Muhammed Hüssein
Europe has rarely found itself in as much of a bind as it faces now, arguably since the conflicts, territorial breakups and political transitions of the 1990s. Amid a perceived rising military threat from Russia, the faltering of Ukraine’s cause on the world stage and the withdrawal of the critical support of the United States for European security, along with the strong-arming of many NATO member states, the continent is being forced to be much more self-reliant in all matters, including security.
Not only has the Trump administration been steadily signalling an abandonment of unconditional support for Ukraine, but the US president has also continued to threaten repeatedly to withdraw from NATO, prompting concerns over the security vacuum which that would produce for the alliance.
US forces aside, estimates from last year put the number of active duty military personnel in Europe at 1.47 million, close to the 1.5m troops that Russia is currently aiming to have.
In terms of military equipment, supplies, ammunition and technology, Europe is said to need at least 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 700 artillery pieces to deter Russian forces from invading Europe through the Baltic states. Such a capacity is, according to those estimates, more than what the combined land forces of France, Germany, Italy and the UK have.
Moreover, 300,000 new recruits would have to be found and trained across the continent torepel a military threat credibly, at a time when Europe is struggling to put together a reassurance force for Ukraine of up to 30,000 military personnel.
Young Europeans are simply not joining the armed forces in sufficient numbers.
A boost in air force capacity would also be required, with the development of un mannedaerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) and their production set to be a primary component.
If the US does pull out of any alliance, including NATO, it would deprive Europe of the80,000 American troops stationed across the continent and their military bases andcapabilities, the sharing of vital intelligence, and hundreds of billions of dollars in funding, as well as the US nuclear weapons deployed in several European countries.
Not only would the continent lose the backing of NATO’s largest contributor, but it would also mean the loss of an ally that is currently indispensable to European security. To put it simply, Europe is faced with a monumental task in attempting to wean itself off Washington’s support.
To that end, European powers are reportedly working on a plan to replace the vacuum in a NATO without the US within five to ten years. Officials revealed this month that countries such as the UK, France, Germany and the Nordic states will aim to shift the alliance’s financial and military burden to European capitals in what would be a gradual handover.
Despite the momentous task that Europe would have in maintaining its own security structures, NATO’s infrastructure would perceivably continue to serve the continent even without the US. As the officials put it, “NATO provides a structure for security co-operation in Europe,” with the UK and other Atlantic naval powers protecting the continent’s western borders, the Nordic countries guarding the north, and Turkiye defending the south east.
It is Turkiye, however, which could very well banish Europe’s defence woes.
At a joint news conference with his Albanian counterpart in Ankara in late February, TurkishForeign Minister Hakan Fidan insisted that Turkiye should not be excluded from any futureEuropean defence strategy, stating that, “A security architecture approach that leaves out a military force like Turkiye would not be very realistic.” Ankara’s role in any such strategy is essential, said Fidan, adding that, “If a European security architecture is going to become operational, it cannot be done without Turkiye.”
Turkiye has the largest military land force — around 800,000 including reserves — in NATO’s European region and the second largest in the alliance after the US; thousands of battle tanks; and operational control over critical shipping lanes in the Black Sea andBosporus Straits. Without doubt, Turkiye is an essential part of the alliance.
Over the past decade, it has also transformed itself into a major producer and supplier of arms, military vehicles and equipment, as well as drones. It is the latter which Turkish force shave used to their allies’ advantage in multiple regional conflicts.
Ankara has secured a number of deals with prominent defence contractors in Europe, such as Turkish drone company Baykar’s partnership with Italian defence giant Leonardo for UAV production; Baykar’s recent investment in and acquisition of Italian aerospace company Piaggio; and France’s agreement last month for the sale of Meteor missiles to Turkiye.
In recent years, and particularly with a central role in the events surrounding the war betweenRussia and Ukraine, Ankara has also advanced its international diplomatic influence by taking a leading role in mediation between Moscow and Kyiv.
Turkiye has thus steadily made itself into an essential component of the future of Europe’ssecurity. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has latched onto the looming security vacuum if the US pulls out, stating this week that, “Heated debates over past weeks haveshown that European security without Turkiye will not be possible.”
Europe’s need for Turkiye has begun to be openly acknowledged, he pointed out, not only in terms of security but also in many other areas, from the economy to diplomacy, and from trade to social life. “Turkiye is ready to advance its relations with European countries and theEU in the framework of common interests and mutual respect.”
Any effort to advance greater Turkish involvement in Europe’s defence sector will, however, inevitably be met with at least some opposition by some EU and NATO member states which continue to find it difficult to accept Ankara’s importance for the continent.
Greece, for example, has already been lobbying France to halt the sale of Meteor missiles toTurkiye and has protested against its defence deals with Italy, and there will likely be efforts by both the far-right and the far left — for their own ideological reasons — to rail againstTurkish influence. There could also potentially be more covert efforts to undermine a greaterTurkish leadership role in the NATO alliance by external state actors.
Both Russia or Israel, for example, have an interest in disrupting Turkiye’s rise up the geopolitical ladder.
Amid these changing tides, though, there are signs that European and NATO states are becoming increasingly warm towards the idea of Turkish involvement in the continent’s defence affairs. The Dutch Foreign Minister Kaspar Veld kamp, for example, acknowledged this month that Turkiye could contribute to a new European security infrastructure due to its strong, efficient and experienced armed forces. It is important, he stressed, for Turkiye to have a seat at the table.
It was within a similar context that Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan was invited to attend theUkraine security summit in London in early March, a move that surprised many analysts and observers at the time.
Ultimately, we are currently witnessing a new approach to Turkiye within Europe, one that is warmer and more open out of necessity. Whether the Trump administration will followthrough on its threat to withdraw from NATO or if it is one of the US president’s many negotiating tactics, Europe wants to be certain that it can fend for itself if the need arises, and it seems to have little option but to accept Turkiye’s involvement as essential for the defence of the continent.
