Adnan Boynukara
In recent months, the disintegration along the SDF line in Syria has begun to be discussed in Türkiye and across the region through the phrase “the psychological or emotional breakaway of the Kurds.” However, this expression has been detached from the concrete developments that have taken place and circulated with meanings it does not, in fact, convey. Moreover, it also functions as a framework that renders invisible the responsibility for political and organizational failures on the ground. Because this discourse transforms an organizational and political failure into a narrative of social breakaway rather than explaining the existing situation. Yet it is clear that these two levels are not the same thing.
In order to make this distinction in a sound manner, it is first necessary to clarify the facts.
The SDF’s failure to effectively implement the agreement it signed with the Damascus government on March 10, 2025, its foot-dragging on the ground, and its insistence on maintaining control over certain areas in Aleppo triggered clashes with the Syrian army on January 6, 2026. After four days of fighting, the organization was forced to withdraw from Aleppo on January 10. Following this development, the operation launched by the Syrian army to end SDF control west of the Euphrates resulted in Arab tribes rising up against the SDF structure. Subsequently, the east of the Euphrates came under the control of the tribes and, consequently, the Syrian army. As a result, the SDF structure effectively collapsed as of January 18, 2026. PYD/YPG withdrew to a limited area, and a ceasefire was declared on the same day. With security units affiliated with the Damascus administration assuming responsibility for security in the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli on February 2, a new period began in Syria.
Comments made within the framework of the term “breakaway” serve more to simplify the process that actually took place than to explain it. After the military and political disintegration, the circulation of the claim that a “breakaway” occurred among the Kurds—without a single assessment of responsibility for the resulting situation—shifts the burden of the failure experienced onto a social psychology rather than explaining developments on the ground. In essence, what occurred was not so much a sudden break as the simultaneous disintegration of a series of illusions, claims of representation, and expectations.
Leaving aside the political responsibility for what happened and focusing on the current situation, it is possible to address the emerging picture under three headings.
The Collapse of the Protective Power Illusion
Throughout the Syrian civil war, the territorial dominance formed through the United States’ military, political, and economic support, as well as the pragmatic relationship established with the Assad regime, was presented for a long time as the “Rojava Revolution.” In fact, the structure established there was placed within such an ideological framework that it was marketed as a regional model and as an example for the peoples of the world. This framework rested not so much on the military reality on the ground as on an excessive confidence in the permanence of international power balances. During this process, the PKK line presented the de facto situation that emerged through perceptions such as “regional actor,” “U.S. protection,” and “permanent status.” When this mode of governance—detached from geographical, sociological, political, and military realities—collapsed, the feeling that emerged among Kurds was not rebellion, but a familiar disappointment. In other words, “once again, we became the temporary instruments of the great powers.”
This disappointment did not take the form of mass anger directed at the state or at Türkiye, but rather a silent awareness produced by the end of a wrongly constructed expectation. In order to prevent this disappointment from being directed at the organization’s leadership and those responsible, the perception of an “emotional breakaway of the Kurds” was generated. That is, organizational failure was translated into a social mood and attempts were made to legitimize it in this way. Racist expressions used by certain groups were also brought into play to support this perception. This discourse, conducted through social media, was reproduced by many people in different tones. Ultimately, what occurred was the inevitable collapse of a wrongly constructed expectation.
The Deepening of the Representation Crisis
Another important consequence of the disintegration along the SDF line in Syria is that the representation crisis, which has been accumulating for a long time in Kurdish politics, has become more visible. As the organizational structure weakens, the question “Who speaks on our behalf?” is being raised more loudly among Kurds. This question points not only to a current political search but also to a deep legitimacy problem. The meaning of the claim to representation, which for many years took shape in the shadow of armed structures, has become open to debate with the disintegration on the ground. By contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that a new and civilian line of representation will emerge. For this reason, what has emerged is a “void.”
This void carries the potential to evolve in two different directions: it will either be filled through constructive, civilian, and legitimate political channels, or it will deepen in the form of silence, resentment, and political passivity. Although the second possibility may remain invisible in the short term, it holds the potential to generate new fragilities in the long term for both the Kurds and Türkiye.
The point that should be noted here is that the emerging representation crisis is not solely an internal matter of Kurdish society. This situation is also directly related to how politics in Türkiye addresses the Kurds—through which language, which actors, and on which platforms. As the space for representation narrows, politics retreats, and where politics retreats, the language of security becomes dominant. For this reason, it is useful to assess the current process not merely as an organizational disintegration but as a critical threshold regarding how the post-PKK period will take shape. This threshold will be decisive not only for Kurdish politics but also for Türkiye’s democratic normalization.
The Question of Honor and Visibility
Another important dimension of the debate referred to as the “psychological or emotional breakaway of the Kurds” is the issue of honor and visibility. What is at stake here is not, as is often claimed, a denial of identity, but rather how and within which framework Kurds are made visible in the public sphere. For a long time, Kurds have been treated primarily as a social group discussed under the heading of security. Although this approach may have been based on compelling reasons during certain periods, it produces serious problems once it becomes permanent. Because as the language of security becomes entrenched, the language of citizenship retreats, and Kurds are positioned not as the natural subjects of ordinary political and social life, but as a domain that needs to be managed.
This situation may not generate a direct reaction or an explicit objection. However, over time it can lead to the formation of a psychological distance independent of political preferences. People may withdraw not because they feel excluded, but because they are constantly kept in an “exceptional” position. The question of honor emerges precisely at this point. Visibility is the other side of this process. In the public sphere, Kurds are often visible as a problem, a risk, or a matter of security. By contrast, they find insufficient space as natural actors of everyday life, labor, culture, and politics. This unbalanced visibility weakens rather than nurtures a sense of belonging.
From Crisis Subjectivity to Natural Subjectivity
The situation experienced by Kurds is less a loud protest than a distance produced by being continuously pushed into an exceptional position in the public sphere. As the form of relationship built through the language of security becomes entrenched, the language of citizenship weakens, and this, in turn, erodes the sense of belonging. When this picture is considered, the situation faced today is not a breakaway, but a political and psychological void. How this void will be filled—whether it will generate new tensions or create opportunities for normalization—depends to a large extent on the language that is adopted and the form of relationship that is established. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that a similar void also exists in an understanding of Turkishness that reads the Kurdish question solely through the lens of security and is therefore allergic to Kurds.
Ultimately, an approach that treats Kurds not as a subject of crisis but as a natural part of political and social life will constitute the only ground capable of repairing this void. Otherwise, the discourse of “breakaway” will continue both to cover up mistakes on the ground and to turn into a prophecy that constantly reproduces a division that does not, in fact, exist.
