The Venezuela Strikes Are the Beginning of a New Western Hemisphere
Following the release of the National Security Strategy and the capture of President Nicolas Maduro, the way is open for a more robust US Western Hemisphere policy.
President Donald Trump’s stunning grab-and-go operation on January 3 against Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, which delivered the dictator to New York to face charges for illegal narcotics trafficking, is the curtain raiser for both the new year and the new National Security Strategy. The NSS is arguably the first foreign policy vision statement since World War II to emphasize the Western Hemisphere’s core strategic importance. It also declares a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, rejecting drug trafficking, irregular migration, and the influence of outside powers like China. The Venezuela strike is its dramatic launch.
Commentary has ranged from celebration to alarm, but objectively, recognition of the fundamental importance of the Western Hemisphere to US security and economic interests is long overdue. Lack of attention has been a bipartisan lament for years, and the administration is right to highlight and center the Americas.
And none-too-soon. In recent years, cartel violence fueled by the drug trade has exploded across the region. Venezuela has produced the largest humanitarian disaster in the modern history of Latin America, and China has reprogrammed the hemispheric economy toward Beijing with both commercial and strategic implications. This can’t all be laid at an inattentive Washington’s doorstep, although benign economic neglect coupled with lectures about predatory elites has done little to advance primary US interests.
The good news—and it is very good news—is that democracy remains strong across the region. In country after country, tired prescriptions and those who promote them are being rejected in favor of leaders willing to take bold steps to improve personal security and economic well-being. The new year will see elections in the Bahamas, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and presumably Haiti; only Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela deny their citizens the right to change rulers peacefully.
As the region shifts away from failed policies, leaders increasingly see Washington as a partner and want more, not less, engagement, just as the administration seeks to prioritize the hemisphere. It’s a historic confluence of interest. That’s not to say Washington has a free hand in the region, or that goodwill cannot be squandered; attitudes about the Venezuela operation continue to evolve. But over the longer term, pursuing a mutually-rewarding partnership is the answer.
To take just one example, the NSS frames critical minerals supply chains in the Western Hemisphere as essential to reducing US dependence elsewhere, increasing resilience in the face of potential disruptions, denying those assets to adversaries (particularly China), and building relations with friendly democratic nations. It shifts the strategic calculus with extractive nations such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru. With friendly governments in place, there is now little reason—or excuse—to overlook the strategic importance of these nations to the United States and to craft intentional, mutually-rewarding trade and investment policies accordingly.
At the same time, it’s not enough for regional leaders merely to wait for investments to materialize, particularly those nations closer geographically to the United States, where the upside of participation in manufacturing supply chains outweighs the commodities trade. The NSS explicitly calls for reshoring to the United States itself, which complicates the race to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), so national advocates need to show how investments will support jobs in both countries, not just their own. They need to improve competitiveness and seek enhanced access to North America through updated trade arrangements, including accession to or parity with the USMCA. They will also need to cast a more skeptical eye toward Beijing, whose promises often fail to materialize and whose participation in US supply chains is politically toxic on a bipartisan basis.
For its part, Washington can flesh out the economic side of the NSS with a meaningful focus on the Western Hemisphere from relevant agencies, including the Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The DFC would work diligently to improve infrastructure, tax, customs, and anti-corruption systems, and identify and finance strategic investment opportunities.
Washington should also include the hemisphere in broader policy initiatives. A real-time opportunity is the Pax Silica, an initiative to secure global silicon supply chains launched on December 12, just one week after the release of the NSS. The initiative includes major microchip-producing nations and others, primarily in Asia and Europe.
Still, it curiously excludes Latin America and the Caribbean, despite Costa Rica’s well-developed chip manufacturing industry and the significant potential for other regional economies, including Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Friendshoring vulnerable microchip supply chains to the Western Hemisphere is critical for US strategic economic resilience; including the region in strategic chip initiatives, among others, is imperative.
The new NSS reimagines US policy toward the Americas and has already framed direct action in Venezuela. But without meaningful efforts to advance a mutually-rewarding hemispheric economic agenda, the broader benefits will not fully materialize. As 2026 starts, we have a real opportunity to focus on the overriding objectives and get this right.
* Eric Farnsworth is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is a senior executive and professional with over 35 years of experience building the policy and commercial agenda of the Americas. Most recently, he headed the Washington, DC office of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas for over 20 years, complementing almost a decade of service with the US government, including the White House, State Department, and Office of the United States Trade Representative.