Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up. Can France Lead the Way?
France’s new nuclear doctrine signals that it is willing to take a greater role in European defense.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized US European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most US angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, sharing risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less consideration. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, the potential of Europe’s own national nuclear forces to deter Russian nuclear first use warrants further reflection by policymakers and military strategists.
In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows.
First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to project deterrence beyond France’s borders. The actual stockpile counts will be withheld from public disclosure for security reasons.
Second, France will permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. France will not share the delegation of authority for nuclear use to other countries, however. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce the message of France’s commitment to its European partners.
Third, France will work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on managing escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the United Kingdom, and six other NATO countries.
Macron’s decision reflects a perceived need to upgrade the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the US commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and free riding on the backs of the US military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany, and on more than one occasion has suggested that the United States should leave the alliance.
There are three reasons for Washington’s continuing cold shoulder to Brussels and other European capitals.
First, Trump is frustrated by his inability to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, despite claims that, had he been in the White House in 2022, the war would never have begun.
Second, the US president launched a war against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies beforehand. Understandably, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support to Operation Epic Fury, which has become more prolonged and challenging than Trump anticipated.
Third, a stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide, creating potential blowback against Republicans in the American midterm elections in 2026.
Notwithstanding these distractions, the European members of NATO have remained steadfast in their commitment to support Ukraine for as long as is necessary. An agreement has been reached for US allies in Europe to purchase weapons from the United States and pass them along to Ukraine, a sort of cash-and-carry arrangement. And the United States has committed to upgrading its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad that provides ultimate deterrence against Russia’s coercive nuclear diplomacy.
US modernization plans for the nuclear strategic triad call for $71.4 billion in next-generation land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and strategic bombers with Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapons, supported by improved nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems.
Clearly, the French nuclear force of several hundred warheads, with delivery systems including submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, cannot substitute for the US nuclear deterrent—nor is it intended to. Instead, France’s system is for national deterrence and, along with the ballistic missile submarine force of the UK, provides a potential regional deterrent against nuclear adventurism by Russia below the level of strategic nuclear weapons.
Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and air platforms and could number up to 2,000. In comparison, the United States deploys some 200 available non-strategic nuclear weapons at bases in Europe and Turkey.
This disparity in the number of NSNW is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of US nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current US operational plans encompass the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within a single comprehensive plan. US nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response.
To that end, the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has adjusted US bomber deployments and military exercises to provide additional support to the US European Command. Bomber Task Forces are now expected to move a fully combat-ready US bomber force into the European theater of operations in good time, and the number of bomber operations over Europe, including flights close to the Russian border, has increased since Russia invaded Ukraine.
In addition to the bomber-delivered weapons, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to the United States’ European and Asian allies.
France correctly assumes that deterrence is not only a matter of the relative sizes of military forces (including nuclear ones) but also perceived resolve among allies and potential enemies. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO precludes the deployment of French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help to send that message.
A more forward-leaning French military doctrine is not a walkabout from France’s commitment to European security. Nor is it a replacement for the US nuclear deterrent. Macron understands that in the realm of reality, not rhetoric, the United States cannot entirely separate itself from NATO—nor can NATO divorce itself from the United States.
NATO, without the United States, invites nuclear coercion of Europe. The United States, without NATO, substitutes credible deterrence for political isolation and military autarky. The American and European pillars of NATO are, as the French might say, “condemned to succeed” together.
*Stephen J. Cimbala is a distinguished professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security studies, defense policy, nuclear weapons and arms control, intelligence, and other fields. He is a graduate of Penn State, having received his BA in Journalism in 1965. He received his MA in 1967 and PhD in 1969, both in Political Science, from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He serves on the editorial boards of various professional journals, has consulted for a number of US government agencies and defense contractors, and is frequently quoted in the media on national security topics.