Julian McBride
Against the backdrop of Hamas’ October 7 attacks, Israel-Turkish relations hit a new low. Both ruling parties in Israel and Turkey are currently in a state of diplomatic conflict that has not only embroiled the Middle East but the Mediterranean as well.
Early December 2024 saw the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria,bringing Turkeyand Israel closer to a shadow conflict on regional hegemony. Though tensions between theTurkish and Israeli governments are high, the question remains whether the dispute can be mediated or if the two countries are truly on a collision course.
Regional Reset During the Israel-Hamas War
In the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attack by Hamas, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip todegrade the capabilities of the militant group. The war is enshrined in controversy and diversetypes of polarization in the Middle East and North Africa, which the Turkish government has taken advantage of. The ruling AKP party, headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, boastsa pro-Islamist and neo-Ottoman ideology that promotes close relations with Hamas and Qatar.
During the war, the Turkish government has come under fire for its moral support of Hamas, along with conflicting reports that some commanders of the organization are located in Turkey. Simultaneously, Turkey is leading the charge in condemning Israel’s conduct duringthe war, joining the ongoing International Court of Justice case against the latter, breaking offtrade relations, and threatening direct action if Israel invaded Lebanon, which never came topass.
The Fall of Assad and the Backdrop of Tensions in Syria
In late November 2024, Syrian rebel groups led by Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surpriselightning offensive against the Assad regime, whose army quickly disintegrated and collapsedwithout adequate support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah.
Turkey’s intelligence services were involved with the preparations of the offensive as Ankara became fed up with the lack of negotiations with Assad, who refused to repatriate safe returnfor Syrian refugees. The now HTS-led transitional government has moved to normalizerelations with Turkey through reconstruction, energy, and potential defense cooperation.
Israel immediately moved to take Syria’s Mount Hermon. The IDF also launched a majorbombing campaign against the remaining equipment of the Syrian military, which the Israeligovernment claimed was a major security threat. In northern Syria, the Turkish-backed SyrianNational Army (SNA) continues to launch operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces(SDF), which is led by Kurdish paramilitaries that are designated as terrorist organizations byTurkey.
Both Israel and Turkey have condemned each other for their respective aggression in Syria. The Turkish government aims to dissolve the SDF and create a buffer against Kurdish forcesin the North, and Israel strives to keep the former regime’s weapons from falling into HTS hands while creating a new buffer in the South.
The Israeli strikes against the new Syrian government’s assets could play into Erdogan’shands as the Turkish resident styles himself as a “leader of the Muslim world.” If the newHTS-led transitional government requests full Turkish military backing, Ankara wouldeffectively replace Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as the latest threaton Israel’s borders.
A Degree of Silent Cooperation
Though Israeli-Turkish relations continue to decline, with the AKP positioning itself as a future liberator for Palestine behind the scenes, there is still a degree of cooperation betweenthe two regional powers.
In late November 2024, Middle East Eye reported on shipment tracking via satellite imagerythat shows crude oil shipments to Israel originating from Azerbaijan that Turkey delivers. Crude oil is delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and shipped via the latter’s port toAshkelon, Israel.
Simultaneously, Azerbaijan uses Turkish airspace to reach Israel’s Ovda airport, which is used for either importing or exporting weapons and logistics. Azerbaijan is closely allied withboth Turkey and Israel. By allowing Azerbaijani heavy aircraft through Turkish airspace, Erdogan is silently acknowledging that he wishes to keep such an alliance for furtherpurposes.
Avoiding Direct Confrontation
Despite Israel’s and Turkey’s growing conflict, several steps can be taken to keep the tworegional powers from colliding. The Trump administration, known for its firm stance in theMiddle East, recently praised Erdogan as a regional power broker. The United States will tryto reduce tensions between the two key regional partners.
A de-escalation hotline over Syria akin to what America and Russia established couldmitigate incidents and direct clashes between the Turkish military and Israeli Defense Forces. Trump could also host the foreign ministers of Turkey and Israel in Washington to attempt tonormalize relations with both countries.
The two regional powerhouses, Israel and Turkey, gained immensely from the decimation of the Iranian-led axis, particularly in Syria. Still, both countries will need a de-escalationmechanism and dialogue to avoid a future conflict. Despite their differences, internationalmediation, particularly by the United States, could keep the Israeli and Turkish governmentsat bay in a battered, war-weary Middle East.
*Julian McBride a former U.S. Marine, is a forensic anthropologist andindependent journalist. He is the founder and director of the Reflections of WarInitiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of thevictims of war through art therapy. He is a contributing editor at 19FortyFive.
