

# THE DISARMAMENT OF **PKK** **AND THE KURDISH ISSUE**

---

JULY 10, 2025



# THE DISARMAMENT OF **PKK** AND THE KURDISH ISSUE

---

J U L Y 1 0 , 2 0 2 5

## ACADEMIC BOARD

---

**Adnan BOYNUKARA**

**Galip DALAY**

**Hatem ETE**

**Bekir GÜR**

**Taha ÖZHAN**

**Osman SERT**

**Hande Deniz TÜRK**

	5	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
	8	FOREWORD
<b>THE KURDISH ISSUE AND ITS ROOTS</b>	.....	
	14	COMMON BOND
	17	STATE-LEVEL EQUALITY BETWEEN TURKS AND KURDS
	19	PERCEPTION OF EXPERIENCING DISCRIMINATION
	21	EXISTENCE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE
	23	FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE KURDISH ISSUE
<b>THE PROCESS OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT</b>	.....	
	33	SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS
	35	PROGRESS OF THE PROCESS
	37	BELIEF IN PKK'S DISARMAMENT
	40	IMPACT OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT ON TÜRKİYE
	43	POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT
<b>RESOLUTION OF THE KURDISH ISSUE</b>	.....	
	53	BAHÇELİ'S PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION PROPOSAL
	55	NEW CONSTITUTION
	57	POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS OF THE PKK
	63	POTENTIAL STEPS TOWARD RESOLVING THE KURDISH ISSUE
<b>THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT</b>	.....	
	68	WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO RESOLVE THE KURDISH ISSUE?
	.....	
	77	RELATIONS WITH THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (KRG)
	79	KURDISH FORMATION IN SYRIA
	.....	
	84	GENERAL EVALUATION
	87	CHRONOLOGY

# Executive Summary

**T**his public opinion survey was conducted between June 27 and July 5, 2025. The sample size of the study is 1.674. The margin of error, considering a 95% confidence level and design effect, is calculated at  $\pm 3.3\%$ .

## THE KURDISH ISSUE AND ITS ROOTS

### COMMON BOND

"Islam" stands out as the primary dynamic enabling the coexistence of different ethnic and political identities. Among highly educated, Atatürkist and/or social democrat segments, secular values such as "common history" and "citizenship" are more prominent. Among Kurdish respondents, emphasis on "Islam" and a "shared future" is notable. The perception of unity varies according to political party preferences. Voters of the AK Party, MHP, and DEM Party cluster around "Islam" as the most common answer to what holds society together. In the CHP, "common history" and "citizenship" are more emphasized.

### EQUALITY BETWEEN TURKS AND KURDS IN THE EYES OF THE STATE

59% of participants believe Turks and Kurds have always been equal in the eyes of the state. Among Kurds, however, the perception of inequality is more common than equality.

### PERCEPTION OF DISCRIMINATION

18% of participants report having experienced discrimination based on identity. Among Kurdish/Zaza participants, this rate is much higher at 51%.

### EXISTENCE OF A KURDISH ISSUE

One in three participants (37%) state that there is a Kurdish issue in Türkiye. Two-thirds believe there is no Kurdish issue.

### FACTORS BEHIND THE KURDISH ISSUE

Among the general public, the strongest perceptions regarding the causes of the Kurdish issue are "foreign states wanting to divide Türkiye" and "the emergence of the PKK." Internally driven causes such as "state discrimination" or "lack of recognition of Kurdish identity" are considered less influential by most. The emergence of the PKK is viewed not as a result of the issue but as its cause.

## THE DISARMAMENT OF THE PKK

### SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS

Two out of three people support the process aimed at the PKK laying down arms. While support hovered around 50% throughout 2025, after May 12, it surpassed 60%. In this latest study, support for the PKK's disarmament process reached 69%.

### ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS SO FAR

Nearly half of society views the progress of the PKK's disarmament process so far as successful.

### BELIEF IN PKK DISARMAMENT

Although belief that the PKK will disarm is significantly lower than support for the process, it has been steadily increasing. In this survey, 36% believe the PKK will disarm, while 54% believe it will not.

### IMPACT OF PKK DISARMAMENT ON TÜRKİYE

Two-thirds of participants believe the PKK laying down arms would be good for Türkiye. Among all political parties, majorities believe the PKK disarming would benefit the country.

### POTENTIAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT

About two-thirds of the public believe the PKK's disarmament will contribute to democratization in Türkiye. Half of the participants believe it would help President Erdoğan get re-elected. 37% believe it would help transform the DEM Party into a party with nationwide appeal.

## RESOLVING THE KURDISH ISSUE

### BAHÇELİ'S PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION PROPOSAL

More than 50% support MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli's proposal to establish a parliamentary commission for legal regulations regarding the PKK's disarmament process.

### NEW CONSTITUTION

One in two voters believes Türkiye needs a new constitution. However, only 37% believe that the current parliament can draft one during this legislative term.

### POTENTIAL STEPS IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS

Although most people view the PKK's disarmament positively, there is considerable hesitation and cautiousness regarding accompanying steps. There is significant opposition to:

- Improving Öcalan's prison conditions (Support: 19% / Oppose: 69%)
- Amnesty for disarmed PKK members (Support: 21% / Oppose: 65%)
- Amnesty for imprisoned PKK members (Support: 21% / Oppose: 64%)

On the other hand, support for ending the trustee (kayyım) policy is higher (Support: 49% / Oppose: 35%), while public opinion on releasing Selahattin Demirtaş and other imprisoned Kurdish political figures is more divided (Support: 39% / Oppose: 44%).

### **POTENTIAL STEPS FOR RESOLVING THE KURDISH ISSUE**

While there is resistance to topics like Öcalan's conditions or amnesty, there is relatively more openness to legal changes involving the definition of citizenship, education in the mother tongue, and strengthening local governments. In these areas, the share of supporters exceeds that of opponents.

### **WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO SOLVE THE KURDISH ISSUE?**

Among those who acknowledge the existence of a Kurdish issue (37%), open-ended responses link the solution most to justice, equal citizenship, peaceful dialogue, and ending discrimination. A significant portion emphasizes the right to mother tongue and democratic reforms, while some advocate for security-based approaches. The findings indicate that solution proposals revolve around a pluralistic and human rights-based approach. The diversity of opinions shows the solution cannot be reduced to a single factor.

## **GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT**

### **RELATIONS WITH THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (KRG)**

One in two people believes relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil should be further strengthened. Only 14% think the relationship should weaken.

### **KURDISH FORMATION IN SYRIA**

More than a third of society (38%) support a clear stance against a potential Kurdish political entity in Syria. However, 30% think Türkiye should establish good relations with such an entity, similar to its relations with the KRG in Iraq.



## Foreword

Since October 2024, Türkiye has been conducting a highly important process.

The developments that began with MHP Chair Devlet Bahçeli walking over to the DEM Party's parliamentary rows and shaking hands with its co-chairs and MPs on October 1 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly gradually evolved; first into a stable political initiative, then into a political process, and finally into a determined state project.

Fundamentally, the process aims to disarm the PKK via Öcalan, in response to potential threats (and opportunities) for Türkiye arising from developments in the Middle East after October 7, 2023. In the past ten months, important progress has been made toward this goal.

The process entered a concrete phase with Bahçeli's call on October 22 for Öcalan to take on a role in persuading the PKK to disarm. It reached a major turning point with Öcalan's February 27 call for the PKK to dissolve and disarm, followed by the PKK's public announcement on May 12 of its decision to do so. The PKK is now expected to act on this decision and disarm. The intense activity observed this week suggests that the first steps toward disarmament will be taken without delay.

Although the process began with the concrete objective of disarming the PKK, it will not remain limited to this goal. This is quite natural, given that both the choices made during the Republic's nation-building process and the spiral of violence and terror that has spanned nearly half a century have produced a deeply layered issue. It is not necessary here to elaborate on the dynamics of the Kurdish issue or the interaction between the PKK and the Kurdish issue. However, it is clear from both public perception and discourse that we are facing a multifaceted, complex problem, even if its scope occasionally expands or contracts.

Therefore, while the current process proceeds with a specific and limited goal, guided in part by lessons learned from the 2009–2015 "opening/solution" period, it will inevitably intersect with the century-long foundations of the Kurdish issue and Türkiye's broader democratization challenges.

Indeed, from the very start of the process, signs such as its framing in terms of concepts like strengthening domestic unity, achieving internal peace, and Kurdish-Turkish coexistence; and later, as the process became more concrete, the expected administrative, legal, and constitutional steps to implement the PKK's decision to dissolve and disarm; the ideas and proposals voiced by political actors regarding a vision for Türkiye in a post-PKK era; the political activity surrounding the Parliamentary Commission and a new Constitution



- all indicate that the process will necessarily extend beyond disarmament to engage with political goals related to the Kurdish issue and democratization.

This study was designed with an awareness of this broad and layered context, without neglecting the concrete topics debated specifically within the scope of the process.

The **first section** reflects public opinion on the issue: from the ties that hold different identities together in Türkiye, to perceptions of equality and discrimination, to views on the existence and framing of the Kurdish issue.

The **second section** is dedicated to evaluating the current process for disarming the PKK, focusing on public perceptions and opinions about the process, its success, and its potential political outcomes.

The **third section** examines public opinion regarding potential administrative, legal, and constitutional steps that may be taken both for the success of the current process and for resolving the Kurdish issue.

The **fourth section** assesses public perceptions of the process's geopolitical dimension, through the lens of Türkiye's relations with Kurdish entities in Iraq and Syria.

The fieldwork for this study, designed and analyzed by the Ankara Institute, was conducted by PANORAMATR between June 25 and July 5. To observe changes in perception on certain topics, monthly surveys previously conducted for PANORAMATR subscribers were also utilized.

We believe that this research, conducted on the eve of one of the most critical moments in the disarmament process, and the report prepared with comprehensive analysis, will contribute meaningfully to political and public discussions.

In the coming period, as the process advances, we plan to reassess public sentiment and share any possible shifts in perception with you.

## THE KURDISH ISSUE AND ITS ROOTS

---

### COMMON BOND

STATE-LEVEL EQUALITY BETWEEN TURKS AND KURDS

PERCEPTION OF EXPERIENCING DISCRIMINATION

EXISTENCE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE KURDISH ISSUE

Türkiye's multilayered social fabric, despite a significant democratic deficit, has long sustained a lived experience of coexistence among different identities. This state of coexistence has at times served as a multiplier for shared belonging, and at other times, it has been the focal point of social unrest. The Kurdish issue, which has deepened over the years, is not only a socio-political problem but also a multifaceted matter that compels us to rethink concepts such as citizenship, identity, equality, security, and state-society relations in Türkiye.

The findings presented in this section offer an important window into understanding the interaction among different sociological groups in Turkish society and the value systems underlying these relationships. However, these data are not merely quantitative. Each figure reflects historical experiences, political discourses, and personal encounters embedded in Türkiye's collective memory. The responses to questions about our core social bond, perceptions of equality before the state, discrimination, and the roots of the Kurdish issue contribute to decoding the historical and political codes of Turkish society.

The Kurdish issue and the PKK question, long-debated topics within Türkiye's political, social, and security structures, are among the key dynamics that directly impact both internal peace and the democratization process. The findings examined under this heading are critical to understanding how public memory is shaped regarding the Kurdish issue, how it is perceived within Turkish public opinion, and how this perception varies across different political, identity-based, and demographic segments. Especially since the 1980s, when the issue was framed around counterterrorism, it has inevitably become a "socialized" problem. While it once concerned specific regions and populations geographically and socially, by the mid-1980s, the Kurdish issue became a political and social concern felt across the entirety of Türkiye. The PKK's initiation of armed struggle marked the first widespread encounter of society with the Kurdish issue—not as a problem of democracy, but through the lens of a terror threat. This perception remains largely intact in today's context.

The Kurdish issue cannot be seen merely as an ethnic demand or a security problem in the classical sense. Historically, policies of centralization, the imposition of official ideology, and the construction of a homogenous nation-state since the early Republican period significantly restricted the recognition, expression, and public representation of Kurdish identity. However, it is important to remember that this historical process of social engineering also began as an attempt to redefine and reshape Turkish identity itself. While "natural" Turkishness was transforming, or rather, being transformed within the new Turkishness project, Kurdish existence was simultaneously problematized. Over generations, this shifting understanding has informed the collective memory that continues to shape notions of how Turkish society is bound together. A striking consequence of this is that Türkiye has still not concluded its debate on the constitution, which functions as a social contract guaranteeing domestic peace.

One of the key indicators in this research concerns how the notion of a “common bond” that unites different ethnic and cultural groups in Türkiye is shaped. The most prominent factor in this context is “Islam.” This religious identity serves as a strong social adhesive across both political and ethnic lines. Moreover, the perception of a “shared past” appears highly compatible with and interwoven into Islamic identity. Taken together, these findings offer insight into the social center of gravity in Türkiye and explain the long-standing dominance of the conservative-right political matrix. Likewise, one might argue that society, in response to the chronic democratic deficit and persistent failures in constructing a shared sense of belonging or establishing a robust rule-of-law state, has found compensation in the shared ground of “Islam and a common past.” This shows that religious and historical identity in Türkiye still holds more potential to produce an inclusive discourse than secular or citizenship-based bonds.

However, among highly educated segments of the population, secular bonds such as “shared history” and “citizenship” gain prominence, indicating that levels of education, lifestyle, and cultural capital play a decisive role in identity formation. This divergence suggests that identity in Türkiye is shaped not only along ethnic or religious lines but also through class, culture, and education.

The Kurdish issue, on one hand, points to a deep democratic crisis, and on the other, highlights societal challenges in cultivating empathy. A significant portion of the public believes that Kurds receive “equal treatment” from the state despite the history of the Kurdish issue and democratization efforts. This viewpoint reveals important clues about both the persistence of the PKK’s armed presence and the formation of related societal pathologies. On one side, there is systematic indifference toward collective suffering and the potential costs of diverging from the official narrative; on the other, the existence of the PKK and the specter of terrorism continue to shape Türkiye’s collective democratic maturity. While this maturity may not present an entirely optimistic picture, Türkiye does differ from other countries facing similar societal tensions.

Globally, the lack of empathy and the persistence of social pathologies often translate into clear-cut segregation, racism, and conflict. In contrast, despite the PKK’s terrorism and deficiencies in the rule of law, the Turkish public has not allowed the problem to radically escalate into broad societal conflict. Social permeability has deepened considerably, and though tensions occasionally resurface, the Kurdish issue has not become a foundation for societal rupture. This maturity, or society’s ability to contain crisis, could help facilitate both equality debates and democratization in the post-disarmament period of the PKK.

However, the fact that Kurdish voters’ sense of equality clearly diverges from that of the rest of the society cannot be ignored. This points to the continued presence of a deeply rooted problem of belonging. It is also evident in the perception of inequality under the theme of “discrimination.” While the majority of society distinguishes itself from Kurdish voters on the issue of discrimination, allowing for a sociological analysis of normalization, this gap also explains why grievances stemming from the democratic deficit have not been politically articulated. Kurdish voters still express strong dissatisfaction regarding belonging, and continue to politicize this experience.

The “existence of a Kurdish issue” is not only a question concerning the Kurds, as it also reflects identity positions within both the ruling power and the opposition. Opinions about


the existence of the Kurdish issue also indicate, to some extent, the presence of an opposition identity that positions itself against state policies in their historical entirety. Hence, the answer to this question in the Turkish political imagination is not merely based on factual knowledge or findings. Viewed this way, the language parties use and their affinity with the issue, whether relating to the state, the PKK, or terrorism, reveals striking dynamics. For instance, the fact that MHP voters acknowledge the existence of a “Kurdish issue” more than AK Party voters exemplifies the complex and evolving relationships discussed above. A significant portion of society affirms the existence of the Kurdish issue, suggesting that, despite the longstanding slogan “there is no Kurdish issue,” and regardless of state power, official discourse, or the burden of the PKK, a considerable segment of the public approaches the issue in a reasonable manner.

There are also notable differences in how the causes of the Kurdish issue are perceived. While external threats and terrorism dominate mainstream opinion, some segments see the roots of the problem in structural inequalities, discrimination, and lack of identity recognition. In particular, Kurdish citizens and opposition-aligned ideological groups tend to interpret the issue through the lens of social justice and recognition. These findings show that while the desire for coexistence in Türkiye remains strong, attention must be paid to the diverse ways in which this desire is conceptualized and justified.

It is important not to overlook the significant transformation the Kurdish issue has undergone over the past decade. After the end of the rebellion periods, the issue largely became a domestic problem and one of the central dynamics in Türkiye's democracy deficit. While it persisted as an internal democratization issue, the PKK's operations from outside Turkish borders placed a “foreign influence” burden on the Kurdish issue. Despite this, the Kurdish issue has not been widely framed as a matter of foreign policy or geopolitics. However, after 2015, with the emergence of the Syrian dynamic, the Kurdish issue came to be perceived, both politically and socially, as a foreign-backed threat and a geopolitical problem. Following this critical shift, the fact that issues like discrimination, identity denial, and underdevelopment continue to be voiced shows that awareness of the root causes remains significant. Still, the prominence of the belief that “foreign states want to divide Türkiye” as a cause deserves attention. This reflects a decade-long effort to frame both the Kurdish issue and the PKK as parts of a larger regional geopolitical crisis; an image neither can bear alone.

## COMMON BOND


The primary dynamic enabling different ethnic and political identities to coexist is identified as "Islam." Among highly educated, Atatürkist, and/or social democrat groups, secular values such as "common history" and "citizenship" are prominent. Among Kurdish-origin participants, there is notable emphasis on "Islam" and a "shared future." Perceptions of unity differ according to political party preferences. Voters from AK Party, MHP, and DEM overwhelmingly identify "Islam" as the strongest bond holding groups together, forming a distinct cluster. For CHP voters, "common past" and "citizenship" are more significant.



Responses to the question "In your opinion, what is the most important bond holding together different groups in Türkiye such as Turks, Kurds, Bosniaks, Circassians, Laz, etc.?" provide important insights into society's perception of coexistence.

Across society, the strongest common bond identified is Islam (30%), followed by common history (25%) and citizenship (22%). "Belief in a common future" ranks lower at 13%, while 11% of respondents selected "other."

This distribution indicates that societal cohesion is primarily shaped by religious identity, historical memory, and citizenship.



Political party preferences significantly influence perceptions of unity.

For AK Party voters, Islam is by far the strongest bond (43%), followed by citizenship (21%) and common past (15%).


For CHP voters, the highest percentages are "common past" (31%) and "citizenship" (24%), with Islam at 17%.

DEM Party voters strongly prefer Islam (38%) as a unifying bond, with "belief in a common future" (30%) ranked second.

Among MHP voters, "common past" and Islam are equally prominent (33%).

Among undecided voters and those who state they will not vote, "common past" (25% and 32%) and Islam (32% and 24%) are closely ranked.






Among Turkish respondents, the strongest bonds identified are "common past" (28%) and "Islam" (26%), with "citizenship" ranked third (23%).

For Kurdish/Zaza respondents, Islam clearly ranks first (41%), followed by "shared future" (20%) and "common past" (18%). Notably, Kurdish/Zaza respondents show very low preference for "citizenship" as a unifying bond.

Among Kurds/Zazas, Islam stands out prominently, while among Turks, "common past" is relatively more significant.



Among participants with lower educational levels, Islam is identified as the strongest bond at 38%, followed by "common past" at 18%.


For those with intermediate education, "citizenship" (23%) and "Islam" (30%) stand out.

Among highly educated participants, "common past" (37%) ranks highest, while "Islam" (20%) falls to the bottom of the list.


These data suggest that as education levels rise, preference for Islam as a unifying bond declines, while "citizenship" and "common past" become more prominent.

## STATE-LEVEL EQUALITY BETWEEN TURKS AND KURDS

59% of respondents believe that Turks and Kurds have always been treated equally by the state. However, perceptions of inequality are more prevalent among Kurds than are perceptions of equality.



59% of respondents believe Turks and Kurds have always been treated equally by the state, indicating a dominant perception of equality. However, 14% feel "sometimes equal," and another 14% say "never equal." Around 14% believe equality occurs "mostly."




More than 70% of AK Party and MHP voters believe Turks and Kurds have always been treated equally by the state, reflecting strong faith in equality among ruling-party supporters. Among MHP voters, however, those who think equality never existed (19%) is higher compared to AK Party voters.

55% of CHP voters believe Turks and Kurds have always been treated equally by the state, compared to 95% of İYİ Party voters.

DEM Party voters strongly perceive inequality between Turks and Kurds before the state. Only 9% believe equality always existed between Turks and Kurds before the state, while 63% think they were "never equal." This starkly contrasts with responses from the supporters of other parties. The combined percentage of DEM voters who think equality always or mostly existed is only 15%. In other parties, by contrast, the response to "always equal" is 63%, and "never equal" is 9%.

Among undecided voters, the perception of "always equal" is stronger. 55% perceive "always equal," 17% "sometimes equal," and 8% "never equal."

Among those who will not vote, "always equal" responses are relatively lower, though nearly half perceive constant equality.



Ethnic background strongly influences perceptions of equality between Turks and Kurds at the state level.

Among Turkish respondents, the combined total of those who perceive equality as always or sometimes reaches 80%, while this total drops to 45% among Kurdish/Zaza respondents. 65% of Turkish respondents believe in constant equality before the state, with only 7% saying "never equal."

Conversely, only 33% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents believe there is "always" equality, while another 33% say equality "never" exists. Two-thirds of this group perceive equality as limited or nonexistent.

Among respondents from other ethnic groups, 57% say "always equal," while 17% claim "never equal."


# PERCEPTION OF EXPERIENCING DISCRIMINATION

18% of respondents state they have experienced discrimination based on their identity.



Overall, 18% of respondents report experiencing identity-based discrimination at some point, while 82%, the great majority, say they have never experienced such discrimination.

This distribution indicates that roughly one in five individuals have faced discrimination, representing a notable minority.




Among AK Party voters, 14% report experiencing discrimination, compared to 6% among MHP voters.

For CHP voters, the figure is 15%, while no İYİ Party voters report experiencing discrimination.

DEM Party voters show a significantly higher rate, with 64% stating they have faced discrimination. This is the highest rate among all voter groups.

Among voters of other parties, the figure is 18%; among undecided voters, 19%; and among those not intending to vote, 24%.



Only 9% of Turkish respondents report experiencing discrimination, while 91% state they have not faced such experiences.

Conversely, 51% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents report having faced discrimination, nearly three times the societal average. Half of all Kurdish/Zaza respondents say they've encountered discrimination due to their identity.


Among other ethnic groups, the experience of discrimination stands at 14%.

# EXISTENCE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE

One-third of respondents (37%) acknowledged the existence of a Kurdish issue in Türkiye.




One-third of respondents (37%) acknowledge the existence of a Kurdish issue in Türkiye, while 63% deny such an issue. This indicates varying societal perceptions regarding the Kurdish question, with more than a third of society recognizing its existence.



90% of DEM Party voters acknowledge the Kurdish issue in Türkiye, compared to only 2% of İYİ Party voters.


Around half of CHP voters (46%) and roughly one-third of AK Party (29%) and MHP voters (33%) agree that the Kurdish issue exists.

Among undecided voters, 33% acknowledge the issue, while among those not intending to vote, the figure is 47%.



64% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents recognize the existence of the Kurdish issue.

This figure drops to 30% among Turkish respondents and stands at 31% among other ethnic groups.



Groups most acknowledging the Kurdish issue include Socialists (62%), Democrats (59%), Social Democrats (51%), and Islamists (42%).


Among Atatürkists, the figure is 36%, while among ultra-nationalists (Ülkücü), it is only 14%.

Nationalist and conservative groups range between 24% and 31% in acknowledging the Kurdish issue.



## FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE KURDISH ISSUE

Among the participants overall, the strongest perceptions regarding the causes of the Kurdish issue are concentrated under the headings of 'other states wanting to divide Türkiye' and 'the emergence of the PKK.' Reasons that could be seen as originating from within, such as 'state discrimination' or 'non-recognition of Kurdish identity,' are viewed as less influential by the majority of society. The emergence of the PKK is perceived as a cause of the Kurdish problem, not a consequence of it.



When respondents were asked, "How influential are the following factors in the emergence of the Kurdish issue?" with a scale from 1 (not influential at all) to 5 (very influential), the highest average score of 3.8 was given to "foreign states aiming to divide Türkiye."

This was followed by "the emergence of the PKK" (3.5) and "underdevelopment of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia" (3.0).

Factors such as "Kurds' desire to establish their own state" (2.8), "lack of recognition of Kurdish identity" (2.4), and "discrimination by the state against Kurds" (2.3) scored below the midpoint of 3.0, indicating they are viewed as less influential.

## FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE KURDISH ISSUE BY ETHNIC ORIGIN

	TURKISH	KURDISH/ZAZA	OTHER
Foreign states aiming to divide Türkiye	3.7	4.0	3.9
Emergence of the PKK	3.5	3.5	3.6
Underdevelopment of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions	2.7	3.8	3.0
Kurds' desire to establish their own state	3.0	2.5	3.0
Lack of recognition of Kurdish identity	2.1	3.6	2.2
Discrimination by the state against Kurds	2.0	3.3	2.2

Turkish respondents emphasize "foreign states aiming to divide Türkiye" (3.7) and "emergence of the PKK" (3.5). Kurdish/Zaza respondents strongly emphasize "foreign states aiming to divide Türkiye" (4.0), "underdevelopment of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia" (3.8), "lack of recognition of Kurdish identity" (3.6), and "discrimination by the state against Kurds" (3.3).

Interestingly, Kurdish/Zaza respondents rated "Kurds' desire to establish their own state" (2.5) below the midpoint of 3.0, indicating it as less influential.

Across all ethnic groups, the reasons consistently rated as highly influential are "foreign states aiming to divide Türkiye" and "the emergence of the PKK."

## Conclusion

The findings in this section provide highly revealing insights into the collective mental codes that shape approaches to the Kurdish issue. The diverse landscape uncovered by the research shows that political preferences in Türkiye are not just expressions of ideological stance, but also reflect deeply rooted differences in perceptions of citizenship, expectations of equality, and historical senses of belonging.

There are both “empty” and “full” sides to the glass, and if one wants to build a political vision on it, the full side can certainly be seen. When citizens are asked what binds together the diverse elements of Turkish society, “Islam” and “a common past” rank as the top two answers. Among Kurds, “Islam” is the most frequent response, followed notably by “belief in a shared future.” This is significant: while there is clearly a large area of shared ground on the question of “common bonds,” the desire among Kurds to imagine their future within Türkiye stands out.

In fact, this response could be read as a kind of reassurance from Kurdish citizens in response to other questions, such as those about “equality before the state” or “the existence and causes of the Kurdish issue.” It might be assumed that once the PKK disarms, the burden placed on societal empathy will lift. However, uncertainties about what kind of democratization vision and program will be implemented may act as obstacles to broader societal normalization. While the idea that resolving the Kurdish issue will automatically democratize Türkiye stands on weak ground, there is a stronger belief that addressing Türkiye’s comprehensive democratization and establishing full rule of law could naturally resolve many grievances rooted in the Kurdish question.

Data on the existence and causes of the Kurdish issue are important because they show how society defines the problem and whom it holds responsible. While a significant portion of society denies the existence of a problem, even among those who do believe there is one, the explanations vary greatly. In this context, the most commonly cited reason is “foreign powers wanting to divide Türkiye,” while internal causes such as “state discrimination” or “non-recognition of Kurdish identity” are much less accepted. This highlights a broader tendency in Turkish society to attribute problems to external factors.

While 37% of the general population believes there is a Kurdish issue, 63% believe there is not. However, this belief rises to 64% among Kurdish respondents and reaches a striking 90% among DEM Party voters. In contrast, only 2% of İYİ Party voters think such a problem exists.

This dramatic disparity shows that the Kurdish issue is not only objective in nature but is also shaped by political and societal positioning. Who defines the problem matters as much as how it is defined. Therefore, it is clear that there is still no social consensus on either the definition or the solution to the Kurdish issue.

The perception that the PKK's armed presence is the most prominent cause of the problem also shows that the Kurdish issue is largely understood within a security framework by broader society. On a 5-point scale, the emergence of the PKK ranks as a major cause with an average score of 3.5, and "foreign states wanting to divide Türkiye" ranks highest with 3.8. By contrast, internal causes like "state discrimination" (2.3) and "non-recognition of identity" (2.4) remain more secondary.

Another prominent issue is the public perception of whether Turks and Kurds are treated equally by the state. It is now an undeniable reality that the Kurdish issue in Türkiye exists not only in ethnic or security dimensions but also deeply intertwined with a democratization crisis. The data reveal that although many citizens do not directly recognize the issue, Kurdish respondents and certain political identities have developed a strong awareness of its existence. This contradictory perception structure shows that democracy in Türkiye operates not only with institutional shortcomings but also with perceptual gaps.

While a majority of the general public believes the state treats everyone equally, this perception is notably reversed among Kurdish respondents. This contrast suggests that ethnic background is not just a marker of cultural identity but also a key variable shaping one's relationship with the state. The stark gap between DEM Party voters who believe "we have never been equal" and İYİ Party voters who believe "we have always been equal" reveals the deep polarization and asymmetry of perception in Turkish politics.

When asked about equality between Turks and Kurds in the eyes of the state, 59% of the general public say "we have always been equal." Among Kurds, however, this figure drops to only 33%, and 33% say "we have never been equal." Again, this reflects how ethnic identity influences how people relate to the state, and how it is not just a sense of cultural belonging.

Perceptions of identity-based discrimination form one of the strongest emotional and structural bases that sustain the Kurdish issue. While 18% of the general population report experiencing discrimination, this figure rises to 51% among Kurdish respondents. These figures indicate that discrimination is experienced by Kurds not only as a perception but also as a lived reality.

The data on perceived discrimination also point to a sociological contradiction. While roughly one in five people in Türkiye report experiencing discrimination due to their identity, among Kurds the figure reaches one in two. Furthermore, the tendency among Kurdish/Zaza respondents and DEM Party voters to emphasize internal causes suggests that these groups directly experience structural inequalities and identity-based exclusion in daily life, making them key drivers of how the problem is perceived.

Another noteworthy finding is that despite inequality, exclusion, and the threat of terrorism, society has largely prevented the issue from evolving into radical societal conflict. Although tensions flare up occasionally between groups, the Kurdish issue has not become the basis of broad societal violence. This points to a significant level of social maturity within Turkish society.

However, for this maturity to transform into a lasting and constructive solution, more is needed than reactive societal reflexes; it requires a new social contract grounded in the principle of constitutional citizenship. If the PKK's armed presence ends, this social permeability and level of empathy may increase further, thereby paving the way for a meaningful process of democratization.



## THE PROCESS OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT

---

SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS  
PROGRESS OF THE PROCESS

BELIEF IN PKK'S DISARMAMENT

IMPACT OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT ON TÜRKİYE

POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT

The PKK issue, terrorism, the Kurdish Issue, and democratization have long stood out in Turkish politics as topics with both polarizing and transformative effects. Particularly the PKK issue, with its complex accumulation of security, geopolitical, psychological, societal, democratic, and historical baggage over the years, must be acknowledged as a very difficult problem to address beyond the usual "counterterrorism" framework. One of the most striking results of the study is the level of public maturity and appetite for resolution for a problem this difficult to approach. In other words, support for the PKK disarmament process points to an unprecedented consensus across different political, social, foreign policy, and economic lines in Türkiye. It can be said that the failure to transform such a strong societal consensus into successful political outcomes will have consequences for all political actors.

That this process enjoys broad public support demonstrates how strong the public's war fatigue, longing for non-conflict, and expectations for peace are. The disarmament process is viewed not just as a security issue, but also as a requirement of political normalization, democratization, and an inclusive understanding of citizenship.

Differences in levels of support for this process among various political and ethnic groups reveal that identity-based politics remain influential in Türkiye. However, what is notable is that it indicates a shared ground of positively receiving this process cutting across most sociopolitical segments. This suggests that, despite past experiences, peaceful solutions still hold a strong place in the public memory. Especially in times when democratic channels are open, support for similar processes has increased. In this context, the current process can also be read as a product of a public desire that advances in parallel with democratization.

Another structural and often underemphasized dynamic is that long-standing armed conflicts and prolonged high inflation crises have created significant fatigue and desensitization in society. And yet, this may also open a new window of opportunity for resolution. The normalization of conflict and economic hardship dominating the agenda mean that ethnic and political issues no longer polarize society as they once did. Society may now respond with less resistance to resolution attempts that would have previously drawn harsh reactions; this can enable political actors to take bolder steps without facing strong social backlash. Moreover, the country being surrounded by neighbors plagued by wars, migrations, and political collapse has fostered a strong desire for stability among the public. This fear-based quest for stability allows a broader approval for cautious moves that can open the door to non-conflict and peace, rather than radical discourse. Thus, paradoxically, public indifference may actually ease the resolution process and expand political room for maneuver, provided that a reassuring political framework is established to prevent this silence from being perceived as a threat rather than an opportunity.

Another important point is that the process is now being underwritten by the very major political actor that had, for years, reacted most radically to the kinds of steps being



pursued today. We observe that the credit and political ownership extended by the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) to the process has significantly influenced public perception. This valuable advantage appears to be preserved in terms of process advancement, public ownership, and eventual outcome.

The fact that political actors with a nationalist identity are embracing this process is said to inspire hope among communities directly affected by the issue. This support is not only for the act of disarmament but also for the quest for recognition, equality, and justice. On the other hand, the fact that support remains limited among some political groups indicates that deep polarization and suspicion still exist in public memory. This suggests that the state must manage the process not solely within a security framework but as part of a multidimensional strategy for societal transformation.

This picture shows that Türkiye stands at a significant threshold in terms of peace and resolution processes. The willingness of a large portion of the public to support any step toward non-conflict provides political actors with both a great responsibility and a strong basis of public legitimacy.

There is a noticeable gap between overall support for the disarmament process and public perception of how the process is being conducted. This gap reveals that while emotional support for the process is strong, critical attitudes toward its implementation persist. The duality between hope for the process and caution about its implementation shows that the issues of trust and memories of past disappointments remain influential in Turkish politics.

A significant portion of society evaluates the progress of this process positively. This view is more pronounced among voters of political parties that support the process and communities directly affected by it. This indicates that the process must be evaluated not only on a technical level but also in terms of political communication, representation, and building trust. However, the presence of a broad segment that sees the process as unsuccessful shows that Turkish society as a whole is not yet fully convinced and that doubts and reservations about the process continue.

This picture calls into question not only the quality of implemented policies but also the nature of communication with the public, transparency, and inclusiveness of the process. The fact that peace and resolution processes in Türkiye have been repeatedly subjected to political manipulation in the past has reinforced the belief among broad social segments that "processes start well but end badly." This clearly highlights the need to learn from past mistakes in the current process.

The fact that Kurds, in particular, evaluate the process more positively shows that it resonates among the communities involved. However, uncertainty, mistrust, and anxiety still dominate for a significant part of society. This indicates that the process must be managed not only technically, but also in its psychological and emotional dimensions.

In conclusion, the gap between public support for the process and evaluations of its execution should serve as a serious warning for political decision-makers.

A more transparent, inclusive, and socially grounded progression of the process would not only ensure lasting peace but also reinforce the institutionalization of democracy. A different way of describing these shortcomings is the issue of how much the ruling party itself has embraced and politicized the process. The gap becomes clearly visible in the question of “whether the PKK will actually disarm.” Naturally, the PKK's decades-long terrorism has created a deep and hard-to-shift trust crisis in society, shaping the answer to this “belief question.” Yet despite this deep crisis of trust, in recent months a modest and cautious increase in belief that the PKK will disarm has been observed in a portion of society.

Public belief that the PKK will disarm lies at the intersection of the social destruction, trust crisis, and search for hope brought about by Türkiye's decades-long conflict. Expectations for disarmament are nourished by a longing for peace in collective memory but are also shaped under the shadow of past disappointments and failed resolution efforts. The added dynamic of Syria, and the external threat stemming from Syria, has made the issue even more complex.

This level of belief does not reflect only an opinion about the PKK's intentions, but also a broader assessment of the state's will to resolve, the consistency of political actors, and whether the overall political atmosphere is constructive. In other words, how politics approaches the process, its appetite, seriousness, and vision, is embedded in citizens' responses to the “belief” question. The fact that this belief is higher among Kurds shows that communities directly affected by the PKK's decisions still hold on to hope for the process. It also implies that the idea of political resolution is deeply rooted in Kurdish society and that there is meaningful support for transitioning to nonviolent political struggle. In contrast, among broader social segments, caution, suspicion, and distance prevail; showing that the conflict intersects not only with security but also with more fundamental issues like representation, identity, and equal citizenship.

Therefore, low belief in disarmament reflects not only a structural skepticism accumulated toward the PKK over the years, but also public concerns about the sincerity and continuity of the state and political actors in managing the peace process.

Evaluations of the potential effects of the PKK's disarmament on Türkiye are highly meaningful in terms of understanding how social peace, political stability, and democratic development are perceived as an integrated whole. In this regard, a significant portion of the public holds the opinion that disarmament would have a positive impact on the country.

The conflict environment that has persisted in Türkiye for many years has damaged the social fabric not only in directly affected regions but across the entire country, polarizing political relations and turning the public sphere into a tension zone. Therefore, in the public mind, PKK disarmament is associated with a hope for “normalization,” envisioned as the beginning of a period in which political conflict will be absent from daily life, security spending will decrease, and social dialogue will strengthen.

This expectation also generates a shared optimism that transcends political identities. Voter groups from various points across the political spectrum largely converge on this


issue despite their ideological differences, confirming that disarmament is one of the country's core issues. However, voter segments from different parties express a range of views on the meaning and consequences of disarmament: some see it as a guarantee of peace, while others adopt a more cautious and conditional optimism.

Evaluations of the possible implications of the PKK's disarmament for the political system and its actors offer important clues to understanding the fault lines in Turkish politics and the potential impacts of this process. Public opinion on this topic reflects not only the desire for peace, but also expectations about power balances, representation dynamics, and the direction of political competition.

Some in society believe that disarmament will contribute to Türkiye's democratization. This view rests on the idea that one of the major barriers to democratization is the environment of armed conflict and terrorism. This is because disarmament means not only the end of physical violence, but also the creation of a suitable ground for strengthening democratic institutions and political representation. This perspective is met with especially high expectations among Kurds, who believe disarmament will expand the operating space for legitimate political actors.

## SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS


Two-thirds of society view the process aimed at the PKK's disarmament positively. Throughout 2025, support for the process hovered around the 50% range, but after May 12, this figure surpassed 60%. In the current study before you, support for the PKK's disarmament process has reached 69%.



Participants were asked the question: “Do you support the ongoing process for the PKK to lay down arms?” Among respondents, 69% answered “I support it,” while 25% said “I do not support it.”


According to PANORAMATR’s surveys conducted for its subscribers, support for the process stood at 51% in January 2025, then rose to 63% after May 12, following the PKK’s announcement that it would dissolve itself. This level of support continued into June.

Meanwhile, opposition to the process dropped from 39% to 31% during the same period, and the proportion of respondents answering “I have no opinion” declined from 10% to 7%. In parallel with announcements and news regarding the PKK’s disarmament, support peaked at the remarkably high level of 69%.



Among AK Party and MHP voters, the rate of support is 86% and 80%, respectively. While support within the ruling bloc is very high, it is notable that 13% of MHP voters did not express an opinion. Among CHP voters, the rate of those stating they do not support the process (36%) is relatively high, whereas the rate of those expressing support (57%) is still above 50%. Only 28% of İYİ Party voters support the process. 89% of DEM Party voters support the process.

70% of "undecided" voters and 65% of those who say "I will not vote" approach the process positively. Among voters who state they will vote for other parties, the support rate is more limited at 43%.



The majority of both Turkish and Kurdish/Zaza respondents support the process.

89% of Kurdish/Zaza participants support the process, while only 7% oppose it.

Among Turkish participants, 64% support the process, while 29% maintain their distance.


Among other ethnic groups, the support rate is 66%, and the rate of opposition is 24%.

## PROGRESS OF THE PROCESS

Almost half of the population considers the progress of the PKK's disarmament process successful so far.



46% of respondents view the process as "successful," while 39% deem it "unsuccessful." 15% have "no opinion." This indicates that although overall support for the process exceeds 70%, opinions on its progress are relatively more restrained.




Among AK Party voters, 82% find the process successful, and only 9% consider it unsuccessful. 74% of MHP voters find it successful, with 26% seeing it as unsuccessful.

Among CHP voters, a majority (69%) views the process as unsuccessful, with only 14% deeming it successful.

63% of DEM Party voters find the process successful, with 25% viewing it negatively.

Among other party voters, support is 27%, and perception of lack of success is at 60%.

Among undecided voters, 45% see success, 30% find it unsuccessful, and 25% have no opinion. Among those who do not intend to vote, 38% see success, while 47% find it unsuccessful.




62% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents find the process successful, while 22% see it as unsuccessful. Among Turkish respondents, 41% find it successful, and 44% unsuccessful.



## BELIEF IN PKK'S DISARMAMENT

Belief in the PKK's disarmament is significantly lower than support for the disarmament process itself but has steadily increased over time.

The study indicates that 36% of respondents believe the PKK will lay down its weapons, while 54% think otherwise.




Despite the PKK announcing its decision to disarm on May 12, 2025, the prevailing public opinion remains skeptical about the organization's adherence to this decision. However, considering the measurements conducted for PANORAMATR subscribers, as of June 2025, there has been a consistent upward trend in the proportion of those who believe the PKK will disarm.

According to July 2025 data, 36.3% of respondents believe that the PKK will disarm. However, 53.7% approach this decision with skepticism and think the PKK will not disarm. 10% of respondents remain undecided. This picture indicates that the majority of the public maintains a cautious stance.

Looking at the changes over time, those who believed the PKK would disarm increased from 22.2% in March 2025 to 28.1% following the organization's dissolution announcement on May 12, and then to 30.8% in June.

During the same period, those who believed the PKK would not disarm decreased from 67.3% to 60.6%, and then to 57.4%.

This trend has continued into July, showing a slight but noticeable growth in optimism among the public.




DEM Party voters show the highest belief that the PKK will disarm, at 85%.

More than half of AK Party (55%) and MHP (50%) voters also believe in this outcome, although a significant minority remains cautious.

Belief in disarmament is significantly lower among CHP and İYİ Party voters (below 20%). In these two parties, skepticism prevails, with 73% and 69%, respectively, believing the PKK will not disarm.

Among undecided voters and those not intending to vote, skepticism also dominates, with 54% and 60%, respectively, doubting the disarmament.




67% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents believe that the PKK will disarm, significantly higher than the 28% among Turkish respondents and 39% among other ethnic groups.

Conversely, skepticism regarding the disarmament decision is much higher among Turkish respondents (62%), compared to Kurdish/Zaza respondents (23%).

This indicates a direct correlation between ethnicity and belief in the PKK's disarmament, particularly highlighting higher optimism among Kurdish/Zaza respondents.

# IMPACT OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT ON TÜRKİYE


Two-thirds of respondents believe that the PKK laying down arms would be beneficial for Türkiye. Across all political parties, the majority share the opinion that PKK's disarmament would positively affect Türkiye.



A strong public consensus exists that PKK's disarmament would be beneficial for the country. Since May 2025, there has been an increase in respondents holding this positive view, while the proportion of those with negative opinions has significantly decreased. Currently, 70% view disarmament positively. According to PANORAMATR's surveys conducted for its subscribers, this rate was 72% in June 2025, up from 63% in May 2025. Over time, the positive perspective has strengthened and stabilized at a high level in July.

Those who responded "makes no difference" constitute 21%, "bad/negative" responses are 6%, and those without an opinion are at 3%.

# IMPACT OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT ON TÜRKİYE BY PARTY PREFERENCE




Among AK Party and MHP voters, 84% believe PKK's disarmament will positively impact Türkiye.

This rate rises to 87% among DEM Party voters.

Positive opinion is at 58% among CHP voters and 54% among İYİ Party voters. Notably, İYİ Party has the highest negative response rate at 27%.

Among CHP voters, "makes no difference" stands out significantly at 32%. Only 3% of DEM Party voters responded negatively.




89% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents believe disarmament will benefit Türkiye, with only 2% viewing it negatively and 7% seeing no difference.

Among Turkish respondents, 65% see a positive impact, 26% are neutral, and 7% negative.

Other ethnic groups show similar distributions: 65% positive, 18% neutral, and 11% negative.

# POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PKK'S DISARMAMENT

Approximately two-thirds of the public believe that PKK's disarmament will democratize Türkiye. Additionally, 50% believe that PKK's disarmament will contribute to the re-election of President Erdoğan. Furthermore, 37% think the process will transform the DEM Party into a party with nationwide appeal.




The public perception regarding the potential political and social impacts of PKK's disarmament presents a complex and multi-dimensional picture.

About 60% believe disarmament will democratize Türkiye further, while 30% disagree.

Regarding the DEM Party becoming a party with nationwide appeal as a result of disarmament, 37% agree, whereas 46% disagree.

Half of the participants believe disarmament will contribute to President Erdoğan's re-election, while 35% disagree.


#### VIEWS ON THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON DEMOCRACY BY PARTY PREFERENCE



Belief in democratization through disarmament is highest among DEM Party voters (88%), followed by AK Party (74%) and MHP (70%). By comparison, this rate is 62% among undecided voters.

CHP (45%) and İYİ Party (around 50%) voters show relatively lower levels of agreement. Though slightly more than half of CHP voters believe that disarmament would further democratize Türkiye, uncertainties regarding outcomes of the process remain higher.

#### VIEWS ON THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON DEMOCRACY ETHNIC ORIGIN




80% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents believe disarmament will democratize Türkiye, considerably above the national average (60%).

Among Turkish respondents, support is at 52%.

In other words, the majority of both Turkish and Kurdish/Zaza respondents believe that disarmament will further democratize Türkiye.






Around 50% of respondents believe PKK's disarmament will help President Erdoğan's re-election, with AK Party voters showing the highest agreement (65%). MHP voters are evenly split (46%).

CHP and İyi Party voters display a polarized response (44% agree vs. 44% disagree that disarmament will contribute to Erdoğan's re-election).

Half of DEM Party voters also believe in the positive effect PKK's disarmament will have on Erdoğan's re-election.


With undecided voters and those not voting, the rate is 43% and 52% respectively.



DEM Party voters strongly agree (78%) that disarmament will make their party have nationwide appeal, at a significantly higher rate than other groups (max 38%).

AK Party voters are evenly split, with 41% stating agreement and 42% disagreement.

CHP and İYİ Party voters mostly disagree. Only 37% of CHP voters agree, with 48% disagreeing. Of the undecided voters, 44% disagree.



60 percent of Kurdish/Zaza voters state that they agree with the idea that the disarmament process would make DEM Party a party with nationwide appeal. In contrast, 31 percent of Turkish participants express agreement with this view, while the majority, at 51 percent, indicate they do not agree.

## Conclusion

**F**or large segments of society, disarmament is the first step toward normalization. However, for this step to transform into lasting peace, the sincerity of both the state and armed actors is questioned. As understood from the research data, although support for the idea of resolution is high in society, this support is closely tied to the establishment of a sense of trust. This trust is nourished by past experiences, the discourse of political actors, and the continuity of implementations.

At the same time, since the search for resolution takes place within a climate of political polarization, party identities have become decisive in shaping attitudes toward the peace process. Research findings show that political affiliation directly affects belief in and support for the process. This indicates that peace and resolution policies must move beyond being merely security policies and be re-discussed on the axis of political representation, identity, and democracy.

Although the idea of a “Türkiye without terrorism” ideally resonates with a large part of society, for this ideal to be realized, a realistic and trustworthy plan is necessary. The disruptions encountered throughout the process have increased public suspicion, thereby weakening the stability of the process. Despite this, a strong desire for peace and nonviolence still exists in Turkish society. This desire is felt more acutely in regions at the center of the conflict.

The decades-long terrorism, democratization crisis, and normalization pains in Türkiye have caused lasting social, psychological, and political wounds not only in the directly affected regions, but across the entire country. In this context, the 69% public support for the process aimed at disarming the PKK should be interpreted as a powerful manifestation of the longing for a conflict-free environment. This rate, when compared with similar processes in Türkiye's political history, points to a striking ground for consensus. The formation of a broad support base among voters from many different political communities, from nationalist-conservative parties to representatives of the Kurdish movement, shows that the desire for resolution has become a shared benefit that transcends identity groups.

Behind this support lies not only the wish for weapons to be laid aside, but also a need for political normalization, economic stability, and social peace. The nearly 40-year conflict and campaign of terror have created fatigue in every segment of society; citizens are now viewing the possibility of resolution more rationally and hopefully than in the past. In this transformation, economic crises, high inflation, and regional instability in the external environment have also reinforced the desire for security and peace in society. As a country surrounded by neighbors grappling with wars and political collapse, Türkiye deeply experiences the fear of instability. In this context, the public's quest for stability shows that support for the resolution process has developed on both an emotional and strategic ground.

However, this high rate of support should not overlook the delicate nature of the process; it should remind policymakers of how necessary a patient, inclusive, and trust-based approach is.

The difference between the high level of public support for the process and public opinion on how the process is being conducted reflects a paradox frequently encountered in Turkish politics. Only 46% of survey participants consider the process successful, while 39% see it as unsuccessful. This shows that the public's desire for peace and its doubt about the state's capacity to manage the process coexist.

One of the reasons for this difference is the imprint left by past experiences. The failure of initiatives such as the 2009 democratic opening process and the 2013–2015 resolution process, the PKK's inability to rationalize within the vicious circle and utopia it constructed, its continuous preservation of a provocative vein, and its failure to move beyond the nature of a proxy organization have all reinforced in the public the belief that "every process that starts well ends badly." Therefore, although a significant portion of society supports the process, it offers its support within a framework of cautious optimism.

In achieving success in the process, not only security policies but also communication strategies, level of transparency, understanding of inclusiveness, and consistency of political will shall be decisive. In particular, the elimination of the crisis of political representation in the regions most directly affected by conflict, and among Kurdish voters who provide the strongest support for the process, is important for reestablishing trust.

The identity of political actors leading the process is also a critical factor influencing public perception. Even actors on a nationalist and security-focused line supporting the process indicates that a new political climate is emerging compared to the past. However, for this transformation to be permanent, the government must manage the process not through the lens of political gain, but in line with an institutionalized vision of societal peace.

Survey data reveal that belief in the PKK's disarmament lags considerably behind overall support for the process. Only 36% of participants believe the PKK will actually disarm, while 54% reject this possibility. This shows that although the public's desire for resolution is emotionally strong, this desire has not translated into a level of trust toward the organization.

Behind this contradiction lies a deep crisis of trust created by the PKK's long-running armed activities. The organization's relationships not only within Türkiye but also with regional actors, and especially its structure in Syria, lead the public to question the sincerity of its disarmament declarations. At the same time, the state's past failure to establish institutional frameworks to make the process sustainable has undermined faith in the resolution process.

However, despite this low level of belief, the upward trend observed in recent months shows that a cautious sense of hope is beginning to form among the public. If this trend is properly managed, belief in the disarmament process may increase over time. The fact that this belief reaches a high rate of 67% among especially the Kurdish population shows

that the demands for peace resonate strongly among segments that hold both the state and the organization accountable.

What must be paid attention to here is that belief is not only dependent on the PKK but also on the sincerity of the state in seeking resolution, the consistency of political actions, and the reliability of the process. Therefore, it is vital to form a transparent, accountable, and consistent roadmap not only for the PKK, but for all parties in the process. Indeed, the new process began and gained the public support reflected in the survey thanks to Bahçeli effectively pledging his identity and political capital as a guarantor and President Erdoğan's endorsement. While this "guarantee" is sufficient for a start, it is clear that for the process to reach completion, it requires political ownership, vision, and lasting steps toward democratization.

## RESOLUTION OF THE KURDISH ISSUE

---

BAHÇELİ'S PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION PROPOSAL  
NEW CONSTITUTION

POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD THE DISARMAMENT  
PROCESS OF THE PKK

POTENTIAL STEPS TOWARD RESOLVING THE KURDISH ISSUE  
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO RESOLVE THE KURDISH ISSUE?

The consolidation of the PKK's disarmament process through a parliamentary commission is a known conflict resolution instrument observed in global examples and is an important initiative in terms of securing the legitimacy of the resolution through the Parliament. The new resolution process, or the initiative seeking a political response to the PKK issue alongside the Kurdish Issue which began in October needed at some point to be consolidated at the level of the Parliament.

Devlet Bahçeli's proposal to establish a commission in Parliament with the participation of all parties regarding the PKK disarmament process represents a striking call that departs from the norm in Turkish politics. Considering the MHP's traditional position that prioritizes security, is state-centered, and favors strict measures, such a search for dialogue and legal ground has heralded a new political climate. On the other hand, Devlet Bahçeli's approach that initiated the process in October and his subsequent intellectual follow-through align with the commission proposal.

Politically, this proposal points to a cross-cutting initiative that has the potential to bring together the ruling party and opposition parties. This is important for increasing societal legitimacy and generalizing public support for the resolution process. At the same time, the fact that a majority of the public views this proposal positively indicates that there is a relatively widespread will in society to end the conflict. On the other hand, the continuation of extensive judicial operations targeting CHP municipalities will naturally reflect pressures on the search for political common ground and on the formation and functioning of the commission.

The need for a new constitution has been on the agenda for many years, both because the 1982 Constitution was drafted under military tutelage and because it has become increasingly unable to address growing issues. The demand for a new constitution is voiced with increasing frequency both at the center of politics and by a segment of the public; this demand reflects the expectation that identity-based issues will be handled democratically and that systemic gridlocks will be overcome. The fact that more than half of society supports a new constitution points to the limited social legitimacy of the current constitution and to the need for a redefinition of the political will toward resolution. However, this support does not progress in parallel with confidence that the current Parliament can draft a constitution.

The disarmament of the PKK is an extremely sensitive topic at the center of both the state's security policy and society's traumatic memories. The biggest public concern regarding this process relates to whether the potential steps taken in return for disarmament might damage the perception of social justice. Issues such as penal regulations, Öcalan's conditions, trustee appointments, and imprisoned politicians are the main axes that determine this balance.

Politically, every step that may enable a resolution must be taken within the framework of transparency and universal legal principles, without wounding the public conscience. This is because societal support for resolution steps is only possible under such conditions. However, public indifference or normalization can sometimes be a window for resolution. The prolonged existence of armed conflict may soften society's political reflexes, making radical steps less likely to provoke a strong reaction. Both dynamics are reflected in the answers given to this study's questions.

Potential steps toward resolving the Kurdish issue are generally shaped around core demands such as the definition of citizenship, the right to mother-tongue education, and the authority of local governments. The fact that these demands face relatively less resistance from the public indicates that a more democratic and civil sphere can be built outside the conflict- and terror-centered debates. Politically, these demands seem feasible through constitutional, legislative, and administrative regulations. However, the issue is not solely a matter of technical regulation. How these steps are presented in political discourse, how the public is persuaded, and how foresighted political actors are—all of these are highly determinative.

The approaches of those who say “There is a Kurdish problem” point to the fact that this issue is not one-dimensional but a multilayered problem. The most frequently voiced themes for resolution include justice, equal citizenship, the end of discrimination, peaceful dialogue, and leadership by political will. This demonstrates the need for both structural reforms and a transformation in societal mentality. The approach of those who support resolution is based on universal values such as justice and peace; this positions the issue not only as one for Kurds but also as a matter of democracy and law for the entirety of Turkish society.


At the same time, the proposals regarding the resolution process do not contradict one another; on the contrary, they converge around a perspective of democratic reform. This indicates that if well-managed by political leadership, a functioning resolution ground can be formed. A significant portion of society realizes the necessity of a process that moves beyond security-centered policies, toward peaceful and lasting solutions based on democratization, inclusive politics, and equality.

What is important at this point is that this awareness be reflected in political practices, and that resolution proposals be supported through inter-institutional cooperation and societal consensus. The resolution of the Kurdish issue has now become not just an ethnic matter, but a measure of Türkiye's capacity to be a state of law, of its democratic maturity, and of its vision for societal peace. For this reason, every step to be taken toward resolution is of critical importance not only for Kurds but for the democratic future of Turkish society as a whole.




# BAHÇELİ'S PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION PROPOSAL

Support for MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli's proposal to establish a commission for legal regulations in the process of the PKK laying down arms is above 50%.



According to the survey conducted in July 2025, 55% of participants stated that they supported MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli's proposal for a Parliamentary Commission. The rate of those who don't support it is 31%. The rate of those who said "No opinion" is 14%.

This opinion is very close to the June opinion following the proposal of the commission. This shows that the positive view of the commission continues among participants.



The highest support for the proposal comes from voters of the AK Party (73%), MHP (71%), and DEM Party (85%).

44% of CHP voters and 42% of İYİ Party voters support the proposal.

Among CHP voters, the proportion of those who do not support the proposal is 49%.


These figures show that the proposal enjoys strong support especially among ruling party and DEM Party voters, whereas opinions among opposition voters are more divided.

# NEW CONSTITUTION

One in every two voters states that Türkiye needs a new constitution. However, belief that the current Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) can make a new constitution during this legislative term is lower (37%).



While 50% of participants state that there is a need for a new constitution, 43% think Türkiye does not need a new constitution.



Among AK Party and MHP voters, those who think there is a need for a new constitution are at high levels, with 64% and 66% respectively.

Among CHP and İYİ Party bases, this rate is below 32%.

94% of DEM Party voters say there is a need.

More than half of the “Undecided” and “Not voting” groups also see a new constitution as necessary.


#### BELIEF IN TGNA'S ABILITY TO MAKE A NEW CONSTITUTION



Only 37% of participants believe that the TGNA can draft a new constitution during this term, while 52% do not see it as possible.

This situation shows that the strong demand for a new constitution does not match the level of confidence in the legislative body's ability to fulfill it.

#### BELIEF IN TGNA'S ABILITY TO MAKE A NEW CONSTITUTION BY PARTY PREFERENCE



Among AK Party and MHP voters, those who think the TGNA can make a new constitution are relatively high (around 57%). In the DEM Party, this rate reaches 63%.


On the other hand, only 21% of CHP voters answered "I believe."

One-third of AK Party voters also do not believe the TGNA can draft a new constitution during this legislative term.

The "do not believe" rate is 75% among CHP and 56% among İYİ Party voters.

# POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS OF THE PKK

Although the majority of the public views the disarmament of the PKK in a positive light, there are notable hesitations and a cautious stance regarding the steps that may accompany this process. In particular, there is a negative attitude toward improving Abdullah Öcalan's prison conditions (Support: 19% / Do not support: 69%), granting amnesty to disarmed PKK members (Support: 21% / Do not support: 65%), and amnesty for those imprisoned for PKK membership (Support: 21% / Do not support: 64%). While those who support ending the government-appointed trustee (kayyım) practice (49%) outnumber those who do not (35%), attitudes toward the release of Selahattin Demirtaş and other imprisoned Kurdish political actors are more divided (Support: 39% / Do not support: 44%).




There is noticeable hesitation in the public's approach to the five main potential steps in the PKK's disarmament process. The general public attitude in this process oscillates between the pursuit of democracy, law, and social peace, and concerns about security.

69% of the public opposes improving Abdullah Öcalan's prison conditions, and only 19% support it. Similarly, the majority opposes amnesty for disarmed PKK members or those imprisoned for PKK membership (65% and 64%, respectively).

Ending the trustee (kayyım) practice is supported by 49% of the public, while 35% oppose it. It stands out as one of the relatively more supported items on the agenda.

Support for the release of Selahattin Demirtaş and other imprisoned Kurdish politicians is more divided than other topics: 39% support, 44% oppose.

## ATTITUDES TOWARD ENDING THE TRUSTEE PRACTICE BY PARTY PREFERENCE




The strongest support for ending the trustee policy comes from DEM Party (94%) and CHP (66%).

Among AKP voters, only 31% support the change, and 48% oppose it. MHP voters are 50% opposed, with only 43% supporting an end to the trustee policy.


A majority of undecideds (51%) also support ending it, while 29% oppose. The distribution is similar in those stating they will not vote.

## ATTITUDES TOWARD ENDING THE TRUSTEE PRACTICE BY ETHNIC ORIGIN




Support for ending the trustee practice is strongest among Kurdish/Zaza participants (77%). Only 14% in this group do not support ending the trustee practice.

Among Turks, support and opposition are almost evenly split: 42% support ending the trustee practice, while 41% oppose, and 9% are neutral.



97% of DEM Party voters support the statement, “Selahattin Demirtaş and imprisoned Kurdish politicians can be released,” while the rate of support is 60% with CHP voters, 57% with İYİ Party voters, 42% with undecided voters and 32% among those not voting.


However, 63% of AK Party voters and 64% of MHP voters oppose this statement.



79% of Kurdish/Zaza respondents support the statement, “Selahattin Demirtaş and imprisoned Kurdish politicians can be released.” Among Turkish respondents, this drops to 30%, and to 18% among other ethnic groups.

53% of Turkish respondents oppose the idea, compared to 61% in other ethnicities and only 14% among Kurds/Zazas.


ATTITUDES TOWARD AMNESTY FOR DISARMED PKK MEMBERS BY PARY PREFERENCE



DEM Party is the only group where the majority (75%) support amnesty for disarmed PKK members. Only 19% opposes the amnesty.

In contrast, majorities in other parties strongly oppose it: 71% of CHP supporters, 69% of İYİ Party supporters, 63% of AK Party supporters and 75% of MHP supporters oppose the amnesty.

ATTITUDES TOWARD AMNESTY FOR DISARMED PKK MEMBERS BY ETHNIC ORIGIN




Almost half of Kurdish/Zaza respondents support amnesty for disarmed PKK members, with almost one out of every two giving support. 36% do not support amnesty.

Among Turkish respondents, only 13% support the amnesty, and 75% oppose.




# ATTITUDES TOWARD AMNESTY FOR THOSE IMPRISONED FOR PKK MEMBERSHIP BY PARTY PREFERENCE



Again, DEM Party shows the strongest support for amnesty (83%) among all parties.

Support is low and opposition high across other groups: 72% of MHP voters, 67% of AK Party voters and 69% of CHP voters do not support the amnesty.


# ATTITUDES TOWARD AMNESTY FOR THOSE IMPRISONED FOR PKK MEMBERSHIP BY ETHNIC ORIGIN



Kurdish/Zaza voters are the only group where support for this idea constitutes a majority (53%). Those who oppose amnesty for imprisoned PKK members in this group are at 32%.


Among Turkish voters, support for amnesty is at 13% while opposition is at 75%.

ATTITUDES TOWARD ÖCALAN'S PRISON CONDITIONS, BY PARTY PREFERENCE



All voter groups except DEM Party oppose improving Abdullah Öcalan's prison conditions. Support in the DEM Party stands at 81%, while opposition in AKP, MHP, and CHP is around 70%. Undecided and non-voting groups show similar attitudes.

ATTITUDES TOWARD ÖCALAN'S PRISON CONDITIONS BY ETHNIC ORIGIN




79% of Turkish participants oppose improving Öcalan's prison conditions; only 10% support it.

Among Kurdish/Zaza participants, 55% support it, while 29% oppose it.

## POTENTIAL STEPS TOWARD RESOLVING THE KURDISH ISSUE

The resistance that appears in topics such as Öcalan's conditions in the PKK disarmament process, amnesty for PKK members who will lay down arms or are in prison, is relatively absent when it comes to legal arrangements such as citizenship definition regarding the Kurdish issue, education in mother tongue, and the strengthening of local governments. In these topics, the rate of those who support demands for change is higher than the rate of those who oppose them.




While 45% support a definition of citizenship in the Constitution that does not exclude Kurds, 43% do not agree with such a view.

48% support granting cultural rights to Kurds such as education in their mother tongue, while 43% oppose it.

Among these three topics, the highest level of support is for increasing the powers of local governments: 50% of participants support this proposal, whereas 36% oppose it.

The combined responses of “No opinion” and “Neither agree nor disagree” remain in the 10–14% range across all three topics.




Although support for increasing local government powers varies by party preference, the proposal enjoys broad overall support.

As expected, the highest level of support comes from DEM Party voters (90%), followed by CHP (58%) and İYİ Party (57%) voters. Around half of AK Party (47%) and MHP (48%) voters also favor the proposal.

Opposition is most prominent among “Other” party voters (55%) and those who state they will not vote (43%).


Among AK Party voters, 36% oppose the proposal, 41% of MHP voters are against it, and in İYİ Party this rate is 39%. Among CHP voters, the opposition stands at 32%.



When evaluated by ethnic origin, the proposal to increase the powers of local governments receives the highest level of support from Kurdish/Zaza respondents (71%). Only 19% of this group opposes the proposal, while 5% state they have no opinion.

Among Turkish respondents, the picture is more balanced: 42% support the proposal, while 43% oppose it.

In conclusion, support for increasing the powers of local governments is significantly higher among Kurdish/Zaza voters, indicating a clear preference for greater local autonomy. Among Turkish voters, however, opinions are more evenly split between support and opposition.




The statement “Certain cultural rights such as education in their mother tongue should be granted to Kurds” receives the highest level of support (95%) from DEM Party voters, consistent with their stance on all proposed legal reforms. The proportion of those who oppose it in this group is just 5%.

Among the two largest voter groups, AK Party and CHP voters support the proposal at rates of 54% and 48%, respectively.

However, the relatively high level of opposition within the CHP base suggests a more reserved or ambivalent stance on this issue among its voters.

SUPPORT FOR GRANTING CULTURAL RIGHTS TO KURDS, SUCH AS EDUCATION IN THEIR MOTHER TONGUE, BY ETHNIC ORIGIN




Among Kurdish/Zaza participants, an overwhelming 85% support the statement “Certain cultural rights such as education in their mother tongue should be granted to Kurds,” while only 9% oppose it.

In contrast, among Turkish participants, 54% oppose the proposal and only 37% support it.

Participants from other ethnic backgrounds show a more divided stance, with 45% in support and 43% opposed.

ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFINING CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONSTITUTION IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT EXCLUDE KURDS, BY PARTY PREFERENCE




The group with the highest agreement on the statement “A definition of citizenship that does not exclude Kurds should be included in the Constitution” is DEM Party voters, with 96% in support. In contrast, support among MHP voters drops to 36%.

Among the two major parties, CHP (44%) and AK Party (48%), responses are more balanced. In CHP, those who agree and those who disagree are almost equal, while AK Party voters lean slightly more toward agreement.

Among the undecided (49%), a majority also support the statement.

The proportion of those with “No opinion” is low across all parties, indicating that voters have a relatively clear stance on this issue.



Participants’ views on “a new definition of citizenship in the Constitution that does not exclude Kurds” vary significantly by ethnic identity.


Among Turkish participants, 50% oppose the proposal, while only 36% support it.

In contrast, Kurdish/Zaza participants overwhelmingly support the idea, with 78% in favor. This indicates a strong expectation within the Kurdish population for a more inclusive and non-exclusionary definition of citizenship in the Constitution.

Among participants from other ethnic backgrounds, views are more evenly split, with 47% in support and 46% opposed.

## WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO RESOLVE THE KURDISH ISSUE?

Among participants who stated “There is a Kurdish issue” (37%), responses to an open-ended question most frequently associated its resolution with justice, equal citizenship, peaceful dialogue, and the elimination of discrimination. A significant portion emphasized the right to mother tongue education and the need for democratic reforms, while some voiced support for security-focused approaches. The findings indicate that efforts toward a solution are shaped around a pluralistic and human rights-based perspective. The diversity of views suggests that the issue cannot be reduced to a single factor.



In the study, participants who stated “There is a Kurdish issue” (which accounts for 37% of all participants) were asked an open-ended question about how this issue could be resolved. Their responses were thematically categorized. It is important to interpret these findings with the understanding that two-thirds of all participants stated there is no Kurdish issue; therefore, the answers analyzed here reflect only the views of those who believe the issue exists. The results show that proposed solutions are largely shaped by a pluralistic and human rights-based approach.



The most frequently emphasized solution among participants was “Equality, Justice, and Rule of Law” (14%). This indicates that guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms holds a significant place in the public's view on resolving the Kurdish issue.

This is followed respectively by the themes of “Ending Discrimination and Racism” (12%) and “Unity, Fraternity, and Coexistence” (12%). These responses reveal a strong expression of the desire for social peace and living together.

The phrase “Peace and Continuation of the Resolution Process” received notable support at 7%. Other prominent themes include political will and governance (5%) and mother tongue education and cultural rights (4%); this suggests that the solution is seen as connected not only to security policies but also to socio-political reforms.

Those who responded with “Pushing back against Kurds, and withholding of privileges” (4%) believe that the issues related to Kurds should be resolved without granting them privileges or fulfilling their demands.

In contrast, only 3% stated that the solution could be achieved through combating terrorism and eliminating the PKK.

The proportion of those who said “It cannot be resolved” is low, at 3%.

However, the fact that 20% of respondents said “No opinion” may be interpreted as either a lack of information about the issue or a sense of hopelessness regarding a solution.

## Conclusion

Within the framework of the questions directed at the citizens participating in the survey, both the perception of the Kurdish Issue and the approach to the resolution processes have been deeply analyzed.

The results reveal a general picture of the sensitivities, expectations, and boundaries Turkish society holds regarding this issue. The proposal by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli for the establishment of a commission in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye with the participation of all parties concerning the disarmament process of the PKK represents an unusual call in Turkish political history. That a party like the MHP, which adopts security-centered policies, proposes a search for dialogue within the parliamentary setting as part of a resolution process, indicates a remarkable shift in both public opinion and political circles.

55% of participants in the survey supported this proposal, while 31% opposed it. These rates indicate a cautious yet significant support within society for the search for a resolution. This proposal may carry a positive potential for overcoming polarization. The establishment of a platform under the roof of Parliament where different opinions are represented may contribute to increasing social legitimacy in particularly fragile matters such as the resolution process.

Debates over a new constitution have been ongoing in Türkiye for many years and have created serious expectations among various segments of society. The authoritarian spirit of the 1982 Constitution and its drafting under military tutelage necessitate the correction of its shortcomings in terms of democratic representation and rights. According to the survey findings, half of the participants believe there is a need for a new constitution. However, only 37% of citizens believe that the current parliament can accomplish this. This situation reveals a contradiction between the desire for a new constitution and the confidence in the functioning of the political system.

In this context, democratization and the redefinition of the social contract are related not only to the text of the constitution, but also to the participatory nature of the constitution-making process. Whether the political power can manage an inclusive process and how much the opposition can contribute to this process will be decisive. The demand for a new constitution reflects not only a legal but also a societal transformation aspiration.

Upon closer inspection, the clustering observed in many questions of our research is also valid for the "Constitution question." The AK Party–MHP–DEM clustering is clearly evident under the topic of the need for a new constitution. In fact, this clustering reaches its highest level in this question. The voters of these three parties show a very high consensus, with belief in the need for a new constitution averaging 75%. On the other hand, this rate remains in the 30% range for opposition parties like CHP and İYİ Party. In this respect, observations can also be made regarding which political actors are candidates to carry and take responsibility in the topics of political change in Türkiye.

The disarmament of the PKK is one of the most intricate and most critical issues in terms of resolution capacity in Turkish politics. What political and legal steps will be taken after the cessation of arms is shaped by the balance of public conscience, justice, and democracy. The societal approach to five potential steps likely to be taken during the PKK's disarmament process is marked by deep sociopolitical hesitation. The research results show that while the public maintains its interest in democratization, the rule of law, and the pursuit of social peace in this process, it also harbors strong reservations shaped by perceptions of security and justice. This dual tension reflects the fragile balances inherited from Türkiye's resolution process experience.

In particular, the proposal to improve Abdullah Öcalan's prison conditions has been rejected by 69% of society. The rate of those who support this step remains only at 19%. This picture reveals the public's high symbolic and political sensitivity toward Öcalan's individual status. Likewise, only 21% support the idea of granting amnesty to PKK members who lay down their arms, while 65% oppose it. The proposal to grant amnesty to those imprisoned for PKK membership is also viewed negatively by 64% of society. These rates show that the concern that amnesty poses a risk of impunity dominates over the perception of it as a peace mechanism.

Among these topics, the issue to which society takes a more positive approach is the termination of the trustee (kayım) practice. The rate of support for this proposal is 49%, while opposition stands at 35%. This indicates that the dismissal of elected local officials and the appointment of replacements by central authority is viewed by a wide segment of the electorate as incompatible with democratic representation principles. Unlike other topics, the trustee issue is addressed more in the context of a general debate on democracy and law and finds broader support in society. The proposal for the release of Selahattin Demirtaş and other imprisoned Kurdish political actors, however, is a topic on which society exhibits a more divided attitude.

In conclusion, it is seen that society offers principled support for the disarmament of the PKK but has serious reservations regarding the steps that would accompany this process. This picture reveals that the post-conflict process in Türkiye requires both social consent and political courage. This fragile balance established between democratization and security policies can only evolve into a sustainable peace if it is managed with principles of transparency, justice, and participation.

The responses concerning possible steps toward resolving the Kurdish issue clearly reveal the sensitive balance society maintains between security and democracy. Compared to proposals aimed at the PKK's disarmament, reforms to be made on the constitutional, cultural, and administrative levels receive higher levels of support. This shows that in the post-armed conflict period, citizens tend to gravitate more toward peaceful, structural, and democratic methods of resolution.

Support for the proposal to include a definition of citizenship in the Constitution that does not exclude Kurds approaches 45%, while opposition remains at 43%. This picture reveals that although there is still a societal divide regarding the definition of citizenship, the idea

of an inclusive constitution resonates with a wide segment of society. In the context of cultural rights, 48% support the idea of providing mother-tongue education for Kurds, while opposition again stands at 43%.

The proposal to increase the powers of local governments finds broader support in public opinion compared to the other two topics. 50% of society supports this step, while only 36% oppose it. In recent months, as opposition parties outside of DEM have also been targeted by judicial processes, CHP and İYİ Party voters also view this proposal positively, with support rates of 58% and 57%, respectively. Overall, among the potential steps toward resolving the Kurdish issue, topics such as constitutional equality, cultural rights, and the strengthening of local governments are strongly supported by certain segments of society. As a result, structural steps toward resolving the Kurdish issue find more public backing than armed resolution proposals. Especially the strengthening of local governments, the inclusive understanding of citizenship, and demands for cultural rights are supported by a significant portion of society.

The section of the research focusing on the question “What should be done to solve the Kurdish issue?” provides an opportunity to thematically analyze society's expectations for resolution on this issue. Only 37% of participants stated “There is a Kurdish issue”; while this does not represent an absolute majority, it indicates that a significant portion of society still sees this as an unresolved issue awaiting a solution.

When the open-ended responses given by these participants are thematically categorized, the most frequently emphasized solution theme is “equality, justice, and the rule of law” (14%), reflecting a tendency to address the issue not only as an ethnic identity problem but also on the basis of the rule of law and democratic equality. This emphasis shows that guaranteeing rights and freedoms is viewed by a wide segment of society as the key point of the solution.

The second most emphasized themes are “ending discrimination and racism” (12%) and “unity, fraternity, and shared life” (12%), which reveal that the desire for social peace and the will to live together with different identities remain strongly present. Society's expectation in this matter is as much about ending conflict as it is about building an equal and inclusive unity at the level of social relations. This shows that the social foundation for resolution processes still exists and can be rebuilt if managed correctly.

These findings show that the solution must go beyond legal regulations and also be supported by political leadership and public policies.

Nevertheless, among the proposed solutions, the rate of participants adopting a security-focused approach remains very limited at 3%. This shows that the general tendency in society leans not toward security-centered but peaceful and democratic methods. Similarly, the rate of those saying “It can't be solved” remains low at 3%, indicating that a loss of belief in the possibility of a solution has not yet become dominant in society.

However, the fact that 20% of respondents answered “I have no opinion” indicates that a significant part of society experiences uncertainty regarding a solution, due to rea-

sons such as the complexity of the issue, lack of information, or hopelessness. Although there is diversity among the proposed solutions, it is understood that a societal consensus is possible around common values such as justice, the rule of law, and ending discrimination.

The connection established between democratic reform demands and the disarmament of the PKK shows that the solution cannot be achieved solely through security measures. For this process to be successful, a healthy bridge must be built between the expectations of society and the vision of political leadership. The research results show that society is open to a search for solutions regarding the Kurdish issue, but has not yet overcome its security concerns. Additionally, a strong relationship is established between structural reform demands, such as democratic representation, a new constitution, and freedom of expression, and the process of disarming the PKK.

## THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

---

---

RELATIONS WITH THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL  
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (KRG)  
KURDISH FORMATION IN SYRIA

**G**eopolitical and foreign policy justifications played a central role in the process that began in October, in a manner similar to, if not more influential than, the process between 2009–2015. Although external developments and justifications were effective in the 2009–2015 period, they did not find their rightful place in the official discourse. In this process, however, from the very first day, geopolitical developments have played a central role in the construction of the public discourse.

Hamas's October 7 attack marked the beginning of a new era in the Middle East. This new period has not been limited to the Palestine–Israel equation. Israel first engaged in warfare with Iran's regional networks and then directly with Iran itself. This active state of war has deeply shaken the security and geopolitical dynamics of a vast geography extending from Lebanon to Yemen, from Syria to Iran.

This new process was presented as an important step toward fortifying Türkiye's internal structure against this geopolitical storm occurring in the region. The renewal of the historical alliance between Turks and Kurds, both domestically and abroad, formed an important component of this new public discourse.

As the world enters the third decade of the 21st century, it stands at the threshold of a multipolar and turbulent geopolitical structure. The U.S.–China rivalry, Russia's intervention in Ukraine, Iran's regional expansionism, and most strikingly, Israel's aggression against Gaza and Palestinian territories in general, all point to a new order in the Middle East in which international legal norms have effectively been suspended.

This wave of aggression has also deeply affected Turkish society. In wide segments of the public, both humanitarian and security-based unease has developed, and Israel's policies have begun to be perceived as a regional threat. In this new era, Türkiye's approach to the Kurdish political structures in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Syria is seen to be shaped not only through a security lens but also by taking into account regional power balances, energy policies, societal sensitivities, and diplomatic maneuvering. Particularly, structures like the KRG have become important partners for Türkiye in terms of energy security, border trade, and political dialogue. On the other hand, the Kurdish formation in Syria is perceived by Türkiye as a security risk due to its connection to the PKK.

In this context, public opinion research offers important data not only for understanding foreign policy trends but also for interpreting perceptions of security, the political attitudes of ethnic identities, and the emotional/strategic reflexes of citizens toward non-state actors. The research results presented below aim to evaluate the perception map of the Turkish public regarding the Kurdish political structures in the KRG and Syria, on both political and societal levels.


Initially brought into the public discourse through Devlet Bahçeli's framing as a "threat," geopolitical developments gained a new dimension of "opportunity" after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, thus reinforcing the process. The regime change in Syria fostered a sense of ownership of the process for both the state and the ruling government as well as the organization. Developments in Syria enabled the "initiative" spearheaded by Bahçeli to evolve into a full-fledged "process" with the active support of Erdoğan.

The center of gravity of the Kurdish issue in Türkiye is, without question, Türkiye itself. Similarly, the PKK is ultimately an organization of Turkish origin. Nevertheless, over the last 10 years, the Kurdish issue in Türkiye and the Kurdish issue in Syria, and the PKK's own rationale for existence, have become highly intertwined. Indeed, identity, politics, and geopolitics have now become entirely enmeshed in the broader Kurdish issue. For all these reasons, we have dedicated a special section in this study to the geopolitical context of the process.




## RELATIONS WITH THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (KRG)

One in every two people believes that relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil should be further strengthened. Only 14% think the relationship should be weakened.



While 46% of participants state that Türkiye should further strengthen its relations with the KRG, 17% argue that the current state should be maintained.

The proportion of those who believe relations should be weakened is 14%, while 24% say they have no opinion.




While preferences on the future of Türkiye's relations with the Erbil government vary according to party affiliation, in all voter groups that intend to vote, the majority believe relations should be strengthened.

DEM Party voters have the highest support, with 76% favoring strengthened ties.

Among AK Party voters, 57% support strengthening relations; for MHP voters it's 47%, and CHP voters 37%.

In the AK Party base, the “no opinion” rate is relatively high at 20%.

The highest opposition to stronger ties is among MHP voters, with 28% favoring weaker relations.




61% of Kurdish/Zaza participants support further strengthening relations with the KRG, while this rate drops to 42% among Turks and 37% among other ethnic groups.

Overall, the dominant view is that ties should be strengthened.

The opinion that “relations should be weakened” is supported by 16% of Turks and 21% of other ethnic groups, but only 6% of Kurdish/Zaza participants.

# KURDISH FORMATION IN SYRIA


More than one-third of the public (38%) express that Türkiye should take a clear stance against a possible Kurdish political structure in Syria. However, a similar proportion (30%) believe Türkiye should build good relations with it, as with the KRG in Iraq.



38% of participants state that Türkiye should oppose such a Kurdish formation in Syria.

30% support building good relations, similar to the case in Iraq.

17% say Türkiye should leave it alone, while nearly 16% have no opinion.




60% of MHP voters believe Türkiye should openly oppose such a formation, followed by 40% of AK Party voters.

By contrast, 87% of DEM Party voters strongly support establishing good relations, similar to the Iraq model. 40% of CHP voters favor opposition.

Among undecided voters, 38% favor opposition and 30% favor cooperation.

Among those who say they won't vote, the "no opinion" rate is nearly 29%.



Among Kurdish/Zaza participants, 61% support building good relations with a potential Kurdish formation in Syria, as with Iraq. Among Turkish participants, this figure drops to 21%, with 46% favoring direct opposition.

Among other ethnic groups, opposition is also dominant at 47%, while only 18% of Kurdish/Zaza participants support such an oppositional stance.

## Conclusion

**T**he research findings indicate that a suitable societal ground has emerged in Türkiye for the PKK's dissolution and the resolution of the Kurdish issue. The answers given to the questions in the geopolitical context also show that a suitable social ground has formed regarding relations with the Kurds in the region.

Approximately 46% of participants in the study support the further strengthening of relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. 17% say current relations should remain as they are. Considering that current relations are already good, around 63% of society desires either the maintenance or further improvement of these good relations. In contrast, only about 14% argue that these relations should be weakened.

This picture shows us that relations with Iraqi Kurdistan are not solely the preference of the state or ruling elite but are also supported by society, which favors the development of good relations. This demonstrates how the existence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which was a source of considerable concern not too long ago, and the development of relations with the KRG have gradually become normalized and supported by the public.

The research findings also indicate that a suitable social ground is forming regarding relations with Syrian Kurds. However, this level of support appears to be below that for relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Public opinion in Türkiye generally supports a more positive relationship with the KRG, whereas possible Kurdish political structures in Syria are met with greater distrust. Both situations are directly related to political affiliation, ethnic identity, and regional geopolitical developments.

46% of participants wish to see relations with the KRG further strengthened, while only 14% adopt a stance favoring weakened ties. These figures indicate that Türkiye's strategic cooperation with this regional actor also resonates positively with the public. Particularly, coordination in energy routes, economic trade, and counterterrorism efforts can be listed as rational factors behind this rapprochement.

In contrast, 38% of respondents express clear opposition to a possible Kurdish political structure being established in Syria, while 30% favor forming relations with such a structure modeled on the KRG relations. These positions are shaped by perceptions of the Kurdish actors' ties to the PKK, U.S. support, and threats to Türkiye's border security.

Research data shows that Türkiye's policy toward regional Kurdish actors must be constructed not solely on a security-focused basis but also with sensitivity to social legitimacy, political affiliations, and regional developments. While there is social consensus on strengthening relations with the KRG, perceptions of formations in Syria are more fragmented and cautious. This difference suggests that a flexible and multi-channel strategy should be pursued in regional policy.

In response to the question, "If a Kurdish entity similar to the one in Iraq were to form in Syria, what should Türkiye's stance be?" 30% of the public say "Türkiye should establish good relations with it as it did with Iraq," while about 17% say such an entity "should be left alone." That is, 47% of the public support either active positive engagement or remaining neutral toward such a structure. Around 38% believe Türkiye should oppose it. Pragmatic approaches are also seen among AK Party (57%) and MHP (47%) voters, whereas support is more limited among CHP voters (37%). This indicates that political identities still strongly influence attitudes toward foreign policy.

Given the intense conflict between Türkiye and the PKK following the collapse of the 2009–2015 opening/resolution process, the conflation of the PKK with PYD-YPG/SDG in public discourse at the time, and the military operations carried out in Syria during this period, the above percentages suggest that it may be possible to establish closer relations between Türkiye and the Syrian Kurds in the future. At the very least, if the PKK's self-dissolution process is successfully completed, there likely will not be significant societal resistance to Türkiye forming closer ties with potential Kurdish entities in Syria. In such a scenario, it would be more appropriate for Türkiye to take on a fair mediator role, rather than taking sides in the relations or tensions between Kurds and other actors in Syria.

A systemic restoration and transformation is occurring in the Middle East. This new restoration has several key characteristics. First, in the foreseeable future, Iran and its allies will continue to lose ground in the region. The U.S. and the West will increasingly invest time and energy in establishing a regional order centered on the Gulf-Israel axis.

Despite having serious reservations about this imagined regional order, particularly regarding the Palestine issue, Türkiye will nonetheless be one of its essential pillars. In the coming period, we can expect a further rapprochement between Türkiye and Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. In a context where the Iranian threat is diminished, Israel's aggressiveness and revisionism will reinforce the sense of necessity for cooperation between Türkiye and the Gulf.

Second, following the failure of the Arab Spring uprisings and their replacement with internal conflicts and regional/international geopolitical rivalries, a phase of change occurred in favor of non-state actors over the state. We are now reaching the end of this phase. In fact, the post-Cold War and post-9/11 international context was not conducive to the continued existence of non-state actors that had emerged under Cold War conditions. However, the special conditions in the Middle East following the Iraq invasion significantly prolonged their lifespan. Now, even for the Middle East, that period is coming to an end. We are entering a new era in which the justification and conditions for the existence of non-state actors like the PKK will be much more difficult to sustain.

Third, as a continuation of the above factors, Türkiye will become a key actor in both the new European security architecture and the regional order of the Middle East. We will pass through a context where previous disputes with the West are resolved and a new consensus emerges. Over the past decade, relations with Syrian Kurds or the PYD-YPG-SDG became one of the major, perhaps the biggest, points of contention between Türkiye and the U.S./West. This issue widened the gap between Türkiye and the West, while bringing Türkiye closer to Russia and Iran, at least by expanding opportunities for cooperation on issues such as Syria.

The PKK's self-dissolution, progress in resolving the Kurdish issue, and positive outcomes in negotiations between the SDF and Damascus would eliminate the biggest point of contention between Türkiye and the U.S./West.

Unlike Iran, Türkiye is not structurally or wholly opposed to the U.S. regional presence, but opposes specific policy items (such as cooperation with the SDF). The PKK's dissolution and the resolution of the Kurdish issue would significantly reduce the extent to which the American presence in Syria or the region is perceived as a problem by Türkiye.

Finally, the Middle East will remain in geopolitical turbulence for a long time. One of the most important aspects of national security under these conditions will be the strength of the internal structure. Resolving the Kurdish issue means both internal fortification and geopolitical reinforcement for Türkiye.

Just as an inclusive definition of national identity and citizenship is of vital importance for resolving the Kurdish issue, so too is an inclusive definition of geopolitical identity of equal importance. Put differently, the success of this process requires an inclusive conception of nationhood, citizenship, and geopolitical identity. The shortest path to this is to articulate a national and civic imagination in which everyone who constitutes the "We" in Türkiye feels a part; and to view the components of this "We" as natural allies in foreign policy as well.

Such an approach would see Kurds outside Türkiye not as a barrier between Türkiye and the Middle East, but as a natural bridge connecting Türkiye to the rest of the region.

The results of this research demonstrate that there is a suitable or potentially strong social ground for developing such a relationship format between Türkiye and regional Kurds or the Kurdish geopolitics.

## General Evaluation

The study before you was conducted at a time when a significant phase had been reached in the process aimed at the PKK laying down its arms, and the organization was on the verge of taking the first step in line with its publicly declared decision to disarm.

In such a critical period, we wanted to gauge society's perception of the Kurdish issue, the process of disarming the PKK, and the resolution of the Kurdish issue; to take a snapshot of the present moment. As you will notice throughout the study, we had the opportunity to regularly examine certain core themes and issues in the field - those also included in this study - almost every month since the beginning of the process. The consistent tracking of these questions since October allowed us to monitor emerging trends. You may also assess these trends within the research.

Each of the four sections of our study was designed with the aim of contextualizing the data in a meaningful political frame through analytical introductions and conclusions.

Rather than repeating the findings or summarizing the main outputs here, we would like to highlight a few interconnected issues we consider important for interpreting the results.

First, the findings presented in this study consist of the answers participants gave to the questions we posed between June 25 and July 5, within the context of the process aimed at the PKK's disarmament. The findings reflect perceptions and opinions shaped not only by historical memory but also by current debates. Therefore, they encompass judgments and perceptions influenced by both long-standing biases and the current atmosphere of hope and concern. While it is very difficult to change beliefs rooted in long historical memory, perceptions shaped by contemporary developments are relatively easier to shift. In this framework, it is important to remember that these results reflect measurements taken within a specific timeframe, and that many opinions are likely to evolve over time.

Relatedly, we must emphasize that the study includes a number of questions/topics that may be considered sensitive by many segments of society. When interpreting data on subjects where society holds sharply polarized views and where terminology has taken on highly nuanced and sensitive meanings over time, it is essential to proceed cautiously. Although we were careful to account for these sensitivities in the study design, data collection, and evaluation phases, we find it necessary to remind you of the same.

The third issue concerns the phenomenon of partisanship, which frequently appears in political research. In Türkiye, public opinion, especially on political matters, is influenced more by party affiliation than by demographic variables such as gender, age, income, or ed-



ucation level. In this study, we observed that participants' ethnic and political identities also played a decisive role alongside party identity. With this in mind, we made a special effort to assess party affiliation, ethnic identity, and political identity components in detail for nearly every question. Given that political identity and party affiliation often overlap, it becomes easy to observe how society clusters around different issues. In this regard, we believe the study offers valuable insights into how society is politically positioned on key topics.

The fourth issue relates to the ability of politics and political leadership to transform public opinion. The findings show that on issues taken up by politics and actively brought into public discussion, society can adapt and evolve with ease, whereas on issues left untouched or treated as political taboos, strong biases and resistance persist. When interpreting the data, it is important to keep in mind the potential of political leadership to shape and transform public sentiment. This also suggests that many of the resistances indicated in the study could change over time through the active engagement of political actors.

Viewed through this general framework, the data suggest that societal perception of the Kurdish issue and the PKK's disarmament process is quite positive. Public support for the process has steadily increased, reaching 69%. Similarly, belief that the process will ultimately benefit Türkiye as a whole has also grown steadily over the months, now reaching 70%.

This strong support for the process has had a positive impact on opinions regarding proposals related to resolving the Kurdish issue, such as the definition of citizenship, mother-tongue education, and strengthening local governments, many of which require constitutional amendments. While society supports the process and the steps needed to resolve the Kurdish issue, it appears more resistant to certain administrative and legal steps that would accelerate the PKK's disarmament.

This picture shows, on one hand, that society has internalized the official public discourse, and that perceptions have been shaped by the current official narrative. On the other hand, it reveals that there is now openness toward political dialogue and negotiation mechanisms rather than a purely security-centered approach, which has dominated for nearly half a century.

The findings suggest that an important space has opened for political actors, and that society stands on a positive footing, unlikely to resist the path they carve out. The attitude of political leadership will be of great importance here.

Though the process began under the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli and later gained the support of President Erdoğan, and has largely progressed as a government and state project, it has also received significant support from opposition parties. Aside from a few political parties whose total vote share hovers around 5%, it would not be wrong to say that all political parties support the process. This broad-based political support provides enormous political leverage to those leading the process. The research findings also indicate that political support is generating a social response.

For the first time in many years, Türkiye has embarked on a path toward resolving one of its most critical problems, which has spanned half a century. The PKK's decision to disarm goes beyond simply laying down arms, as it also lays the groundwork for transforming our political culture and the institutions and structures shaped by it. Achieving this will require intense political effort and determined political will.

Thanks to the determined stance of the political leadership and the communication ongoing between the state and Öcalan, the PKK's disarmament process is about to pass a critical threshold. Following the first disarmament footage to be released on July 11, the process is expected to continue, and the era of armed conflict is anticipated to end in the near future.

This stage is undoubtedly important. However, if the goal is to “strengthen the home front,” as expressed in the justification for the process, many administrative, legal, and constitutional reforms will need to be enacted after the PKK lays down arms—reforms that will contribute to resolving the Kurdish issue and democratizing the political sphere. In addition to achieving its stated aim, the process will succeed only when these reforms are implemented. Put simply, it would not be wrong to define this as Türkiye's process of adapting, both as a society and a political system, to a post-PKK era.

The study in your hands captures a snapshot of public sentiment at a critical turning point in which Türkiye is finally moving toward freeing itself from the shackles of the PKK. The findings show that society is ready to support the building of a Türkiye without the PKK, and that, despite certain reservations and resistances, it can readily adapt to this change if political will remains firm.

We hope that, once freed from the shackles of the PKK, Türkiye will successfully implement the transition to a PKK-free future, and we hope this study contributes to that effort.

#### • August 26, 2024

President Erdoğan emphasized “internal fortifications” on the anniversary of the Malazgirt Victory. President Erdoğan repeated the same emphasis on the anniversary of the August 30 victory and at the opening of the new legislative session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 1.

#### • October 1, 2024

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with DEM Party deputies in the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. AK Party Deputy Chairman Efkan Âlâ accompanied Bahçeli and also participated in the handshake. Bahçeli said about the handshake: “We are entering a new era. While we want peace in the world, we need to ensure peace in our own country.”

#### • October 2, 2024

Asked by reporters after this contact with the DEM Party, Bahçeli responded: “It was the speech of our President that prompted me to act, to respond to the call of our President for ‘internal fortification’.”

Regarding the “handshake” gesture, DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan said, “Türkiye needs dialogue and negotiations more than ever. Mr. Bahçeli’s visit was also quite normal, there was nothing abnormal. We have already stated that we are ready to hold every hand and support every step that defends social peace in Türkiye and will bring prosperity and peace to the country, and I repeat the same today.”

#### • October 3, 2024

President Erdoğan visited Devlet Bahçeli at his residence in Beytepe.

#### • October 5, 2024

Referring to the DEM Party members, Devlet Bahçeli said, “My shaking their hands should be seen as a sign of being a party of Türkiye. The President of the Republic has extended an invitation for a smart work of solidarity and peace in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. After this invitation, as the chairman of the MHP, it is my duty to take steps according to the call of the People’s Alliance and the president of the Turkish nation.”

#### • October 8, 2024

Devlet Bahçeli targeted Israel at the group meeting: “It is now clear that Israel is challenging the world. The world must remember that if Israel comes against us, it will regret its treacherous audacity a thousand times. The hand I extend to DEM Party is the message of our national unity and brotherhood. The hand I extend is the light of the first Parliament and our president burning like a torch.”

#### • October 9, 2024

At the AK Party group meeting, President Erdoğan said, “Considering the atmosphere in our region, we believe that we need to talk more, we need more compromise, we need to expand the ground for dialogue more. We do not avoid dialog on any issue that will benefit the nation. We appreciate the statements made by MHP Chairman Mr. Devlet Bahçeli both on the first day of the Parliament and yesterday, and we find them very valuable for Turkish democracy and the brotherhood of 85 million people.”

#### October 12, 2024

President Erdoğan responded to the question *"Will the new process start?"* by saying *"We are always ready to eliminate problems through non-terrorist methods"* and stated that *"problems can be solved with a civilian and liberal constitution"*.

#### October 15, 2024

MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli mentioned the PKK for the first time in his group meeting and talked about laying down arms. Bahçeli said, *"Both politics and terrorism cannot fit into the same mold, cannot fit into the same body, cannot take refuge in the same mouth. Either politics or terror, either politics or weapons; there is no in between, no middle, no here, no there. The only way out for PKK militants at all levels who have betrayed Türkiye by getting stuck in the deadlock of terrorism is to immediately and unconditionally end their terrorist activities, come down from the mountain with their weapons, surrender to the state of the Republic of Türkiye and serve their sentences by accepting the verdict of Turkish justice."*

CHP Chairman Özgür Özel stated that he would visit Diyarbakır, Batman and other provinces in the region and said, *"We will courageously do whatever we have to do so that the tears of our mothers will stop, so that there will be no more martyrs, so that all citizens will be de facto free and feel free and equal as in the constitution. Let no one have any doubt."*

Ali Babacan stated that dialog and efforts for a solution would be beneficial for Türkiye and said *"we would support a new process"*.

Müşavir Davutoğlu stated that *"if it is a step to close the wounds inflicted internally against external threats, they will support the process, (...) if it is a tactical maneuver, they will oppose it."*

#### October 16, 2025

Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani met with Foreign Minister Fidan and MIT Director Kalın.

#### October 17, 2025

Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan visited former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş in Edirne prison.

#### October 22, 2024

At his party's parliamentary group meeting, Devlet Bahçeli invited Öcalan to speak at the Parliament and for the first time mentioned the *"right to hope"*: *"There are many people who do not yet understand the inner meaning of this call of mine, and even if they do, there are many who try to pervert it because it does not suit them. My second sentence of judgment, which is aimed at eliminating terrorism and strengthening national unity and solidarity in the Türkiye and Turkish century, is as follows: I also address those who say that nothing will happen if the terrorist leader is not involved; if the isolation of the terrorist leader is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. Let him shout that terrorism is completely over and the organization has been disbanded. If he shows this resilience and determination, let the legal regulation on the use of the "Right to Hope" be made and the way for him to benefit from it be opened wide open. Neither Kandil nor Edirne; let the address extend from İmralı to DEM, and let this severe and historic terrorism problem be completely removed from the country's agenda."*

Özgür Özel responded to Devlet Bahçeli by *"raising his hand"*. Özel said, *"If there will be no more martyrs in Türkiye, if there will*

*be no more bloodshed, if the tears of mothers will stop, if this country will be one and united, if there will be no more barrels pointing at soldiers, every word spoken and every actor who speaks for this is valuable. Mr. Devlet raised his hand. I am raising my hand, Mr. Devlet, and I am offering a state to the Kurds. I am offering all Kurds who do not fully feel that they belong to be the owners of the state of the Republic of Türkiye."*

President Erdoğan: *"We expect everyone to realize that there is no place for terrorism in Türkiye's future. We want this historical window not to be sacrificed to greed. We want to build a Türkiye without terrorism together."*

#### October 23, 2024

PKK carried out a terrorist attack on TAI facilities and claimed responsibility for the attack.

Selahattin Demirtaş condemned the TAI attack: *"We condemn the attack in Ankara, we wish God's mercy to those who lost their lives, condolences and patience to their relatives. We also wish the wounded a speedy recovery. The understanding that tries to stop the search for solving our problems through talking, dialog and politics with blood should know that if Öcalan takes the initiative and wants to open the way for politics, we will be behind him with all our strength."*

Öcalan met with his nephew Ömer Öcalan. The meeting took place as part of a family visit and Ömer Öcalan conveyed the following message from Öcalan after the meeting: *"Isolation continues. If conditions arise, he stated that he could move this process from the grounds of conflict and violence to the legal and political grounds."* *"Such calls are meaningless until the isolation of Öcalan is lifted,"* the KCK Executive Council said in a statement.

#### November 26, 2024

President Erdoğan said, *"By using all the means and opportunities available in our country, we will definitely build a Türkiye where there is no terrorism, no violence, where peace, democracy and brotherhood prevail. For many centuries to come, we will live on these lands as brothers and sisters, 85 million of us, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Alevis and Sunnis."*

Devlet Bahçeli said, *"We stand by what we have said since our Group Meeting on October 22, 2024. We expect face-to-face contact between İmralı and the DEM Group to take place without delay and we repeat our call with determination."*

#### October 30, 2024

President Erdoğan said, *"When we took office, our Eastern and Southeastern provinces were neglected. We made the biggest investment in history in these provinces. We did almost everything to increase the brotherhood of the Kurds and Turks. But every time we were confronted with a betrayal... We do not and cannot have any appeal to the terror barons in Qandil. The treacherous attack on TAI has once again shown that the only language that terrorists understand is the uncompromising fight against terrorism. We will resolutely continue our fight against terrorism in Iraq and Syria as well as in Türkiye, and we will eradicate threats to our country wherever they come from."*

#### October 31, 2024

Esenyurt mayor Ahmet Özer dismissed and replaced by a trustee.



#### November 3, 2024

Some officials from the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government stated that *"the PKK must leave the region"*. This was an external factor that increased the pressure to lay down arms.

#### November 4, 2024

Mardin metropolitan mayor Ahmet Türk, Batman mayor Gülistan Sönük and Halfeti mayor Mehmet Karayılan were dismissed and trustees were appointed to replace them.

#### November 5, 2024

In his group meeting, Devlet Bahçeli reiterated his call for Öcalan, spoke about the trustees and gave a new constitution message: *"The exploitation of Mr. Ahmet Türk, a Kurdish squire with health problems, and the insidiousness of trying to drive a wedge between İmralı and the DEM Party are the products of a black campaign led by the CHP with foreign connections. (...) If terrorism is uprooted from our lives, if the inflation monster is crushed, if Türkiye reaches the peak of political and economic stability, is it not a natural and right choice for our president, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to be elected once again? (...) If the head of the terrorist organization wants to say that terrorism is over, that the organization has been disbanded, let him come to the DEM Group, I stand by my promise. I insist on my proposal. Many possibilities will arise from the suffering."*

#### November 9, 2024

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık said that *"the absolute condition for Erdoğan and Bahçeli's calls to be answered is the lifting of Öcalan's complete isolation."*

#### November 10, 2024

*"Türkiye is determined to smash this bloody and treacherous death plot fueled by the terror barons in Qandil, and will not back down from this. (...) In no civilized country in the world is it allowed to do politics by backing a terrorist organization."*

#### November 12, 2024

Devlet Bahçeli said, *"The end is near for the separatist terrorist organization. If there is a gun, there is no politics. If there is violence, the language of love and peace is dry. MHP stands for national unity and brotherhood. We stand behind everything we do and say. We are not calculating the next elections, we are calculating the next generations. We never, never, never want our grandchildren to be subjected to the same disasters. We are in the sincere thought of taking firm steps in the direction of building and constructing the future, not saving the day. Ending terrorism is a national ideal. We do not think of votes when the homeland is under threat. Embracing our Kurdish brothers and sisters and making the law of national unity and fraternity Türkiye's stronghold of might and power that will not fall is a sign of our loyalty to the future and the past."*

#### November 14, 2024

Devlet Bahçeli and President Erdoğan met at the Presidential Complex.

### November 19, 2024

Devlet Bahçeli: *"The President and I have an unshakable bond. It is my duty, both of our cause and conscience, to remind that there will be no separation and divergence. (...) Terrorism will be eradicated. We are not interested in offices and positions. I address all my Kurdish brothers and sisters from here. PKK cannot represent Kurds. Those who were the servants of the terrorist head yesterday are now the servants of America. We cannot sacrifice the noble sons of the Turkish nation to Biden's stepchildren. You have no right to do this. Let's be united."*

Evaluating the process that started with Devlet Bahçeli's call for Öcalan, Bakırhan said, *"There is a very important, historical opportunity. Peace and negotiation camp should be established in İmralı."*

### November 20, 2024

On his return to Brazil, where he went to attend the G20 Leaders Summit, President Erdoğan said about his meeting with Bahçeli last week, *"Our meeting with Mr. Devlet is of critical importance especially in the political and social conjuncture Türkiye is in with the harmony, cohesion and unity of the People's Alliance. There is never a disagreement or a difference of opinion between us. But some people put forward allegations such as "the People's Alliance has split and cracked". The main opposition hopes to use such rhetoric to cover up the fight between the old and new administration and the mayors. We evaluated the additional steps that can be taken on the way to our goal of "Türkiye without terrorism".*

### November 22, 2024

Tunceli Mayor Cevdet Konak and Ovacık Mayor Mustafa Sarıgül were dismissed and replaced by trustees.

### November 26, 2024

MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli said, *"It is impossible and insane to separate Turks from Kurds. Then we must join hands and remove terrorism from our agenda. At the October 22nd group meeting, we stand by what we said. The DEM Group meeting with İmralı should not be delayed. We must never give up on our views. Terror is a dead end. Our Kurdish brothers and sisters have nothing to do with terrorist organizations. Enough has been suffered, enough pain has been experienced. Arms are not an option, embracing politics is our goal."*

### November 27, 2024

President Erdoğan said, *"Mr. Bahçeli has put forward a really courageous and game-changing proposal. We are discussing many issues, including the meeting we had at the Presidential Complex on November 14. We are in full agreement with Mr. Bahçeli. We are determined to eliminate the scourge of terrorism. We will tear down the wall of terror built between Turks and Kurds. We are sincere and determined in this goal. After Mr. Bahçeli's historic call, both structures have shown that they are of the same mind. The picture before us does not allow us to be very hopeful. (...) In the past, I said you will bury the weapons, the moment you bury the weapons, you will open the way. If you do not bury the weapons, the hand of this state will be on your shoulders. Our fight against terrorism will continue until the last terrorist is eliminated. We will not allow the establishment of a terrorist structure on our borders."*

Özgür Özel said, *"We are not busy with Bahçeli's unfulfilled words. If strong democratic steps are taken, we are for it. But we will not be a tool for someone else's plan. Martyr families are also rebelling against this. Do not use it for political gain. If the nation has a plan through this parliament, I will support that plan."*

.....• **November 28, 2024**

Özgür Özel said about Bahçeli's call to İmralı: *"I would not find it right if they exclude the parliament. If they decide to meet on the parliamentary floor, we will contribute."*

.....• **November 29, 2024**

Bahçesaray Mayor Ayaz Hazır was dismissed and a trustee was appointed in his place.

.....• **December 7, 2024**

HTS took control of Damascus and Bashar al-Assad left Damascus. The Baath regime collapsed.

.....• **December 8, 2024**

HTS announced that it was in talks with state authorities to take over Damascus. Thus, after 12 days of struggle, the Syrian revolution took place.

.....• **December 14, 2024**

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said, *"The elimination of the YPG is our strategic goal. Either they dissolve themselves or they will be dissolved. While the YPG is eliminated, no harm should come to the ancient Kurds living in the ancient cities of the region."*

.....• **December 20, 2024**

President Erdoğan said that they are in contact with the new administration in Syria: *"We have already started communication with the names in the new Syrian administration, especially Mr. Shara. As you know, we have sent our Head of National Intelligence Organization. Our Foreign Minister has already been in dialog with all the interlocutors of the issue from*

*the beginning. We will also show that it is time to neutralize the existing terrorist organizations in Syria."*

Mazlum Abdi said that *"foreign fighters will leave Syria if a full ceasefire is reached."* With this statement, the SDF/YPG acknowledged for the first time that PKK fighters are in Syria.

.....• **December 22, 2024**

Bahçeli said, *"As a result of the negotiations with İmralı, the end of terrorism and the disbandment of the terrorist organization should be announced within the framework of the ideal of a common future and love for humanity and nation."*

.....• **December 28, 2024**

Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, who are in the DEM Party's İmralı delegation, met with Öcalan. After the meeting, it was announced that *"they had a comprehensive meeting and Öcalan described the initiated process as an important step towards a permanent solution to the Kurdish problem."*

.....• **December 29, 2024**

DEM Party's İmralı delegation announced the 7-point message from Öcalan. *"I can support Erdoğan and Bahçeli's new paradigm, I am ready to make a call. Parliament and the opposition's contributions are important".*

.....• **December 31, 2024**

The SDF delegation, including Mazlum Abdi, met with Ahmad Shara in Damascus. Mazlum Abdi said *"the meeting was positive"*



#### January 4, 2025

Israeli media, citing Israeli officials, reported that Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar and PYD's Ilham Ahmed spoke by phone. During the meeting, Ahmed was reported to have spoken about the arbitrary arrests and executions of Kurds by armed groups in Syria, while Saar said, "We raise Kurdish concerns on every platform."

#### January 5, 2025

"Democratic resistance should be taken as a basis instead of armed struggle," the KCK said.

#### January 6, 2025

DEM Party delegation met with AK Party delegation and leaders of Felicity Party and Future Party.

#### January 7, 2025

KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani came to Ankara and met with President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. No official statement was made about the meeting.

DEM Party delegation met with the leaders of CHP, DEVA and Yeniden Refah Party.

#### January 11, 2025

DEM Party delegation visited Selahattin Demirtaş in Edirne Prison.

#### January 13, 2025

Mersin Akdeniz mayor Hoşyar Sarıyıldız was dismissed and replaced by a trustee.

#### January 16, 2025

Massoud Barzani and Mazlum Kobani met in Erbil. They discussed going to Damascus with a joint delegation, Kurdish unity and relations with Türkiye.

Mazlum Abdi said that "PKK fighters could leave Syria if a ceasefire is reached with Türkiye".

HDK launches "1 million signatures for peace" campaign.

#### January 18, 2025

The KCK Executive Council issued a written statement: Öcalan's "absolute isolation has been overcome". DEM Party's Parliamentary work was supported and the importance of political solution and democratic social support was emphasized.

#### January 20, 2025

"PKK's disarmament is important for regional stability," US Secretary of State said in Ankara.

#### January 22, 2025

Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan, who were part of the DEM Party's İmralı delegation, visited Öcalan for the second time. The meeting lasted about 4 hours. A government official also attended the meeting.

#### January 27, 2025

AK Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik said after the Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting: "The visit traffic has been completed. There is no concession to terrorism. What is expected from now on is the call for the liquidation of the terrorist organization. There is no negotiation process, PKK should lay down arms."

.....• **January 28, 2025**

Bese Hozat said, *"So far we have not received a letter or a direct message from the leadership. But we think it will come. When it comes, of course we will evaluate it and act accordingly. If the Kurdish problem enters the path of a democratic solution, if the state shows goodwill, if it sits down with Leader Apo and negotiates on the basis of a democratic solution to this problem, of course the issue of weapons will be discussed."*

.....• **January 29, 2025**

In Syria, Ahmet Shara was declared interim head of state.  
Siirt Mayor Sofya Alağaç was dismissed and replaced by a trustee.

.....• **February 4, 2025**

Ahmed Shara arrived in Ankara. *"We discussed the steps to be taken against the separatist terrorist organization and its supporters occupying northeastern Syria,"* President Erdoğan said. Erdoğan also said they will provide all kinds of support to Syria, including control of ISIS camps.

.....• **February 11, 2025**

Van Mayor Abdullah Zeydan was dismissed and replaced by a trustee.

.....• **February 13, 2025**

Cemil Bayık said they received a letter from Abdullah Öcalan.

.....• **February 15, 2025**

In a statement released on the anniversary of Öcalan's capture in 1999, the PKK stated that *"a new era must be entered"*. Some sections emphasized that *"the armed struggle has completed its task"*.

.....• **February 16, 2025**

DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) President Masoud Barzani. KDP leader said, *"Peace is the right way to solve the problems. We are ready to give our support."*

.....• **February 17, 2025**

DEM Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan confirmed that a letter from Öcalan was sent to Qandil: *"Yes, Mr. Öcalan's letter has reached Kandil, Europe, Northern and Eastern Syria and the relevant authorities. They explained it themselves."*

.....• **February 23, 2025**

Speaking at the 8th Ordinary Congress of the AK Party, President Erdoğan said, *"As a new world is being established, Türkiye needs to get rid of its dead weight, especially the scourge of terrorism. Turks, Kurds and Arabs will act together to tear down the 40-year-old wall of terrorism. After the terror problem is eliminated, the doors of a new era will open from democracy to development, from brotherhood to regional integration."*

.....• **February 24, 2025**

KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat said, *"Leader Apo's statement must be on video, we will not accept otherwise."*  
Kağızman Mayor Mehmet Alkan was dismissed and a trustee was appointed in his place.

## February 26, 2025

Speaking at the Erbil Forum, Nechirvan Barzani said, *"This problem cannot be solved with weapons. President Öcalan's call will be a roadmap on how to solve this problem in the right way. I hope the PKK and all other parties will respond positively to Mr. Abdullah Öcalan's call."*

## February 27, 2025

DEM Party's İmralı delegation expanded and the third meeting with Öcalan was held. Ahmet Türk, Tülay Hatimoğulları, Tuncer Bakırhan, Cengiz Çiçek and Faik Özgür Erol joined the delegation consisting of Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder.

Öcalan's call for the PKK/KCK to lay down arms was made public. Based on Öcalan's call, the first concrete call for the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve the organization was made: *"Lay down arms, dissolve the organization and return to democratic politics."*

CHP Chairman Özgür Özel stated that he found Abdullah Öcalan's call for the PKK to lay down arms important and said, *"We hope that the requirements of this call will be fulfilled by the interlocutors."*

DEVA Party Chairman Ali Babacan said in a written statement: *"I welcome the statement made by the DEM Party's İmralı delegation. It will be a historic development if the terrorist organization PKK abolishes its existence by laying down arms."*

In a post on his social media account, Future Party Chairman Ahmet Davutoğlu said, *"In conditions where the international system is shaken and our region is in a ring of fire, every call and every step taken to strengthen our country's internal structure and to be completely free from terrorism is positive."*

Nechirvan Barzani said on his X account: *"We call on the PKK to follow this message and*

*implement it. (...) As the Kurdistan Region, we fully support the peace process and we are ready to play our role to ensure the success of the process."*

KDP President Massoud Barzani: *"Our position on the peace and resolution process in Türkiye has not changed. We continue to support this process by utilizing every effort and opportunity. Peace is the only right way to solve problems. I hope that Mr. Öcalan's message will serve as a basis for the resumption of the peace process and a result that will benefit everyone will be reached."*

Bafel Talabani *"We think this is a responsible and necessary call at this stage to unite the Kurds and solve the problems through peaceful dialogue. We call on all parties to embrace this statement and seize this historic opportunity to take practical steps to achieve a comprehensive peace."*

Salih Muslim said, *"We agree with Öcalan's statements. If we are allowed to operate as a political group, there will be no need for weapons. If the reasons for carrying weapons disappear, we will give them up,"* he said, adding that they would take a stance according to the PKK congress.

## February 28, 2025

President Erdoğan: *"The efforts for a terror-free Türkiye, which started with Devlet Bahçeli's courageous initiative and advanced with our determined stance, have entered a new phase as of yesterday. We have the opportunity to take a historic step towards the goal of tearing down the wall of terror that has been built between our thousand-year brotherhood. When the oppression of weapons and terrorism is removed, the space for political action will expand."*

Selahattin Demirtaş wrote to the newspaper Duvar: *"Erdoğan, Bahçeli and Öcalan, may God grant them all a long and healthy life, but I will do more than I can to ensure the success of these three leaders who have taken the initiative for Middle East peace and the historic Kurdish-Turkish peace at the last stage of their lives..."*

#### • March 1, 2025

In a written statement, Devlet Bahçeli said, *"The statement read to the public by the DEM delegation on February 27, 2025 and written in İmralı is valuable and important from beginning to end. On November 27, 1978, the PKK terrorist organization, which held its first congress in Fis Village of Lice District of Diyarbakır, aiming to establish a great Kurdistan within the Marxist-Leninist framework, was called upon to dissolve its organizational structure 47 years later by its founding leader."*

Devlet Bahçeli called Selahattin Demirtaş, who was in Istanbul for his wife's surgery, and wished Başak Demirtaş a speedy recovery and thanked Demirtaş for his contribution to the process and his latest statement.

Representative of the KKK Executive Council (PKK administration) announces PKK's unilateral ceasefire decision and states that Öcalan's call will be obeyed.

#### • March 2, 2025

Tuncer Bakırhan said, *"This call must not remain idle. The outstretched hand should not remain in the air. It would be a pity if this call remains just a call. Political and legal arrangements are now inevitable for the call to turn into concrete steps."*

#### • March 4, 2025

DEM Party co-chairs held a press conference at the Parliament, *"The call was made to the PKK, there is a different equation in Syria, but peace here will also have an impact on Syria."*

#### • March 9, 2025

In a written statement on the "process", Devlet Bahçeli said, *"The YPG's claim that YPG is an exception to the call of İmralı contradicts the nature of the founding leadership. DEM Party's efforts will pave the way for it to become a party of Türkiye. PKK's ceasefire declaration is not correct, ceasefire regime is between equal powers."*

#### • March 13, 2025

Selahattin Demirtaş wrote to QAD: *"We built the state together, we will grow it together, govern it together and democratize it together. For this reason, I call out to Turks, Kurds and the whole society: Do not be afraid! Make peace."*

#### • March 17, 2025

DEM Party Co-Chairs met with CHP Chairman Özgür Özel and AK Party delegation.

#### • March 19, 2025

Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Şişli Mayor Resul Emrah Şahan and Beylikdüzü Mayor Murat Çalık (along with nearly 100 others) were detained and arrested on corruption and terrorism charges.

### March 20, 2025

*"Our vision and proposal is that on the eve of Hıdırellez, for example on Sunday, May 4, 2025, in the Malazgirt district of Muş, with the support, contribution and help of the DEM Party mayor, the PKK convenes its congress and brings its dissolution discussions to an end, and finishes this job," Devlet Bahçeli said in a post on MHP's X account.*

### March 21, 2025 (Newroz)

Öcalan's message was made public:  
*"Politics, not weapons, must speak now."*  
 President Erdoğan said after the message,  
*"This call should be read correctly. Türkiye will get stronger as it gets rid of terrorism."*

### March 23, 2025

The PKK announced in a press statement in Qandil that it had decided to *"withdraw its armed forces from Türkiye"* and would *"abide by the ceasefire"*.

Şişli Mayor Resul Emrah Şahan was dismissed and a trustee was appointed in his place.

### March 30, 2025

President Erdoğan published an Eid statement on the Presidential website.  
*"Our state has done its part by making the call. Now it is time for the organization to comply with the call without any buts. We do not have unlimited time and tolerance in this regard. Without further delay, we expect the organization to dissolve itself and lay down its arms completely."*

### March 31, 2025

AK Party and DEM Party delegations exchange Eid al-Fitr greetings at the Parliament for the first time in 10 years

### March 31, 2025

Ömer Öcalan and his brother Mehmet Öcalan, Ömer Hayri Konar's brother Ali Konar, Hamili Yıldırım's brother Polat Yıldırım and Veysi Aktaş's sister Sabiha Aslan visited İmralı and met with their relatives.

### April 4, 2025

President Erdoğan answered journalists' questions after Friday prayers: *"At the moment, this process of 'Terror Free Türkiye' is going on as planned. There is no problem in question. Developments are in favor of our country, in favor of our region and a healthier structure every day."*

### April 5, 2025

Mehmet Öcalan, who met with Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı Prison on March 31, reported that Abdullah Öcalan told him, *"We will take this process to the end, we will have a chance of success if our side does not break, if the other side does not break, if it proceeds properly. We will fulfill our promise to the end,"* he said.

### April 10, 2025

President Erdoğan received DEM Party's İmralı delegation Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder at the Presidential Complex in Beştepe. AK Party Deputy Chairman Efkân Ala and MİT Director İbrahim Kalın also attended the meeting. The meeting lasted approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes. President Erdoğan described the meeting as *"the first face-to-face contact after 13 years"*.



#### April 11, 2025

In a statement on MHP's official X account, Devlet Bahçeli said, *"The goal of a Türkiye without terrorism must be realized without compromise and without further prolongation, and this misfortune that has lasted for decades must be eliminated. The February 27 call to İmralı must be answered. (...) The meeting of our President with the DEM Party delegation yesterday at the Presidential Complex is admirable in terms of content, progress and symbolic expression. Of course, it must be ensured that the PKK terrorist organization convenes its congress and concludes its disarmament and organizational dissolution within a short period of time without giving any opportunity for Zionist and imperialist conspiracies to intervene."*

#### April 14, 2025

In an interview with BBC Farsi, Cemil Bayık said, *"Leader Apo's call is not an ordinary message, but a strategic step towards solving the Kurdish problem. If democratic paths were open, we would not have gone to the mountains. Our only condition is that the heavy isolation imposed on Leader Apo in İmralı Prison is lifted and he can work freely."*

#### April 15, 2025

DEM Party Istanbul MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder was hospitalized in Istanbul in the evening due to a heart condition. Önder, who was taken to the intensive care unit after the operation, is reportedly in life-threatening condition.

#### April 22, 2025

In a message shared on social media on the occasion of April 23, MHP Chairman Bahçeli said, *"The most appropriate option is for the PKK to convene its congress and complete the organizational dissolution process in accordance with the February 27th İmralı call and hand over its weapons to the Republic of Türkiye."*

#### April 24, 2025

Minister of Justice Yılmaz Tunç met with DEM Group Deputy Chairpersons Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit, Sezai Temelli and Law and Human Rights Commission Co-Spokesperson Öztürk Türkddoğan.

#### April 29, 2025

In a written statement, Devlet Bahçeli said the following about the process: *"It must be ensured that the PKK immediately convenes its congress and completes the organizational dissolution process so that the goal of a terror-free Türkiye is not compromised, and complications are not experienced. The efforts of Mr. Sırrı Süreyya Önder and the joint steps taken so far should not be wasted. The Qamishli provocation is a disgrace meant to spoil the process."*

#### May 3, 2025

Sırrı Süreyya Önder died on the 18th day of his treatment due to multiple organ failure.

#### May 5-7, 2025

The 12th Congress of the PKK convened, the armed struggle ended and the organization was dissolved. It was stated that the announcement would be made later.

### May 6, 2025

President Erdoğan visited Bahçeli at his residence.

### May 9, 2025

The PKK Central Committee made a statement on the meeting held on May 5-7, 2025. "Decisions of historical importance were taken on the basis of Öcalan's call, extensive and detailed information and documents will be shared with the public very soon after the results in two different areas are combined, the meeting was held in two different areas in parallel with each other with delegates representing all working areas, and the perspectives and proposals presented by Leader Abdullah Öcalan to the congress were also evaluated," the statement said.

Devlet Bahçeli called Pervin Buldan on the phone after the PKK's announcement of its congress to decide on dissolution: "I wanted to thank you specially. Your contribution to the process is great. The process has come this far thanks to you. From now on, I will do whatever I can to complete the process."

### May 10, 2025

CHP leader Özgür Özel said at a rally in Van that they support the PKK's decision to lay down arms and want this process to be completed as soon as possible.

### May 12, 2025

By the KCK/PKK: "The armed elements have been completely disarmed, the PKK has been dissolved and democratic political struggle has begun".

Özgür Özel made a statement on his social media account about the PKK's decision to "lay down arms and dissolve": "Today, the PKK terrorist organization announced that it has dissolved itself and

decided to lay down its arms. As the Republican People's Party, in a historical consistency, we are in favor of peace. However, the success of this process and its evolution into a lasting social peace is directly related to the sincerity, legality and democratic legitimacy of the steps to be taken. We underline the need for all legal arrangements required for democratization to be made under the roof of the Turkish Grand National Assembly without waiting."

### May 14, 2025

Speaking at the AK Party Group meeting, President Erdoğan said: "The era of terror, weapons, violence and illegality is over. It is contrary to the spirit of the time to look for other ways when there are legitimate and acceptable ways. (...) I think the trustee practice in municipalities will become an exception again. (...) MİT will meticulously follow up whether the promises are kept or not. When the organization fulfills its part, it will become the job of politics to talk about the remaining issues and to move forward. I would like to express our gratitude to Mr. Bahçeli, whose efforts and sacrifices we know closely in bringing our efforts for a terror-free Türkiye to this day. The strength of the People's Alliance and its ability to produce politics was once again seen in this process. I would like to thank all the people, co-chairs and politicians who acted with a sense of responsibility, especially the late Sırrı Süreyya Önder, who gave great support to the process within the DEM Party. We expect common sense discourse to continue in the coming period. We express our appreciation to Mr. Özel and other political party leaders for their constructive attitude in this process."

#### May 15, 2025

The Ministry of National Defense held a press conference following the PKK's decision to dissolve and lay down arms: *"A mechanism will be established by the relevant units of our state in coordination with the counterparts of the countries in the region regarding the delivery of weapons."*

#### May 18, 2025

In a post on MHP's X account, Devlet Bahçeli suggested the establishment of a commission in parliament for the process: *"With the PKK's decision to lay down arms and declare organizational dissolution, a new phase has begun that is sensitive, delicate, fragile and requires patience. No opportunity should be given to the provocation and fomenting of an environment of provocation, or to offenses and misunderstandings that may arise for trivial reasons. The commission, which will include representatives of 16 political parties represented in the Assembly, should consist of 100 members, and commissions should be established according to working conditions."*

#### May 18, 2025

Pervin Buldan and Lawyer Özgür Erol from Asrın Law Office met with Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. The delegation shared Öcalan's message with the public. Öcalan said, *"There is a need for a new contract on the law of brotherhood. What we are doing expresses a big paradigm shift. The nature of the Turkish-Kurdish relationship is completely different, what is broken is the brotherly relationship. Brothers and sisters fight, but one cannot exist without the other. One by one, we are clearing the traps and mines that disrupt this relationship, and repairing the broken roads and bridges."*

#### May 19, 2025

DEM Party went on a political party tour following the PKK's decision to dissolve and lay down arms. DEM Party delegation visited DEVA Party and Felicity Party

#### May 20, 2025

Following the DEM Party delegation's visit to CHP Headquarters, Özel emphasized that *"the process should be Parliament-oriented, transparent and based on social consensus"*.

#### May 27, 2025

President Erdoğan spoke at the AK Party's expanded provincial presidents meeting: *"As of yesterday, I assigned 10 of my lawyer friends. We are determined to add the constitution, which will enable Turkish politics to prove its maturity, to the inventory of our beloved nation."*

The DEM Party visited the MHP at the TBMM, Bahçeli welcomed the DEM delegation at the door. Bahçeli's call for a commission on the process and the penal execution regulation are among the topics on the table. Tuncer Bakırhan: *"It was a good, productive meeting. We continue consultations,"* he said.

#### May 28, 2025

DEM Party delegation visited AK Party in Parliament. The meeting lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes. Making a statement after the visit, AK Party Deputy Chairman Efkân Ala said, *"Comprehensive evaluations were made regarding the process. The process continues as envisioned, there is no pause or disruption."*



After the PKK's decision to dissolve, MLKP called for organization and war.

The execution regulation that will lead to the release of sick and elderly prisoners has been submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

#### May 29, 2025

Duran Kalkan reacted against MLKP for criticizing the PKK's decision to dissolve and calling for "war": *"Why do they say the PKK is giving up the war after so much fighting? Will the life of Kurds always be spent in war? Some of them are very smart. If they want war so much, let them fight themselves. If they are so war-loving, let them go ahead and fight, who's stopping them?"*

#### June 7, 2025

MHP and DEM Party delegation exchanged Eid at MHP Headquarters

#### June 7-8, 2025

On the occasion of Eid al-Adha, Öcalan met with his nephews Ömer Öcalan, Ali Öcalan and two child nephews. Hamili Yıldırım met with his brother Polat Yıldırım and Ömer Hayri Konar met with his brother Ali Konar.

#### June 18, 2025

Mithat Sancar becomes new member of DEM Party's İmralı delegation

#### June 21, 2025

MHP announced on its social media account that it will organize public meetings on the solution process under the name of *"National Unity and Solidarity Meetings"*.

#### June 24, 2025

Minister of Justice Yılmaz Tunç met with DEM Party Group Deputy Chairpersons Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit and Sezai Temelli and Law and Human Rights Commission Co-Spokesperson Öztürk Türkdoğan.

#### June 25, 2025

DEM Party's İmralı delegation Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar met with Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş.

#### July 1, 2025

Head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) İbrahim Kalın visited Erbil. İbrahim Kalın met with KRG President Nechirvan Barzani, KDP Leader Massoud Barzani, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani, Interior Minister Reber Ahmed and Kurdistan Security Council officials.

#### July 1, 2025

AK Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik announced that *"the PKK may lay down its arms in a short time and the coming days will be very important for a 'terrorist-free Türkiye'."*

#### July 6, 2025

DEM Party's İmralı delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı.

12 of the soldiers who entered the cave to take the body of First Lieutenant Nuri Melih Bozkurt, who was martyred on May 28, 2022, were poisoned and martyred.

#### • July 7, 2025

President Erdoğan met with the DEM delegation consisting of Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar. Efkan Ala and MIT Director İbrahim Kalın also attended the meeting.

#### • July 8, 2025

Head of National Intelligence Organization İbrahim Kalın visited Baghdad.

#### • July 9, 2025

The PKK released Öcalan's video message in which he emphasizes *the need to "end the phase of armed struggle and move to democratic politics"* and says *"I believe in the power of politics and social peace, not weapons"*.


The PKK announced that it would lay down arms on July 11, 2025 in Sulaymaniyah (Iraq).

## M E T H O D O L O G Y

This research was conducted between June 27 - July 5, 2023. The sample size of the study is 1674. The margin of error of the sample is 3.3% with a 95% confidence interval, considering design effects. Participants were randomly selected from all provinces and contacted via mobile phone.

Post-stratification weights were calculated to adjust the sample to the population of Türkiye aged 18+, using TURKSTAT demographic benchmarks (NUTS I region, age, gender, education) and YSK's official 2023 general election results.

## RESPONDENT DISTRIBUTION







THE DISARMAMENT OF **PKK**  
AND THE KURDISH ISSUE

---