The Strategic Void in Germany’s Defense Debate

The debate on the Medium Forces can serve as an example of both the progress and the challenges of the German defense debate.

Since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the German Armed Forces have undergone a rearmament program unlike anything seen since the end of the Cold War. Defense spending is set to rise to 152.8 billion euros (about $180 billion) by 2029, thereby meeting the NATO quota of 3.5 percent of GDP. At the time of writing, plans include 35 F-35A Lightning II, 20 additional Eurofighters, 1,000 new Leopard 2 main battle tanks, 3,000 GTK Boxer armored fighting vehicles, 3,500 Patria 6×6 armored personnel carriers, precision weapons with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, and armed drones. The aim is to become the strongest conventional armed force in Europe. However, the decisive factor will be whether Germany also develops civil-military relations that allow a substantial strategic debate—or whether this remains a purely quantitative arms build-up.

One key modernization project is the establishment of so-called “Medium Forces.” These are intended to bridge the gap between light, highly mobile forces and heavy tank units. At the heart of the concept are wheeled combat vehicles such as the GTK Boxer and the Patria 6×6, which can be quickly deployed to NATO’s eastern flank without rail transport—for example, to secure the strategically important Suwalki Gap between Poland and Lithuania. Their strength lies in their rapid response: they can form flexible lines of defense and slow down or divert enemy advances until heavy forces arrive. They could not hold their own against armored enemy formations but could “conduct deep operations—striking at the enemy’s logistics, command and control, and other critical nodes” in the rear. In that sense, the introduction of the Medium Forces fits into the longer evolution of US and NATO military thinking since the 1980s, inspired by maneuver theory. The primary focus is on rapid power projection and early and decisive action.

The concept of Medium Forces is controversial inside the Bundeswehr itself. Critics point in particular to the lack of firepower and limited off-road capability of wheeled platforms such as the Boxer. This could be problematic, since the terrain in the Baltic region is characterized by dense forests and swamps (however, the same terrain therefore also restricts the movement of heavy armored forces).

Whatever the merits of the Medium Forces may be, it is telling that the debate on this new category of forces has so far been limited to operational and tactical questions. It is true that, from an operational point of view, the ability to quickly deploy troops in the east makes perfect sense. But seen from the strategic level, substantial problems arise. Then basic questions have to be raised, such as: What happens once the Medium Forces have covered the distance between Germany and the Baltic states? What happens once the first Russian advance is halted? What—in essence—is NATO’s theory of victory or, at least, theory of war termination?

The political and geographic environment in the Baltic region makes it highly likely that no quick solution to a war will be reached by “decisive maneuver” but that such a war will bog down into positional and attritional fighting. The reasons for this are straightforward: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia not only demand a credible “forward defense” policy but are investing strategically in a project called the “Baltic Defense Line.” For example, on Lithuanian territory, a 50 km deep system of mines, barriers, and dispersed strongpoints is planned. Furthermore, there is a high chance that land maneuver on Russian and even Belarusian territory will be fairly restricted by the political authorities, since they must balance operational demands with the possibility of Russian nuclear escalation. As the strategist Lukas Milevski has written, Russian territory could in fact be a “sanctuary” backed by Russia’s nuclear forces. This would enable Russia to reconstitute its forces even after an initial Russian attack has been successfully repelled. This would mean that NATO—and Germany—have little choice but to prepare themselves for a long, drawn-out war in the Baltics.

This scenario becomes even more likely should the United States de jure or de facto withdraw from NATO. Then, the European NATO members would have to consider even more seriously the possibility of limited nuclear escalation by Russia. They would also lack the means to provide air cover for ground operations inside Russia or Belarus—at least until US capabilities for deep strikes and target acquisition have been replaced.

In such a protracted war, NATO forces would primarily fight on the defense on Baltic territory, while maneuvering on Russian and Belarusian territory would only be possible to a very limited extent. If this is indeed the case, the Medium Forces would still play an important role in reinforcing the units already deployed forward and would act as a dynamic element in positional warfare on the NATO side, in synergy with the Baltic Defense Line. However, once deployed in the east, they would not conduct any deep maneuver.

Discussing the concept of the Medium Forces, therefore, goes beyond purely military considerations or the viability of maneuver theory. The Medium Forces’ potential and limits can only be adequately considered in recognition of the political and strategic environment. Therefore, the debate on the Medium Forces can serve as an example of both the progress and the challenges of the German defense debate. Strategic and operational issues must be discussed in tandem, but to do so, political and civilian actors must become more familiar with strategic and military issues. Key questions to be discussed are: Is NATO’s maneuver-oriented warfare against Russia still appropriate today? How should the risks of nuclear escalation as a result of military land operations on Russian territory be assessed? How would a war with Russia be terminated? Ultimately, these questions must be answered from a distinct European perspective that clearly addresses the scenario of a Europe that must defend itself on its own.

*About the Authors: Tobias Fella and Lukas Mengelkamp

Dr. Tobias Fella is a Senior Researcher at the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH).

Lukas Mengelkamp is a Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH).

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/in-germanys-defense-debate-strategy-is-the-missing-link