Kritik Bakış
Bekir Gündoğdu: Our guest today is journalist and writer Mustafa Ekici, former coordinator of TRT-Kurdî. He is the author of the books “Resembling You” and “Kurds at the Crossroads of Reality and Imagination.” While continuing his academic work, he also publishes articles in Kritik Bakış magazine. Mr. Mustafa Ekici, welcome.
Mustafa Ekici: Glad to be here, thank you.
How do you evaluate the process that began with the statement of the Chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party, Mr. Devlet Bahçeli, calling for the PKK to lay down its arms? What do you think is the meaning and significance of this statement coming from the MHP?
Mr. Bekir, as you know, Türkiye has been struggling with the scourge of terrorism for over 40 years. In the 1990s, there were times when scenes emerged that could be described as a civil war. However, in recent years, with the measures Türkiye has taken—not only military but also social and economic—it is evident that the PKK has suffered a significant loss of power, particularly in Türkiye, where it has lost considerable military capacity. Some officials have even stated that the number of terrorists in Türkiye has dropped below 50, even below 20. Therefore, the ambiguous and undefined issue that some circles refer to as the “Kurdish issue” has now settled onto a sociological and political ground. However, despite its diminished capacity, the PKK’s continued existence as a terrorist organization—particularly in Syria and Iraq, as well as in Türkiye—remains the biggest obstacle to discussing this issue freely on legitimate political platforms and in public spaces. Mr. Bahçeli’s statement is truly significant, given that he is the leader of a key party representing Turkish nationalism and, in this domain, a somewhat mythical figure. For him to make such a statement, essentially saying to the PKK, “Lay down your arms, come and speak in Parliament,” is indeed very valuable.
He took a big risk already.
Of course, and a significant risk still remains. In fact, this can be seen as a more realistic and solidified new version of the “Politics on the Plain” discourse put forward in the mid-90s by Mehmet Ağar, who was then Minister of the Interior and Director General of Security. The significance of this statement coming from Mr. Bahçeli lies here: Throughout the 40-year struggle against terrorism, many of the activities carried out in the Kurdish region—some of them criminal, irregular, or even unlawful—were largely attributed to the idealist movement or the nationalist community. Whether they were directly involved or not is a separate debate, but this is the prevailing perception in society. Historically, the ideological axis represented by Mr. Bahçeli has been positioned as a party to this war, to this conflict. Therefore, Mr. Bahçeli’s statement allows him to speak as a stakeholder in this issue, as someone with a claim to it, and makes his position meaningful.
It was truly a valuable and groundbreaking move. I watched the MHP group meeting live. When Bahçeli made his statement, there was an initial moment of surprise within the MHP group. There was no immediate applause—people were genuinely wondering, “What are we hearing? What is happening?” There was a noticeable shock. However, it seems that Mr. Bahçeli’s stature as a wise figure, his character as a statesman, and his weight as a Turkish nationalist leader suppressed any potential backlash. It appears that his own base has been convinced by this statement. The Turkish nationalist grassroots, for the reasons I mentioned earlier, likely believes that “If Devlet Bahçeli has made such a statement, then there must be a solid foundation behind it, he must know something.”
Undoubtedly, at the core of this stance is the trust his supporters have in Devlet Bahçeli. The image he has cultivated within both society at large and his own base—as a wise leader and a statesman—is not just mythical but also grounded in reality.
In this regard, it is highly significant that Bahçeli has reached this stage. What it will evolve into remains an important question. Because a similar mythical perception exists among the Kurdish nationalist base for Öcalan as well. A considerable number of people perceive Öcalan with a similar mythical reverence. Whether Öcalan will raise the bar to the level set by Mr. Bahçeli—or even higher—is something we will see. I personally believe he will.
Because the issue at hand is not just technically about the PKK laying down its arms. The PKK’s operational capacity in Türkiye is already at its limits and is not of significant importance. But the real issue here is that the PKK, as a terrorist organization, continues to cast a shadow over politics, still maintaining a presence that can influence society. This is a sociological and political matter.
Therefore, Öcalan’s statement—its tone and content—will certainly be important in terms of calling for the PKK to disarm. However, in my view, the more crucial aspect is whether Öcalan will create a similar impact on his own base as Mr. Bahçeli has on his. If this process unfolds positively, I believe it will lead to beneficial outcomes. I think the combined result of both statements will lead to a favorable place.
The positive climate that emerged after Bahçeli’s meeting with DEM members seems likely to be reinforced by Abdullah Öcalan’s upcoming statement. However, there is a cautious atmosphere in public opinion. On one hand, past experiences that ended in failure, and on the other, the belief that the organization will not lay down its arms, are affecting this positive mood. What do you expect? How do you see this process unfolding?
There are many risks, and I agree. This cautious stance in society is not unfounded. Because, as you know, in the previous process, expectations were set extremely high, and both the state and the relevant institutions took very bold steps. However, in the end, the organization turned this into a spectacle and interpreted it in a way that led to different expectations, which unfortunately derailed the process. But this time, the situation is different. Firstly, the PKK’s operational capacity in Türkiye is truly at rock bottom. Secondly, the political sphere is stronger, more established, and there is a more unified, more consistent approach within state institutions. This is a critical factor. More importantly, the fact that a statesman like Mr. Bahçeli—someone with a strong character—has taken the initiative, claimed ownership of the issue, and is leading the process is fundamentally altering and transforming the nature of developments. Therefore, yes, there will be dissenting voices within the PKK. Such a development would not be surprising, in my opinion. Because the PKK is now essentially a multi-sponsored enterprise—a terrorist corporation.
Ultimately, while its ideological legitimacy is rooted in Kurdish nationalism, we all know that various actors—Western powers, the United States, remnants of Assad’s Syria, Iran, and others—are actively involved in this structure. The PKK is a space where many conflicting and overlapping interests intersect. As a result, we may not hear a unified voice from the PKK, or we may hear fragmented and contradictory statements. Moreover, Abdullah Öcalan has not had direct contact with his organization for 20 years. His influence over the organization has become more of a mythical one. Thus, we will see how much Öcalan’s statements will directly impact the military cadres—the armed wing of the organization. That is a separate discussion, a technical matter. But in my opinion, it is not the most critical issue. What is far more significant are the sociological, political, and psychological dimensions of the matter.
So, are you suggesting that when the founder and still the leader of the organization tells them to lay down their arms, it might not have any effect within the organization?
What I mean is that it may not have a unified effect. The reason is this: If I remember correctly, Öcalan made a statement in 2019, but the organization—especially DEM—swept it under the rug. Since that day, Öcalan has not been in contact with the party or the organization. Although the organization continuously keeps the “isolation” argument alive as a propaganda tool within its own internal discourse, it is evident that neither the party nor the organization made an effort to “go and meet” with him, nor did Öcalan say “come and meet with me.” In reality, such a relationship has not existed for a long time. Öcalan severed that connection a long time ago because he saw that he was being sidelined, discredited, and rendered insignificant. However, I believe that Öcalan still holds a mythical influence over his own base—both in Türkiye and, to an even greater extent, in Syria. This influence extends to military cadres as well but is primarily over the society itself. Therefore, the issue of the organization laying down arms is, of course, significant. However, we need to see how much of an actual impact it will have. Because from the very beginning, Cemil Bayık and other senior figures within the organization have consistently stated that “we are the real interlocutors of this process; Öcalan’s prison conditions are not suitable for this role.” These remarks, in my opinion, provide clues as to the potential impact any statement by Öcalan might have within the organization. But, as I said, the PKK is not a monolithic entity. There are multiple factions within it, and the idea that these factions will act in complete unison will be tested by Öcalan’s statement.
There may be a difference of opinion between the leadership and the grassroots of the organization, despite Öcalan’s statement. So, do you think the leadership will resist?
Resisters may emerge, yes.
Is this related to an issue of vested interests?
Undoubtedly. Let’s not forget that the first-generation cadres of the organization are now in their 70s. From Duran Kalkan to Cemil Bayık, from Murat Karayılan to others—they have all passed the age of 70. And more importantly, they are still mentally stuck in the world of the 1970s. These men have had no ties to real life since the 1970s. They have been isolated in the mountains, completely immersed in a military conflict environment. At the same time, however, they live within a network of relationships that has been built over the years. This includes not only military matters but also economics, politics, and an entirely different way of life. The organization has created its own aura, its own language, its own world. Escaping the comfort of that world is difficult because politics means coming face to face with reality. We have all experienced this many times. For example, the trustee (kayyum) policy in Türkiye tells us a lot about this issue. I was probably the first to point this out: People vote for the HDP, municipalities are won, but then trustees are appointed. However, there is no significant reaction from society in response to these appointments. At the time, I formulated the public’s approach to this situation as follows: “Let the HDP win, but appoint a trustee.” The reason for this is that HDP, today’s DEM, or even the PKK itself operates on a very large, maximalist scale. Their stance, their approaches, their arguments, and their politics are all maximalist. Therefore, for those who exist within this ideological universe, dealing with people’s daily problems—garbage collection, water supply, paving roads, infrastructure—is seen as trivial.
So, is it a mindset of, “We’re trying to build a state—why should we bother with your garbage collection”?
Yes, but the people also have their own reality. Life goes on, garbage needs to be collected, and people want to receive services at a decent standard. They want proper municipal services. In this sense, the trustee (kayyum) policy did not generate the level of backlash in the Kurdish public sphere that the HDP or PKK had expected. And the reason is precisely this: “Let the HDP win, but appoint a trustee.” This was the solution that people found to navigate between both the state’s assimilationist and dismissive stance and the PKK’s maximalist position. A similar situation will likely happen again today. That is, PKK should leave the stage, lay down its arms, and dissolve. Fine. But the Kurdish people’s expectation of respect for Kurdish identity, Kurdish existence, and its recognition within a legal framework as a political demand will continue. Actually, let me emphasize this point as well: I believe that both the AK Party, right- and left-wing parties in general, Turkish public opinion, and even the PKK are misinterpreting the votes cast for DEM. For instance, the PKK interprets the 70-80% Kurdish vote for DEM or HDP as support for armed conflict and terrorist activities—and uses it as such. Likewise, both the right and left wings of Turkish public opinion interpret this high percentage of Kurdish votes for HDP or DEM as support for PKK terrorism. However, this is a serious mistake.
The same percentage of votes had previously gone to the AK Party in those provinces.
Yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying. There is no monolithic Kurdish electorate. Moreover, this vote carries a meaning. Its meaning is this: “We expect respect for Kurdish identity and Kurdish existence. We seek its recognition within a legal framework.” In fact, casting a vote for a state-recognized, officially sanctioned party represented in Parliament essentially means: “I am Kurdish, and I exist.” It carries no other meaning. Then, after the election, when a trustee is appointed, people say: “Fine, let the trustee come and do the job.” And that’s exactly what happens. As you know, DEM’s mayoral candidate wins with 70% of the vote, but three days later, they are replaced by a trustee—yet the streets do not erupt in protest. Now, compare this to the 1990s. Think back to the events of the 90s and the public’s reaction. The streets were burning, masses of people were mobilized. But today, we are face to face with reality. And what is that reality? Bread, the streets, electricity, water, roads, and jobs. These are the realities we must provide. And now, both the government and the state are engaging in healthier communication with society. Therefore, if Mr. Bahçeli’s statements, and hopefully those of the leader of the terrorist organization, Öcalan, come at this level and in this tone, I believe that a political, sociological, and peaceful space for discussion will emerge on a societal level.
So, you are saying that if the PKK is out of the equation and the weapons fall silent, a reasonable ground for discussion and debate will emerge, and this issue can be resolved? In other words, if the PKK disarms…
We call it a problem, but it is actually a very amorphous and vague issue. What we understand as the Kurdish issue spans almost the entire spectrum, covering all possible perspectives—from the far right to the far left, from the most radical to the most liberal. It is an amorphous field that can be interpreted in many ways. That is why I emphasize looking at it from a more sociological perspective. If this issue remains in the hands of fanatics, terrorists, and maximalists, we will have a serious problem. These arguments need to be taken out of their hands. We all need to face societal realities. In 2019, I published a book on this topic titled Kurds at the Crossroads of Reality and Imagination. Kurds have their realities, and they also have their dreams. And these realities and dreams are by no means uniform—they diverge based on class, region, ideology, socio-economic status, and many other factors. Now, there is a segment of people living in a strange psychological state, as if the state is going to establish a Kurdistan and simply hand it over to them. This is a very naïve, childish, and immature perspective. Or there is another claim that the Kurds will establish their own state, their own Kurdistan, but Türkiye is preventing this from happening. These, too, are naïve and unrealistic perspectives. First of all, this way of thinking demonstrates a deep ignorance about the existence, nature, and structure of the state itself. It is a failure to understand how states function. During the trench warfare incidents (Hendek Olayları), Kurds saw that they were being forced into a dark tunnel with no clear end in sight. The organization suffered significant losses, and it did not receive the reaction or support it had expected from its own base. Because society lives in reality, whereas the organization exists in a maximalist world of illusions.
So, the people saw what the organization was trying to do and disrupted their plans?
Yes, that’s exactly what I’m trying to say. A similar debate will take place again today. Therefore, where the Kurdish issue will evolve and how it will be resolved is a highly contested, amorphous, and vague matter. It needs to be brought into the political arena, where real politicians can discuss it without fear or hesitation. There is clearly a system of tutelage over this issue. Just as Turkish politics in the past was unable to speak freely under the pressure of oligarchic and military tutelage, today, Kurdish politics is under a similarly suffocating tutelage. They do not speak or act without directives from Kandil. They cannot, because they have no independent ideas, no political arguments. It is a vague space, a culture of obedience dominates there. However, once weapons are removed from the equation, once the organization’s control and pressure through arms is lifted, a more realistic and reasonable type of political actor will emerge—one with whom discussions can take place at a more constructive level. This will make the issue more open to discussion. And as recent statements have shown, the proper platform for this is Parliament, as well as society and the media. These spaces will become places where we can talk more freely about these matters. Then, everyone will have to lay their cards on the table. What do you have in your bag? Let’s see. Right now, everyone is just trying to interpret each other’s intentions. We are engaging in speculation. But what exactly would solve this issue? What would constitute a resolution to the Kurdish question? These are very ambiguous matters that require careful and extensive debate. As I said, from the most radical to the most liberal, the Kurdish community is a society that encompasses people of all perspectives, beliefs, and political inclinations.
There are different beliefs, sects, and various elements among the Kurds. There are parties and ideological groups. In this context, reducing the discussion to a broad concept like “the Kurds” oversimplifies both the stakeholders and the diversity of problems and solutions. In your opinion, on what kind of ground and through what method can this issue be discussed more effectively?
This is truly a valuable question. You see, this is a form of integrism. That is, reducing everything to a singular framework, throwing everyone into the same bag, and treating them as if they are identical and uniform is a fascistapproach. Kurds have long been subjected to this dual-sided integrist, fascist pressure. Turkish politics also experienced this during the period of military tutelage. A political atmosphere was imposed on Türkiye in which politicians were forced into a loyalty vs. betrayal dichotomy. If you deviated even slightly from the vision imposed by the military bureaucracy and the guardianship system, you were immediately branded either a traitor or disloyal. A similar imposition exists in Kurdish politics today—except it is twofold. On one side, there is a “proper Kurdish identity” dictated by the organization, while on the other, there is an insecure Kurdish identity shaped by the perception of terrorism. This forces the entire Kurdish society into a monolithic, singular, fascist narrative that does not reflect reality. And that is simply not true. Just like Turkish society, Kurdish society is also a Muslim society—but within it, there are also atheists, leftists, right-wingers, religious conservatives, and even advocates of sharia. There are all kinds of people because life itself is diverse and colorful. Therefore, it is crucial that all these different perspectives, political stances, and ideological approaches within Kurdish society can be expressed, discussed, presented as political programs, and tested for approval by the public. This is the way forward. In this sense, even the fact that these statements and good-faith initiatives are bringing the issue into a more realistic and discussable framework is, in my opinion, already a great positive step.
Mr. Ekici, shall we move on to the PYD? The PYD and YPG in Syria—there is now discussion about them disarming and integrating into the new Syrian order. This is one of the most talked-about issues today. The Ahmet Şara administration has demanded that the PYD lay down its arms and transfer control of the regions it holds to the Syrian state under the new system. The PKK issue here has essentially become a shared problem for Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and the Kurds living in these countries. In a post-revolution Middle East equation that excludes Iran and Russia—and possibly even the U.S., or at least a less influential America—what do you think Türkiye’s step means for both the countries and the people of the region? What kind of future does this suggest?
This is both a responsibility and an inevitability for Türkiye—an inevitability imposed by the realities of the situation. The vision we are discussing is one that frames regional politics in a way that allows Türkiye, Iraq, and Syria to act jointly. As is well known, for a long time, the PKK was an organization protected by the Ba’ath regime and used as leverage against Türkiye. Hafiz al-Assad’s condition for this protection was clear: “You can recruit militants from here, but you will never engage in any activity for the Kurds in Syria.” Indeed, for nearly 20-30 years, the PKK remained in Syria without ever criticizing the Assad regime or conducting any political activities there. A significant portion of the Kurdish population did not even have legal identity documents. They had no rights. The Kurdish community lived under the severe oppression of Ba’athist national socialism, yet the PKK never acted against the Syrian regime. In return, it received both financial support and protection. The PKK’s headquarters remained in Damascus for many years. From the beginning, Syrian Kurds have formed an important faction within the PKK. The YPG emerged under this protective umbrella as a somewhat artificial structure. The developments in Syria led to expectations of a territorial region similar to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which was formed after the U.S. invasion under conditions that facilitated a kind of federal structure. At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, as the Assad regime found itself in a desperate situation, it appointed the PYD as a de facto trustee over the region. In reality, the PYD governed the area as an administrator on behalf of the Assad regime. However, when Assad weakened further, a cantonal system was established, followed by local councils, and eventually, the U.S. entered the equation, bringing the region under American protection. This drastically changed the course of events. At this point, here is the reality we have arrived at: the belt along Türkiye’s border, where Kurds predominantly live, is fragmented. The entire region is not under PYD control. In the remaining areas, settlements where Kurds form the majority are limited. In general, Arabs constitute the majority in the areas controlled by the PYD. Afrin is under the control of forces supported by Türkiye. What remains under PYD influence are areas stretching from Qamishli and Hasakah toward Iraq, extending to Dêrika Hemo/Melke, as well as territories reaching southward to the oil regions of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. It is estimated that the total population in these regions is less than 2 million.
What is the proportion of the PYD here?
The main Kurdish population is not actually in the areas controlled by the PYD. In the regions under PYD control, Kurds make up perhaps less than half of the population, yet the PYD controls approximately 45% of Syria’s territory, more precisely around 43%. They control nearly 100% of the country’s natural resources, including oil and gas. They also dominate key trade routes leading to Iraq and control a significant portion of agricultural land. However, the majority of the population in these areas is Arab, and this is not a structure that can be sustained under a Kurdish national socialist ideology. Therefore, the PYD’s territorial project, aiming to establish a governance model similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, is not realistic. In Iraq, the Kurds historically lived in a geographically distinct area from the Arab-populated Iraqi desert, with limited integration and interaction with Arab society. This has been the case historically—they remained separate. Consequently, the KRG’s existence is meaningful and sustainable in terms of geography, demographics, and resources. However, in Syria, a territorial entity under PYD control, modeled after the KRG, is highly unrealistic and largely a fantasy. Such an entity would require an extremely high level of external protection, similar to Israel’s security umbrella, provided either by the United States or another major power. When concerns arose over a potential U.S. withdrawal, the PYD even sought protection from France. A similar statement came from France itself, prompting Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to respond: “We are in dialogue with the United States. We do not engage with small countries operating under the shadow of America.” This clearly indicates that the idea of a PYD-controlled territorial entity in the region is unsustainable. Kurds in Syria live in a highly integrated manner, much like in Türkiye. There are significant Kurdish communities in two districts of Damascus—Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh. Likewise, along the Turkish border, there is a substantial Kurdish population living interwoven with Arab communities. Therefore, I believe that the future of Kurds in Syria lies within a democratic system—one that is pluralistic, where their rights are recognized, registered, and respected within the framework of a legitimate state. However, in its current form, the idea of a PYD-controlled independent state is simply not viable.
Mr. Ekici, can it be said that if Türkiye deepens its democracy, develops its legal framework on an egalitarian basis, achieves economic prosperity, and becomes a more influential country in foreign policy, it could serve as a model for all the countries in the region?
This is what should happen. The realities of the region make this a necessity, and it seems that Türkiye will adapt to this necessity. It is already clear that the new government emerging in Syria will be aligned with Türkiye. Similarly, in the power vacuum created by Iran’s withdrawal from the region, Iraq is also expected to take a similar approach. There has long been a Development Road Project under negotiation between the two countries, and significant progress has already been made. I believe that Syria, which was previously kept at a distance from this project by the Assad regime, will eventually be included as well. Meanwhile, security agreements are also being signed. Both Syria’s new government and the current Iraqi government officially recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization and are taking measures against it. Therefore, all three countries will grow even closer under Türkiye’s leadership within a new framework of economic development and security cooperation. It is hoped that this will evolve into deeper alliances. But how feasible this will be remains to be seen. Because, beyond Türkiye, Iraq, and Syria, there are also global powers with interests in the region. First and foremost, will the United States withdraw from the region? We will see. Russia has already withdrawn because it has suffered serious capacity losses in Ukraine. Iran has also pulled back, as its confrontation with Israel has exposed that it does not actually possess the capabilities it claims to have. So, in essence, we are now standing alone here.
Additionally, it has become evident that the Shia population in Iraq is not the kind of Shia community that Iranians assumed it to be—not one devoted to Iran, but rather an Arab Shia population that prioritizes its Arab identity and even competes with Iran. We saw a similar dynamic in Azerbaijan, where Turkish identity took precedence over Shia identity. The same thing is happening here. That is why I keep emphasizing that this issue must be approached sociologically. Unless there are strong external forces intervening, social structures tend to follow their natural course, much like the saying, “Water finds its own way.” In this case, the natural flow of events necessitates strong economic, industrial, and security cooperation between these three countries, and it will happen. However, many countries will work to prevent this, primarily Israel, the United States, and some Arab states. Because ultimately, if Türkiye succeeds in establishing a high-standard democracy, it will influence Syria and Iraq—but it will also pose a threat to the political structure of Arab monarchies. We already saw their stance during the Arab Spring; these reactionary regimes were clear in their opposition. Some of them still do not want this transformation to take place. I have been reading some of the analyses from Saudi intellectuals, and frankly, their arguments are absurd.
But no matter what happens, in the end, power disrupts the game. And in this entire region, there is only one entity substantial enough to be called a state—Türkiye. With its democratic experience, industrial production, political and social structure, military industry, and overall capacity, Türkiye will be the central actor in this process. I expect that within a short period, the relations between these three countries will develop faster and deeper than anticipated.
In the construction of this envisioned democratic model, there appear to be two main paths: one where Kurds play a positive role as active actors in all three countries, and another where organizations acting on behalf of Kurds, with the support of Israel and the West, attempt to forcibly create a nation-state. Your book Kurds at the Crossroads of Reality and Imagination analyzes this historical dilemma and the critical choices involved. How would you evaluate this process now? Which option seems more reasonable and feasible to you?
Is what we call a state defined by an ethnic structure? Is a state necessarily linked to an ethnic identity? Or should a state be built on an ethnic foundation? This is a major debate. In our history, there is a concept known as the benevolent state. A state governs a demographic within a region, creates economic capacity within a particular domain, and so on. What matters is that the people living within that state—the citizens—feel secure, important, and valued. But this does not mean that Türkiye belongs only to Turks, that Türkiye is for Turks, or that Türkiye is solely Turkish. Similarly, if there were a state called Kurdistan, it would not mean that it belongs only to Kurds or that only Kurds live there. This is a very narrow and limited approach to statehood. Türkiye, however, is much bigger than that.
Look at history—Türkiye is a state that emerged from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, from which 63 different states were born. Calling many of them “states” is even questionable. Most of them function at the level of petroleum companies—they have populations of 700,000 or 300,000, yet they control vast amounts of wealth. What we call a state is something more value-oriented. Of course, economy and demographics are factors, but a state is ultimately driven by values. States must have core values that ensure their people feel secure, valued, and included. The way to achieve this, as you mentioned, is through democracy—a functional and effective legal system, a stable economic structure, and a political environment that fosters freedom.
Türkiye is capable of achieving all of these. We have historical experience in this, but there was an intervening period of military tutelage and coups, which created an oppressive environment. Some remnants of that period still persist, but they will be overcome. It is now evident that within the framework Türkiye is leading, the traditional concept of an ethnic-based nation-state no longer fits Türkiye’s reality. Nationalism in Türkiye, particularly among idealists (ülkücüler), is an ideological nationalism. While there may be fringes with racial undertones, neither idealists nor other nationalist movements define themselves through racism. The same applies to Kurdish nationalism. The reason for this is the unifying role of Islam in shaping the foundation of society. We need to understand this.
Therefore, I believe that Türkiye should be built on a foundation where Kurds feel a sense of belonging, security, and value. This requires a guiding authority that will shape the shared future of Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye, determining the common destiny of Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. That authority is Türkiye. In this vision, Kurds can be a tremendous source of energy. In Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye alike, Kurds are the driving force behind pluralistic, liberal democracy, development, and unity. The alternative is a scenario where this vast energy—stemming from a population of 30 to 40 million—is handed over to imperialist forces through terrorist organizations, allowing it to be exploited for their purposes.
So, are you saying that Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq should jointly govern their respective regions?
Of course. Isn’t that the case? What I am saying is that Kurds are the driving force of Türkiye’s democracy. What we call the Kurdish issue today is, in fact, the key demographic force behind the deepening of Türkiye’s democracy, the functionality of the legal system, and economic development. A similar dynamic will also apply in Syria—they will exert positive pressure there as well. What can we expect from a Syria governed by a single monolithic organization like HTS? But a Syria shaped by the democratic demands, contributions, and even pressures of the Kurds will transform into something entirely different. The same applies to other minorities. The rights of Turkmens, Alawites, Druze, non-Muslims, and others will be protected in the same way. There is no other alternative. A political environment where all these diverse groups can participate, express themselves, and feel valued and included can only be established through their integration into the system. The same is true for Iraq. Iraq’s current fragmented structure can only be resolved if Kurds become more prominent in social, economic, and cultural spheres and actively participate in the system.
The same thing is happening in Türkiye, as you know. What are we currently discussing in Türkiye? The significance of Mr. Bahçeli’s statement—bringing a 40-year-long bloody terror issue to Parliament, shifting it to a more political, more discussable platform. All of this is directly linked to the presence of Kurds. It is directly connected to the resilience Kurds have demonstrated. The real question is: Are we going to transform this resilience into a positive force that contributes to the country? Or are we going to abandon it to be used as an imperialist tool in the hands of terrorist organizations? That is the real debate.
Therefore, I believe that the positive contribution of the 30-40 million people living along the intersecting borders of Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq is enormous—immense, in fact. And I believe Türkiye sees this reality as well. Mr. Bahçeli’s statements reflect precisely this understanding.
Externally, Türkiye behaves like a great power, even an empire. After the United States, Türkiye is the country with the most overseas military bases and the most deployed soldiers in the world. But domestically, we sometimes act like a small nation-state. That is not the right approach. The political language of the great structure we are building abroad must also be established within Türkiye. What Mr. Bahçeli is doing is precisely this—he is shaping the political discourse of a state that acts like an empire externally. He is trying to construct this political language and is paving the way for it.
Kurds hold a critical and valuable place in this equation. And I believe the state intelligence is fully aware of this, recognizes it, and is working to incorporate it into its strategy.
– Mr. Mustafa Ekici, it was an honor to have you. Thank you very much.
Thank you. My pleasure.
