Taha Özhan
The Assad regime was a system of pure evil, born out of Cold War conditions following the establishment of Israel. We know of regimes around the world that have committed massacres and carried out ethnic cleansing. Israel, right before our eyes, is perpetrating genocide. However, we also know that all these evils can only persist within certain historical conditions and for a limited period of time. At the very least, the violence experienced has a political context and goal — ultimately serving as “an instrument of politics.” Perhaps the most immoral and cruel of these crimes against humanity has been taking place in Palestine for nearly a century. Yet even Israel’s murderous policies can be placed on a specific political ground within a heavy asymmetry of power. An occupying and genocidal force, guided by a theological perversion and supported by the world’s most powerful states, is trying to implement an impossible political mission. And still, it cannot convince either itself or the world that it will succeed. The question “Will Israel see its 100th year?” remains a very serious one. Despite all its power and support, it cannot eradicate hope.
Yet, until just a few weeks ago in Syria, there was little hope for anyone — including the overwhelming majority of Syrians who have made all the sacrifices for years. After all, it is unsurprising that there is no room left for hope within a system of pure torture that has continued uninterrupted for over half a century.
The Assad order represents an unparalleled case that cannot be compared to Israel’s genocide, Hitler’s Holocaust, Russia’s Holodomor, or Suharto’s massacres. This is because global examples largely involve massacres directed at a single ethnic group, a specific political movement, or a religious community, continuing for a certain period and ultimately ending. Moreover, these genocides are anchored to a bloody geopolitical objective. While the scale of these massacres and genocides is far greater than Syria and has been recorded as humanity’s most brutal moments, none of them persisted as a purely “torture regime” for more than half a century. By “torture regime,” we mean a regime whose beginning and end are defined solely by torture, with no other known characteristic.
The Assad regime, which has persisted for 61 years, has had no function other than torture. This system of torture has had nothing to do with preserving power within the country or maintaining a presence at a regional geopolitical crossroads. It is pure cruelty and perversion — evil for the sake of evil, oppression for the sake of sadism — where torture has not even served as an instrument of immoral politics. Years ago, when Türkiye extended its hand, if this torture order had chosen transformation and ended itself, today there could have been a completely different Syria and even a different region. At that time, it was believed that Assad rejected Türkiye’s offer, ignored the voice of the Syrian people, and became a prisoner of his supporters’ plans, trapped by the sectarian fanaticism that surrounded him. Yet, looking at how Assad’s supporters have now abandoned the regime, we can more clearly understand that Assad himself could not give up the torture order to which he was addicted. He could only exist within this system, driven by a sadistic perversion.
A Partnership of Sadism with Both Iran and Israel
We know that while Assad has maintained a full proxy and tutelage relationship with Tehran, he has simultaneously transformed into a fully functional apparatus of Israel. On one hand, he engages in every possible relationship with Hezbollah; on the other, he has turned into a state for Israel’s routine military operations. Official documents that have come to light demonstrate that the long-held analysis of “Syria being Israel’s most comfortable enemy” was, in fact, quite naïve.What has transpired is that the Syrian regime has merely served as a functional tool of Israel, enabling Hezbollah and Iran’s proxy forces to exist under Israel’s oversight. Tehran, despite knowing this reality, has spent years struggling to convince even itself that it is working with Damascus under the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” while watching Tel Aviv manipulate nearly everything for years. In short, it has now become an accepted fact — outside of the “talk to Assad” camp — that the meanings and functions the region and the world have ascribed to Syria within the Middle Eastern equations are of no concern to the Assad order. The regime’s sole function has been to sustain its system of torture.
How can a regime exist solely for the purpose of torture, at this scale and for such a long period? Why does a regime, with no other quality but sadism, derive a perverse masochistic pleasure from torturing its own people? Of course, we have analyses regarding why it exists. Similarly, there are detailed economic, political, and geopolitical explanations of how it has managed to survive. But do we also have an explanation for the world of those who defend the existence of such a torture regime? Is it the masochistic nature of a sadistic regime that is more brutal, or is it the mind that crazily defends and attempts to rationalize the continuation of an absurd system of torture?
Why do the advocates of a sadistic regime still feel no shame?
Why should these questions concern us? Because we live alongside these people who defend the torture regime and are devastated, as if they have lost a child, when the regime collapses. For example, do those who were cruel, heartless, and inhuman enough to let children drown in pools of blood 11 years ago in Banyas, Daraa, Hama, Damascus, and Ghouta now feel the crushing agony echoing through Sednaya? What are they thinking? Do they find any solace from the scenes of the human slaughterhouse that is Sednaya, viewing it as a way to somehow compensate for the devastation they feel over Assad’s downfall? Do the images that devastate any observer give them “even a slight sense of consolation” for the collapse of Assad’s regime?
At this stage, the lines and analyses we have written about the Syrian crisis and the Assad regime since 2012 no longer hold much meaning. No analysis can offer a more realistic picture than the collapse of this regime. Nor can any arrogant assessment of what comes next, or speculation about the future awaiting Syria or the regional order to be shaped, be more frightening than the dismantling of this system of torture. Of course, chaos emerging in the aftermath of revolutions is an expected development. Syria has more than enough actors and geopolitical grounds for a period of chaos to unfold. But for the sake of the innocent faces smiling for the first time in years, we can afford to ignore the doomsayers for a while—those who try to compensate for the pain of losing Assad with “realist geopolitical risk analyses” and who spread fear.
The Authenticity of the Syrian Revolution
The most important reality that must not be forgotten is that the tremendous sacrifice behind the Syrian revolution is completely authentic. The affection created by the regime’s collapse—when Assad’s soldiers, Shabiha of all ethnicities, and even Russia withdraw, and people greet the resistance fighters with love—is Syria’s only current asset. It is certain that many actors will attempt to tarnish this asset. However, it is also evident that none of them will have the strength to choke Syria for long. Syria, as it experienced in the first half of the last century, is a country that is very difficult to divide but struggles to remain united. In this sense, it resembles Iraq, which is structurally indivisible yet finds it difficult to maintain cohesion. Those who tried to divide Iraq ethnically hit the wall of sectarianism, while those who attempted to divide along sectarian lines failed to resolve the issue of sharing economic resources. Ultimately, after 15 years and the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives following the occupation, they accepted a fragile power-sharing arrangement. This system is far from presenting a reasonable structure, yet it became one that all exhausted parties agreed upon because it offered a genuine “ceasefire and sharing arrangement” on the path to democratic transformation and mature statehood. In this regard, it can be said that Syria is in a much better position compared to Iraq.
Will Syria Be Divided?
Dividing Syria and then managing it in its fragmented state would be both the most difficult and the most costly method compared to implementing a formula for coexistence. It goes without saying that all actors on the ground know this better than anyone. It is self-evident that there will be regional actors threatening stability in a post-Assad Syria. The actors who have relied on Assad, who turned into a proxy for the forces that kept him in power from day one, may now search for new proxies after losing him. However, finding these new proxy forces — or ensuring that they are as “useful” as Assad — will not be easy. Moreover, as decayed and hollow as the Assad regime was, Russia and Iran’s geopolitical and economic capacity to bear the costs of operations in Syria had been significantly strained. Therefore, it is impossible for Moscow or Tehran to be unaware of the quagmire created by the “junk bonds” they have invested in for years. Their choice was either to admit they made an irrational geopolitical investment or to convince themselves, the region, and the world — at least for a while — that keeping Assad in power was some kind of geopolitical genius. This scene is nothing new for either Tehran or Moscow.
The truth is that with the collapse of the Assad regime, the regional camps from the early months of the Arab Spring have re-emerged: the status quo supporters — who aligned the Gulf with Iran and Egypt with Israel — and those who advocate for change. It is difficult to claim that these camps maintain the same level of power maximization as they did 12-13 years ago. The Syrian revolution will plunge all these actors into a significant legitimacy crisis. The simple reality that the will of the masses has been realized in Syria will subject all these actors to a “legitimacy stress test.” However, this time, they will not be able to actively fight against change as comfortably as they did 13 years ago. They will be forced to act with limited provocations initially. Even in the worst-case scenario, the energy generated by any attempt to suffocate the Syrian revolution will likely be felt on themselves.
Türkiye’s proactive role on the ground will be the most critical factor in establishing a peaceful order in Syria. For over a decade, the actors who have done everything possible to impose costs on Türkiye can be deterred from undermining the Syrian revolution only if Ankara utilizes its full capacity to establish order in Syria. Far from naïve expectations, the rapid and intensive implementation of experience and capacity transfer to help Syria get back on its feet is both the most realistic and essential approach for Türkiye’s geopolitical interests and for maintaining regional peace.
The Assad torture order was an apartheid regime. A new Syria can only maintain its stability to the extent that the overwhelming majority of its population feels at home while all differences also have a stake in the system. In other words, no one can now establish a stable and sustainable structure — either across Syria or in any of its regions — by setting up another apartheid regime. With Syria transitioning to a more decentralized administration, two distinct aspirations have emerged during the last decade of crisis. The first can only be realized with the approval of the Syrian people. The second, however, involves the chaotic proliferation of artificial structures—ranging from ISIS to Hezbollah and from the PKK to smaller factions—that have, at various points, exploited the geography of a collapsed state through all kinds of negotiations.
Therefore, these groups—just as Hezbollah has been forced to accept—will eventually realize that the gains they achieved amid the chaos created by the Assad regime’s devastation of Syria are not structural but merely temporary. They will face a choice: either confront this reality and become a reluctant part of the Syrian revolution, or invent “mini-states” in their so-called “liberated regions” that lack actual populations. Choosing the second option is not sustainable. After all, just as the Assad regime failed to find a “people” to legitimize its rule, these proxy forces will also fail to secure popular support.
The PKK/SDF Is a Burden on the Kurds
To put it more clearly, neither the SDF nor the PKK — which will be reduced to a political toll after Assad’s departure — will find a sufficient or suitable “people” for the administration and power they dream of. The cheap rhetoric of the PKK, akin to the Kemalist hysteria of the past with slogans like “religious reaction exists and will exist forever” or today’s “ISIS exists and will exist forever” narratives, has now reached its expiration date. Just as in the 1980s and 90s, when they were hosted under the auspices of the Mukhabarat and showed zero concern for what the capital inflicted on Syrian Kurds, this mindset has now instrumentalized the fight against ISIS to serve as an insurance policy in the West, becoming a cheap apparatus in the war against the Syrian revolution. It seems unlikely that this logic serves any function other than being a burden on the Kurds. Nevertheless, there remain elements within this structure that are less alienated and still belong to Syria, and they have a chance to remain part of the country. The Syrian revolution and Assad’s departure should be seen as a final opportunity for them to be included in this normalization.
The United States’ tragically comical “SDF presence” has no viable ground to stand on in Syria. This is because it seems increasingly unlikely that the SDF will have any semblance of a “Syria” to call its own. Similarly, a military organization that derives its legitimacy solely from armed power and Washington can hardly claim any real connection to the term “Democratic.” Finally, a structure that has lost Syria—meaning all other non-PKK (Kurdish and Arab) elements—cannot meaningfully remain a “force” in the medium or long term.
It would be the best choice for the SDF, that is, the PKK, to normalize itself by making a politicization move for the first time in its history. However, given the PKK’s “timeshare” mentality that has been going on for years, it is likely that after the pressure it feels, instead of normalizing and politicizing, it will look for an actor to whom it can transfer its “property” once again. Finding such an actor will not be easy this time. For this anachronistic structure, which has been circulating between Russia, Syria, Iran and the United States for decades and which has never been hostile to anyone other than Turkey, is not easy to end its historical jetlag crisis and pain. It would not be wrong to say that the PKK, which seems to have no qualms about destroying the future of all Kurds in Syria for the sake of a meaningless fantasy of organizational power in a region inhabited by a very small portion of the Kurds, who constitute a very small portion of the Syrian population, has been tested for the last time.
Just as the PKK fears a Türkiye (and Syria) where Kurds are truly protected with dignity and recognized as equal citizens, it will not be surprising to see those who dread Türkiye’s genuine democratization and its attainment of a truly democratic constitution walking hand-in-hand during this process. It is unacceptable for our country to once again succumb to the same 20th-century actors and mindset whose roles, lines, reasoning, and moral standards we now know by heart. In recent times, the initiatives that have emerged in search of a final solution must be thoroughly developed and concluded. Achieving a definitive solution to this issue would be as valuable for Türkiye as the collapse of the Baath regime. The myths and fears surrounding the Kurdish Issue are no less decayed than the Assad regime, which was swept into the dustbin of history in 11 days when truly confronted. If approached with courage, morality, and conscience, these century-old fears and taboos can be overcome far more quickly than expected. The key is recognizing that those who have long sold the false might and grandeur of Assad’s regime to the people are the same charlatans who built the taboos and fears around the Kurdish Issue.
All the Old Regimes Collapsed Along with Assad
The Assad torture order has collapsed. While there are those who remain buried beneath the ruins, it is also necessary to recognize that Syria serves as a microcosm of the region’s broader order. There is no demographic, ethnic, or sectarian element present in Syria that does not also exist in the Middle East, and vice versa. Similarly, all of the region’s problems are also Syria’s problems. In this context, Assad represented the most meaningless link of the collapsing torture system. Indeed, Assad’s downfall occurred over a period of 11 years plus 11 days. Just as it was not Assad who resisted for 11 years, it was not Assad who collapsed in 11 days. Therefore, it is not only the Assad regime that has fallen. All the forces that sustained his regime have also lost in Syria. The political vacuum created by this collapse must be managed pragmatically, without naivety. How effectively this vacuum is handled will determine the geopolitical rationalization of the defeated powers and the extent to which this void is managed proactively.
The “Türkiye” that emerged at the Umayyad Mosque is promising for managing and filling this void. Since 2012, Türkiye has not only built a comprehensive file on Syria but has also become well-versed in the regional and global geopolitical nerve map centered on Syria. Ankara now has a greater understanding of which nerves to stimulate, where, and in what timeframe. Therefore, as an actor with mastery over the muscle memory of Syrian geopolitics, Türkiye must act proactively. It is both Türkiye’s right and responsibility to build the period in which stability in Syria will be established and consolidated. Moreover, the way for large segments of the population in Syria to feel secure is through an active Ankara. Particularly in the field of security, Türkiye’s active engagement will provide a positive contribution to its relations with all regional actors—contrary to common assumptions.
