The issue of PKK/KCK presence in Syria

Following the overthrow of the Assad Baath regime, the PKK’s organizational structure in Syria became a topic of renewed discussion. The group took control of areas abandoned bythe regime without conflict, expanded its territorial dominance with support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and changed its name under U.S. guidance. However, it was forced to relinquish control over some of the territories it held. It is inconceivable to discuss Syria’s future without addressing this structure and the PKK, fromwhich it originates and of which it is a part.

What is PKK/KCK?

It is meaningless to discuss PYD/YPG or SDG without first addressing the PKK/KCK. Longregarded solely as a threat in the context of Türkiye, the PKK evolved into a regional threatfollowing a structural reorganization in 2005. This transformation occurred when the groupannounced on May 17, 2005, that it had restructured itself under the name “KurdistanCommunities Union” (KCK).

At the time of the PKK’s transition into the KCK and the establishment of this new entity, it was reported that approximately 300 different organizations—ranging from NGOs andtelevision stations to newspapers—operated within the framework of this announcedstructure. The “KCK Charter,” which outlines all the details of this new organizationalsystem, was written by Abdullah Öcalan.

The KCK is structurally a “umbrella” organization, with all its subordinate groups linked toan entity referred to as “leadership.” In this context, the KCK Charter consists of sectionssuch as Introduction, Leadership, General Principles, Fundamental Rights, Freedoms, andDuties, General Organs, Regional Structures, Provincial and Regional Organizations, City, Town, and Neighborhood Organizations, Village and Street Organizations, Judiciary, Obligations of Legitimate Defense, Democratic Action, Economic and Financial System, Democratic Organization, General Provisions, and Additional Articles.

A careful reading of these sections and their accompanying explanations makes it clear whatthe structure is, what it aims to achieve, how it is organized, who constitutes its subordinategroups, and that the issue at hand is not one of societal rights.

The most striking aspect of the KCK structure is found under the sections titled “General Organs” and “Regional Organizations.” These sections detail the KCK’s organizationalframework in Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

The subordinate organizations are listed as follows: the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) forTürkiye, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) for Syria, the PJAK (Kurdistan Free Life Party) for Iran, and the PÇDK (Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party) for Iraq. These are referred toas “political” entities within the KCK structure.

In addition to the “political” entities, three distinct armed organizations are also defined: theHPG (People’s Defense Forces) for Türkiye, the YPG (People’s Protection Units) for Syria, and the PJK (Kurdistan Free Life Party) for Iran. However, no armed organization wasproposed for Iraq due to the presence of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the KYB (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), as well as the potential risks of conflict this might pose for theKCK.

A key point to note is that these three armed organizations share the same pool of militantsand decision-making authority. All three are headquartered in Qandil. Senior leadershipappointments and the assignment of militants are made from this single central location. Moreover, all decision-making processes related to these organizations are directed by theQandil leadership.

The Transition from YPG to SDF

First and foremost, the timeline of NATO countries establishing relations with the Syrianbranch of the KCK, as outlined in the KCK charter, coincides with the period when the PKK sabotaged Türkiye’s “peace process.” This connection is worth noting as the first step in thename-change process.

The sabotage of the process became evident in several areas. It included the declaration of “self-rule” under orders from the organization, the implementation of the theory of bringingterrorism into urban centers, the creation of so-called liberated zones through the “trenchincidents,” and the collaboration with infiltrated elements within state institutions to hold thecountry hostage through terrorism. All of these were part of a strategy planned by the KCK and executed under strict directives from the leadership.

These acts of terrorism, which clearly demonstrated the group’s unwillingness to pursuepeace, cannot be overlooked or forgotten.

Western countries, particularly the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, sought totake advantage of the situation in Syria. Following the undermining of Türkiye’s peaceefforts, they devised a name-change strategy to mitigate Ankara’s objections. Their proposedsolution was to create a structure that incorporated a limited number of Turkmen, Arab, andAssyrian figures into the YPG.

However, this was not a genuinely new structure. It remained the Syrian branch of the PKK, as defined in the KCK charter, with a few local names added to its ranks. All decision-makingprocesses, key actors, and militant cadres continued to be directed from Qandil. Thisrepackaged entity was renamed the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF).

U.S. Special Operations Commander Raymond Thomas spoke at the Aspen Institute’s annualsecurity forum in July 2017, revealing that they had advised the YPG to change its name because Türkiye associated it with the terrorist organization PKK. He stated that the groupsubsequently changed its name to the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF).

Raymond Thomas went a step further, saying, “I asked them, ‘What would you like to callyourselves besides YPG?’ The next day, they declared their name as the ‘Syrian DemocraticForces.’ I thought adding the word ‘democratic’ in the middle of their name was a clevermove. It gave them a bit of credibility.”

In essence, this was entirely a U.S.-orchestrated maneuver and a superficial change.

The Trap: Discussing Kurds Through PKK and Its Derivatives

When discussing the PKK, commonly known by its Turkish acronym, there are several keypoints to keep in mind: the distinction between Kurds and the PKK, and the need to avoid thetrap of conflating the PKK with all Kurds.

The existence, rights, and legal protections of Kurds are the fundamental responsibility of thestates where Kurds live and hold citizenship. Ensuring that communities are not associatedwith the PKK is critically important. Otherwise, the PKK exploits such outcomes to sustainits existence and advance its agenda.

This is a fact well understood by Türkiye’s leadership. Therefore, it is the responsibility of those in power to maintain an environment of maximum sensitivity and ensure an atmosphereof equal rights for all citizens.

Since 2005, the KCK structure and its foundational charter have been widely discussed andare well-known. To debate the PKK without considering the KCK framework and charter would be incomplete and even meaningless. It is well-documented that the PKK and certainactivists deliberately mix and confuse these issues in discussions.

The reality of the KCK’s structure—its branches in other countries, its shared leadership andmilitant pool, and the fact that all assignments and decisions are made from Qandil—must be emphasized in all discussions. Otherwise, activist interpretations dominate. The corecharacteristic of such activism is using Kurds and the PKK in the same narrative to obscurethe PKK and exclude it from the debate. This, in turn, results in ignoring the reality of thePKK.

The real issue here is that such approaches often function to criminalize the legitimatedemands of Kurds. In any struggle for rights, legitimacy depends on framing those demandswithin the context of the country in which they are made. Given the current agenda, thisdiscussion must be framed within the concept of “Syrian-ness.” Otherwise, the stance of a subunit of a transnational organization cannot be seen as legitimate because it fails theessential test of legitimacy—adhering to the concept of Syrian-ness.

The PKK/KCK may not consider this a problem, but for the future of Kurds living in Syria, it represents a significant challenge.

Syrian Kurds, the PKK, and the Assad Regime

When discussing Syrian Kurds and the PYD, it is useful to divide the timeline into threeperiods.

The first period is the pre-2005 era. This was the period when the PKK was managed fromSyria under the control of the Assad regime. During this period, did the Kurds living in Syriahave fundamental rights and equal citizenship? The Syrian regime did not recognize Kurds as citizens, did not even grant them identification cards, and did not provide them with evenminimal rights. During this time, Syrian Kurds were not a topic on the PKK’s agenda. For thePKK, the recognition of Syrian Kurds’ existence dates back to 2005, the year the KCK structure was established.

The second period is when the PKK organized itself in Syria as the PYD for its politicalbranch and the YPG for its armed wing. After this structure was established, the first activitycarried out was the elimination of all other Kurdish organizations. The PYD/YPG gave SyrianKurds three options: surrender and comply, be destroyed, or leave the region. This tactic wasidentical to the one the PKK employed during its early years against other organizations: allowing no other organization outside its own structure to exist.

The third period is when, after achieving territorial control, the PYD/YPG sought toovercome its legitimacy crisis by engaging with the elements it had previously eliminated andintroducing the option of aligning with them under its authority as a “dominant power.”

Is It Possible to Forget Recent History?

The key factors influencing security strategies are past experiences. Türkiye has beencombating the PKK’s terrorist activities for years. However, the termination of the peaceprocess by the organization marked a turning point. On August 8, 2015, the PKK implemented a plan titled “Rural-Based Urban Guerrilla Warfare,” which had been drafted in 2012 by Duran Kalkan. This plan, referred to by Qandil as a “revolutionary people’s war,” consisted of 17 points. Its objectives included besieging cities, creating impenetrable zoneswithin urban areas, and fostering the perception that the state was no longer functional. A careful examination of these 17 points offers a better understanding of the “trench incidents” and provides a clearer assessment of the organization.

Another critical issue that requires close examination is the “self-rule” declarations madeunder directives from Qandil. These declarations, led by members of the DBP, represented an attempt to seize control of public administration, govern regions separately, and alter theadministrative system. Rather than treating self-rule as a political project, the organizationapproached it as a declaration—a direct challenge to the broader society.

Can those who implemented Qandil’s directives be considered independent of the KCK? On August 12, 2015, a statement from Qandil declared, “The People’s Assemblies of Silopi, Cizre, Nusaybin, and Şırnak will no longer recognize state institutions, will sever all ties withthem, and will handle their own affairs by establishing their self-rule.” The organization alsoadded that they would exercise their “legitimate self-defense rights.” These two examplesillustrate the stance the organization and its affiliates are likely to adopt in the face of evenminor turbulence.

The point I wish to emphasize is that a change in fundamental strategy requires theorganization to alter its position. This entails disarmament. As long as the PYD/YPG/SDG’sdecision-making processes are controlled by Qandil, its leadership appointments are made byQandil, and its shared militant pool is utilized by Qandil, any effort to create space for thisstructure will remain impossible. The only way to make this feasible is for the organization todisarm and transition to civil politics.

Does the PKK Have a Place in Syria’s Future?

One of Türkiye’s key concerns is the absence of PKK influence in Syria’s future. It must be remembered that the issue of the PKK’s presence in Syria, led by the United States, theUnited Kingdom, and France, is not about Kurdish identity but a security issue due to thePKK-KCK. As we stated earlier, the PKK has never considered Syrian Kurds a matter of concern. Leaving aside their fundamental rights, during the period when Syrian Kurdsexperienced citizenship problems, all the key terrorist elements in the main KCK structurewere members of Assad’s Baath regime. Until the Syrian people revolted against Assad’sBaath regime, not a single statement was heard from the PKK regarding the rights of SyrianKurds.

The foreign and defense ministers emphasized in their statements that, in Syria’s future, Kurds have a place as equal citizens with equal rights. They also stated that there is no placefor KCK/PKK sub-organizations.

A joint effort is essential for Syria’s future. At this point, two issues are important. The first is to work toward building a democratic Syria where different identities freely exist, equalcitizenship is ensured for all identities, and there is a system of pluralistic representationbased on equality and freedom. The second is the elimination of ethnic and sectarian armedorganizations along Türkiye’s borders, a critical issue for Türkiye, which has borne much of the cost of the Assad regime.

In this context, the two most important issues for Syria’s political future will be fosteringSyrian identity and clearing it of armed (terrorist) organizations. According to these twocriteria, the PKK and its affiliates cannot be considered legitimate actors.

In Syria’s future, there is a place for Kurds as a fundamental component of Syria, with a voice, political representation, and a role in public administration. However, there is no placefor the PKK—nor should there be. This point is the starting framework for analyses of Syria.