Adnan Boynukara
The text signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland could motivate more than 30 separatist movements active in 27 African countries. Increasing terrorist activities pose a threat not only to Somalia’s security but also to Ethiopia and the entire region. In this regard, the correct approach is not to weaken Somalia but to contribute to its strengthening.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland protocol, which came to the forefront in the early days of 2024, carried the potential to turn into a new and dangerous crisis in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye’s involvement and the initiation of a diplomatic process have been meaningful in terms of containing the crisis. However, it is also valuable to recall the process, highlight the risks, and monitor the situation. The reason for the crisis is Ethiopia’s desire to access the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. If Ethiopia’s search for sea access, which it defines as “an existential issue,” is not properly managed, it could lead to new conflict risks. If regional balances, the historical background, and the consent of relevant countries are disregarded, and solutions are imposed, the risk of conflict will increase.
Ethiopia, which continues to face its internal problems (such as the Tigray issue), cannot overlook the risks posed by its efforts to gain sea access—a matter with the potential to create new problems. However, it is clear that Ethiopia seeks to achieve results by creating a fait accompli. Ethiopia’s desire for sea access has actually been on the agenda since 1991, when Eritrea separated from Ethiopia and declared its independence. After this date, Ethiopia became a landlocked country. Nevertheless, Ethiopia resolved its international trade issue in 2002 with the “Port Usage and Transit of Goods to Ethiopia” agreement signed with Djibouti. However, the aforementioned pursuit has continued.
Ethiopia’s Desire for Sea Access
Ethiopia has three options for gaining sea access: the ports of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. The strategy of accessing the sea through Somalia has caused wars at various points in history. In recent years, an attempt to “resolve” the issue through Somaliland has come into play. Ethiopia began to exploit the “weak” relations within Somalia’s federal structure to achieve its goal of accessing the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The first attempt was an agreement reached in 2018 between Ethiopia, the UAE-based DP World company, and Somaliland. According to the agreement, 19% of Berbera Port’s shares would be purchased. However, the agreement was annulled because the conditions were not fulfilled.
The second attempt was the protocol signed on January 1, 2024. This protocol includes the use of Berbera Port and the establishment of a military base by Ethiopia in Somaliland. Although its content has not been shared with the public, Somaliland announced that the protocol includes “a 50-year lease agreement and the establishment of a 20-square-kilometer military base on the Red Sea.” Regarding the protocol, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali stated that it was “an important step towards securing Ethiopia’s sea connection.” Abiy’s National Security Advisor Redwan Hussien also announced that the protocol would provide “access to a leased military base.”
This step taken in January 2024 was seen by Somalia as interference in its internal affairs, establishing relations with a regional administration without the central government’s permission, and as a threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The fact that relations were established with Somaliland while bypassing Somalia is a matter that involves serious risks and threats. This is because the protocol also appeals to Somaliland’s aspirations for independence. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence in 1991, but this declaration was not recognized by Somalia, regional countries, or the United Nations. Ethiopia “invested” in this independence aspiration, and the protocol included a clause stating that “Ethiopia could recognize Somaliland’s independence.”
The Protocol and International Law
Attempts to gain access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean through Somali territories were made with agreements and protocols in 2018 and 2024. While some claim that these two agreements are similar, there are significant differences between the 2018 agreement and the 2024 protocol. The key difference lies in granting Ethiopia the authority to establish a military base and recognizing Somaliland’s independence. In fact, under international law, the signed document is not binding and serves only as an expression of intent for bilateral cooperation. The two main reasons why this document has received so much attention are Ethiopia portraying it as a major success and diplomatic victory, and Somaliland declaring that the protocol is “a diplomatic turning point for their independence.”
International law considers the signing of this protocol as an action that undermines the sovereignty of the Somali state. The United Nations Charter, the African Union’s founding agreement, the “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” (signed on December 26, 1933), the Somali Constitution, and principles related to recognition and sovereignty all serve as references for this issue. For example, Article 4 of the African Union’s founding agreement clearly highlights fundamental principles such as “sovereign equality, respect for existing borders, and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.” It is clear that these fundamental principles have been violated.
Why Is Ethiopia Pushing?
Understanding why Ethiopia insists on this issue despite international law and regional security risks is necessary to produce the correct solution. Ethiopia’s stance can be attributed to three main factors. The first significant factor is Ethiopia’s governance mindset and its historical connection to this approach. One of the fundamental principles of the Cold War era, which dominated the world for many years, was the habit of not wanting strong neighbors and the presumption that a strengthening neighbor would become a threat. In this context, Ethiopia perceives Somalia—a country that is integrating into the global system, striving to eliminate Al-Qaeda terrorism within its borders, working to institutionalize its army, and reviving its economy—as a threat. Wars that occurred throughout history also reinforce this sentiment.
Another factor is the approach of relying on foreign policy to overcome domestic political challenges. There are many assessments suggesting that Abiy Ahmed Ali is following this strategy. It is argued that the issue is being used as leverage to alleviate domestic pressure, suppress problems in northeastern Ethiopia, and create political space domestically. Another factor is the belief that fractures in the current international system and the loss of rational approaches in the global system present an opportunity for sea access. In other words, Ethiopia believes that current conditions allow it to create a fait accompli. In reality, Ethiopia knows that the factors we mentioned lack credibility, but it wants to take advantage of the existing circumstances. This attitude reflects how the irrational approach of the West in supporting Israel’s occupation and genocide in Gaza serves as a harmful example for other countries.
The fundamental question is whether Ethiopia’s pursuit of ports is genuinely for international transportation and trade activities. Based on existing data, it is not possible to answer “yes” to this question. First, it must be noted that the 2024 protocol signed with Somaliland is not a commercial document. There has never been an issue with the use of Berbera Port, and there still isn’t one. In fact, the Somali state has taken a positive stance on the commercial use of all Somali ports. For instance, former President Farmajo signed a memorandum of understanding for the commercial use of four ports. What makes the protocol signed with Somaliland different is the allocation of a 20-square-kilometer area along Somalia’s coastline for Ethiopia to establish a military base. In other words, the issue is the establishment of a military base. This is significant because there are historical issues between the two countries, and Somalia’s internal instability has been associated with Ethiopia. For example, it is believed that Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia is linked to the emergence of Al-Shabaab, which remains a major threat to Somalia. Therefore, it is also necessary to view the issue from this perspective.
Security Risks That May Emerge in the Region
The Ethiopia-Somaliland protocol has the potential to create significant security risks. First and foremost, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, and the entire African continent could face new security challenges. However, the country that will be most affected by this process is Somalia. Ethiopia’s move poses a serious risk at a time when the fight against Al-Shabaab is critically important for Somalia’s unity. At a time when the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia has been lifted, when the necessary defense capacity for internal security has been established, and when significant progress has been achieved in terms of regional security and stability, there is a high possibility that these achievements could be wasted. However, the resulting situation could impact not only Somalia but also other countries in the region.
When considering the relationship between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, it becomes clear how crucial dismantling this group is for the countries in the Horn of Africa region. Al-Qaeda’s most active function is to direct global terrorist networks to desired regions and operate under various names. The West’s deviation from rationality and its complicity with Israel is sufficient to create opportunities for such groups. The first targets of these groups, which are given space, are Muslim populations. This pattern has been repeated for decades. Therefore, Ethiopia’s stance toward Somalia at a time when Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda’s key branch in Africa, is weakening can be interpreted as creating space for Al-Shabaab and inviting its parent organization into the region.
In fact, the risks that may emerge have the potential to affect all the countries in the region through various dynamics. To give a few examples: Ethiopia’s reduced dependence on Djibouti could create a threat for Djibouti. This threat may not take the form of a direct attack but could instead manifest as an effort to fuel inter-tribal rivalries within the country. Another country that will perceive Ethiopia’s sea access project as a threat is Eritrea. As is the case with all countries in the region, any strengthening neighbor will be viewed as a threat, and attempts to weaken them will be pursued. Eritrea, for instance, may attempt to cooperate with organized groups present in northeastern Ethiopia.
In fact, the way the protocol was signed disregards both Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty while also encouraging separatist elements. However, it must be remembered that when a country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are targeted, the resulting consequences will not affect only the target country. Furthermore, when it comes to Africa, it is essential to remember the multitude of active separatist movements. Because it is possible to speak of multiple separatist movements targeting every African country. (To understand the active separatist movements in Africa, this can be referenced.)
Therefore, the text signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland could motivate more than 30 separatist movements active in 27 African countries. The moment Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland’s independence, it would open the way for other active separatist movements on the continent to seek privileges and support. There is a possibility that similar steps could be taken by Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, and even within Ethiopia itself. In fact, Ethiopia, which has 11 states and nine distinct ethnic groups, is the country that must exercise the most caution regarding such erroneous steps.
Another issue that must be carefully considered is the security risk caused by Israel, which occupies Gaza and commits genocide with the economic, military, and political support of Western countries, in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In other words, there is a possibility that Berbera Port could become a contentious issue and that the African coast of the Red Sea could be terrorized by Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaab elements.
Ignoring Possible Consequences
Due to its importance, it is necessary to revisit the protocol signed with Somaliland and mention its three possible consequences. The most significant one is the possibility that the progress Somalia has made against Al-Shabaab could be sabotaged, creating space for the terrorist organization. Because the group will attempt to exploit Ethiopia’s behavior as an opportunity. To achieve this, it will manipulate both the religious and national sentiments of the Somali people and use the resulting impact to its advantage.
Another consequence is the sabotage of the Somali state’s fight against terrorism and the disintegration of its focus. Another consequence is the creation of a power vacuum and increased instability in the country. The potential power vacuum could be exploited by Al-Qaeda/Ash-Shabaab. This could lead to an increase in terrorism and piracy activities, and international trade in the Gulf of Aden would be negatively affected.
At this point, the critical issue that all countries in the region must consider is the possibility that such actions could increase the activities of Al-Shabaab, the most resilient and active branch of Al-Qaeda. The increase in terrorist activities would not only threaten Somalia’s security but also Ethiopia and the entire region. In this sense, the correct approach is not to weaken Somalia but to contribute to its strengthening.
Türkiye’s Role
Türkiye’s close relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia are well known. Following the emergence of the crisis, Türkiye stepped in at Ethiopia’s official request on May 8, 2024, and launched mediation efforts under the name of the “Ankara Process.” This was important for resolving the issue through diplomatic means. After the second round of talks, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan stated that “significant convergence and substantial progress had been achieved on some fundamental principles and specific issues.” In the same statement, he emphasized that “the parties would meet again for the third round in Ankara on September 17.”
Türkiye’s acceptance as a mediator, its hosting of the talks, and its efforts to keep the doors of diplomacy open are invaluable. In an atmosphere where international mechanisms do not function, where the United Nations has become ineffective, and where Western countries have openly taken sides in conflicts, Türkiye’s stance should be seen as a gain for both countries. Türkiye’s ability to demonstrate to the parties that solving problems through utopian goals, exclusionary attitudes, approaches that interfere with internal affairs, or steps that risk sovereignty is not possible will be a significant achievement.