Taha Özhan
The most significant outcome of today’s expected dissolution process is the elimination of the greatest “obstacle and excuse” preventing the Kurdish issue from becoming a natural part of Türkiye’s broader democratization problem. To confirm this assessment, one can observe that the common trait among those who voice fear of resolution in different forms is a hidden “fear of democracy” behind the prevailing fear. By dissolving itself, the PKK can remove the “obstacle” to democratization, and politics can eliminate the “excuse” by embracing the resolution.
Türkiye is a country that is used to carrying many burdens for years without any reward. While we have such a political tradition, we also have a tradition of escaping politics in times of democratic crisis. Türkiye’s depoliticization crisis, which first showed its signs at the end of 2013, entered a new phase with the 2016 coup attempt. The centrifugal effect caused by the two interventions in politics, together with the change in the government system, made the mentioned crisis structural and legal. Coalitions formed within a parliamentary system, if necessary, to establish power for a certain period after the election based on a transparent agreement (mutual oversight and a declared set of policies) regarding roles and limits of power, have in the Presidential Government System turned into coalitions formed without a pre-election consensus protocol (focused solely on exceeding 50% and maintaining power), making “politics-less governance” the de facto and sole foundation. The fact that coalitions have become permanent and have been dragged back to the pre-election period, and moreover, the emergence of the crude tutelage of those who represent every tiny percentage towards completing 50 percent, and the transformation of the alliance from a political consensus to a numerical conviction, have made apolitical the main software of the entire system. It was also evident that neither those in power nor the opposition actors were particularly disturbed by this radical transformation.
This is because the effortless politicslessness of numerical alliances offered a more comfortable alternative to the difficult path of politics, which requires labor, vision, and the generation of legitimate consent. Starting in October last year, Bahçeli’s political intervention put serious pressure on change in this comfortable period. Since the end of October, the timid and indecisive attitudes of different political actors, including the PKK, towards this process have been due to their fear of leaving the world of non-politics to which they have been accustomed for years, rather than their certain doubts and different approaches. Six months later, it is this same politicslessness that lies behind the fact that discussions about major crises, deadlocks, and impossibilities regarding the PKK’s disbandment have garnered more attention than the resolution itself.
Some question where the utopian and undefined “victory” lies for the PKK, while others emphasize a democratic deficit, repeating the distorted cliché of “no democracy means armed struggle.” Clearly, we are facing a deep psychopolitical paradox. It is also apparent that the prolonged conflict and its resolution require a deeper confrontation with its psychological, structural, and psychoanalytic dimensions. The misfortune is that the PKK’s disarmament has coincided with the most politicsless period in Türkiye’s recent history. In a period when conspiracy, political analysis, communication, political courageous decisions and the functioning of the 50 percent election threshold system have replaced taking political positions; in a Turkish politics without the PKK, it will not be easy for a political approach to maturely manage the Kurdish Question and democracy issues to emerge.
Yet despite everything, the PKK’s disarmament remains the primary scenario. If this process is not derailed, the same mindset that once deemed it impossible for Assad and his backers to leave will first need to calm down and then face reality. Likewise it is necessary to remember that those who have difficulty being convinced of the existential change in the approach of the MHP line with the problem that they have known and recognized for half a century are those who are on the same axis of thought. Of course, it is not easy for those who are not convinced by Bahçeli’s change of political stance to be convinced of a Türkiye without the PKK readily. Although the MHP leader’s unprecedented change of approach in Turkish political history has taken place before everyone’s eyes, it is not surprising that those who are still not convinced by the transformation are not convinced by the dissolution process declared by the PKK. Of course, it is not easy for a mind that has difficulty accepting and tolerating what is, to be convinced of what will happen.
Between Mourning and Melancholy: The Dissolution of the PKK
A large portion of this group has deeply identified themselves with the ongoing conflict. Regardless of which side they view the issue from, we are faced with the anguish and doubts of those who have placed the conflict at the core of their identity. It is only natural that the end of the conflict would create a risk of identity vacuum. However, if they displayed the pragmatism necessary for this change as much as Bahçeli did, it could seriously shorten the time it takes to get over the trauma. Moreover, we may even see trauma recurrence in the future. For even if conditions change, the subconscious tendency to reproduce trauma may persist as a defense against the psychological disorientation peace might bring. Therefore, disarmament can be framed not as a natural consequence of strategic or political expiration, but as a surrender imposed or constructed by different powers. If you pay attention, you will see that these kinds of emotional outbursts appear in almost the same forms and with similar rhetoric for the actors who are assumed to be on the opposite side of the issue. For those who have identified with the problem and have built a structural world over the years that has transformed the issue into a PKK bubble or a counter-terrorism industry, the problem is not disarmament but the disruption of their mental routines.
For many actors, the aphorism “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of the conflict” could well describe their current state. However, this situation points to an institutionalized skepticism shaped by self-preservation rather than analytical instincts. The only institution that can eliminate this skepticism is politics. If politics does not step in, the discourse that will make laying down arms and changing the subject of the fight against terrorism meaningful will have difficulty flourishing in the face of the provocative rhetoric of a “dishonorable surrender.” Unless a convincing new narrative is built, the old mythology—the belief that only violence can bring about change—will continue to occupy political imagination. The involvement of politics, with an approach that places the axis of a Türkiye without PKK and politics without terrorism on a meaningful basis, can pave the way for a healthy mourning process instead of the parties of the conflict industry clinging to melancholy. After a bloody process that cost the lives of tens of thousands of people, it is possible to emerge from the “40-year memory” in a healthy way without creating a feeling that the history, sacrifices and those lost have been betrayed. Otherwise, the process lived within the pathological world of melancholy will inevitably transform the past into a lost object, a lost history, and lost meaning, thus breeding anger.
Politics must step in at this point to prevent the denial of the process that is taking place before our eyes. The political maturity that will convince the masses that conflict is not an existential necessity and peace is not an identity threat, must be demonstrated. Similarly, it is essential for the structures and discourse that have emerged over the years to change and for different political segments to build a common language in order to prevent collective melancholy from creating resistance to the results of the solution. The reconstruction of longstanding narratives, clichés, and mythologized stories is necessary for a healthy mourning process, a return to politics, management of the organization’s dissolution, and the development of a new political vision. Politics can easily take charge of these aspects of the process and facilitate its healthy progression on diverse grounds.
In the PKK issue, it shouldn’t be as difficult as one might think for all involved stakeholders to realize that we have already reached the “no return to the old state, only the new state” moment. The cost of imposing ethnocratic nonsense on a country that was the remnant of the Ottoman Empire or trying to turn the Kurds, who are the homeowners of these lands with its all qualities, into elements of civil war or geopolitical bargaining chips has been quite high. Losing oneself in that history and insisting that the democratic deficit can be resolved through violence and blood can only produce a vicious cycle. Therefore, the pressing question is not, “What will happen when the PKK lays down its arms or is dissolved, what will it gain, what will we gain?” On the contrary, the correct question is: “What will Türkiye, the Kurds and our region gain if the PKK does not lay down its arms?” There is no meaningful answer to this question, neither within the PKK’s narrow worldview nor from outside its structures. Because the fact that the PKK could not achieve anything with weapons on the first day remains unchanged even after 40 years. These 40 years have left nothing behind but great pain, blood and tears, hatred, and hostility. While the PKK has functioned for years as a primary mechanism in sustaining Türkiye’s democratic deficit, it has prevented the Kurdish issue from becoming a natural part of the country’s broader democratization.
The most significant outcome of today’s expected dissolution process is the elimination of the greatest “obstacle and excuse” preventing the Kurdish issue from becoming a natural part of Türkiye’s broader democratization problem. To confirm this assessment, one can observe that the common trait among those who voice fear of resolution in different forms is a hidden “fear of democracy” behind the prevailing fear. Both those who feature prominently across various sectors of the PKK industry and those who turned counterterrorism from a tool into a primary function are united under this shared “fear of democracy.” By dissolving itself, the PKK can eliminate the “obstacle” to democratization, and politics, by embracing the resolution, can eliminate the “excuse.”
The fatigue of not being able to find the traps, conspiracies and secret plans behind Bahçeli’s statement and intervention for six months, and the efforts to construct the discourse of the impossibility of the PKK’s dissolution congress and the continuation of the process are in the same camp. It is no surprise that disbelief in the process itself is also a part of that very process. The emergence of adjustment pains to a world without the PKK should also be seen as an expected outcome. However, today’s agenda should not be overwhelmed by subjective expectations about the post-PKK era, thinking in a world of mechanical reading and give-and-take. Because this situation is like condemning democratic initiatives that will be exposed today and strengthened tomorrow with the grave mistakes made in the past for years. It is possible to imagine a Türkiye without the PKK and democratized on the grounds built by the drastic transformation experienced both in Türkiye, in our region and in the world (and by the succession of many developments that many of those who ask “How can the PKK lay down their weapons?” consider impossible). The key is not to fight what is happening, but to rationalize and internalize the transformation and to establish a founding political framework.
Syria: An Opportunity or an Obstacle?
It is true that the fear of a resolution has understandable psychological and political-economic reasons. However, the existence of these reasons does not legitimize the fear itself. On the contrary, especially after Öcalan’s capture and the collapse of the military tutelage regime, the existence of the PKK has turned into an indefensible political and social burden. Moreover, this state of senselessness has dragged on far too long, becoming a gangrenous process that has held both Turkish democracy and the Kurds hostage. In this respect, if desired, it can be seen that the dissolution of the PKK with all its dynamics is essentially a choice as well as a long-overdue obligation. The first aspect of this obligation is removing the PKK as an obstacle to democratization. The second is the clear and pressing security, geopolitical, and societal matrix imposed by the world of 2025.
Despite these obligations, the continued existence of the PKK serves no other purpose than prolonging the cost it has already inflicted for years. In the new equation post-December 8, the PKK is likely to further alienate Kurds in Syria and eventually trigger a bloody conflict that it cannot sustain, leading to more suffering for the Kurds. Moreover, it would not be surprising if, after years of flourishing under the shadow of the Baath regime, they leave Syria and seek new alliances, leaving the Kurds to pay a heavy price when they are in a difficult situation. It is highly unlikely that the PKK can maintain its presence on the ground in Syria without entering into a proxy relationship on behalf of a foreign power. Moreover, the list of demands that emerged after the conference held by the organization in Syria points to an adolescent and rather inexperienced world that, after all these years, has not been able to overcome the maximalism of simple identity politics and has not been able to read the geopolitical and economic-political environment around it at a minimum level. Without eliminating the PKK burden, just as in Türkiye, it seems nearly impossible to find an alternative in Syria that escapes the triangle of conflict, proxy relations, and alienation.
They may attempt to continue their nearly decade-long contractual relationship with the U.S. by transitioning to a newly updated function involving Israel and Iran. These relations, which different names from the organization’s leadership no longer hesitate to openly express to the public, will inevitably reduce the PKK’s continued existence to a mercenary status. This would not seem strange, considering the PKK’s long-standing “time-share” role. However, it is clear that such a choice would serve no purpose other than squandering a major opportunity that emerged in Türkiye years later, closing the book on Öcalan, rendering Kurdish political figures, who could have integrated the Kurdish issue into Türkiye’s democratization narrative, entirely irrelevant and outlawing any legitimate political space where even a trace of the PKK’s shadow is perceived. At this point, the PKK can only continue to exist—as a proxy force—by causing harm to the Kurds, to Türkiye, to Syria, and to Iraq.
The Pain of Democratization
Therefore, the supposedly clever and meaningful questions often posed arrogantly, “What happens if the PKK disarms? Why should the PKK disarm? What is the PKK getting in return?”, have a clear answer. Given global geopolitical fractures, profound regional shifts, Türkiye’s ongoing transformation, realpolitik considerations, the paralyzed structure of the Kurdish political movement, and the situation in Syria, above all, considering even the founding leader couldn’t politicize the organization, it’s evident that this group will have no other position than being confined to the narrow bracket of a pure terrorist organization. There is no point in questioning the dissolution of the PKK by those who cannot describe a realistic basis for the PKK’s continued existence – other than continuing as a time-share organization. What must be considered today is how to overcome political phobia after the PKK’s dissolution and what steps need to be taken for Türkiye’s democratization.
At this very point, the problem of light burden and heavy cost stands before politics. From a political perspective, there is no real risk in taking ownership of the process and paving the way, and there is no real threat to fear other than phobias. Yet this does not eliminate the to-do list. In fact, most of that list is essential for Türkiye’s democratization and normalization. Just as the PKK’s outdated, mountain-bound world has long since expired, Türkiye, too, must finally exit the purgatory in which it has remained for years. At a time when global balances are experiencing shakes and the regional geopolitical and security matrix is rapidly transforming, the cost of Türkiye’s democracy deficit may produce a rather unnecessary cost.
The process can also serve as a serious leverage to overcome the approaches of using the democratic deficit that developed economies have begun to experience to legitimize Türkiye’s democratic pain. Ultimately, Türkiye must close its period of political inertia. The cost of extending this period is far greater than assumed. Especially in a period when the global order is undergoing a radical change, there is no distance that Türkiye can cover by being non-political, nor is there an insurance policy. A return to politics must be realized through this process or through democratization. The coming years will be the years when only those who make the “return in question” can become real actors.
Source: perspektifonline.com