Mao Ruipeng
From Biden to Trump: The Potential Trajectory of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report For The Mixed Legacy of the U.S. Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Future, pp:19-25
The Trump administration’s perception of China is likely to be even more negative than Biden’s, viewing China as an existential threat to the U.S. and a more dangerous enemy than the Soviet Union, rather than a mere competitor. Trump is expected to abandon the Biden administration’s policy of “strategic competition” with China, opting instead for a harsher “Cold Warstyle” confrontation. He also advocates disengaging from Europe and the Middle East to focus on countering China. Against this background, the Indo-Pacific region, as the frontline of U.S.-China rivalry, will see an intensified anti-China stance in Trump’s strategy, with increased pressure on countries in the region to align with the U.S. in security, diplomacy, economics, and technology. This will undoubtedly exacerbate U.S.-China geopolitical tensions in the region, narrowing the strategic space for Asia-Pacific countries to remain neutral. Consequently, these countries may find it more challenging to benefit simultaneously from both the U.S. and China.
About the Authors
Mao Ruipeng
Deputy Director of Center for American Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS)
Wu Chunsi
Director of the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies, SIIS
WANG GUOXING
Distinguished Research Fellow, SIIS
LOU XIANGFEI
Associate Research Fellow of the Center for American Studies, SIIS
Lai Yuan
Assistant Research Fellow, SIIS
Shao Yuqun
Director of the Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong & Macao Studies, SIIS
Niu Haibin
Director of the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies, SIIS
Sun Haiyong
Research Fellow of the Center for American Studies, SIIS
Su Liuqiang
Assistant Research Fellow, SIIS
Compiled by;
Mao Ruipeng
Deputy Director of Center for American Studies, SIIS
Jan 2025
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), one of China’s influential think tanks established under the government in 1960, has published a comprehensive report evaluating the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was elevated to a national strategy level during Trump’s first term and continued by his successor, Biden, as well as how this strategy might take shape in a second Trump term. Prominent academics, including SIIS directors and researchers Mao Ruipeng, Wu Chunsi, Wang Guoxing, Lou Xiangfei, Lai Yuan, Shao Yuqun, Niu Haibin, Sun Haiyong, and Su Liuqiang, contributed to the preparation of the report.
The report states that the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” was formulated by U.S. strategists in the early 21st century to eliminate the influence of the widely used term “Asia-Pacific” and dismantle the effective regional cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it was elevated to the national strategy level during Trump’s first term and was strengthened as it continued under Biden, who succeeded Trump’s first term and preceded his second. The report comprehensively evaluates the possible implementation and outcomes of this strategy in a potential second Trump term.
The report highlights that this strategy, implemented in a structured manner during Biden’s presidency, has the potential to disrupt peace, stability, and regional integration in the Asia-Pacific region. It argues that China has been singled out as the sole challenge to U.S. hegemony and has been subjected to containment efforts. However, the report also points out that the U.S. has overestimated its own capabilities, assumed that Asia-Pacific nations would prioritize Washington’s regional strategy over their own national interests, and underestimated China’s capacity—factors that have prevented the strategy from achieving its full objectives.
We present for your consideration the second chapter, titled “ From Biden to Trump: The Potential Trajectory of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy “ which evaluates the legacy left by Biden and the potential implementations and consequences of the strategy in a second Trump term—an analysis that forms the core of this comprehensive report. (Kritik Bakış)
Chapter II
From Biden to Trump: The Potential Trajectory of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report For The Mixed Legacy of the U.S. Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Future, pp:19-25
Political polarization and populist trends sweeping the U.S. have brought about tremendous uncertainties to the Indo-Pacific strategy itself. With Trump winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election, much of the Biden administration’s political and security “legacy” under the Indo-Pacific Strategy may be inherited and reinforced by the new Trump administration to a considerable extent. However, the economic and values-driven aspects of this legacy face uncertainties and might weaken. Furthermore, the local dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region and the evolution of U.S.-China relations are crucial factors influencing the future trajectory of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
I The Complexity of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
The political principle that “Politics stops at the water’s edge” was once considered a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. In the absence of a powerful external adversary, foreign policy often aligns with domestic political agendas. However, amid the increasing polarization in the U.S. political landscape, the Republican and Democratic parties view each other as real enemies. The disappearance of liberal factions within the Republican Party and conservative factions within the Democratic Party has further intensified partisan divides, leading to even greater opposition between the two parties. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy has also become heavily polarized based on partisan divides. Studies in recent years show that Democrats and Republicans have grown further apart on international issues. Amid escalating political polarization, U.S. leaders, in pursuit of narrow partisan or group interests, have let go radical populist and anti-intellectual currents unchecked. This has not only resulted in social division and confrontation but also fueled anti-globalization sentiments.
On the other hand, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy was initially proposed during Trump’s first term and subsequently inherited and developed by the Biden administration. Both parties share significant common ground on the strategy, with the greatest consensus being that China is the primary adversary, and the U.S. should contain and restrict China by strengthening its presence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, thereby shaping a regional geopolitical environment favorable to itself. In light of this, Trump will definitely continue advancing the Indo-Pacific Strategy in his second term, potentially with the following characteristics.
Firstly, Intensified Confrontation with China and Exacerbated Geopolitical Divisions in the AsiaPacific region. The Trump administration’s perception of China is likely to be even more negative than Biden’s, viewing China as an existential threat to the U.S. and a more dangerous enemy than the Soviet Union, rather than a mere competitor. Trump is expected to abandon the Biden administration’s policy of “strategic competition” with China, opting instead for a harsher “Cold Warstyle” confrontation. He also advocates disengaging from Europe and the Middle East to focus on countering China. Against this background, the Indo-Pacific region, as the frontline of U.S.-China rivalry, will see an intensified anti-China stance in Trump’s strategy, with increased pressure on countries in the region to align with the U.S. in security, diplomacy, economics, and technology. This will undoubtedly exacerbate U.S.-China geopolitical tensions in the region, narrowing the strategic space for Asia-Pacific countries to remain neutral. Consequently, these countries may find it more challenging to benefit simultaneously from both the U.S. and China.
Secondly, military and security measures may further step up, leading to fiercer regional tensions. The Biden administration has sought to influence China’s foreign policy by shaping its external environment, and this also applies to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which thus encompasses political, security, economic, and technological dimensions. In contrast, Trump is expected to abandon this comprehensive approach and instead bolster military deterrence against China to maintain U.S. dominance in the region. Although Trump and the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) faction within the Republican Party generally oppose further overseas military engagements, bracing military deterrence against China remains a shared objective of foreign policies upheld by Republicans. This trend could lead to heightened regional security tensions and an accelerated arms race in the region.
Thirdly, the U.S. may adjust its alliance system, with Japan and Australia becoming the leading force of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Under Trump’s leadership, the U.S. will continue to emphasize its system of alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China and maintain the trajectory of multilateral cooperation established during the Biden administration, in an effort to counter China. Trump may also pressure U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to shoulder more of the financial burden for U.S. security expenditures in the region and take on greater responsibilities. Meanwhile, Trump may impose additional tariffs on Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries, citing their trade surpluses with the U.S. and accusing them of “taking advantage of the U.S.” Despite these potential frictions, the asymmetric interdependence between the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies will prevent such issues from fundamentally destabilizing their relationships. During Trump’s first term, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, in the principle of “choosing the lesser of two evils,” adopted a strategy of compromise to maintain stability in their relationships with the U.S., accommodating some of Trump’s demands. The U.S. also established the Quad mechanism (U.S.-Japan-India-Australia). However, due to Trump’s transactional attitude toward U.S. allies and his persistent extortion of U.S.’ allies and partners in military expenditure, economic & trade issues, etc., these countries including Japan and Australia are expected to strengthen ties among themselves to hedge against the uncertainties of a Trump-led U.S. government. The Indo-Pacific Strategy itself is closely tied to the interests of Japan and Australia. To create a “latticework” of alliances, the Biden administration has also been fostering deeper cooperation among these allies and partners. Should Trump resume his policies towards the region from his first term, Japan and Australia will likely seek to address an unpredictable U.S. administration by enhancing their mutual relations and solidifying their ability to shape the Indo-Pacific order.
Fourthly, economic strategy may be further weakened, while looming tariff wars and “decoupling and breaking the chain” policies will render the Asia-Pacific economic order more volatile. The IPEF is the weakest link of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. The main reason why this framework has not been well-received by Asia-Pacific countries is that the Biden administration cannot offer what they desire most: access to the U.S. market. Trump and his supporters firmly believe that the U.S. has “suffered losses” in foreign free trade. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly emphasized his intention to impose high tariffs on all trade partners. Meanwhile, Trump himself has little interest in regional multilateral cooperation. Even if his diplomatic team continues promoting policies similar to those under the IPEF, their effectiveness would be greatly diminished. Therefore, after Trump assumes office, the Biden administration’s IPEF might be scrapped, much like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was during Trump’s first term. Trump might resume the geopolitical attributes of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, while seeking direct economic decoupling from China. Former National Security Advisor of the first Trump administration Robert O’Brien proposed in The Return of Peace Through Strength: A Defense of Trump’s Foreign Policy, an article published in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs in 2024, that higher tariffs should be imposed on China and stricter export controls be applied to any technology that could benefit China. Former U.S. Trade Representative of the first Trump administration Robert Lighthizer suggested revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, enabling the U.S. President to impose discriminatory tariffs on China without restriction. Since the U.S. started to levy massive tariffs on China from 2018, the original bilateral trade pattern between China and the U.S. has gradually shifted into a trilateral trade pattern: “China–Third Parties–U.S.” The supply chain and industrial chain structures in the Asia-Pacific region have been continually adjusted amid intensifying U.S.-China geopolitical competition. The most notable change has been the shift of international supply chains from the Chinese Mainland to “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring” countries favored by the U.S. ASEAN countries and India have emerged as the main third-party beneficiaries in this trilateral trade pattern. After Trump returns to power, he is likely to employ tools such as tariffs, export controls, and rules of origin to push manufacturing back to the U.S. while seeking to restrict China’s ability to export to the U.S. via third parties. This will undoubtedly bring tremendous challenges and uncertainties to economic cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region.
II The Local Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific Region
The local dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region have a significant impact on the development direction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Firstly, countries in the region have their own assessments of the strategy in several key aspects. (1)The stability and sustainability of the strategy, both of which could be undermined with Trump’s return to power; (2) Whether the strategy could provoke direct military conflict between China and the U.S. and severely harm regional countries’ interests and regional peace; (3) Whether the strategy can deliver what regional countries truly desire, such as access to the U.S. market as well as investments, development funds, and technologies from the U.S.; and (4) whether the strategy genuinely represents U.S. attention to the demands of regional countries. From the perspective of Southeast Asian nations, while successive U.S. administrations have consistently proposed strategies targeting the region and emphasized shifting their strategic focus to the region, U.S. diplomatic investments in the region have remained limited in practice.
Secondly, major regional countries and organizations have launched polices in response to great power competition and its impact. After the Trump administration takes office on January 20, 2025, its policy towards China, while maintaining the overarching goal of containing and suppressing China, will likely undergo adjustments in terms of focus, scope, and intensity. Consequently, the U.S. strategy for great power competition with China and its impact on the Indo-Pacific region will also change. The policies of major regional countries and organizations in response to this will directly influence the development of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. On the one hand, the perspectives and stances of regional countries and organizations on “choosing sides” and “bloc formation” are of significant importance. Following the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy under the Biden administration, most countries in the region and ASEAN, while not explicitly opposing the strategy on the whole, have consistently rejected taking sides between China and the U.S. and have firmly opposed the trend toward bloc formation in the region. On the other hand, it remains in question whether ASEAN, as the most important organization in the region, still holds potential to play a stabilizing role through mechanisms such as “10+1,” “10+3,” “10+6,” and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), or is capable of maintaining the region’s economic and security stability while ensuring that hot security issues in the region remain unaffected by external powers and great power competition.
Thirdly, unexpected hot issues concerning global economic and security landscape may also affect the development of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The U.S. foreign strategy often reflects reactions to specific unexpected events at the level of specific policies. Therefore, first and foremost, unexpected hot issues concerning economy and security in the region will become key factors influencing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. It is foreseeable that if such unexpected hot issues arise, U.S. strategic and policy circles will engage in fierce debates between “intervening” and “preventing strategic overextension.” Given the current U.S. political landscape, its administration will ultimately strike a balance between these two approaches when making decisions. Furthermore, unexpected hot issues outside the region may also affect the development of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. For instance, the phased “escalation” or “de-escalation” of the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the Israel-Palestine conflict has exerted great impact on the strategy. The Indo-Pacific Strategy has been designed to maintain U.S. global hegemony, thus tightly linking the Indo-Pacific, Eurasia, and the Middle East. The challenge for the second Trump administration lies in how to maintain its investments in the Indo-Pacific without being overly drawn into affairs of Eurasia and the Middle East amid the relative decline of U.S. hegemonic power.
III The U.S.-China Relations
The structural factors leading to challenges in U.S.-China relations will not disappear simply because of a change in administration. However, whether these factors can be effectively managed to avoid catastrophic impacts on U.S.-China relations will highly depend on the new U.S. administration’s policy towards China. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is deeply intertwined with its strategy towards China, and in this sense, the development of U.S.-China relations is another critical factor influencing the trajectory of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
On the one hand, the Republican and Democratic parties share a high level of consensus in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. First proposed by the Trump administration, the framework was largely inherited and further strengthened by the Biden administration. Therefore, in general, the U.S. Indo-Pacific policy framework centered on containing China and aimed at reinforcing U.S. political, security, and economic influence in the region is unlikely to change. (1) Adherence to Fierce Competition with China. Both parties view China as the primary strategic rival of the U.S., with containing China being the core objective of advancing the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Both parties advocate for all-encompassing and intense competition with China to limit its regional influence. (2) Emphasis on Building the System of Allies and Partners. It is regarded by both parties as a critical pillar to cement the Indo-Pacific alliance system for maintaining U.S. influence in the region and competing with China. Both parties will also continue to urge NATO countries to participate in Indo-Pacific affairs. Although Trump tends to bully U.S. allies, the cooperation relationship between the U.S. and its allies will not undergo fundamental change. (3) Fortifying U.S. Military Presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Being concerned that the military power comparison between the U.S. and China will experience any changes unfavorable to the U.S., both parties advocate for maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in the region, developing nuclear deterrence, and reallocating more U.S. global military resources toward the region. Both parties may promote expanding AUKUS to include more U.S. allies and partners like Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and India and incorporate these countries into advanced military technology cooperation under its second pillar. Both parties are committed to imposing military pressure on China by sticking to FONOPs, carrying out joint military exercises with allies, and supporting allies in building their capabilities to counter China. (4) Emphasis on Offshore Balancing and Unwillingness to Engage in Direct Military Conflicts with China. Although both parties emphasize fierce competition and confrontation with China, neither of them expects to see direct military conflicts between the two countries. When it comes to regional security issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait issues, they prefer a situation where countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan of China confront China on the frontlines, while the U.S. provides comprehensive support and plays an offshore balancing role. (5) Reshaping Regional Supply Chains. Both parties will continue pursuing policies of “de-risking” and “decoupling” in economic and technological relations with China. They aspire to redirect global supply chains from China to the U.S. and its allies, pressuring allies to join U.S. efforts to block China’s access to advanced technologies.
On the other hand, however, the Biden administration’s strategy for great power competition with China has failed to address a critical question: “What is the ultimate outcome of this competition?” Under such circumstances, its Indo-Pacific Strategy has inevitably triggered strategic anxieties among countries in the region regarding choosing sides” and “whether the U.S. and China can coexist peacefully.” This is indeed the case. Whether a reelected Trump administration can answer this question remains uncertain. While there are some realists within the Republican Party advocating for pragmatic policies towards China, there are also highly ideological factions calling for a regimechange policy towards China. How these factions will contend and how Trump will balance these divergent intra-party positions are still unknown. Given the current exceptional bias as well as emotions and whims regarding China in the U.S. strategic policy circle, it is unlikely that the Trump administration’s policy towards China will undergo a positive shift. This is also why its Indo-Pacific Strategy will continue to prioritize containing and suppressing China.
Source:
https://www.siis.org.cn/updates/cms/cms/202501/201632388rf2.pdf
