Cengiz Sözübek
Translation and Introduction: Cengiz Sözübek
Last August, Vladimir Putin signed a decree granting temporary residency rights in Russia toWesterners who “wish to escape neoliberal ideals and move to Russia, where traditional valuesprevail.”
This intriguing move can also be interpreted as a reflection of neo-Soviet dreams, emerging fromthe backdrop of Russia’s internal dynamics. The country imposes various sanctions, includingimprisonment, on its own citizens who choose to read or speak about Russia through the lens of neoliberal ideals.
In the early 2000s, had Putin not been in power, the communist faction would likely have becomeat least a significant coalition partner in the government. However, Putin, labeling the longing forcommunism’s return as “foolishness” despite its nostalgia, relegated this ideology to theKremlin’s dusty shelves. Consequently, Russia, now positioning itself against the West in whatcan be seen as a new “Cold War,” finds itself in search of a new “narrative” to define its placeand identity.
In the global arena, the concept of “globalists” —a term widely discussed in Turkey, theoriginator of the notion of the “deep state,” and later turned into a bogeyman during the Trump era—has found its counterpart in Russia under the general label of “neoliberalism.” UntilTrump’s emergence, Russia stood as the only country that sought to weaponize the discourse of battling neoliberalism as an ideological tool in its singular ideological economic model—a system to which even China, by all appearances, succumbed, lured by the temptations of neoliberal policies.
Russia’s East-West identity search, evolving concurrently with Turkey’s, has grown even moreintricate within the context of its shift to a wartime economy. On one hand, it steadfastlychampions the demand for a multipolar world, positioning itself as a leader in the fight againstneoliberalism. On the other hand, it declares statements such as “the world is not greater thanfive,” while bypassing alliances with the Islamic world’s main axis in favor of aligning withIranian geopolitics. This approach has created deep fissures, both with its own Muslim citizensand with the broader Muslim communities in its immediate sphere of influence.
Andrey Vinokurov from Kommersant explored Russia’s ongoing quest in his column titled “InSearch of the Right Civilization.”
The title of the book How Can Russia Be Saved?, written in 1990 by philosopher AleksandrSolzhenitsyn—whom Putin awarded a state prize and acknowledged as a source of inspiration—remains relevant today as a cornerstone of Russia’s identity search.
In the book, Solzhenitsyn argued that Russia “must free itself from non-Slavic republics.” Today, however, Russia finds itself at war with Ukraine, arguably the most quintessential of Slavicnations, as part of its broader “war against the West.”
Solzhenitsyn’s vision was based on the happiness of a pure Slavic population, centered around 40 principal cities, and distanced from Western popular culture—which today manifests as neoliberalism.
It is well known that Putin closely follows the works of the Nobel laureate. Interestingly, Trump also seems to have been significantly influenced by this model.
In Search of the Right Civilization
For the past two years, my professional focus has not only been ideological but also philosophicalin some respects: the Kremlin’s efforts to construct the concept of Russia as a separatecivilization. This process began shortly after the launch of the Special Military Operation (SMO), but the drafts for this project clearly predated it. The sharp and mutual rupture between Russiaand the West merely brought these ideas to the forefront.
Our authorities needed an ideological justification for the events that unfolded, both to validatetheir historical accuracy and to explain contemporary developments within this framework. In myopinion, the authors of this concept needed a sense of justification at least as much as they soughtto influence others through “philosophical and ideological” means.
It was also necessary to convey to citizens—particularly the youth, both present and future—thelofty goals for which they were enduring the hardships brought on by the aforementioned divide. Finally, for a long time (and especially over the past two years), the Russian state has beenadvancing toward perceiving itself as a strengthened, independent, and self-sufficient entity. Thistrajectory demands a conceptual framework to legitimize it. Classical Western ideas are lesssuitable for this purpose, as they predominantly focus on the social contract and human rights, while Russia’s path requires state-centeredness.
Analysts working with the Kremlin were eager to begin addressing this issue. The best expertswere unleashed into the arena of public ideological debate, alongside long-time advocates of Russian civilization, such as the philosopher Alexander Dugin.
However, reality turned out to be far more complex. The concept of Russia as a distinctcivilization is not widely recognized within society. In public discussions on this topic, only a few initial theses support the idea of Russia as a unique civilization, after which the discoursequickly shifts to criticism of the West.
As Alexander Dugin lamented in response to one of my questions, as soon as Russian thinkersbegin discussing this topic, they tend to revert to the language of Western terminology.
The problem is that the approach chosen to accomplish this ideological mission was inherentlyflawed from the very beginning. Russian society is incredibly diverse, encompassingWesternizers and Slavophiles, as well as supporters of both left– and right-wing ideologies.
Furthermore, when observing the speeches of the concept’s proponents, it becomes clear that theparticipants in these debates themselves hold vastly different views, to put it mildly. It is understandable that they find it challenging to arrive at a single, all-encompassing paradigm andeffectively convey it to their audience.
Does this mean it is impossible to unify society on a philosophical-ideological level? I don’tbelieve so. The real challenge lies in changing the approach. Of course, there is the experience of attempting to impose a single “correct” understanding during the Soviet era, but did that trulylead to anything positive?
Let Westernizers debate with Slavophiles, rightists with leftists; let someone criticize Peter theGreat while praising Catherine the Great, or do the opposite. Let someone even quote fromLenin’s works. Will such debates suddenly give rise to some brilliant new concepts, and willeveryone, regardless of their views, come to know they have a place in Russia?
After all, there is nothing inherently wrong with the civilizational approach: great thinkers, including Nikolai Danilevsky, adhered to it. However, these concepts are valuable because theywere born in the realm of debate—not as ultimate truths, but as interesting ideas worth exploringamong others.
And now, a bit about state-centeredness. This is one of the few theses that all proponents of theconcept have confidently put forward: the Russian state holds intrinsic value in the eyes of itscitizens. I have a rough understanding of where this idea originates, and I, too, observe a highlevel of paternalism in Russian society. Citizens (and even the youth) perceive the state, crudelyput, as a father figure. However, this leads to an important interpretive divergence.
In a happy family, however, things work a bit differently. After all, children and other familymembers do not want to be told what to do; they want to be accepted as they are, with all theircharacteristics and even quirks. They seek a caring father—one who does not push them away fortheir differing views or try to mold them into something else.
Moreover, if state-centeredness is our sole defining feature, it essentially divides all citizens intotwo classes: the privileged who work for the state, and the rest who are expected to serve thoseinterests. This picture certainly does not appeal to everyone. However, if the concept is slightlyinverted, perhaps it could lead to something more effective.