Turkish military alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
Talk of a Turkish military alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reflects Ankara’s opportunistic ‘hedging’ strategy
An alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would not make NATO member Turkey better defended. But it would provide other advantages.
On 9 January, Bloomberg reported that Turkey was ‘likely’ to join the defence pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and that talks to do so were in an ‘advanced’ stage. Later that month Pakistan’s Minister for Defence Production told Reuters that a draft defence deal between the three countries had been prepared.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan agreed a defensive pact in September 2025, following American inaction on two occasions: initially in 2019, when Iranian drone attacks on Saudi Arabia failed to elicit more than mild condemnation from Washington; and in 2025, when Israel’s attacks on Qatar were met only with lukewarm rebuke.
The potential inclusion of Turkey into the alliance has received mixed reactions from Turkish commentators. Some interpret the anonymous briefing as more of a messaging strategy than concrete statement of intent. It remains to be seen whether the alliance will come to pass.
Opportunities
Certainly, a level of ‘synergy’ could exist in a Pakistan–Saudi–Turkey alliance. Turkey and Pakistan both have developed, modern defence economies which specialize in different sectors, and have become increasingly linked in recent years. The countries have a long history of cooperation on shipbuilding and fighter pilot training.
Turkey could provide access to NATO standards of training – by the standards of the Middle East, Turkey’s military is highly effective and capable – as well as large-scale shipbuilding facilities. Saudi finance would be welcome in reinforcing Turkey’s inflation-battered economy, just as it has been in Pakistan.
The idea that this might be an ‘Islamic NATO’ is misleading – most Muslim states sit outside the alliance, and religion lacks any real salience in regional foreign policy. But the alliance would likely be well-received by Turkish President Recep Erdoğan’s base, as well as playing into his own desire to be seen as a leader of the Muslim world.
Furthermore, historic tensions between Ankara and Riyadh have been more effectively managed since 2022, and no major international issue (currently) divides the three countries.
Turkey was content to side with Pakistan against India during their brief confrontation last year, going so far as to block the transit of Indian equipment through Turkish airspace. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated satisfaction with the new regime in Syria, and the integration of the SDF into centralized Syrian institutions, aligning with Turkey’s position. The trio have also converged on their stance on Israel and the war in Gaza over course of the past year.
Why a formal alliance?
Like Saudi Arabia, Turkey’s potential alliance with Pakistan would represent a ‘hedging’ strategy, as it seeks to create redundancy around existing structures and partnerships. However, Turkey has less to gain from such an arrangement.
Whereas Riyadh has long sought a formalized defence agreement with Washington, Turkey has enjoyed a formal security agreement with the US for decades, via NATO. Nor does an alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan offer Ankara anything better than the status quo, or anything it couldn’t obtain via less binding means.
For a start, any offer by Pakistan to extend nuclear deterrence to Turkey is unrealistic. Pakistani missiles do not comprehensively reach Turkey’s potential adversaries. Their range covers Iran, and stretches as far as Rostov-on-Don inside Russia, but no further.
Pakistan is unlikely to station such weapons abroad, and even less likely to be drawn into a direct confrontation with a NATO state such as Greece. Turkey could pursue a technology transfer from Pakistan without a binding alliance. But that would mean leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and risking international isolation.
Most compellingly, within NATO, Turkey is already protected by American and British nuclear weapons: of considerably higher quality and reliability then Pakistan’s. Up to fifty American nuclear bombs are already stationed at Incirlik air base.
Ankara may view the alliance as a way to shore up its regional power, build its export base, acquire foreign currency, or develop its ballistic technology. But it could achieve such goals without committing to a binding mutual defence agreement. Its own armed forces are comparatively strong. And the ongoing peace process with the PKK in Turkey, and integration of the SDF in Syria, leaves it yet more secure. A Saudi–Pakistan alliance offers Ankara nothing that NATO or other agreements cannot do better. So why bother?
Opportunism
Some commentators have suggested the move indicates a lack of faith in NATO, following recent ‘America First’ belligerence. But such an explanation is insufficient. Even in the event of an American departure from NATO, European members would likely work hard to keep Turkey in the alliance, aligned against Russia, with whom it remains locked in competition.
If Turkey enters into a formal alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, it would represent a broader regional trend of ‘hedging’: should NATO become unreliable in the future, Turkey is made more secure by a new, separate defence agreement.
But a new alliance would also represent a continuation of a uniquely Turkish policy of opportunism. Just as Turkey has reached out (or loudly announced it is reaching out) to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ‘hedging’ affords not only alternatives to alliances like NATO, but crucially leverage within them.
A Saudi–Pakistan alliance, even with a less credible nuclear deterrent, gives the Turkish state options in the event of a NATO Article Five scenario.
The flexibility offered by an alternative defensive structure would allow it to shape NATO policy, by threatening to withhold its own forces, or to ‘opt out’ of alliance commitments. That can only have more weight as US commitment to NATO shrivels. Even just announcing the move has the desired effect of messaging Turkey’s lack of dependence on its existing alliance partners – strengthening its hand.
The same effect can apply to other long-running Turkish foreign policy aims, whether EU accession, cooperation within BRICS; a move towards full SCO membership, partnership across the Turkic Central Asia region; and mediating international conflicts.
In each case, Turkey sees the opportunities provided by ‘bridging East and West’ as not just securing the state, but demonstrating its independence, offering it leverage within each successive power bloc.