Taha Özhan
The division of Syria, which has been ongoing since the 1920s, has once again become the focal point of heated debates and unverifiable projections. Since the 1920s, Syria was divided into the states of Damascus, Aleppo, Alawites, Druze, and Greater Lebanon, only to reunify—except for Lebanon—before two decades had passed. Some may find it remarkable to discuss the “division” of a country with such a history. However, a closer look reveals that this is not a history of Syria’s partition, but rather a history of its inability to be permanently divided.
The division of countries and the emergence of a final status is not as simple as it is of ten portrayed in hasty geopolitical analyses or conspiracy theories. Throughout recent history—from Yemen to Germany, from Vietnam to Taiwan, and from Syria to Sudan—partition has always been far more difficult due to internal and external factors. Some nations that were divided over the past century have managed to reunify, while others still struggle with the dilemmas of “unification or division.” Today, in an era when scenarios of America’s fragmentation are openly debated in mainstream media, and think tanks present visual analyses of geopolitical disintegration, division has become a normalized topic. Moreover, at a time when debates on Balkanization dominate the global economy, geopolitical alliances are under increasing pressure to be redrawn, and the nearly century-old global order is experiencing seismic changes, partition has become a highly popular subject of discussion.However, the partition scenario being repeated for Syria today—one that offers nothing but a crude, meaningless, and unsustainable fragmentation—is highly unviable from economic, geopolitical, and security perspectives. While partition may appear as a provocative concept that generates much noise, when the possibility of its realization arises, it presents an exceptionally heavy and complex reality.
In reality, partition does not unfold as neatly as it appears on maps; it comes at a tremendous cost. Even if these costs are somehow endured during the division process, sustaining a partitioned entity requires either an open-ended commitment of external economic and security support for years to come or sufficient internal resources to bear the entire burden independently. When examining the regions in Syria subject to partition discussions, theBalkans emerge as a prime example—having convinced the world of their fragmentation sothoroughly that “Balkanization” has become synonymous with division. Yet, the overwhelming majority of these “states,” which once exerted maximum effort to break apart, are now struggling with radical demographic decline, economic stagnation, and geopolitical irrelevance as they desperately seek reintegration into NATO and/or the EU.
An Iraq That Cannot Be Divided or United
Although it is rarely remembered today, former U.S. President Joe Biden, then a senator, was the leading advocate of Iraq’s partition in 2006. He formalized this idea into a project and publicly introduced it in an article in The New York Times. The goal was to achieve “Unity through Autonomy” in Iraq. According to Wikipedia, Iraq was broadly composed of threemain groups: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Thus, Biden’s supposedly clever “soft partition” plan had a clear structure: the Shiites would control the south, the Sunnis the center, and theKurds the north.
However, Wikipedia did not mention that the Shiites were simultaneously Arabs andTurkmens, that the Sunnis were Arabs, Turkmens, and Kurds, or that sectarian borders were distorted by the energy map. It also failed to highlight how ethnic boundaries were rendered meaningless by sectarian affiliations and energy resources, or how geographic divisions were obstructed by a combination of ethnicity, sect, and energy interests. Ultimately, these plans never materialized. Iraq remains a country that can neither be fully divided nor unified. Over the years, while the momentum for partition has diminished, the drive for unification has not necessarily increased either. Instead, Iraq has settled into a primitive arrangement—sharing energy resources and political positions in a fragile balance that prevents the outbreak of another civil war. Although this “lesser of two evils” continues to erode Iraq, it is still preferred over the half-century of bloody dictatorship, invasions, embargoes, and civil wars the country previously endured. Despite this historical context, those who fail to take Syria more seriously than Iraq—and who approach the topic with the same shallow perspective as Biden did—have, since December 8, begun pushing Syria’s “partition projects” with even greater enthusiasm.
Partition Scenarios in Syria
The prospect of Syria’s division—an issue that has persisted since the 1920s—has once again become the focal point of heated debates and unverifiable projections. Some may find it remarkable to discuss the “division” of a country that was split into the states of Damascus, Aleppo, Alawites, Druze, and Greater Lebanon in the 1920s, only to reunify—except forLebanon—before two decades had passed. However, upon closer examination, Syria’s history is less about its partition and more about its inability to be permanently divided. Moreover, when considering how separate or independent Lebanon truly was from Syria during theBaathist regime, one must reassess the concepts of division and unification in Syria. AfterDecember 8, those who passionately clung to the rhetoric that Syria was “on the brink of partition due to massacres” found themselves deeply disillusioned upon hearing of the SDF’s“decision to dissolve.” Just as they had mentally carved Syria into at least three separate entities, the news of unity forced them to once again confront the country’s reality.
So, can Syria be divided? Of course, it can. Syria could be divided in a scenario where the cost of unity far outweighs the cost of partition, and where sustainable military and economic resources exist to support separation. This principle applies not only to Syria but to almost any country facing the possibility of division. However, it is evident that coexistence in Syria today does not come with an unbearable security or economic burden. Those who refuse to acknowledge that a society fractured in every sense for decades under Baathist oppression yearns more for unity than for division—more for peace than for conflict—are trapped in a far greater and more irredeemable delusion than Biden’s amateurish plan to divide Iraq. Moreover, such partitions typically require an external power willing to commit to long-term, sustainable security guarantees and economic funding. Additionally, the actors receiving this support must have the necessary geographical positioning, population size, and social and political capital to sustain it. Those who are convinced that two of the actors in these partition discussions will receive backing from Israel and one from Iran are simply unwilling to acceptSyria’s potential for coexistence.
None of the actors discussed in partition scenarios today possess the military, economic, or ideological capacity to implement and sustain a division on their own. In other words, we are talking about actors who lack the strength to achieve and maintain separation. The PKK does not have the military capability, the necessary geographic concentration of Kurdish population, or a unifying ideological foundation to sustain such a division. Likewise, it is implausible to claim that the Druze—who mounted the fiercest resistance against the French occupation in 1925, even under chemical attacks—now, with their limited population and lack of a shared vision, aspire to secession or even an Israeli mandate.
Similarly, the Alawites face a choice: either integrating into and rationalizing the new Syria or becoming a proxy force for Iran, burdened with the legacy of Assad’s transgressions. There is no sustainable geopolitical, security, or economic reality that supports the notion of independence for the latter. Ultimately, all partition scenarios revolve around the idea of breaking away from a Damascus-centered Syria. However, there is no realistic answer to how these entities could survive independently after detaching from Damascus and the other key centers that uphold Syria’s core structure. In fact, the natural celebrations that erupted in many Syrian cities following the SDF’s agreement with Damascus offer ample evidence for those willing to see the country’s prevailing desire for unity rather than division.
The American Problem and Changing Geopolitics
Despite all these factors, the possibility of a chaotic post-revolutionary period in Syria is not entirely off the table. The country remains under heavy sanctions, and particularly, theAmerican embargo—beyond the direct pressure caused by Washington—has also paralyzedactors who are otherwise willing to support Damascus. This remains one of the mostsignificant challenges today. However, in a period where the U.S.-Europe divide has become increasingly apparent, there is also a possibility that this issue could be overcome. Washington’s blatant inconsistency has once again been laid bare in the latest crisis in Syria. While CENTCOM was preparing the SDF for dialogue with Damascus, the U.S. Secretary of State’s highly populist and activist reading of Syria highlighted the extent of this irresponsibility. Placing the U.S. Secretary of State’s stance—where he nearly echoed the speech notes of a fanatic Israeli cabinet member—side by side with the EU’s more positive and responsible statement is enough to reveal the emerging fault line.
In this fault line, it will be difficult to maintain the Syrian embargoes in their current form for much longer. Either Washington will turn this issue into yet another point of contention withEurope, or the EU, amid its broader alliance crisis with the U.S., will take independent stepsin Syria as a modest but strategic opening. The shift in European policy is already becoming evident, with European leaders now regularly inviting Syrian leadership to key meetings. This trend suggests that the policy change will continue. If the American embargo is lifted or circumvented, it may become possible to discuss far more optimistic scenarios for Syria’s near future. However, if the current economic catastrophe persists, it is reasonable to expect that multiple conflicting scenarios will continue to remain on the table.
At this stage, one of the biggest uncertainties is the future of America’s military presence in Syria following the SDF-Damascus agreement. The transfer of energy resources to Damascus’ control will have tangible consequences in Washington. Many key figures in Congress who aggressively push the Syrian agenda, particularly regarding the SDF, have direct economic ties to the companies that manage these energy resources. In other words, the pragmatic military-driven step regarding the SDF could clash with the Zionist activism of theWashington establishment and personal economic interests. At this point, the most precarious aspect of Washington’s Syria policy is the extent of Israel’s leverage over it. It is important to remember that the foundations of today’s deep crisis were laid by Biden’s unconditional and limitless support for Israel. Likewise, Trump’s regional policy, which was largely surrendered to American Zionism—an approach even more reckless than that of the most radical Zionistsin Israel—was bound to create serious problems. Unless a regional initiative emerges to shift focus intensely toward Gaza and, more importantly, the broader Palestinian issue, Syria will inevitably continue to suffer the consequences of this recklessness.
What Will Be the PKK’s Direction After the New Agreement?
Regardless of what is happening in Washington, the reality that emerged yesterday—particularly the message sent by the broader public—serves as a lesson for the PKK. There are two key dynamics in the practical implementation of this agreement. Damascus will embrace the SDF and integrate them into the new era, while the SDF itself will effectively dissolve. For years, the Kurdish social imagination, living in the heart of Mesopotamia, has been trapped in a world disconnected from the broader history of the region. With this agreement in Damascus, they now face a new reality. It is unacceptable that the Kurds, one of the most ancient peoples of the region, exist only to the extent that a geopolitical equation allows. In Iraq—and now in Syria—the role assigned to the Kurds, particularly in the form that the PKK desires, has been less about their historical significance and more aboutexploiting temporary geopolitical opportunities, whether for the benefit of a particular family or an organization claiming to represent them.
This alienation has been fueled by the absence of democratic governance among the region’s state actors, as well as by fanatic nationalism and historical arrogance. The Kurds, in turn, have internalized this alienation, distancing themselves from the historical flow of the region.
In the case of Syria, the Damascus agreement offers an opportunity to break free from thePKK’s Kemalist alienation and instead become a stakeholder in the Syrian government. It provides a framework where Kurds, along with all Syrians, can engage with national concerns within the framework of democracy and constitutional citizenship.
Therefore, the dissolution of the PKK in Syria will belatedly allow the Kurds to reconnect with a broader Syrian identity.
Any resistance from the PKK to this dissolution will inevitably clash with the message that resonated on the streets the night of the agreement. Such tensions could lead to a more costly resolution for the PKK, one that would be enforced not through negotiations, but through the withdrawal of Arab forces—leaving the group in an even more precarious position. Ultimately, this could create a PKK structure trapped between the Imrali process and theDamascus agreement.
At this stage, the most pragmatic choice is to accelerate normalization with a realistic approach, rather than dragging Syria into an unnecessary and futile ‘Biden moment’—a misguided political miscalculation with no clear outcome. It remains uncertain whether thePKK world will be able to embrace this rationalization. Will they choose to contribute toSyria’s future in Damascus, or will they resort to juvenile activism—turning a prison contractin to a supposed global geopolitical axis?
Or, will they become so detached from regional realities that they openly express a desire foran Israeli mandate, confronting both Ankara and Damascus in the process? Whether they recognize the catastrophe they are inviting upon themselves remains to be seen.
In the end, it is hoped that a perspective emerges—one that understands the call from İmralı, the realities of Syria, and the position of Türkiye. More than anyone else, this clarity is needed by those who filled the streets with celebrations last night.
Source: https://www.perspektif.online/suriye-bolunebilir-mi/