Mustafa Ekici
Syria’s Corrosive Spiral: Minorities
Syria is a country of immense significance, regardless of recent events. The Syrian state, established on this strategically important piece of land in the Eastern Mediterranean, is nothing more than a shadow of the Bilad al-Sham region as it was defined under the Ottoman administrative system—distorted and further fragmented by colonial powers. As a crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa, Bilad al-Sham is now divided into five states: Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon. Syria, the largest among them in terms of both land and population, finds itself isolated from the significant Mediterranean coastlines due to the creation of Lebanon and Israel. Under the Alawite Assad dictatorship, Syria has been cut off from the world, dependent on a largely agriculture-based economy, scarce resources, and an eclectic demographic structure, making it highly fragile. Clearly, Syria will continue to be the epicenter of political upheaval in the Arab world, just as it has been over the past century.
Now that the 54-year-long Alawite Assad dictatorship has come to an end, it is critical to take a calm and thorough look back at the process, focusing on the structural characteristics of Syrian society. This society—shaped by the combined forces of sociology and geography—gave rise to one of the darkest dictatorial regimes in history. Analyzing these characteristics will likely provide invaluable political and cultural lessons for the future.
Syria: A Living Gallery of Archaeological Cultures
First and foremost, Syria and Lebanon have served as central nodes for global trade networks in almost every era, beginning with the Phoenicians. These vast trade routes brought various cultures, political currents, and demographic groups—transported from the Arabian desert on one side and the Mediterranean and Europe on the other—that exhibited behaviors akin to temporary settlements rather than permanent colonization in Syria. From 300 BC to the 60s, Alexander the Great and his successors; from 100 BC to 600 AD, the 700-year-long Persian-Roman wars; the rise of Christianity, which reshaped and remixed the region; the Islamic conquests beginning in 700 AD; the Crusades starting in 1100 AD; the Mongol invasions; and the Shiite wave that came from Iran and devastated the region—each of these historical waves contributed to the creation of a vibrant geographic and cultural hub where vast armies, immense populations, and competing religions, cultures, and political systems clashed, transformed, and shaped the land.
Syria has been, perhaps, the most critical stage for this dynamic and eventful history. This stage has consistently served as a passageway for armies, caravans, and religious movements—”sometimes a stopover, but more often a bridge.” These movements and temporary pauses left enduring and profound marks not only on Syria’s politics but also on its demography, culture, faiths, and economy. One could rightly claim that Syria is the legacy of these enormous military and civilian human movements.
Syria, which can be seen as a kind of microcosm of the Middle East, is a living, dynamic gallery of archaeological cultures. These “living fossils” reflect a history repeatedly intertwined with traditions and beliefs reaching back not only to the Middle Ages but also to prehistoric times. Despite the destructive social and political risks that such diversity can pose, it is this very diversity that defines Syria’s essential character.
In Syria, every religious sect, faith, and ethnic group is tied to specific geographical regions. The central areas of Damascus, Hama, and Homs are home to the Sunni Arab majority. The Druze community, which has historically resisted the Damascus regime, resides in the Druze Mountain in the south and maintains close ties with neighboring Jordan and Israel. In the north lies Aleppo, a cosmopolitan hub of trade and commerce that includes large populations of Kurds, Turkmens, Christian Arabs, Armenians, Circassians, and Jews—many of whom feel a stronger connection to Mosul, Baghdad, and Anatolia than to Damascus. To the west, the Alawites inhabit the Alawite Mountains of Latakia, adjacent to northern Lebanon. Meanwhile, Salamiyah in the Hama region serves as the primary center for the Nizari Ismailis in Syria. The Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis are the lingering remnants of the Shiite wave that swept across the region a millennium ago.
A Criminal Dictatorship Built on Suspicion, Fear, and Hatred: Assad and the Alawites
This contradictory diversity, at times, followed a path of assimilation as a method of coexistence. However, particularly in the case of the Alawite minority, dissimulation (taqiyya) emerged as an alternative survival strategy. Through this practice, old beliefs and ways of life were preserved under new outward behaviors. Indeed, Alawite religious leaders proclaimed, “al-kitman jihaduna” (dissimulation is our jihad).
In Syria, a power structure built on minorities—most of whom were rivals and steeped in mutual suspicion and hatred—made any form of governance other than a chaotic dictatorship nearly impossible. It was under precisely such conditions that Hafez al-Assad rose to power in 1970, toppling a coup regime in which he himself had been a participant. However, Assad had a “minority army” at his disposal to safeguard his rule. The modern Syrian Army, a remnant of the Troupes Speciales du Levant—an elite force created by the French Mandate and composed almost exclusively of minorities, particularly Alawites—was well-positioned to provide the protection that such a dictatorship required.
Assad, like every dictator perpetually fearing a coup, tightened his inner circle. It was no longer sufficient to rely solely on the Alawite minority; he began to construct a cocoon of power around his own tribe, the Hayyatin. This circle eventually narrowed further to include his village, Kardaha, and then his close relatives—the Assad family itself and his in-laws, the Mahlufs. Within this cocoon, Assad maintained his power during the Cold War with Soviet support, later aligning with Iranian Shiite expansionism from the 1990s onward. In the last three years of his rule, Assad effectively rented out the country to Russia and Iran to sustain his grip on power. Over the course of its 54-year reign, the Assad dynasty grew increasingly corrupt and entrenched in crime, tightening its control while unleashing unimaginable violence upon all segments of Syrian society. Ultimately, this criminal and oppressive regime left behind over a million dead, destroyed cities, a collapsed economy, and a country sold out to colonial powers.
The Alawite Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar, who ruled Syria under severe oppression for half a century, can be seen as a kind of reincarnation of Hassan Sabbah’s Syrian Dais, Rashid al-Din Sinan, the “Old Man of the Mountain” (Shaykh al-Jabal), who terrorized Syria from the fortress of Masyaf in the 12th century.
Before the French withdrew from Syria, they offered leadership to the Alawite Sheikh Salih al-Ali. His rejection of the offer and his subsequent prophecy proved prescient. To those Alawite leaders who questioned him, he said: “No sectarian, ethnic, or partisan group can rule Syria without leaning on a foreign power. Those who attempt to do so with foreign backing will only bring destruction upon both their minority and Syria itself.”
Years later, Udi Ala Mohammed, a Syrian refugee, succinctly captured the fragmented state of Syrian society and the path to stability: “Among the Ismailis, the Ahl al-Sunna (Sunnis) are described as the ‘mother’s lap of the sects.’ When minorities are left alone, conflict becomes inevitable because we all harbor theological and historical enmities. We are all narrow-minded and lack flexibility. Only the Ahl al-Sunna have tolerance.”
This candid observation vividly illustrates the realities of recent decades: the Druze distrust the Alawites, the Alawites despise the Ismailis, the Christians look down on all of them, and even the Orthodox Christians are divided into countless conflicting sects. The list continues endlessly, painting a stark picture of a society plagued by divisions and rivalries.
The Revolution and Opportunities Won with the Blood of the Syrian People
In Syria, the concept of a defined homeland holds far less significance compared to sectarian, religious, and ethnic affiliations. Indeed, across much of the East, the idea of a homeland—understood as a sacred territorial entity with clear borders—is a modern construct introduced by the nation-state system. However, in the case of Syria, this notion is even weaker due to the country’s structural characteristics. Despite decades of indoctrination under Ba’athist ideology (Arab nationalism), modern urbanization, the development of transportation networks, widespread communication tools, and a partially modernized socioeconomic structure, the influence of closed, minority-based systems remains unbroken. This persistence stems partly from esoteric theologies but primarily from the Assad dictatorship’s instrumentalization of minority fears to create a self-serving equation of security and interests.
Ethnic and sectarian differences, in and of themselves, are not inherent causes of conflict. These differences only become sources, parties, or targets of conflict when political power centers weaponize them for their own purposes. This has been the case in Syria.
The Syrian Revolution brought down the Assad dictatorship in less than a week—a speed that surprised many analysts. However, this swift collapse was underpinned by 14 years of ongoing resistance and 54 years of systemic decay. Over the final two years, the regime’s army had disintegrated into little more than a corrupt criminal network led by the Assads. This network, incapable of even feeding its soldiers a daily meal, had descended into smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, rape, and drug-related crimes. Bereft of political motivation, these gangs lacked the strength, support, or willpower to resist the Syrian people’s determined uprising.
Syria, having once again endured the destructive consequences of the minority power equation, will now attempt to heal its wounds. The social trauma caused by this experience will likely take decades to overcome. Yet, despite these deep scars, a bright—albeit risky—future lies ahead for Syria. If the country can transform its internal diversity into a source of strength, it will overcome its limited resources, fragmented demographics, and the ongoing security threats posed by Israel. In doing so, Syria could recover rapidly and potentially establish the only democracy in the Arab world.