Taha Özhan
The PKK is facing a crucial opportunity to break its vicious cycle—one in which it cannotdefine anything it can achieve through arms and cannot even articulate a political strugglewithout them. However, as long as the PKK mindset perceives this statement as a “sinisterthreat” or a “grand conspiracy” rather than a genuine proposal, it will fail to break its viciouscircle.
Türkiye’s struggles with democratization have created a deep-seated vicious circle. At theheart of the country’s issues lies the problem of democratization—ranging from establishingan efficient and impartial public administration to fully instituting the rule of law, fromensuring a functional free market economy at an acceptable level to achieving fair incomedistribution, from an education system rooted in cult-like structures to the formation of a genuine civil society. Politics, which is the only means to resolve these challenges, has grownaccustomed to both coexisting with the problems and taking refuge in the comfort of age-oldtaboos, regardless of whether it is in power or opposition. Adaptation has been favored overtransformation, the mere communication of problems over actual politics, and—oftenunknowingly—criticism of politics over political engagement itself. This crisis has naturallyled to a new kind of political phobia. With almost everyone preferring the comfortableshadow of this fear and these taboos, policymaking has been left orphaned. In fact, the moreone adheres to the axis of “non-politics,” the more they are deemed clever and shrewd. However, in this climate of apolitical stagnation, social opposition and politics continue togrow in a lumpen, leaderless, and directionless manner. One of the key instruments of thisdepoliticization is the “PKK problem.”
Over the years, the “PKK world,” which has transformed in some ways while maintaining a fetal position with an inconceivable resistance to time, history, and life, has produced its ownvicious circle. Since October 22, the PKK has once again been “recognized” as a politicalissue, and we will see whether, after all these years, it will seize the opportunity presented toit. For the PKK and all the elements within its structure, the process essentially revolvesaround a single question: Will they break free from the PKK’s vicious circle? As long as theyremain trapped in this cycle, it seems difficult for them to make a new breakthrough. ThePKK’s vicious circle has some immediately recognizable characteristics.
Maximalism: The Enemy of Politics
Foremost among these is a non-political maximalism. Disconnected from life, and thereforefrom politics, this maximalism is the product of a self-centered approach to the world, basedon an ahistorical narrative, often laced with allusions, and a dialectic that catastrophicallymisplaces cause and effect. Dealing with PKK maximalism requires taking the risk of tryingto convince someone who, from the outset, is intent on self-harm. Given the situation, thepolitical framework, and the changes that have taken place, none of these seem to hold muchmeaning in the face of this maximalism. Within a rigid belief system overly convinced of itsown prophecy, operating on a moral ground that does not care in the slightest about past andfuture costs, it does not appear easy for this mindset to rid itself of maximalism and becomepoliticized and rationalized. Nevertheless, even for the PKK, breaking free from maximalismmight be possible through certain catalysts. Öcalan is assumed to be one of these catalysts. While still alive, the organization’s first founding leader may have the potential to break thePKK’s insular world. Whether he can take responsibility for transforming this potential into a political will and perspective will depend on how much Öcalan wishes to escape the PKK prison in which he voluntarily remains.
Nihilism and Theology
Another element that has shaped the PKK’s vicious circle is the nihilism born out of its fear of politics from day one. The PKK, in its inception, was neither the product of a long-standingpolitical struggle with deep-rooted traditions nor of a well-defined ideological framework, noreven of a cadre with enough historical depth to be taken seriously. War or armed struggle maynot necessarily produce nihilism—provided that it serves as a tool of politics. However, thePKK has embraced armed struggle within this nihilism. Moreover, the question of whether it was the PKK itself that reached for these weapons or whether “other hands” in the Cold Warera placed these weapons in the PKK’s hands has never been seriously examined. In any case, within the PKK’s nihilistic mindset, this question has never held any significance. The PKK had as little idea on its first day of armed struggle about what it could achieve with weaponsas it does today, forty years later.
The current leadership, who were in their early twenties during the birth of the PKK, whichbegan to take shape in the mid-1970s, had as much political maturity, naivety, depth of experience, and ability to comprehend Türkiye and the world as could be expected at thataverage age. This was the cadre that, when viewed retrospectively, has been re-aestheticized, intellectually embellished, and endowed with a manufactured political history. Their mindsand the language they used belonged to them only as much as their weapons did. The PKK mindset, shaped within the political sophistication of the Cold War and Türkiye in the 1970s and 80s—where it was impossible for their intellectual level to progress beyond an adolescentpoliticization—has nearly disappeared into history and time almost half a century later. Thanks to the armor built by PKK nihilism, they have become resistant to all forms of changeand pressures toward politicization, reinforcing the walls of their vicious circle as much as possible.
The third element of the PKK’s vicious circle was the theology it invented and constructed byimitating Kemalism. Of course, both this theology and the other elements that built thevicious circle were primarily aided by the tutelage regime. This regime, which imposed a primitive racist social engineering on the entire society, always prepared the groundwork thatwould serve as the PKK’s lifeblood. Succeeding in constructing a theology of its own, thePKK did not hesitate to attempt to reinvent Kurds and Kurdishness within this framework. The organization, which sought to implement Kurdish Kemalism under the feudal strugglewith the implicit imposition of the sectarian dynamics it had adopted and translated fromcompletely different worlds, significantly contributed to the foundations of Kurdishalienation. PKK theology, with its invented history, abstractions, and dialectic, foundconvenient excuses and arguments to close all legitimacy gaps within a highly comfortablespace. When a selective or utilitarian historiography of the PKK was added to this, it becamepossible for the PKK to attain a sinless past. In other words, while an extensive body of literature has emerged on the Roboski tragedy, the meaning of the “60 kg” left behind in Dürümlü has been carefully erased to the extent that most readers of these lines will not evenremember it.
Thanks to this theology, which granted it the ability to be faultless, infallible, and perpetuallyvictimized, the PKK became the guarantor of the near-total severance of its ties with politicsby placing a mortgage on the will of Kurdish social opposition over the years. In fact, lookingat the history written and imposed by this theology, the familiar notion of “without us, youwould not exist” has been wielded as a highly functional stick against the Kurds for years. Inother words, thousands of years of Kurdish history and identity were placed withinparentheses by the PKK, and every element and approach that did not remain under thePKK’s shadow was dismissed. In order for these policies of denial and rejection to be smoothly implemented, those who addressed the country from other capitals, as well as theTurkish left and liberalism, provided more than enough support. Going even further, with the”Türkiyelileşme” (Turkey-ization) strategy they invented to overcome the crisis of politicization, they successfully carried out the first wave of government-appointed trustees(kayyum) on Kurdish voters. Ultimately, as long as PKK theology was preserved, its viciouscircle continued to extend its lifespan.
An important, if not the final, element of the PKK’s vicious circle is its fluid alliancementality. In order to exist, and with the relief of already having detached itself from politics, it has remained entirely open to all kinds of shifting collaborations, almost like a timesharestructure. It is difficult to track how many capitals it has visited, how many intelligenceservices it has shuttled between, and how many centers it has simultaneously soughtcooperation with. In the world of fluid alliances, each new alliance update, each new contract, serves the function of resetting the grave past that everyone knew until that day, concealingits lack of purpose, and most importantly, compensating for the distress of non-politicization.
Today, in Syria—a country where, for years, not a single Kurd remembered living—the PKK, which flourished under the wings of the Damascus regime, has received orders for an impossible mission in the wreckage of the collapsed Assad regime, with which it oncecooperated. The fact that the PKK, which has literally been reduced to the function of a “mercenary” or even a contracted guard in Syria, has now made its strategy of fluid alliancesexplicit explains a great deal. Moreover, it has become its main function to run ISIS campsand prisons on behalf of the U.S. in Syria—without any legal basis and in violation of international law, as determined by Amnesty International and other organizations, whichhave documented war crimes. We are talking about a structure that has not even accepted thedemands of different countries to take back their citizens for years in order to protect thisfunction, which consists of running Guantanamo in Syria.
It is impossible for this function, which openly capitalizes on ISIS, poisons the Syrianprocess, and condemns the Kurds to an undeserved predicament, to be sustainable. Thecunning tactic of covering up a disgraceful position with definitions such as geopolitical gainor the fate of the Kurds has nowhere to go. Instead of facing the distress of doing what is asked of it and acknowledging that, in the end, no matter who requests what, its only functionremains “shedding blood,” the PKK has always preferred the comfort of its vicious circle.
Can the PKK’s Vicious Circle Be Broken?
These days, we are discussing whether the PKK, which exists within these vicious cycles but cannot define the beginning or the end of its purpose of existence, can make a political leap. After 40 years, we are expecting the PKK to do today what it should not have done on thefirst day. The so-called process has no other meaning.
In PKK theology, the question “When should we lay down our arms?” has long been reducedto mere rhetorical babble, and it has always had only one answer: At the strategically righttime. Instead of engaging in endless discussions about the “right time”—which will nevercome—through grand theories, utopias, conspiracies, and mythologies, the best approach is simply: “You should have laid them down yesterday.”
The PKK is facing a crucial opportunity to break its vicious cycle—one in which it cannotdefine anything it can achieve through arms and cannot even articulate a political strugglewithout them. However, as long as the PKK mindset perceives this statement as an “insidiousthreat” or a “grand conspiracy” rather than a genuine proposal, it will fail to break its viciouscircle.
This situation applies first and foremost to Öcalan as well. Instead of recognizing that theupcoming process is his last opportunity, Öcalan may choose to start by overseeing the PKK and pursue regional utopias. We will see whether Öcalan, too, will fall into the samepredicament as the PKK mindset, which, with the possibility of a new fluid alliance, has beendragged into a utopia so great that it envisions creating a regional axis, even power, out of a short-term geopolitical anomaly under the auspices of an American colonel in northern Syria.
The right to hope for Öcalan’s future is neither in the hands of those who courageously voicethis idea nor in those of the actors outside the PKK who are trying to move the processforward. Öcalan’s fate is almost entirely in the hands of the PKK. There is no complexity in the situation. The years-long entanglement of the Kurdish issue, the inability of actors topoliticize, geopolitical dynamics, Türkiye’s heavy democratic burden—none of these holdany practical value in terms of the process expected to unfold today.
There is also no exchange value in mistaking activist excitement or political criticism forpolitics and attempting to disrupt the clear framework of the current process. In short, if thePKK disarms, there will be a process; if it does not, there will not. In other words, the PKK itself will decide what the fate of its founding leader will be.
There are, of course, many reasons why the situation has become so mechanical. The state of democracy in Türkiye, the repeated interruptions in democratization, the cost of the PKK’sfear of politicization after 2008, the inability of the Kurdish political movement to establish a genuine political party, the disappointments of the last resolution process, and the region’smassive upheaval are just some of them.
Ultimately, from the tragedy of digging trenches in the streets and declaring a so-calledautonomous self-governance to attempting to establish a liberated administration in nearlyone-third of a country like Syria due to geopolitical vacuum and chaos, this drift now needs totake a rational leap.
What Will the PKK’s Decision on Öcalan Be?
However, within its own world, the PKK’s vicious circle does not, of course, interpret thesituation this way. This is precisely why we see a mindset attempting to enter the Ahmet Shara meeting in Damascus accompanied by its American guardian. According to medialeaks, the lack of political will and decisiveness, as evidenced by their inability orunwillingness to respond positively to any of the proposals presented during the Damascusmeeting, reveals the gravity of the situation.
Proposals such as constitutionally guaranteeing Kurdish cultural rights, establishing a decentralized administration that would transfer power to local authorities, and integratingSDF/YPG elements into the army have all gone unanswered. In contrast, what is being voicedis the recognition of the existing de facto situation. In other words, the demand is thatDamascus confirm the current status quo: that the YPG is an independent force, that it continues to control the regions it occupies, and that it utilizes the energy resources there.
It seems highly unlikely that these two approaches can find a middle ground. This is because, once again, the maximalism of the PKK world appears to have come into play.
This tension is not expected to cause much confusion about where it will lead. It is inevitablethat this process will trigger a conflict. We can also foresee the consequences of an approachthat confronts both a more self-confident Damascus and Türkiye at the same time. But doesthe PKK’s world have such foresight? So far, it hasn’t. As long as the PKK mindset continuesto see the “mountain” as a fallback option it can always return to, it will not feel theresponsibility of being a host in any place it occupies.
For this very reason, just as it has disregarded the costs paid by the Kurds and Türkiye foryears, it will not hesitate to act irresponsibly in Syria. Moreover, those who engaged in organization-building for years under the supervision of the Mukhabarat in Damascus neveronce remembered the Kurds or the Syrians who were severely oppressed by the same regime. If there is to be any special obstacle preventing them from doing the same now, it would be İmralı.
Can Öcalan demonstrate this courage and wisdom? We do not know. But what we do know is that if Öcalan fails to seize this final opportunity, the equation will have two inevitableoutcomes. First, the PKK will have abandoned Öcalan to death. Second, Öcalan will haverendered the PKK’s vicious circle unbreakable.
There must be another actor who wishes to prevent this outcome, and that actor is none otherthan the DEM Party. The DEM Party needs to decide whether it will act as a mere courierbetween Öcalan, Qandil, the public, political parties, and the media, or whether it will becomean actor in the process. This process also presents an opportunity for the DEM Party topoliticize itself.
Until now, they have filled the gap in this area, which they have shown little interest in, withactivism and PKK maximalism. However, neither of these approaches has any value in thenew equation. To the extent that the DEM Party recognizes this, it can generate the politicsrequired for the process. It must be understood that interpreting Öcalan on behalf of Öcalan serves no purpose for anyone.
It is evident that interpreting Öcalan with a reverent language befitting a cult leader—“designing the region, freeing Türkiye from its shackles, bringing Bahçeli and the state mindtogether, while also preventing misogyny, and announcing a roadmap to ensure the laborers’ sweat is not spent on security policies”—will contribute nothing to this process.
At this point, Demirtaş’s relatively simple and effective democracy-focused approach couldprove functional.
In order to become a genuine political party, there is no alternative to democracy for breakingfree from the PKK world’s vicious circle and its armed tutelage. After all, it was not thesevere democratic deficit that left all of Türkiye breathless 40–45 years ago that gave rise tothe PKK. On the contrary, the PKK became an entity that accepted the weapons handed to it because it lacked the courage to wage a democratic struggle.
Today, the PKK faces a choice: to lay down weapons that do not truly belong to it and make a fresh start. The success of the process appears to depend not only on whether the PKK can break its vicious circle but also on whether Öcalan truly desires such a leap.
The first step in breaking this cycle must come from Öcalan. There is no particular reason forother actors within the PKK world to demonstrate the courage that Öcalan has not. Moreover, when compared to other actors, Öcalan is the only figure who is not under tutelage or in isolation—despite being imprisoned, he is paradoxically the most “free” among them!