İsmail Sarı
Tehran believes that Türkiye’s assertive foreign policy in the Middle East and the Caucasus directly threatens its influence in these regions. Concerns are growing in Tehran about Türkiye’s efforts to increase its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and the South Caucasus in light of Iran’s weakening position. Türkiye’s strong support for Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War not only ensured a decisive victory for Azerbaijan, but also demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape regional outcomes.
The developments in Lebanon and Syria, with Israel’s strategic weakening of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime, have created a new rupture in the geopolitical balance of the Middle East. Even though the major wounding (some say collapse) of what Iran calls the “axis of resistance” may appear to be a de-escalating factor in the region, the strategic vacuum created by the weakening of Tehran’s geopolitical weight in the Levant is likely to further deepen regional rivalries. The effects of this transformation are not limited to the Iran-Israel axis, but have the potential to reshape other power balances in the region, particularly the Türkiye-Iran rivalry. For Iran, the loss of Syria is not only a loss of a regional foothold, but also a severe blow to Tehran’s long-term geopolitical strategy. Syria is a nexus through which Iran provides access to Hezbollah in Lebanon and increases its influence against the United States and Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime has disrupted this strategic axis and severely weakened Iran’s capacity for influence in the region. However, it is not only the loss of positions in Syria that worries Iran, but also Türkiye’s growing regional influence and the challenge it poses.
In this context, in order to analyze the likely post-Assad Türkiye-Iran rivalry, it is first necessary to answer some questions:
Has Iran’s “axis of resistance” collapsed?
While there is continuity in Iran’s security policies in terms of resistance to Western interventionism and asymmetric warfare strategies, developments such as the Arab Spring, US sanctions and the 2020 Abraham Accords have led Iran to change some of its policies. Over the years, Iran has been quite agile in developing tactical responses to regional developments. However, Iran’s rapidly expanding network of allies and changing regional and domestic dynamics have made it increasingly difficult for Tehran to respond to emerging threats.
The fall of the Assad regime has further increased Iran’s regional vulnerability. For many years, Syria has served as a critical logistical hub of the land corridor linking Iran to the Mediterranean, enabling the provision of advanced weaponry as well as logistical support to Hezbollah. The disruption of this supply line with the fall of Assad has isolated Hezbollah and disrupted the geographical cohesion of the so-called “axis of resistance.”
Already severely weakened by the ongoing conflict with Israel, Hezbollah faces a major challenge in rebuilding its operational capacity with the disruption of logistical support from Iran. Moreover, the collapse of the Assad regime deepens the existing ideological and sectarian divisions among Iran’s allies, further weakening the cohesion of the “axis of resistance.”
While Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, and the Houthis see the development in Syria as a strategic loss, Iranian-backed Sunni groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have sent congratulatory messages to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) for its victory over Assad. Moreover, Iran’s failure to intervene decisively and effectively in defense of the Assad regime has raised serious doubts about Tehran’s credibility and strategic resolve among its allies in Iraq and Yemen.
Can Iran destabilize Syria?
Despite the many challenges Tehran faces, it is strategically flexible and open to tactical changes in order to maintain its influence in Syria and the Levant more broadly. One of these changes is the tendency to cooperate with Syrian Kurdish groups that are not directly opposed to the Assad regime. These groups in northern Syria are considered a pragmatic partner for Iran. Prior to Assad’s ouster, Iranian-backed forces withdrew from strategic positions in eastern Syria, particularly Deir ez-Zor near the Iraqi border, and largely ceded control of these areas to PYD/PKK elements. This move is Iran’s attempt to position itself as a potential partner for the PYD/PKK, especially at a time when the Kurds are worried about a decline in US support. The PYD/PKK, on the other hand, is worried that in Donald Trump’s second term, the US will reduce its military presence in Syria and develop stronger relations with Türkiye. In recent days, analyses and comments supporting/requiring an “Iran-PYD/PKK alliance” have started to appear frequently in the Iranian press/media.
Another strategic approach of Iran aims to build alliances with Shiite and Alawite minorities in western Syria. Failure to ensure a coherent central government in Damascus could trigger more intense rivalry/conflict between various factions and numerous ethnic and religious minorities. Moreover, for Arab states, from Egypt and Jordan to those in the Persian Gulf, HTS’s victory in Syria is seen as a dangerous echo of the Arab Spring. These countries are uneasy about the possibility of a revival of the demands for democratization, freedom and good governance that they suppressed during the Arab Spring. They will not want the establishment of a democracy in Syria that can serve as a model for the Arab world. These developments may also strengthen Iran’s efforts to deepen its influence in line with its strategy of exploiting chaotic environments. Moreover, after the fall of Assad, Israel has moved beyond the Golan Heights and settled deeper into Syria. However, a prolonged Israeli occupation could give Iran the opportunity to revitalize its anti-Israeli agenda in Syria.
New era in Türkiye-Iran rivalry
The capture of Damascus by the Syrian opposition in a military operation is not only an important turning point in the Syrian civil war, but also has a transformative effect on the status quo in the region. The fall of the Assad regime also represents a strategic setback for its main backers, Iran and Russia. Ankara’s maneuverability in Syria has made Türkiye the most influential external actor in post-Assad Syria. Therefore, the collapse of the Assad regime not only shakes the existing regional balance but also accelerates Türkiye’s efforts to build a new status quo. In such a conjuncture, the rivalry between Türkiye and Iran, which is fueled by historical, ideological and geopolitical tensions, is expected to intensify/stiffen under these new dynamics. Türkiye’s growing influence in Syria, together with the weakening of Iran’s position in Lebanon and Iraq, has the potential to move regional dynamics beyond the Levant.
Tehran believes that Türkiye’s assertive foreign policy in the Middle East and Caucasus directly threatens its influence in these regions. Concerns are growing in Tehran about Türkiye’s efforts to increase its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and the South Caucasus in light of Iran’s weakening position. Türkiye’s strong support for Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War not only ensured a decisive victory for Azerbaijan, but also demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to shape regional outcomes. This process neutralized Iran in the South Caucasus, significantly weakening its influence in a region with which it has historically struggled. Moreover, the possibility of Türkiye using its power projection in Syria to support Azerbaijan is a direct challenge to Iran’s regional strategy, especially through strategic objectives such as the opening of the Zangezur Corridor. Such a development would not only strengthen Türkiye’s geopolitical influence, but also confront Iran with strategic isolation by cutting it off from the trade and energy routes connecting it to the Caucasus and Europe. In this context, the transformation in Syria could reshape not only the future of the Levant, but also the geopolitical architecture of the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Moreover, the return of Donald Trump in the United States stands out as an important factor in the developments in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and the Middle East in general. In this context, Trump’s policies are also of critical importance for Iran. Whether the Trump administration’s strategy towards Iran will be shaped by a negotiation-oriented or confrontational approach will only become clearer over time. If there is a settlement process, it is not yet clear whether it will be limited to the nuclear program or whether it will be broader, including regional issues and pro-Iranian groups. Of course, even if Trump’s policies in his first term provide clues to the answers to these questions and possible outcomes, it is not possible to make a definitive assessment. Therefore, the policies that Donald Trump will pursue after his inauguration on January 20 will directly affect the Türkiye-Iran rivalry.
It should be emphasized here that before the October 7 Hamas Operation Aqsa Flood, Washington had announced an ambitious trade corridor plan to connect India to Europe via the Middle East in order to balance China’s growing influence in the region. On September 10, 2023, a preliminary agreement was signed between India, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Italy, France, Germany, and the European Union for the construction of a strategic trade corridor (IMEC) from India through the Middle East to Europe. With Trump’s return, this project and the Abraham Accords could be back on the agenda. This initiative is seen as part of efforts to create an alternative economic route to China’s “One Belt, One Road” project. This new trade corridor supports India’s goal of reaching Europe via the Mediterranean, but also includes powerful economies such as the oil-rich United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It is also shaping up as an alternative route to the Suez Canal.
In the future, if security and stability are restored in Lebanon and Syria, there is a possibility that these countries will also be included in the project. These developments raise concerns in Tehran about Iran’s regional isolation. By not being included in the corridor, Iran risks being excluded from these economic and trade integration efforts. Iran’s strategy in the face of this exclusion and the impact of developments on regional balances is an issue that will need to be closely monitored in the future. Therefore, the future of this project is also important as a factor that will affect Türkiye-Iran rivalry in the region.
