Andrew A. Michta
Western democracies are finally recognizing that a major system-transforming war could happen soon. As regional power balances threaten to unravel across Europe, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Indo-Pacific, Western capitals are taking steps to address years of neglect by increasing defense budgets. The Trump administration has proposed a $1.5 trillion defense budget, along with a $67.1 billion supplemental to help cover the costs of the Iran war and to expand production of high-demand weapons and munitions. At the Ankara Summit, NATO allies committed to implementing the Hague pledge to spend 5% of GDP annually on defense and defense-related investments. Defense industries in the United States and Europe are ramping up to meet the growing demand for weapons and munitions. These are all positive moves that will help strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense.
But deterrence isn’t just about building up arms or strengthening military forces. It depends on the political will of national leaders and the public’s readiness to accept the consequences if deterrence fails and war erupts. Nations, not armies, go to war, and to succeed, they must maintain strong societal unity and resilience. Yet, despite clear signs that a large-scale conflict could occur within the next few years, Western societies are becoming more divided and less resilient every day. The issue isn’t a lack of money or weapons per se. It’s largely due to leaders’ failure across democracies to unite their nations for the coming crisis.
Free people, united and mobilized around a common cause, are unstoppable in conflict because no dictatorship can match the dedication and resilience of patriotic volunteers. However, for free nations to be mobilized, leaders must honestly address the challenges ahead and, most importantly, build trust by demonstrating that the elite’s goal is to serve and protect the nation, whatever the cost. They must earn the right to lead if they are to ask their fellow citizens to follow and sacrifice.
America and Europe are currently unprepared for a major war because a prolonged leadership crisis has weakened their national resilience. In the U.S., despite lofty rhetoric, over the past 30 years, policy and corporate elites have seemingly forgotten the principle of servant leadership—that those in power owe their positions to the citizens and that their primary duty is to serve the nation above all else. After three decades of globalization and offshoring, the U.S. middle class, once the backbone of the nation, feels abandoned and marginalized. In the 1950s, the middle class made up about 65 percent of American society; by the early 1970s, it had dropped to 61 percent; in the 1990s, to 56 percent; and today, it barely exceeds 50 percent. In the post-Cold War decades, the American middle class has experienced an accelerated decline as corporations have amassed billions. American citizens are angry, and rightfully so, as they face shrinking prospects for preserving their standard of living and ensuring their children’s prosperity.
In the United States and Europe, the leadership crisis has manifested differently. Democracy is a fundamental part of American identity, with the nation’s ideals rooted in strong democratic values and institutions. In Europe, democracy developed from the fall of monarchies that ruled the continent for a thousand years. The fundamentals of American democracy were integrated into its constitutional structure from the start. Conversely, European democracy often evolved through crises in individual countries. For instance, in Great Britain, democracy was shaped over centuries through power struggles, bargains, and legal reforms that gradually expanded political participation. In France, it arose from a bloody revolution, the guillotine, and imperial wars. While Britain’s democracy was molded through gradual constitutional evolution, compromise, incremental reform, and expanding parliamentary sovereignty, France’s democratic development was marked by revolutionary upheaval, violence, civil conflicts, and eventual democratic consolidation. Germany’s democracy was imposed after 1945 under conditions of military defeat, unconditional surrender, occupation, and long-term Allied supervision. West Germany did not initially choose its postwar political structure, but it gradually solidified its democratic institutions, and after unification, it extended them to East Germany.
Popular anger in America and Europe manifests differently. In the U.S., citizens’ frustration with the elite’s failure to prioritize their well-being has sparked a populist wave, while in Europe, it often leans toward nationalism, directly challenging the EU’s supranational institutions. Likewise, different paths to democracy in America and Europe have resulted in distinctly different elites on each continent. In the U.S., the elite has mainly been shaped by wealth accumulation, although in the past, especially during systemic crises, civic virtue and character were also emphasized— “to whom much is given, much is expected.” In Europe, the aristocracy and bourgeois intelligentsia gradually faded after World War II, replaced by a strong bureaucratic class focused on regulating—and overregulating—every citizen’s life. This trend has accelerated since the Coal and Steel Community evolved into the European Union. At its core, it echoes an old monarchic impulse among Europe’s elites, even though directives are now expressed in democratic institutional language.
The American nation today lacks resilience because its elites have nearly forgotten the principle of servant leadership: that those who are privileged to govern owe their positions to the citizens they are duty-bound to serve. European nations also lack resilience, partly because their elites have turned traditional liberalism into a rigid ideology that refuses to consider other perspectives. Citizens who oppose it are marginalized, labeled as “populist” or “far-right,” and all but pushed out of the public sphere. This unwillingness to listen and seek compromise worsens divisions within EU societies, thus reducing societal resilience in times of war.
In the U.S., the decline of the principle of servant leadership has left the shrinking middle class searching for alternatives. Every day, Americans send a clear message to both political parties that elites need to relearn their duty toward them and refocus on the nation’s security and welfare. In Europe, a powerful wave of discontent is now unmistakable in projected voting intentions. This voter frustration in Europe crosses generations, though, as in the U.S., it is most pronounced among younger voters who see out-of-control immigration and energy policies consume more and more resources, while their opportunities for a prosperous life shrink. Radical politics are on the rise, with the Reform UK party in the United Kingdom polling at 24%, the National Rally (RN) in France at around 35%, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) now the largest party in the country, with about 28% of German voters supporting it.
The growing divide between elites and citizens in both the United States and Europe has weakened democratic societies just when they need to be strong and resilient. Instead of uniting to face external threats, people are turning inward and against each other, with extreme politics on the left and right gaining more influence each day. This is happening as the U.S. pulls back a significant portion of its military assets from Europe, even as the security situation on the continent and in the Middle East continues to worsen, and the risk of a systemic conflict remains high.
Unless servant leaders step up to replace the managers currently in power, we could soon face a major crisis like Dunkirk or Pearl Harbor that will shock Western nations to their core. If that moment comes, our democracies may find they are neither politically nor psychologically prepared for it.
*Andrew A. Michta is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Hamilton School at the University of Florida, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The views expressed here are his own.
