Levent Kemal
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has undergone significant evolution since the start of the Syrian civil war, particularly during the period of the Salvation Government in Idlib. Originating from a jihadist core rooted in a predominantly Salafi global jihadist ideology, HTS gradually transcended its role as a military force to become a governing actor through its insurgent governance experiment in Idlib.
This transformation encompassed not only military strategies but also elements such as civil governance, relations with minorities, dealing with internal opposition, and foreign relations. HTS sought to create a public domain through the Salvation Government established in the Idlib region and achieved partial success. Instead of adhering to a universal legal framework, this public domain was built on a generally accepted law more aligned with HTS’s ideological formation. During its implementation, HTS managed to provide municipal and security services that surpassed those of the Syrian regime and the Turkish-supported Syrian Interim Government, addressing the primary needs of large populations in conflict zones.
The governance model of HTS is characterized by a blend of civil administration and military oversight. Although HTS established a hybrid judicial system in Idlib that integrated Islamic law with civil legal principles, it lacked a formal constitution or an elected legislative body. Governance was carried out through decrees, with HTS maintaining control over essential services and infrastructure.
Despite its organizational transformation, HTS faced significant challenges. Economic conditions, political pressures, and demands for greater accountability led to widespread protests in various settlements across Idlib. Protesters called for the release of political prisoners and improvements in living standards. These demands marked a more advanced point compared to the basic demands seen in other opposition-held areas and those under the Assad regime.
To better understand the Salvation Government affiliated with HTS and how insurgent governance has evolved into a central focus, it is essential to examine the organization’s transformation process and how it restructured its multi-layered relationship with society.
HTS and Governance Transformation
HTS, in its early years, operated as a group affiliated with al-Qaeda, engaging in activities rooted in a radical ideology. However, by 2016, it began distancing itself from this ideology and took steps to consolidate its power in Idlib. This evolution materialized with the establishment of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). As the main governing body in the region, the SSG took responsibility for providing essential services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure while also enabling HTS to cultivate a more moderate image internationally.
HTS’s governance approach combines military oversight with civil administration. The group established a judicial system that integrates Islamic law (Sharia) with civil legal principles. However, this governance model lacked a formal constitution or a legislature elected by the public. Instead, decisions were made by HTS leaders, who maintained control over infrastructure.
This marked a significant departure from the pre-2016 organizational mechanisms of HTS and its predecessor groups, as well as from their claims of establishing an emirate. It also indicated a fundamental shift in the ideological mindset of the group’s leadership.
During both the Nusra Front (NF) and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) periods, the predecessor structure and leadership of HTS referred to their aims in Syria as disciples of al-Qaeda, envisioning an emirate and a strict interpretation of Sharia. However, starting in 2016, and with the subsequent establishment and development of the SSG, HTS shifted its focus toward more pragmatic processes.
During the NF and JFS phases, group leaders defined their goals based on an autocratic militaristic structure. However, as they faced the pressing realities of civilian demands in practical processes, they realized they could not simultaneously function as both soldiers and administrators. A senior HTS official describes the situation as follows:
“You cannot pave roads, lay water pipes, provide police services, build and paint schools, and still go to the frontlines (ribat) all at once. One aspect was always lacking. Municipal services, education, and infrastructure had to be handled by others. We realized that telling people ‘we are fighting jihad for you’ did not yield the expected response if we didn’t provide them with bread, homes, schools, electricity, and water. We delegated these tasks to civilians who could handle them.”
Despite taking civilian steps in fundamental areas such as education, healthcare, and security, HTS was unable to fully distinguish between military and civil administration in its governance of Idlib. However, it largely succeeded in integrating these two aspects—military and civilian. While this model allowed for partial societal participation in governance, HTS maintained a heavily centralized decision-making structure, which was inevitable for a war organization.
Nevertheless, HTS continued to reform its military formation and approach to civil governance. To modernize its military structure, it focused on unmanned aerial vehicles, taking inspiration from the Ukraine war. Its ground forces were reorganized into brigades and divisions, akin to a regular army, with officers trained and structured at the Military Academy in Idlib. Separate teams were established for logistics and combat units. Technological advancements differentiated and improved military communication. This military transformation was accompanied by a shift in HTS’s perspective on civil matters, most notably reflected in its relations with minorities in the territories it governed.
Relations with Minorities
HTS’s approach to minorities reflects the shift between the group’s jihadist past and its current leadership strategies. In the past, HTS’s predecessor, the Nusra Front, targeted religious minorities such as Christians and Druze, employing methods such as forced conversions and violence. However, in recent years, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, HTS has adopted a more moderate approach toward these minorities.
HTS reached out to the Druze community, who had suffered in Idlib. Confiscated homes were renovated and returned, and an official apology was issued. Druze began returning to the village of Qalb Lawzah, and over the past two years, the Druze population in the village has neared its previous levels.
During its transformation period, HTS provided security guarantees for Christians and Druze. Similar to the Druze case, properties previously seized during earlier incidents were returned. According to a senior HTS official, more than 100 homes and large amounts of land were returned to their owners along with compensation.
One of the most recent examples is the Christian community in the village of Yakubiye, near Jisr al-Shughur. In 2022, they resumed holding religious services. This development indicated a significant departure from HTS’s predecessors, the Nusra Front and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. It also served as strong evidence that HTS was delineating the scope of its military structure and attempting to engage with society through a civil governance approach.
HTS was indeed changing over time. Despite its Salafi roots, the SSG established by HTS provided rights to women in its governed territories, unlike similar groups. Women actively participated in fields such as nursing, teaching, and daycare management. Additionally, no issues related to girls’ education arose in Idlib under the SSG’s administration.
Foreign Relations and International Image
HTS managed this process not only for internal governance restructuring and transformation but also in the realm of external relations. HTS cultivated the image of a successful insurgent group recognized as an actor opposing the Assad regime, while also strengthening its relations with Turkey, which entered the region as a guarantor state in 2018.
Although this contradicted HTS’s designation as a ‘terrorist’ group internationally, it aligned with its strategy of demonstrating its transformation through internal actions and external messaging, distancing itself from the methods and approaches associated with such labeling.
Thus, HTS positioned itself as a more moderate force by implementing outreach initiatives for minorities and women, improving infrastructure and superstructure, and engaging in actions that demonstrated its responsiveness to civilian demands.
Conclusion
The governance evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib and its statements and approaches after gaining control of Idlib clearly illustrate the challenges and complexities insurgent groups face in state-building efforts within conflict zones.
Although HTS has not distanced itself from its jihadist identity of the past, it has taken significant steps toward greater state-building and the establishment of civil governance, clearly expressing its intent to demonstrate this practically within its new government.
So much so that at the time this article was written, HTS officials were reportedly discussing among themselves whether to declare Christmas a public holiday for Christians.
Although this transformation has occurred in many micro-areas, the 13-year war in Syria has left lingering apprehensions about HTS’s stance. However, it is already evident that the New Syrian Transitional Government declared in Damascus will further develop HTS’s practices in Idlib in a more inclusive and affirmative direction. In other words, what is unfolding is not deception but a reality.