Adnan Boynukara
The issue at hand is locked between the rehabilitation of the ‘old’ Sudan with uncertain formulas and the construction of a new Sudan where the will of the people is reflected in governance. This situation necessitates not just a new mediator but also a new approach. The defining characteristic of this new approach is that it requires a negotiation process that includes not only the warring parties but also civilian elements that are not directly involvedin the conflict. While the ceasefire aspect of the issue concerns the conflicting sides, it is crucial to remember that the root cause of the problem is largely political.
The civil war that began in Sudan on April 15, 2023, has led to the deaths of tens of thousands, devastated the country, displaced millions, and created deep fault lines of conflict that seem impossible to close. Initially fought between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the war has since expanded with the involvement of other organizations, continuing to cause one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
International initiatives and mediation efforts to stop the war have failed. Due to the overwhelming global agenda, no one has prioritized the conflict or its immense humanitarian cost. The United Nations and the Security Council were “occupied” with other crises. The European Union was concerned not with the conflict itself but with managing a potential wave of migrants to Europe. The African Union chose to act as if the conflict was not part of its agenda. Meanwhile, Muslim-majority countries demonstrated both their lack of capacity to address multiple crises simultaneously and their general disregard for the war in Sudan, which was not even a topic on the agenda for most of them.
The indifference was so extreme that there was not even a coordinated effort to provide humanitarian aid. Every risk we highlighted in our June 4, 2024, article, “The Sudan Issue and Possible Risks,” has now materialized.
How Did We Get Here?
The first step in finding a proper solution to the problem is to define it, assess the factors that contributed to its emergence and current state, and move beyond ideological assumptions.
To give a brief chronology, Omar al-Bashir, who ruled the country for more than 30 years, stepped down on April 11, 2019, following the protests that began on December 19, 2018, and the military siding with the demonstrators. This was the first “intervention” aimed at stopping civilian protests. The military administration that was formed was initially led byAhmed Awad Ibn Auf. However, when the protests continued despite his leadership, an unnamed second “intervention” took place within the military three days later, bringing Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to power.
Despite this, the demonstrators did not leave the streets, and to establish the necessary political legitimacy, a Sovereignty Council was formed, consisting of both military and civilian members.
Following the agreement reached between the civilian leaders of the protests and the military, the Constitutional Declaration was signed on August 17, 2019. According to this declaration, the transitional period, planned to last 39 months, officially began on August 21, 2019, withGeneral Burhan taking the oath as the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council.
As per the agreement, General Burhan was to serve for 21 months, after which a civilian member would assume the presidency of the Sovereignty Council for the remaining 18 months. On the same day, Abdalla Hamdok was appointed as prime minister, and the Council of Ministers was announced on September 5, 2019.
However, despite the deadline for transferring the leadership of the Sovereignty Council to a civilian member, the military-backed coalition changed its stance. In clear violation of the explicit provisions of the signed Constitutional Declaration, the decision to hand over power to a civilian leader was abandoned.
The third “intervention” in the process that began in 2019 took place on October 25, 2021, under the leadership of General Burhan. The civilian government was overthrown, and several ministers were detained. Prime Minister Hamdok declared that he would not support the intervention and called on the people to resist.
As a result, on October 26, Hamdok was placed under house arrest. On the same day, theSovereignty Council, composed of both military and civilian members, was dissolved, a state of emergency was declared, and Prime Minister Hamdok and the ministers were arrested.
However, according to the Constitutional Declaration signed on August 17, 2019, a civilian member was supposed to assume the chairmanship of the Sovereignty Council in May 2021, and 18 months later, power was to be fully transferred to civilian rule.
Despite Sudan being largely governed through military interventions since its founding, the military continued its search for legitimacy. To overcome this legitimacy crisis, a newTransitional Process Protocol was signed on April 19, 2022, in a broad-based meeting attended by both military and civilian representatives.
The main provisions of the Transitional Process Protocol included the release of political prisoners, the establishment of a democratic political climate, the participation of all parties in decision-making processes, adherence to the provisions of the Juba Agreement, the appointment of a civilian prime minister, the formation of a Council of Ministers (comprising20 ministers representing all states in Sudan), the drafting of a new constitution, theintegration of the RSF into the military, democracy, civilian rule, federalism, transitional justice, and the conclusion of the transition process with elections scheduled for May 2024.
However, just like previous agreements signed by the parties, this protocol was also not implemented.
There may be significant details regarding the outbreak of the conflict. However, external assessments indicate that the war is fundamentally driven by power sharing, struggles for political control, the integration of armed forces, and the reluctance of organized structures from the Bashir era to relinquish power and their interventions in the process.
It would be inaccurate to view the war solely as a personal power struggle between two leaders. Rather, the conflict is rooted in Sudan’s long history of military rule since itsindependence, its efforts to modernize, the reconstruction of the state, the future of military structures, the pursuit of democratic governance, and the regional power struggle for influence.
Warring Parties
The ongoing civil war in Sudan is generally perceived as a conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). However, in reality, it is a civilwar led by two main actors but involving many different factions.
The first group includes SAF, the Minawi Group, the Al-Bera bin Malik Brigade (a movement consisting of Bashir-era actors), the Sudan Shield Command (Darfur-El Mustaraka), theMustafa Tanbur Army, the armed wing of the Sudanese Resistance Committees, Sudanese groups trained by Eritrea, and the army of Musa Hilal, leader of the Mahamit Tribe.
The second group consists solely of RSF.
Apart from RSF, there are other groups that do not align with it but still fight against SAF. These include the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM/AM), led by Abdulwahid Nur.
Additionally, although they are not directly involved in armed conflict, certain civilian groups play an important role in the resolution of the conflict. These include Takadum, theRevolutionary Front, Emergency Response Chambers, Albarlman (People’s Parliament), Mansam (Women of Sudanese Civil and Political Groups), various NGOs, and some political parties, including Prime Minister Hamdok, who was removed from office by General Burhan.
Negotiations and Efforts for a Solution
Although interest, focus, and participation levels have been low, some attempts have been made to achieve a ceasefire. These efforts can be categorized into the Jeddah negotiations, the initiative of Sudan’s neighboring countries, the African Union and the IntergovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD) initiative, the Manama negotiations, and the Geneva talks.
The first attempt at a resolution was the Jeddah negotiations, initiated by Saudi Arabia and theUnited States. These negotiations took place twice. The first round began on May 6, 2023, and ended on July 24, 2023. The primary objective was to reach a ceasefire that would ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians. However, despite some efforts, no concrete results were achieved. Discussions did not even progress to establishing a mechanism to halt hostilities or launching a political process to resolve the crisis. After theSAF delegation left for consultations with their leadership and did not return, the RSF delegation, which had waited in Jeddah for three weeks, also departed, leading to the failure of the first round.
The second round of the Jeddah negotiations started on October 25, 2023, and concluded on December 3, 2023. This time, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and IGAD also participated in the discussions. Despite lengthy debates, no decision was made regarding a ceasefire.
The second attempt, though not aimed at finding a direct solution, was the meeting of Sudan’s neighboring countries in Egypt in July 2023. This meeting was attended by Egypt, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. However, no concrete proposal or action emerged from this gathering.
The third and only negotiation that produced a tangible outcome was the Manama talks. These negotiations took place between January 7 and January 26, 2024, with the participation of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The second-in-command officials from both SAF and RSF attended. The parties signed a document outlining the principles and foundations for a comprehensive resolution. The discussions progressed toward steps to halt the fighting, and a follow-up meeting was scheduled. However, the negotiations collapsed after Al-Kabbashi, who was representingSAF, failed to attend, citing an issue with his aircraft.
For the fourth round of talks, at the request of the SAF commander, steps were taken to organize direct negotiations between IGAD, SAF, and RSF. The meeting was planned to take place in Entebbe, Uganda, with the participation of SAF and RSF commanders alongsideIGAD representatives. However, the SAF commander failed to appear, and the talks did not take place.
The fifth round of talks and the last direct negotiations between the two sides took place in Geneva. Upon the invitation of UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative RamadanLamamra, a series of meetings were held in Geneva between July 10 and July 19, 2024. Although SAF officials were present in Geneva, they did not participate in the discussions, which were instead conducted between the UN and the RSF delegation. The talks primarilyfocused on the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians.
The sixth meeting was the second round of Geneva talks. Initiated by the United States and attended by Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the UAE, Egypt, the UN, and the African Union, these discussions began on August 14, 2024. The urgent agenda of the talks was to secure a ceasefire, protect civilians, and establish a monitoring mechanism. However, due to SAF’sabsence from the negotiations, no progress was made.
The most recent efforts to find a solution were the negotiations led by Türkiye. Both sides welcomed Türkiye’s initiative, inspired by its role in the Ethiopia-Somalia process. However, developments in Syria diverted attention from Sudan, and at least for now, the initiative does not seem to have produced concrete results.
Understanding why these mediation efforts and initiatives have failed is crucial for better planning future attempts. Seven key reasons can be identified.
The first issue to consider is the unwillingness of the warring parties to seek a resolution. Based on the negotiations and the resulting situation, it is difficult to determine which side is genuinely willing to compromise. The key question here is whether this reluctance is a natural outcome or influenced by external factors. One frequently discussed factor is the influence of Bashir-era actors over SAF. Analyzing this influence is essential for ensuring meaningful progress in peace efforts.
The second factor is the continued military and economic support provided by foreign countries backing the conflicting sides. For the negotiations to succeed, these external actors also needed to be committed to a resolution. However, there is no clear indication that this issue has been thoroughly analyzed or addressed.
The third factor is that mediation efforts have been conducted by actors who are too limited in scope, not fully accepted by both sides, and whose neutrality and consistency have been questioned. On one hand, Egypt is perceived as a party to the conflict, yet it hosts peace talks. Similar concerns apply to Kenya as well.
The fourth factor is the oversimplified analysis that portrays the conflict as a struggle between two generals. This view is inaccurate, as there are numerous factions involved, and their influence is being overlooked. A two-track approach to negotiations is possible: first, efforts to secure a ceasefire, followed by a political negotiation process that includes non-combatant parties.
The fifth factor is that mediators have avoided exerting strong pressure on the warring sides and have instead allowed them to choose negotiation forums that best serve their own interests.
The sixth factor is the involvement of Bashir-era actors and organized structures in the war, as well as their alleged influence over SAF.
It is important to consider the unspoken attitudes that contribute to the failure of negotiations. If this is not done, it becomes difficult to determine who genuinely seeks a resolution and who does not. This, in turn, can create challenges in planning for the future. In a conflict where human lives are at stake, it is also worth noting that some groups adopt positions based on ideological alignments rather than humanitarian concerns.
Will the Conflicts End If the War Stops?
Given the scale of the war and the diversity of groups involved, it is clear that the end of the war alone will not guarantee lasting peace. A sustainable peace can only be achieved througha political solution based on elections that include all factions. Otherwise, the groups perceived as having lost the war may continue the conflict in smaller factions, fueled by existing grievances.
For this reason, any negotiations should primarily focus on securing humanitarian aid and achieving a ceasefire.
Field experience shows that if either SAF or RSF wins the war, the prospect of a stable Sudan remains unlikely. Moreover, given the current balance of power, an absolute victory for either side is nearly impossible.
If RSF wins, elements of the former regime may resort to guerrilla warfare. If SAF wins, it will likely face the emergence of multiple new RSF-like groups.
For this reason, it is crucial for the negotiations to have a clear political vision. A comprehensive solution framework must be developed, one that prioritizes political participation.
How Should the Issue of Bashir-Era Actors Be Managed?
Between 2019 and April 15, 2023, when the war began, two agreements were signed, stating that the country would transition to civilian rule and elections would be held. Despite the seagreements, the military’s refusal to relinquish power appears to stem from the ongoing alliance between SAF leadership and organized groups that held power during Bashir’s rule. This coalition is a continuation of the tensions that emerged both during and after Bashir’sera.
This issue can be seen as a problem of representation between the central government and the periphery, as well as a deep divide between the ruling elites and the general population. A significant portion of the Sudanese people feel that they have no influence over the country’s governance, which remains a major issue. There is no indication that those in power recognize, understand, or are working toward a solution to this problem.
Bashir’s resignation was not merely a result of the protests but rather a means for the existing coalition to continue ruling under a different format. The civilian integration process, whichhad been implemented to contain the protests, came to an end in October 2021.
What transpired can be interpreted as the military shifting its focus from national security topolitics and the economy, with the aim of preserving its privileges. One of General Burhan’sfirst actions after taking power was to ban the National Congress Party, which had maintained control during Bashir’s rule, citing the protests as justification. This decision opened the doorfor Bashir-era actors to exert influence over SAF’s middle and senior ranks, which is believed to have played a role in prolonging the war.
How Should the New Initiative Be Structured?
Currently, there is no active initiative aimed at stopping the war and achieving peace. However, Türkiye has made some efforts in this regard. To prevent new initiatives from failing like previous ones, past experiences must be carefully analyzed. We have already outlined key factors influencing the negotiations, but there are still actions that can be taken, and these should be prioritized.
The first point to consider is the necessity of introducing a new mediation approach that differs from previous efforts. This does not mean simply appointing a new mediator; rather, it requires adopting an entirely new method.
The defining characteristic of this new approach should be a negotiation process that includes not only the warring parties but also civilian elements that are not directly involved in the conflict. While the ceasefire aspect of the issue concerns the conflicting sides, it is crucial to remember that the root cause of the problem is largely political. Therefore, it is essential to adopt an approach that includes political actors as well.
Thus, the focus should not be on determining a military winner or securing territorial control within the country but on establishing a political framework.
For this reason, alongside negotiations aimed at securing a ceasefire between the warring factions, a parallel civilian political process must also be initiated. Structuring the talks in this manner is possible.
Another important issue is that negotiations should be conducted as discreetly as possible to build trust between the parties and limit the influence of “invisible” actors involved in the process. Additionally, there is a need for more effective international coordination to exert pressure on the parties. This mechanism should also create pressure on both the warring factions and their external supporters.
Mediators should ideally work toward establishing a broad political framework for the post-war order, with strong input from Sudan’s civilian groups. International mediators should only offer political recognition and legitimacy to the warring parties in exchange for concrete, enforceable concessions. Backchannel communication must be activated, involving all actors with real political power in Sudan.
In conclusion, perhaps due to the dynamics of our time, no conflict can be resolved solely by military means. Similarly, it is impossible to end hostilities without a political solution. Sudanese people understand this better than anyone, given their experiences with South Sudan, Darfur, and the Juba Agreement process. A well-defined political framework is essential.
Thus, the issue at hand is locked between the uncertain rehabilitation of the “old” Sudan and the construction of a new Sudan where the will of the people is reflected in governance. Failing to approach the matter from this perspective and instead viewing it solely through the lens of military conflict will do little more than prolong the humanitarian crisis and security vacuum or, at best, delay them temporarily.