make approximately 4,000 high-level appointments, over 1,000 of which will require Senateapproval. Unlike his first term, Trump’s administration now lacks figures with merit, experience in statecraft, or public service backgrounds.
In his farewell speech, Biden, the individual who ironically played a major role in Trump’s victory, broke new ground by acknowledging the situation and declaring that the incoming administration would function as a dangerous oligarchy. Although the outgoing president has been treated as a largely irrelevant and obsolete figure for months, his assessment of the next administration deserves to be taken seriously.
The G-Zero World
The return of this concept, long absent from the American political lexicon and rhetoric, mustbe taken seriously. The American empire was never far removed from an oligarchic structure, nor could it have been. It would be naïve to assume that a power of this scale could be governed through a shared and participatory democracy. What made the American empire functional was its algorithm and social contract, which balanced tutelary powers to an acceptable degree. Until the 1990s, this balance was maintained by political elites who adhered to specific political codes and possessed a clear vision.
The collapse of America’s political elites led to the chaos that gradually shaped the currentl and scape. The crisis of elites, which began to manifest after 1990, can best be summarized by the names—and even the clans—that dominated elections. For the first time since 1976, the 2024 elections took place without a Bush, Clinton, or Biden on the ballot. Trump not onlywon the American elections for the second time but also escalated the American political crisis to a new stage. As Benjamin Franklin, one of America’s founding fathers, once said, “America was a republic, if you could keep it!” Trump 2.0 will be a period during whichAmerican institutions face a serious test of democracy.
As Washington’s political crisis grows in America, the world is also moving toward a “leaderless” era for the first time since 1945. The world, accustomed to addressing global problems shaped by a hegemonic power, now faces a period in which no power occupies thepositions of hegemony or leadership. For the first time, the outcomes of crises during such a period are unpredictable. While certain countries have frameworks and projections forvulnerabilities, risks, and threats, the domino effects of the crises are beyond what the seminimal forecasts can encompass.
In this context, alongside the dysfunction of global political and economic institutions, evenstructures like the G-20 and G-7—though lacking institutional foundations but crucial in shaping global economy and geopolitics—may lose their significance. A new orientation, likely to confine global economy and geopolitics to the G-2 (U.S.-China) framework, could ultimately lead to what Ian Bremmer describes as the G-Zero global geopolitical landscape. By its nature, the G-Zero world would render all global and regional responsibilities meaningless and pave the way for global deregulation. In other words, the world order we have scrutinized from every angle throughout the last century and into the first quarter of thiscentury might now be debated in terms of its very disappearance.
As we enter the second quarter of the 21st century, slow growth and inflation will dominate the global economic agenda. As long as these issues persist, geopolitical tensions will remainhigh. With the multiplier effect of the “American problem,” it is likely that global geopolitics will face an even harsher stress test. Considering the significant issues in the distribution of the $110 trillion global GDP, it is plausible that capitalism’s new crisis will deepen in the absence of a global order. Trump’s policies, which are likely to be carried out in a careless and irresponsible manner, will further exacerbate geopolitical fractures on a global scale.
Trump’s Tariff World
Trump’s most tangible policy tool so far appears to be tariffs. He views tariffs as a multipurpose mechanism to close trade deficits, boost competitiveness, and create jobs. This perspective, however, is far removed from reality. Historically, tariffs have only been effective in specific periods and in countries like South Korea and China, where they were combined with broader domestic policies. Without such a comprehensive strategy, Trump’sindiscriminate use of tariffs risks causing uneven impacts on U.S. manufacturing and highercosts for consumers.
At the global level, there is no mystery about what such a policy will entail: declining trade volumes, disruptions in supply chains, rising consumer inflation, economic inefficiency, and a deteriorating investment climate are all predictable outcomes.
As Europe’s stagnation deepens, China shows signs of “Japanification,” and global economic fragmentation continues, the costs of the Trump effect—or the American Problem—will be felt more acutely in 2025. A series of consequences, such as the weakening of multilateral cooperation, the suppression of emerging economies, and the impact on growth and financial market stability, will become inevitable. Ultimately, in Trump 2.0, focusing on the tariffweapon hanging on the wall will make trade wars unavoidable at some point. Two key questions linger: how much the economic costs of these wars will escalate and whether they could lead to hot conflicts.
Many countries around the world, particularly in Europe, may find themselves trapped in a lose-lose scenario in the face of Trump’s trade wars. They will either have to align with theU.S. completely, effectively engaging in a forced trade divorce with China, or confrontWashington and bear the economic and political costs of Trump’s tariff walls.
In scenarios where Europe views the U.S. as akin to another China, certain commercial and geopolitical opportunities may emerge for Türkiye. It is critical for Ankara to prepare now to capitalize on these opportunities and maximize its interests. In this regard, Türkiye needs to establish a new framework for European geopolitical and economic relations.
A World with Less America
HARİTA
[American military bases and facilities worldwide]
The global implications of Trump’s “America First” strategy are self-evident. The themes of this year’s Davos meetings, which coincided with Trump’s inauguration, are sufficient to glimpse the geopolitical fractures Washington is poised to cause. For years, Davos has been the stage where Western global decision-makers shaped the world agenda. Now, it passively listens to Washington, wondering about its fate. This situation, while tragic in some respects, might not have been a major problem if it remained confined to an internal Western rupture or civil war. However, if a Trump-centered negative scenario materializes, the tectonic fractures it causes will inevitably send shockwaves to every corner of the globe.
Trump is entering his second term as U.S. president with a highly problematic team—rhetorically intense, devoid of value-driven function, and heedlessly embracing grave errors at the level of substantive knowledge. Despite all efforts to produce analyses, Trump and his team, lacking alignment with any value system or ideological axis, have no vision forAmerica or the world. The first scenario on the horizon is a state of chaos, much stronger thanduring his first term, taking root in Washington. This would result in American political instability and economic imbalance reverberating across the globe.
No one has strong predictions about the consequences of a “leaderless and disorganized world” in the aftermath of globalization’s most intense period. This is not surprising, as despite all its flaws, the current order and globalization, though faltering, still cannot imagine functioning without leadership or order.
Ultimately, America has always maintained its position as a “country” more inclined and prepared to live with “very little of the world.” American isolationism has consistently offered more genuine possibilities compared to the rest of the world. The United States’ exports of goods and services constitute only about 10 percent of its GDP. If Canada and Mexico are excluded from this figure, the resulting number is even more modest. The pressing question now is how prepared the world is to live with “less America.” Since 1945, the American military network, comprising approximately 750 bases and facilities across 80 countries, has been a defining feature. How the world will manage the reality of “less America” within this framework remains an enigma.
However, it will become increasingly challenging for Washington to sustain this network under the “less America” formula. Particularly in a scenario where a potential trade war impacts NATO alongside the economy, we could witness a genuine “American reset” on a global scale, significantly amplifying the “American problem.” The more pressing question than Trump’s “America First” strategy is how this massive structure, which spends close to$1.5 trillion annually (including additional expenditures) on military efforts, will remain idle.
For Trump’s high rhetoric to prevail, it must first overcome the “American military-industrial complex.” To date, no American president has ever crossed—or even attempted to cross—this barrier.