Ahmet Özcan
“Only the weak are good. Because they lack the power to be bad…”
Alexandre Mantochoff, Oil Billionaire
Mr. Aleksandr Dugin,
The Romanian philosopher Cioran once said, “The Spaniards suffer from being expelled from history; the Russians suffer from being able to take their place in history.” Your book, Russian Geopolitics, unmistakably reflects the deep anguish embedded within the Russian subconscious, which you embody as a Russian Eurasianist. While your intriguing and significant approaches to geopolitics—an inherently cold, soulless, and emotionless subject—aim to advocate for Russia’s resurgence as an imperial power, they fail to conceal the lament seeping through the lines. Throughout your book, a cry echoes in the background: “Russia, great nation, you should not have fallen to such a state; you must be larger and stronger.”
I wonder whether the rigid, hierarchical, and sacred spirit of the East—manifested in religion, language, and the state—serves to obscure this profound and historical pain. After all, the history of the East encompasses humanity’s earliest and most formative periods—its very childhood.
Mr. Dugin,
Your book, a collection of articles written throughout the 1990s, is significant not only for reflecting your proximity to the Russian state apparatus and one face of Russia but also for the positions and evaluations you envision for us—Türkiye. Moreover, your analyses serve as a mirror, reflecting the historical parallels between Russia and Türkiye. However, the most pressing matter today is that we all face a global threat, and it seems we are all in the crosshairs of Atlanticist powers.
The entire world—nations, great entities, religions, nation-states, and everything that binds humanity together—has become a target. The scenario of a “one-world state” or “global empire” is, in my opinion, an unattainable dream. Yet paradoxically, its danger lies precisely in its impossibility. Global financial capital, the military-industrial complex, or what I call the “children of the devil”—whatever term we use—these centers of power seem more invested in chaos and instability than in establishing order. The so-called leaked dreams and scenarios they promote give the illusion that they seek a new world order, distracting us all like a juggler deceiving his audience. If chaos serves their interests, then their claims of building a new order are merely smokescreens. Otherwise, they would neither find support for their destructive ambitions nor enjoy the satisfaction of watching a confused world struggle to decipher their true intentions. Your book intuitively evokes precisely this notion.
But first, I must summarize your arguments.
In essence, you argue: “Geopolitics is the foundation, the determinant, and the commissioner of all other fields—economics, religion, politics, and cultural phenomena. The nature of your geopolitics dictates your domestic and foreign policies, your societal and state order, and your short- and long-term goals.”
In this regard, as the British geopolitical scholar Mackinder outlined, the central geopolitical axis of history is the conflict between land powers and sea powers. Rome and Carthage, Athens and Sparta, Britain and Germany, America and Russia, Atlanticism and Eurasia—these are perpetual adversaries, fundamentally opposed in every aspect. Sea powers embody trade, money, wealth, individualism, and materialism. In contrast, land powers represent the spiritual, the sacred, society, ideals, morality, and mysticism. These two camps diverge fundamentally in their views on humanity, history, and the future. In the modern age, sea powers are represented by the United States and Britain, while land powers are embodied by Germany and Russia.
Today, having defeated Germany and dismantled the USSR, Atlanticism seeks total world domination. In response, you propose the construction of a Russian-led, Russian-centered Eurasian Empire. Geopolitically, Russia constitutes the heartland, while its rimlands include Germany to the west, Iran to the south, and Japan to the east. You argue that throughout history, Atlanticism has provoked Russia into conflict with these natural allies.
Thus, you advocate for the construction of a Berlin-Moscow-Tehran-Tokyo axis, exaggerating the impending danger to ensure this unity. Russia, you argue, should support these allies with energy resources and nuclear military capabilities in exchange for maritime access, technology, and capital. This cooperation, according to you, should represent an alternative world empire, with anti-Atlanticism as its cornerstone.
France, Türkiye, and China are viewed as allies or tendencies of Atlanticism, according to your thesis. Against these nations, you argue that a hostile stance should be developed to neutralize their influence. Catholicism and Shiite Islam, you propose, should be turned into allies of Orthodoxy through Germany and Iran, while all other roles should be designated as adversaries. The buffer zones between Eurasia and Atlanticism—such as leftist Arab regimes, India, and Eastern Europe—should either be kept neutral or drawn into Eurasianism to prevent their alignment with Atlanticist powers.
For the realization of the Eurasian Union, you advocate dismantling states aligned with Atlantic policies of instability. Specifically, you propose increasing Russian demographic presence as a guarantee in critical regions. To this end, Turkic communities—whose populations are steadily growing—must be forcibly relocated northward to Siberia, while Russian settlers would replace them. The envisioned Eurasian Empire, you describe, would consist of a coalition of four sub-empires: Moscow-centered Russia, Berlin-centered Europe, Tehran-centered Central Asia, and Tokyo-centered Pacific Asia. Supporting forces and spheres of influence would include Pan-Arab, Pan-African, and Latin American anti-Atlanticist movements. Through this strategy, you aim to reverse Atlanticism’s “Anaconda” policy, which confined the Soviet Union to land by restricting its access to the seas.
Do not mistake my summary for an oversimplification of your arguments. Your book delves deeply and meticulously into these topics, including contradictions between Ukraine and Russia, separatist tendencies in Tatarstan and Yakutia, the necessity of maintaining control over the Caucasus and the Caspian regions at all costs, and perspectives on Shiite Iran, China, Türkiye, Saudi Wahhabism, Eastern Europe, the diminishing role of Slavophilism, and Balkan politics.
However, Mr. Dugin, some of your proposals and analyses expose contradictions and shortcomings. You emphasize that Eurasianism is Russia-centered yet not Slavophilic. You claim that during the Kievan Rus period, Russia, with its Slavic identity (“Molarus”), emerged as a European entity, whereas the later Muscovite Russia (“Velikorussia”) incorporated Tatar and Finno-Ugric elements and assumed the mission of a post-Byzantine Orthodox ecumenical state. From this perspective, you highlight the danger of Ukraine’s detachment from Russia and its Slavic identity under the influence of Atlanticist alliances.
Here, parallels emerge with Türkiye’s national and imperial identities. In Türkiye, we witness an increasing divergence between minimalist Turkish nationalism—leaning toward Atlanticist tendencies—and the Ottoman identity, which remains unnamed yet historically and geopolitically significant. Interestingly, Turkish nationalist factions, representing a minimalist geopolitical vision, align ideologically with liberal and Atlanticist circles despite their apparent conflicts. For instance, Turanist nationalism openly allies with Atlantic powers in Central Asia under the guise of so-called grand geopolitics, deepening relations with Britain and Israel as far as the “Red Apple alliance.” Meanwhile, a maximalist geopolitical vision inspired by Ottoman identity has yet to emerge. Unlike its counterparts, this vision would not build itself on opposition—whether anti-Atlanticist, anti-European, or anti-Russian—but would rely on its natural historical and geopolitical space, nourished by values such as justice, peace, and law rather than conflict.
Mr. Dugin, we Turks do not need to make claims to the Eastern Roman heritage, invent utopian socialist ideals, or spread anti-Atlanticist fear to assert our place in history. We have not merely made claims; we have accomplished them. We took Eastern Rome, upheld its legacy, and ruled it with justice and peace for four centuries. We united it without fragmenting it, restored order without chaos—until we abandoned the very qualities that enabled this achievement.
Forgive me, but throughout history, Russia collaborated with Britain to attack the Ottoman Empire from the east, pushing it into Britain’s orbit starting in 1838. Later, with the Soviet Revolution, you seized almost all of Asia by exploiting humanity’s dreams of justice, equality, and freedom. Yet you could not sustain this utopia, and you disintegrated. Russia and Germany have always pursued ambitions beyond their worth. Throughout the 20th century, you caused immense suffering and disasters in your quest for imperial power. And now, you wish to invent a new myth and build a Eurasian Empire?
Have you even engaged in self-criticism of the Soviet period? Have you apologized to the states, organizations, and peoples who fought and spilled blood for you? If you truly aspire to lead humanity, don’t you owe a heartfelt apology to all who believed in justice and freedom?
I understand you; you have a historical complex toward Britain. Your only card seems to be presenting yourselves as a “great power” rival to the Anglo-Saxon hegemony. However, the burden of aspiring to be the sole ruler of Asia, a lasting empire, and the center of the world is more than you can bear.
The Eurasian project you outline has two faces: on one side, there is anti-Atlanticist defense, unity, a vision of civilizational solidarity and brotherhood; on the other side, there are Anglophile habits—scapegoating those who do not conform to the project as Atlanticist, suppressing demands for freedom as Atlantic provocations, nuclear armament, war, and civil conflict.
And how, Mr. Dugin, are you any different from them?
At least on one side of the Atlantic lies freedom, prosperity, and democracy. So tell me, why would the peoples of this region rally behind you? Why would they choose to become pawns or allies of Russian Eurasia? You offer no logical answer. Your ambition to mimic the Ottomans who conquered Byzantium, the British who colonized the world, and the Germans who industrialized rapidly only reveals your envy and lack of originality.
Mr. Dugin, history is filled with the graves of imperial powers. Stop trying to carve out a new imperial market for yourself using the bogeyman of Atlanticism. The heartland of Eurasia has never been, nor will it ever be, Moscow. If you seek a heartland, I regret to inform you that it has always been Istanbul. Stop adapting British geopolitical theses; the primary axis of geopolitics is not the conflict between land and sea but the synthesis of East and West.
This synthesis includes the South of the world within the East and often includes Russia within the West. East-West conflict is a Western illusion, whereas East-West synthesis, harmony, and common ground have been the driving forces behind history’s greatest civilizations—Mesopotamian, Mediterranean, Alexandrian, Egyptian, Roman, Persian, Islamic, and Ottoman.
What I am telling you, Mr. Dugin, is that Türkiye—not Russia—stands at the center of this historical-geopolitical axis. Türkiye synthesizes the spirit of the East with the mind of the West, often without even realizing it. One day, when the immoral battles of power-blinded nations leave only a fragment of the world intact, Türkiye will restore justice and peace, vanquishing the children of chaos.
Read Türkiye—the heart, brain, and center of Eurasia—again. Then, without haste, rethink your Eurasian project.
If you truly fear the Atlanticists, do not worry—they will fail. But if you care about civilization, humanity, justice, and truth, abandon this cold, Anglophile geopolitical perspective. Develop a human-centered vision that embraces life’s ethnic, religious, and cultural richness, along with its joy, sorrow, love, and hope. Only then can we discuss peace and cooperation in Eurasia.
Otherwise, with all due respect, Eurasia belongs to us.
Mr. Dugin, we are Muslims. We bear no enmity toward anyone but oppressors, yet if someone strikes our right cheek, we do not turn the other.
Goodbye.
* Russian Geopolitics, Eurasianist Approach, Aleksandr DUGIN, Küre Yay. Ist. 2003
Source: Ahmet Özcan – Tomorrow (Yarın) Magazine, 2004