What has Türkiye done in Syria?

The most important question is what kind of governance structure Syria will have in a country with many ethnic identities, different beliefs, and religions. While the examples of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Afghanistan are very painful experiences, Türkiye has been very insistent on preventing a similar chaotic structure from emerging. In that chaos, Türkiye, which has a 900 km border with Syria and nearly 4 million Syrian migrants, would suffer the most.
December 23, 2024
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US President-elect Trump’s remarks about President Erdoğan and Türkiye had a surprising impact not only in Türkiye but around the world:

Nobody really knows who the winner is, but I think Türkiye won. Erdogan is a very smart and tough man… Assad was a butcher. We saw what he did to children… Türkiye holds the key to Syria.”

I had just returned from Syria when Trump said these words. I had traveled to almost all the cities and then interviewed the new leader of the revolution, Ahmad al-Sharaa (Golani). In the TV broadcasts I attended and on my social media accounts, I said, “There is a state mind in Syria, not the US, not Israel, not Britain. I saw that this state mind is Türkiye on the ground.”
But what Türkiye did in Syria, how it became so effective, no one talked about the details of this.

The greatest victim of the Syrian civil war became the key country

Türkiye has been the biggest casualty of the Syrian civil war. For 13 years, Türkiye has received migration without stopping and the number of Syrian migrants in the country has exceeded 3.5 million. Paramilitary groups loyal to the Assad regime and field operatives of the Mukhabarat carried out many bombings in Türkiye, and many people lost their lives.

For years, Iranian and Assad sympathizers have been publishing publications that have been destructive of the Erdoğan government. Serious demonstrations, arguments, and fights broke out in many cities over Syrian migrants. In the last local elections, opposition parties campaigned on anti-immigrant sentiment, and Erdoğan’s party lost significant votes, with municipalities going to the opposition.

Despite all this, President Erdoğan rejected the demands to forcibly send the migrants back to Syria. Instead, he stood up for them and did not back down.

But he did something even more critical, and it went unnoticed: Erdoğan continued to invest in the Syrian opposition and inside Syria.

What has Türkiye done for Syria?

Türkiye has conducted several cross-border operations against PKK/YPG attacks from its borders and created safe zones there. Through the Astana and Sochi agreements, it has helped the opposition establish a government, provide security, and create an economic cycle in cities like Jarabulus, Azaz, Afrin, and al-Bab.

It has built secondary education and university buildings in these cities. It established systems and provided support for Syrians to receive public services such as education, health, municipal services, and security.

For example, the municipality of Gaziantep built the roads in al-Bab, and the Ministry of Health built the health facilities. Many non-governmental organizations in Türkiye have provided aid, cultural, and educational activities.

Türkiye has prepared a flexible ground for the economic and social relations between Türkiye and Northern Syria. For this reason, Türkiye was allowed to supply all the necessary materials for communication, transportation, food, health, education, and other needs in that region.

Türkiye also carried out a separate project to ensure the security of northern Syrian cities. It supported the establishment of the Syrian National Army (SMO), provided military training and arms, and established police organizations in the cities to maintain security through coordinators.

The Free Syrian Army soon controlled thousands of square kilometers of territory inhabited by several million people. On November 17, when the operation against Assad began, the Free Syrian Army also started to take YPG/PKK-held areas in the north.

The critical issue is relations with HTS in Idlib

I was inside Syria when Aleppo was handed over to the Assad regime in 2016, and a huge wave of migration flowed towards Türkiye. I saw the tents and makeshift structures in the Idlib countryside. At that time, Idlib was a small, almost insignificant place. However, it received such a huge migration from Aleppo and its surroundings that suddenly that small place became a city of a million people.

This was not enough; there were mass migrations from Hama in 2017, Damascus, and Daraa in 2018, and they settled in Idlib. Today, according to UN reports, the population of Idlib has reached 4.1 million.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was already present in Idlib. However, Hezbollah withdrew its entire military presence to Idlib as a result of the Assad regime and Russia’s attacks against them in Aleppo, Hama, Damascus, and Daraa. Thus, it built up a large force there.

Since Türkiye is a guarantor state in Idlib in accordance with the Astana and Sochi agreements, it has established relations there. However, elements of the Syrian National Army and some groups within HTS clashed in Idlib. For this reason, Türkiye listed HTS, which it sees as a continuation of al-Nusra, as a terrorist organization.

However, due to its position as a guarantor state in Idlib and the Free Syrian Army elements inside Idlib, it was forced to establish relations with the Idlib administration, and HTS’s transformation began.

How did HTS move away from radicalism and how did it transform?

Idlib was frequently bombed and blockaded by the Damascus regime and Russia. Therefore, HTS had no choice but to get closer to Türkiye in order to survive in the city of 4 million people. Since foreign elements within HTS were attacking Türkiye and clashing with the SMO, Türkiye wanted these foreign elements to be purged from HTS and the organization to be centralized.

HTS leader Golani welcomed these proposals from a pragmatic point of view and ensured that foreign militants and extremists were purged from HTS. Sometimes there were clashes; sometimes he arrested them.

HTS entered into an intensive relationship with Türkiye for the public and social administration of Idlib during this period. Türkiye’s main motivation here was to prevent a new wave of migration from Idlib as a result of the Assad regime’s attacks. However, as Türkiye observed the change and transformation of HTS over time, it increased its relations even more.

The biggest impact was achieved in the economic cycle. Electricity lines were laid through Türkiye, and many systems started to work. Subscriptions were set up to be paid through banks, thus revitalizing the banking sector.

Even people from Latakia and Tartus came to Idlib to shop for food, clothing, and household goods, which had become more affordable due to the war opportunism of the corrupt Assad regime.

Türkiye provided Idlib with the same public services that it had provided in Azaz, Jarabulus, and Afrin, which led to the socio-economic development of the city. This has made it a center of attraction.

HTS’s excesses have been gradually curtailed. Women were banned from driving, but this was lifted; they were provided with all kinds of education, and there was no pressure on people. This was heard inside Syria and partially broke down prejudices against HTS.

The organization, which was shunned as a terrorist organization and seen as horrible all over the world, changed and transformed thanks to this support from Türkiye. Golani went from being an extremely tough military figure to a more civilian and reasonable one through this interaction.

Türkiye’s effort to transform HTS has thus succeeded.

HTS was not targeting Damascus

These developments were taking place in Syria, which the world had forgotten during the period of de-escalation. On the other hand, in the last two years, the geopolitical balances in the region have suddenly changed with the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Lebanon. The three actors that got involved in the Syrian civil war in 2015 and changed the balance in an instant have been worn out and lost power in the last two years. Russia in Ukraine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran in its fight with Israel have all suffered major wounds and lost power in the Syrian theater.

With the field suddenly empty, the YPG attempted to fill the gaps, but without much success.

In order to take advantage of this vacuum, HTS has prepared to take over the Idlib countryside and around Aleppo. Türkiye persuaded HTS to postpone operations in these areas. When the Lebanon war ended, operations in the Syrian theater began.

HTS never thought it could take Damascus or even all of Aleppo. However, when it realized that the Assad regime was rotten and that Hezbollah, Iranian militias, and Russia did not have the power to fight, it decided to advance.

After easily taking Aleppo, it turned to Hama. When that too fell easily, it moved on to Homs. HTS planned to stop there and negotiate with Assad. However, when it learned that the Jordanian/US-backed factions in the Daraa region had entered the Damascus countryside, Golani ordered all his forces to move to Damascus.

Damascus was captured on December 8, 2024; the 61-year Baathist regime collapsed, and Assad fled the country.

They have no experience in running a state, they receive support

“It’s like we are in a dream; we can’t believe we took Damascus,” an HTS leader told me. When I was interviewing Golani, I asked him, “How did you take it so easily?” He replied, “The regime persecuted our people so much that it was as if they were waiting for us to come.”

In fact, the changing geopolitical situation on the ground was to the regime’s detriment and in HTS’s favor in all respects, and the rotting system collapsed with an easy coup.

In Idlib, HTS had gained experience in public administration and partly succeeded in learning from all the mistakes of the civil war. In Aleppo, life returned to normal in two days, and no one was avenged. This weakened the resistance in Damascus.

Despite all this, HTS lacks the experience, knowledge, and manpower to run the state. That is why Türkiye has provided support in this regard as well. The statements made to the international community strengthened the perception that HTS is not a terrorist organization to be feared. The steps taken were well calculated, and chaos was prevented. I was surprised to see life in Damascus return to normal in three days. There were picnics on the Kasyoun mountain, and trade in the old Damascus bazaars was back to normal. Bread and gasoline were rationed, but suddenly they were no more.

What will the new state look like?

The most important question is what kind of governance structure Syria will have in a country with many ethnic identities, different beliefs, and religions. While the examples of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Afghanistan are very painful experiences, Türkiye has been very insistent on preventing a similar chaotic structure from emerging. In that chaos, Türkiye, which has a 900 km border with Syria and nearly 4 million Syrian migrants, would suffer the most.

HTS announced three important principles:

  1. Syrian territory will be governed as a single whole; there will be no federation.
  2. All armed groups will become part of the Ministry of Defense and lay down their arms.
  3. All ethnic and religious groups in Syria will be part of the government. No one’s life will be interfered with.

These principles reassured many states and prevented the possibility of internal chaos. The reason why the hopes of those who were expecting a “Sharia state,” a government monopolized by a group of people, and a new oppressive regime were disappearing day by day was because of these principles and their observance.

However, this should not be taken to mean that everything is rosy. The political, social, and physical reconstruction of Syria will not be easy. The next few months are very critical.

The Syrian people are tired of conflict and fighting; they have suffered a lot. That is why they are praying for the establishment of a government, a system, and a structure in which everyone will be happy. All countries should support this.

https://kemalozturk.com.tr/blog/turkiye-suriyede-ne-yapti/

Kemal Öztürk

Kemal Öztürk
Journalist-Writer
Kemal Öztürk graduated from Marmara University Faculty of Communication and started his professional journalism career at Yeni Şafak newspaper in 1995. He worked as a television journalist and documentary director.
Between 2003 and 2007, he worked as the communication advisor to the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In 2008, he served as press advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In 2011, he was appointed as the General Manager of Anadolu Agency.
Since 2014, he has been working as a columnist, analyst and program producer in national and international newspapers and televisions. He has published 6 books and 10 documentaries.İletişim: [email protected]
kemalozturk.com.tr

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