Erol Göka
The question of what the state is and where it originates has defied resolution, despite the wealth of empirical data and extensive debates surrounding its types and its ties to historical and social formations. It may well be unresolvable, as it is not simply an empirical matter, but fundamentally a philosophical one. That is to say, the answer depends on the stance one adopts in the struggles of life. The philosophical position one takes directly shapes the quality of the answer. Our own philosophical stance on the state largely aligns with Hegel’s perspective and is developed with reference to it. Therefore, we shall begin by summarizing the place of the state in Hegel’s philosophy.
Long before Huntington’s observations on political struggles, Hegel had already perceived similar patterns in both history and philosophy. He sought to construct a systematic philosophy of history in service of Western civilization and Christianity. Hegel was exceptionally successful in his efforts to develop a systematic, modern philosophy that embraced the fundamental themes of Western history. So successful, in fact, that the hallmark of modernity—the individual’s adoption of the self as the absolute reference point and capacity for self-reflection—found in his thought a philosophical maturity capable of clarifying the meaning of history, philosophy, art, religion, humanity, and even the entire universe.
It is not only Hegel’s philosophy of the state that draws our attention. Behind his success as the representative philosopher of the modern Christian West lies the fact that he was a citizen of a state that was among the last to board the train of modernization. Alongside his attentive engagement with both the achievements and shortcomings of modern developments in the Anglo-Saxon world and its intellectual sphere, he developed his thought in Germany, which had only recently been the heir of the Roman Empire, but in his own time had fallen into a relatively backward historical position. He reflected on both what had been accomplished and what still needed to be done. Hegel laid the final stones on two major paths: the Germanization of philosophy, which began with Kant, and the secularization of Christianity, which had been initiated two centuries earlier by Luther. Hegel is of particular interest to us because, like ourselves, he lived in a late-modern spiritual climate and treated the modernization of religion as a central concern in his philosophy. Indeed, there is much to be learned from him.
In short, what does Hegel assert?
According to Hegel, philosophy is the comprehension of being through pure thought. Since being and thought stem from the same essence, philosophical knowledge is knowledge of the essence of being. The way to think philosophically is by constructing a system through concepts. The fundamental concepts of Hegel’s system—such as “idea,” “reason,” and “spirit” (Geist)—were devised to express that thought and being share the same essence. Building on these concepts, Hegel developed a vast conceptual system: At the origin of everything lies the spirit (Geist), initially in a state of pure potential and isolation. This spirit becomes alienated from itself and transforms into nature, continuing its operation as a blind process of determination. In the phase following this alienation—contrary to its free existence—spirit regains the possibility of liberation and self-discovery through history and culture. Within a single individual, spirit is still partial and manifests only as the “subjective spirit.” In the second stage of its development, spirit manifests as “objective spirit” in the form of history, society, and the state. Finally, art, philosophy, and religion represent the absolute stages of the development of spirit.
According to Hegel, history is nothing other than “the process by which spirit, as its own action, advances toward self-knowledge in world history.” In other words, history is the realm in which Spirit unfolds and expresses its own essence. Spirit expresses itself as vision in art, as intuition and sentiment in religion, and as thought in philosophy. The state, in turn, is the organized form in which spirit carries itself into universal existence. Accordingly, both states and nations serve as instruments in the spirit’s progression toward totality—each of them a part of that totality.
All of this truly exemplifies the perfect and harmonious embrace of thought and being. Other thinkers seem diminished in the face of Hegel’s all-encompassing and integrative discourse. As we stated earlier, this article does not aim to address Hegel’s overall system but focuses specifically on his philosophy of the state. Let us continue with quotations from two of his disciples:
“Neither the family nor the state is a contract; the mistake of the individualist theories of the 18th century—Kant’s theory of the family or Rousseau’s theory of the social contract—was in defining that which is higher, namely the substantive will of the family and the state, only through its weaker appearance or its phenomenal intuition, the ‘contract’” (Hyppolite, 2010).
“The state is the representative and defender of the universal. While society is the foundation and, if understood within certain forms, the substance of the state, reason that is self-aware aligns wholly with the state. Outside the state, there may exist concrete morality, custom, labor, abstract law, emotion, or virtue—but not reason. Only the state thinks, and only the state can think in a holistic manner” (Ilting, 1984).
Hegel’s view of the state as a manifestation of objective spirit—clearly evident in the words of his disciples—was soon embraced as a magnificent legitimation of raison d’état and became a continuous source of inspiration for Western nation-states.
“If we contrast the state with civil society—if we define it merely as something aimed at protecting and securing private property and individual liberties—then individual interests alone become the highest goal that people unite to realize, and being a member of a state turns into an optional matter. Yet the relationship between the state and the individual is quite different; if the state is objective spirit (and it is), then the individual can attain objectivity, truth, and morality only insofar as they are a member of the state.”
These words of Hegel form the foundations of our own “organicist” view of the state. Namely:
Until now, we too have stated on various occasions that while we have consistently avoided any understanding of “statism” that rises to the level of etatism (rigid statism), we nonetheless draw upon Hegelian philosophy in our view of the state. Indeed, by extending Hegel’s understanding of the modern state even further, we have argued that the state should be seen as an ontological entity—one that inevitably emerges, in some form or another, whether in outline or as a Leviathan, under all conditions in which a social nomos exists.
Together with Hegel, we reject drawing strict lines between state and civil society, and instead maintain that the triad of family, civil society, and state are all manifestations of objective spirit (Geist), with the state representing its highest culmination. For this reason, we reject the division between civil society and the state as absolute and separate categories.
We claim that the dynamics of the nation will inevitably reflect themselves at the level of the governing intellect, and will ultimately transform into a form of governing intellect at the highest level. The state is the general authority that society produces from within itself—encompassing even the exclusive right to exercise legitimate power. It stands as proof that society possesses its own internal discourse; it is the embodiment of the practical reason endorsed by society.
That is why we believe that “you are governed as you deserve,” or that “the state, as the organizational form of the spirit within the collective life you inhabit, is your state—no matter what distance you may personally feel from it.” The “I,” the “we,” and our state exist in an organic relationship, in which change or development in any one of them inevitably influences the others.
However, unlike Hegel, our organicist view of the state also carries within it a persistent opposition to the established order. It occupies a position that takes into account the irreducible tensions between subjectivity and objectivity, morality and politics, the individual and the state. The state is neither absolute nor immutable; it is merely one of the many manifestations of spirit. As the social spirit changes in accordance with its own internal dynamics and oppositional currents, the state too must undergo transformation.
In this sense, criticism of the state’s current functioning and acts of opposition contain, in embryonic form, the more evolved state of the future, and are ultimately constructive.
However, our political philosophy, which affirms the state, must not be confused with etatist or fascist views that absolutize the state and exempt it from all forms of criticism. Etatism, which abolishes the organic relationship between society and the state and subordinates society entirely to the service of the state, has nothing in common with our organicist approach that always seeks to explain the state through society and its dynamics.
Liberal and radical democratic perspectives, while offering well-equipped critiques—especially in terms of individual freedoms and democracy—are ultimately incapable of explaining the nature and essence of the state. Defenders of the anarcho-liberal line applaud the words of the anarchist Duval, who replied to the police officer arresting him by saying, “I arrest you in the name of freedom,” and claim that it is not the rule of law but the glorification of pleasure and liberty that will bring about justice. But their grandiose rhetoric falls silent when it comes to the sources of pleasure and freedom, to the genetic and social injustices, and to the unequal nature of the struggle for power.
Marxists, despite their persuasive discourse on global conjunctures, class alignments, and the ideological apparatuses of the state, will falter so long as they remain bound to the formula that defines the state as “the repressive apparatus of the ruling class”—especially those within the civil society camp, who will be left clinging to concepts that serve no practical purpose. Even according to their own dogma of economic primacy, this Marxist definition of the state is absurd. If you strip the state of the holistic reason it represents and its ethical foundations in society, what remains is nothing more than a collection of public servants—each envious of the bourgeoisie and struggling to make ends meet. No compelling theory can explain how these unfortunate bureaucrats could come together to form a Leviathan.
While the state may, at certain times and places, serve as the repressive apparatus of a particular class, this fact alone can never account for its fundamental raison d’être.
Intellectuals who identify as Islamist, on the other hand, have long dismissed the importance of developing a philosophy of the state and politics. Even if they appear not to compromise on theological principles, they ultimately reduce politics to a form of realpolitik based solely on exploiting the contradictions between rivals. They have failed to transform their moral authority and historical legacy into politics, thought, or a social project. Instead of producing answers to real problems, they have come across as opportunists—at times legitimizing the benefits of modernity, and at others choosing the path of puritanical anti-modernism. The reason no one dares today to even mention the once fashionable and cheap “theory of legal pluralism” or the much-touted “just order,” and instead pretends these things were never said, is not due to the necessities of realpolitik, but rather because lazy minds, lulled by the comfort of shared beliefs, have failed to develop a philosophy of the state.
Our understanding of the state can best be conveyed through an analogy:
The organic state is the invisible state.
The most fitting metaphor for our “organicist” perspective on the state is the human body. One of the best-known definitions of physical health is based on the idea that a healthy body is one that cannot be felt. As we go about our lives, we are fully aware that we possess a living body and that its various systems, organs, tissues, and cells function in remarkable harmony—yet we do not feel this functioning. If it were otherwise—for instance, if we could feel every beat of our heart without consciously focusing on it—life would become an unbearable nightmare.
We only feel the workings of our body when our physical health deteriorates, and even then, what we perceive are not the actual functions of the body, but the symptoms caused by their dysfunction. In other words, the moment we begin to feel our body, we are actually sensing symptoms of impaired functioning.
The same is true for nomos: we only perceive it when order is disturbed. This truth also applies to the social nomos: when the state—which exists for the maintenance of social order, whose raison d’être is to uphold that order, and whose legitimacy depends entirely on its ability to do so—begins to be seen and felt in daily life, it is a sign that something is amiss in the social order.
Therefore, the best state is the invisible state. The invisibility of the state is, in fact, a rather simple phenomenological concept: it means that the state can exist within social life and in the lives of individuals without making its presence felt.
What we mean by the “invisible state” is the state’s ability to maintain the minimum possible distance from society—just enough for an organic relationship—while also developing a strong cohesion with it. And such cohesion cannot take a single, fixed form; each social formation determines for itself the most appropriate state structure and the mode of cohesion that suits it best.
There is no universal template for how the state should be rendered invisible—no model valid across all societies and historical periods. On the contrary, the criteria for the state’s invisibility vary depending on the particularities of each society and each historical context.
A view consistent with our organicist understanding of the state is that what renders the state both possible and legitimate is not coercive authoritarianism, but the conscious consent it receives from the individuals of the society it governs. Just as we are aware of our physical existence, we are likewise conscious that there must be an apparatus responsible for the order of our social life—and that it does, in fact, exist. Everything operates within the framework of our conscious approval.
Authoritarianism, along with the forms of coercion and ideological apparatuses it employs to prolong its existence, is not a manifestation of the invisible state, but rather of a state that has become visible—signaling a rupture between itself and society and entering a crisis of legitimacy.
Just as a ventilator or dialysis machine is alien to the natural body, so too are authoritarianism and the pressure it exerts on society foreign to the invisible state, which derives its legitimacy from society itself.
From this perspective, it is no longer difficult to answer the question of what is meant by the so-called “deep state.” Although the prevailing narrative today seeks to equate the deep state with authoritarianism, the true measure of a state’s depth lies in the strength of its ties to society.
A state that places its trust in society and derives its legitimacy from it is, in fact, the true deep state. Every individual consciousness that trusts in and approves of the state—including those in opposition—is a part of that deep state.
References
- Hyppolite, J. (2010). Studies on Marx and Hegel (Trans. D. B. Kılınç). Ankara: Doğu Batı Publishing.
- Ilting, K. H. (1984). Hegel’s Conception of State and Marx’s Early Critique. In Z. A. Pelczynski (Ed.), The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[1] The Hegel quotations in this article are taken from Tülin Bumin’s 1993 book Reading Hegel, published by Kabalcı Publishing.