Why Moscow Won’t Play Ball on a Ceasefire…Yet

Russia’s cross-border attack on Sumy in northeast Ukraine this Palm Sunday killed at least 34 people and injured 117 others. The missile barrage seems particularly egregious considering that Moscow blocked Ukraine’s efforts last month to negotiate a full and unconditional U.S.-brokered ceasefire. Putin’s delaying tactics are costing lives as he stalls in an opportunistic attempt to gain leverage.

Does it mean that Russia doesn’t want peace? Not necessarily.

But it shows that the Kremlin’s calculus for negotiations prioritizes elements that are most likely to place Russia in a strong position in terms of both foreign and domestic policy whenever a settlement is reached. For now at least, the Kremlin has little incentive to cease hostilities and plenty of reasons to continue fighting.

Russia Continues to Gain Ground

Despite military setbacks at the start of the war and continued devastating losses of personnel and equipment, Russia is not losing the war. Over the last three years, not only have the Russian economy and defense industry shifted effectively to a wartime footing, but Russian forces have adapted, revised force structure, attacked in smaller, more agile formations in the Donbas, resisted Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, and learned how to deploy and evolve new technology.

In recent days, Russian forces have made advances in the Sumy region. Recruitment levels are surging. Meanwhile, what political science scholar Graham Allison terms Russia’s “lava” offensive is seizing approximately 100 square miles of territory in the Donbas per month.

Given these territorial gains and the possibility of more to come, Moscow isn’t in any hurry to “get the shooting to stop” despite Washington’s urging.

War is the Only Game in Town

After the GDP fell slightly in 2022 following U.S.-led sanctions, Russia’s economy rebounded swiftly, with real GDP rising by 3.6 percent in 2024. Despite a labor shortage, inflation, and a weakening ruble, unemployment is down and wages are up, fueling increased consumer spending.

However, this resilience is thanks in part to a militarized economy. Prime Minister Mishustin recently reported that Russian manufacturing and tech industries are key economic drivers, growing in 2024 by 8.6 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The impressive figures derive from ramped-up government defense spending on military salaries and industrial production related to the war, with factories churning out ammunition, armored vehicles, drones, and other military equipment at breakneck speed.

In 2024, Russia’s military expenditures outpaced Europe’s, hitting record highs, and are expected to continue to grow. Considering how closely the country’s economic growth is tied to the military-industrial complex, an end to the war could risk economic stagnation, a reality that the Kremlin would sooner put off than face in the near future.

The Challenge of Returning Veterans

Ending the war would necessitate the demobilization and reintegration of Russian troops. However, given the relative weakness of Russia’s civilian economy, it is unclear how Russia can absorb hundreds of thousands of troops returning home from the war, to say nothing of the even higher numbers of military sector workers.

Most of the returning troops were recruited from Russia’s poorest regions, which means they often lack the education and skills to find well-paying jobs in a civilian economy. This will be a particularly difficult adjustment after unsustainably high military salaries and bonuses, and many returning veterans are likely to take out loans, burdening state finances.

Additionally, veterans are likely to suffer from drug addiction, alcoholism, PTSD, and other health-related problems, which may overwhelm Russia’s already-strained social services in sectors like healthcare and education. Russia faces a drastic shortage of treatment and rehabilitation centers, counselors, and psychology professionals, which will make the process of demobilization and reintegration particularly costly and time consuming.

Finally, veterans who know how to handle weapons and find themselves without adequate means of economic and social support may well turn on the regime.

Threats to Regime Stability

Moscow’s efforts to centralize and expand state political and economic power, which began more than a decade ago, have accelerated dramatically in recent years, with harsh crackdowns on dissent coupled with increased repression, censorship, and surveillance. Regional political elites, from mayors to governors, have been swapped out for those loyal to the ruling party. The aggressive measures are justified by appeals to national security—the country is, after all, at war.

However, rolling these policies back as part of a broader transition to peace is highly unlikely because it would threaten Putin’s grip on power. At the same time, expecting the Russian population to accept a constant state of military emergency could prove ultimately unsustainable and eventually lead to a legitimacy crisis. In a very real sense, Putin’s political power in the Russian imagination—indeed, his very raison d’etre as the country’s leader—hinges on his alleged confrontation of Western imperialism, a narrative in which the Ukraine conflict is a proxy war between the United States and Russia. If that war ends, so does the ideology that sustains it.

This is likely why, in the wake of America’s impatience to withdraw from Ukraine as quickly as possible, Moscow is casting Europe as the new Hannibal at the gates, making sure that Russia can continue to justify its national identity as the victim of Western liberalism. While the responsibility for the conflict shifts from American to European shoulders, as the pro-Russia think tank Valdai Club has written, Russia and the United States can focus on normalizing their relationship in other areas, like the economy and arms control.

Ultimately, Putin’s dithering is about buying time. When the war eventually ends, he hopes, it will be entirely on Russia’s terms. The strategy is not, however, without its risks. Each day a ceasefire agreement isn’t reached, Trump’s reputation for dealmaking takes a hit even among supporters while his team grows more desperate for a deal.

This could lead to two possible outcomes: bigger and better concessions for Moscow or a frustrated Trump. Shortly before the Sumy attack, for example, the White House reissued Biden-era sanctions on Russia, indicating that the administration is in no mood to wait around for a procrastinating Putin to nitpick his way to an agreement.

 

*Sveta Yefimenko is a research director at the Massachusetts State House of Representatives where she works on legislative and policy research and analysis. She holds a PhD in Russian Studies from the University of Exeter, and her recent scholarship focuses on war narratives and memory politics in Russia and Eastern Europe.

 

Source: https://fpif.org/why-moscow-wont-play-ball-on-a-ceasefire-yet/