Cengiz Sözübek
Figures close to the Kremlin, such as Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, writes under the subtitle “The Role Russia Should Adopt After Syria” with the headline: “The Era of Great Powers’ Dominance is Ending; Moscow’s Future Lies in Mastering Regional Diplomacy,” drawing the new roadmap for what Russia should become.
The Era of Great Powers’ Dominance is Ending; Moscow’s Future Lies in Mastering Regional Diplomacy
Figures close to the Kremlin, such as Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, writes under the subtitle “The Role Russia Should Adopt After Syria” with the headline: “The Era of Great Powers’ Dominance is Ending; Moscow’s Future Lies in Mastering Regional Diplomacy,” drawing the new roadmap for what Russia should become.
Lukyanov believes that Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, alongside Iran, to save the regime was the first time since the collapse of the USSR that Russia ventured “beyond the Soviet borders” with such intensity, aiming to regain its status, prestige, and influence on the world stage.
Pointing out that the current conjuncture does not correspond to the status Russia achieved in 2015, the author summarizes the advantage provided by the changing global dynamics to “regional powers” as follows:
“Today’s international system is shaped by transactional interests. Each country now prioritizes its immediate national concerns while only marginally considering broader, long-term alliances. This situation has led to a form of regionalization, where the countries closest to a crisis not only have the greatest interest in its resolution but also the best chance of achieving it.”
Lukyanov emphasizes the “lesson” learned alongside the United States and states that Russia must be a regional rather than a global power, remaining only to the extent of the space opened by Trump-era America’s withdrawal:
“In today’s fluid world order, achieving long-term gains solely through military success is nearly impossible. Agility and the ability to readjust quickly are essential. The United States learned this lesson the hard way in the 2000s and 2010s. Russia now faces a similar dilemma.
With limited resources and competing priorities, Russia must rethink its Middle East strategy. If withdrawal from the key base in Tartus becomes inevitable, Moscow must use its ties with all regional actors—from Israel and Türkiye to Gulf states and even Syria’s new rulers—to ensure this occurs smoothly.
The collapse of the Syrian state is an undeniable setback for Moscow, which has used its military presence there to expand its influence in the Middle East and Africa. However, unlike Iran, Russia retains the option to adjust its commitments and reposition itself strategically. This is the advantage of being an external participant: the Kremlin can leave the region, but Tehran cannot.
Moscow’s next move should focus on reorganizing its relationships in the Middle East while maintaining its reputation as an independent and pragmatic actor. The United States may wish to remove Russia from the region entirely, but Washington’s reluctance to engage directly provides Moscow with room to maneuver.
When Obama described Russia as a “regional power” about ten years ago, the term carried a tone of derision. However, in today’s fragmented world, being a capable regional power may be the only sustainable form of influence. The era of undisputed global powers is ending. Countries that can dominate their immediate surroundings while carefully managing their global ambitions are in a much better position to survive and thrive.
Russia must now consolidate its role as a dominant regional power and continue to remain in strategically critical regions such as the Middle East. In this sense, Obama’s assessment today seems less like an insult and more like a roadmap for survival in a turbulent world.”
A War of All Against All
Nikolai Surkov, Head of the Group on General Problems of the Region at the IMEMO RAS Middle East Studies Center within the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, analyzes post-Assad Syria in his article titled “A War of All Against All,” published in Kommersant on December 10.
Surkov argues that stability will not come to Syria in the near future and claims that the ultimate solution will be a federation:
“Rebuilding Syria will require tens of billions of dollars, and none of the foreign backers of the anti-Assad opposition can afford this. The experiences of Islamist governments in Tunisia and Egypt have shown that governments that begin with elections and promising rhetoric often end with economic crises and military interventions in politics.”
Regarding Russia’s future in Syria, he paints a “pessimistic” picture and requests asylum for Syrians “close to Russia”:
“As for Russia’s role, despite signals from Damascus that it does not want to spoil relations with the Kremlin, there is little reason for optimism. Those who come to power are unlikely to forget the attacks carried out by Russian air forces. Nor is it realistic for Moscow to want to buy friendship through generous aid to rebuild the country.
Perhaps the most important thing Russia can do for its former ally right now is to facilitate the smoothest possible political transition and provide asylum to Syrians who find themselves closely tied to our country.”
Everything Is Just Beginning in Syria
Andrei Kortunov, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), also evaluates the future of Syria without Assad in his article titled “Everything Is Just Beginning in Syria.” He likens Assad’s departure to the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan in 2021:
“In both the first (Afghanistan) and the second (Syria) examples, the national armed forces essentially voted no confidence in the country’s leadership, after which the government collapsed like a house of cards.
Ashraf Ghani ruled Afghanistan for seven years, but during these years, he not only failed to expand the political and social base of his power but also lost much of what he had inherited from his predecessor Hamid Karzai.”
Kortunov, who is also known for his closeness to the Kremlin, points out that Iran and Russia saved the Assad regime at the last moment in 2015 and states:
“Bashar al-Assad was granted something like a ‘bonus game’ for nine years to achieve national reconciliation, but he never managed to unite the Syrian people.”
The author claims that Russia’s total investments in Syria exceed $20 billion and argues that remnants of strong pro-Russian sentiment from the Soviet era still persist within Syria. He concludes that Moscow has many reasons to remain an active player.