Muhammed Davut Ünalmış
Considering the new governance practices adopted in Damascus, the government’s rhetoric, and its attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Europe, the Arab world, and Islamic countries, it can be said that HTS and its leader Jolani have adopted a more realistic understanding of state administration. In this context, the organization has shifted away from the organizational mindset of a revolutionary movement and has begun operating with a state-oriented logic that prioritizes Syria’s national interests. Among its primary objectives are lifting sanctions imposed on Syria, ensuring economic and social development, and laying the groundwork for long-term stability through a highly pragmatic approach.
The Syrian opposition’s takeover of Damascus and the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime 13 years after the Syrian Revolution began in 2011 were considered a surprise by most circles. However, one of the most astonishing developments was the ideological transformation of Ahmed Şara, formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. Jolani had previously led both the Nusra Front and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Contrary to expectations and predictions, Şara adopted an extremely tolerant military and ideological stance after the revolution.
On New Year’s Eve, as people strolled between Christmas trees adorned with festive lights on the streets of the Bab Tuma and Bab Sharqi in Damascus, New Year celebrations continued in bars. Security for these celebrations was provided by HTS-affiliated security forces.
It wasn’t just the international community that was surprised—Damascus residents were also in shock. Many had expected an alcohol ban and the enforcement of mandatory headscarves in the city, but the reality was quite the opposite. Even HTS members, who had fought for years under slogans advocating the rule of Islamic Sharia, were stunned by the scenes they witnessed while carrying out their tasks.
This article examines the transformation within HTS and the Syrian opposition in general, based on field observations and interviews with numerous fighters, politicians, and military officials. It covers the approximately two-month period in Damascus from the fall of the Assad regime to Ahmed Şara’s election as President of Syria. To provide context, it is useful to begin by discussing HTS and its leader, Ahmed Şara, before the revolution.
The Emergence of the Nusra Front
When the revolutionary movement in Syria began in 2011 and protests spread nationwide, the regime’s attempt to suppress them with live ammunition escalated the situation into an armed conflict. Meanwhile, different developments were also taking place in Iraq.
A young Syrian man, who was acting under the name of “Os Al-Musuli” in Iraq and was in the ranks of the organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq, which was the Iraq branch of Al-Qaeda at the time, presented a proposal to the leadership of the organization. This proposal was to transfer the jihad experience in Iraq to Syria. Seeking financial and military support from Al-Qaeda, he planned to establish a structure in Syria. Eventually, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the organization at the time, accepted the proposal and allocated a small group of fighters and a budget of $50,000.
This young man would later become known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. In his early 30s at that the time, Jolani emphasized Syria’s unique dynamics in the plan he presented to the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda. He highlighted key differences:
- • While jihad in Iraq had started against a foreign occupier, the struggle in Syria was a popular revolution against oppression. Therefore, the same rhetoric could not be used to mobilize people.
- • In Iraq, Shiites were the majority, whereas in Syria, Nusayris were a minority.
- • Iraq had a strong tribal structure, but Syria did not. Relying solely on tribal support would not be sufficient; a discourse appealing to urban populations needed to be developed.
Additionally, Jolani believed that in Syria, a leadership model should be established that remained connected to Al-Qaeda but could make independent decisions.
After Jolani arrived in Syria, the process of forming the Nusra Front began. In its early operations, the group carried out suicide attacks in the Syrian capital, Damascus. In 2012 alone, it conducted more than 600 attacks, including strikes on the Syrian intelligence headquarters in Kafr Sousa, Damascus. These attacks included operations against Syrian army positions and actions carried out with vehicle bombs.
However, ideological differences within the organization quickly surfaced. Initially, disagreements centered on combat tactics and priorities. The Iraqi branch of the organization planned to carry out car bombings in Türkiye and directly target the Alawite population, while Jolani sought to develop a different model of jihad in Syria. He aimed to move away from the “management of savagery” strategy employed by the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, which sought to instill maximum fear in the enemy.
Jolani convinced the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq to back his project and shifted his focus to Syria. However, just a few months after his arrival, the aforementioned ideological differences began to deepen within the organization. Jolani argued that Syria had its own unique structure and that applying Iraq’s methods in Syria would not be convenient.
These divisions eventually led to a major split in 2013, when the Islamic State of Iraq announced the formation of a unified structure encompassing both Syria and Iraq—ISIS. From this point forward, open conflict erupted between the two factions. Then Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri recognized the Nusra Front as the official Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. However, ISIS rejected this decision and adopted a hostile stance not only toward the Nusra Front but also toward Al-Qaeda’s central leadership.
This external intervention marked a critical turning point for Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. Jolani realized that the existence of a strong neighboring state that cares about the interests of the Syrian people is a decisive factor, and accordingly, he began to invest more in developing political relations within HTS. As part of this effort, the Political Affairs Administration was established to oversee the organization’s diplomatic engagements, laying the groundwork for the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the collapse of the Assad regime.
From this perspective, it can be said that the difficult years of the revolution—with all its hardships—helped mature the Syrian opposition. This process ensured that actors who acted in accordance with the realities of the field prevailed in the struggle. Although violence and internal conflicts inflicted deep wounds, they also paved the way for the emergence of a pragmatic generation within the opposition with high political maneuverability.
Factors Influencing the Transformation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
It can be said that the reason why the war continued for such a long time in the process leading up to the revolution in Syria was the crushing intervention of Russia and Iran, as well as the internal conflicts between HTS and other opposition groups. In this context, it can be said that there are two main driving forces, one internal and the other external, behind the transformation in the discourse and policy of HTS, the architect of the revolution.
Internal Dynamics: Governance Experience in Idlib
HTS’s takeover of Idlib and the subsequent responsibility of governing a major city marked a turning point for the organization. The region’s population of over four million required access to basic necessities such as water, electricity, and food. Additionally, managing trade and border crossings became essential responsibilities. Failure to meet these obligations would have resulted in a failed governance experience. This reality forced HTS leader Ahmed Şara to adopt a more pragmatic perspective and prioritize addressing the fundamental needs of the population.
To establish effective governance in the region, a series of institutional structures were created. The “Salvation Government” was formed to oversee administration through a council of ministers. Additionally, specialized institutions were set up to manage border crossings, ensure security through a general security unit, and oversee economic activities through various investment companies. This experience shifted the organization’s identity from being merely an “armed jihadist movement” to one that could manage public affairs, laying the foundation for a model capable of governing Damascus in the future.
External Dynamics: War Against the Regime and Türkiye’s Role
In 2019, the Syrian regime, supported by Russian air forces and Iran-backed militias, launched a large-scale military operation. As a result, the regime made significant advances in the Hama countryside, reaching the borders of Idlib. The Assad regime’s reckless advance caused great destruction in Hama and its countryside, and the fall of Idlib was only a matter of time after this wave of attacks. At this critical juncture, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) intervened, establishing military observation posts along the frontlines. Simultaneously, Turkish drones (UAVs) targeted Syrian army convoys, forcing the regime to halt its operations. This intervention ultimately prevented Idlib from falling.
This difficult test, where Idlib came to the point of falling, showed HTS leader Şara the importance of the realities of the field and political relations, and made him realize that HTS had to adopt political pragmatism instead of traditional Salafi-jihadist discourses. The reason for this transformation in Şara, or in other words, HTS’s assessment of the conditions and its pragmatic policy, which some circles find quite astonishing, is based on this difficult experience. A source close to HTS expressed the following during a meeting in Damascus, just days after the regime’s collapse:
“In the past, we had a firm and uncompromising stance on our methods and strategies, and we were ready to fight for them. While our goal remained the same, the years that have passed and the challenges we faced taught us the importance of being more flexible and pragmatic in our approach to achieving our objectives.”
Considering the new governance practices adopted in Damascus, the government’s rhetoric, and its attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Europe, the Arab world, and Islamic countries, it can be said that HTS and its leader Jolani have adopted a more realistic understanding of state administration. In this context, the organization has shifted away from the organizational mindset of a revolutionary movement and has begun operating with a state-oriented logic that prioritizes Syria’s national interests. Among its primary objectives are lifting sanctions imposed on Syria, ensuring economic and social development, and laying the groundwork for long-term stability through a highly pragmatic approach.
Conclusion
HTS initially appeared on the Syrian scene as a structure affiliated with ISIS, the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda. Over time, it distanced itself first from ISIS and later from Al-Qaeda, adopting an independent stance and working to establish a unique governance model in northern Syria.
Military operations by the international coalition, attacks by the regime and Russia against the opposition, and Türkiye’s support for the opposition reshaped all dynamics and priorities on the battlefield for HTS. During this process, all factions of the Syrian opposition, including HTS, learned to act in a more strategic and mature manner. Eventually, they set aside their internal disputes, advanced toward Damascus, and overthrew the Bashar al-Assad regime. Thus, Ahmed Şara, formerly known as Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani, took office as the President of Syria. At this point, it is observed that the new Syrian administration aims to establish balanced relations with the Arab world, Islamic countries, the West and the United States by following a pragmatic and realistic policy aimed at strengthening regional and international relations.