The Hidden Dimensions of Disarmament and Dissolution Processes

The disarmament or dissolution of long-standing, ideologically driven armed groups such as the PKK is often treated as a mere technical “decision.” Yet such processes signify a multi-layered transformation that involves not only organizational change but also profound psychological and mental fractures, which are reflected in language and style.

In order to understand the challenges facing the process, it is necessary to go beyond the surface-level political debates. Within this framework, two fundamental axes come to the fore: the language used and the organizational mode of thinking.

While the PKK example shares similarities with global experiences, it also exhibits significant differences due to its character shaped by the geography in which it is located, cultural codes, social structure, the strategy it follows, the organization’s unpredictable rigidity, and similar features. Decisions regarding disarmament or dissolution are mostly discussed through political will, security balances, or negotiation agendas. However, the underlying ground that makes these decisions possible—due to the characteristics we have mentioned—is shaped by two deeper-rooted areas: the language used by the organization and its organizational mode of thinking.

While the language used delineates the actors’ scope of action, the organizational mindset determines how this scope is perceived and how its boundaries are interpreted. When these two axes operate together, the process either progresses or, even if it appears to be progressing, effectively stalls. Reading such processes solely through security, politics, or negotiation techniques renders the most difficult part of the issue invisible. Because the real rupture occurs not in the decision itself, but in the mental and discursive ground that makes that decision possible.

The Constitutive Power, Boundaries, and Weight of Language

Although the issue of language is often seen as a secondary element, it is one of the most decisive areas in such processes. The language produced within the context of organizational activities not only describes events, but also defines the parties, assigns roles to individuals, fixes positions, and limits the scope of action. In such situations, concepts such as “resistance,” “betrayal,” “collaboration,” “counter-revolution,” “annihilation,” “surrender,” or “victory” are not simple definitions. Each carries powerful normative weight, and this weight determines what actors can and cannot do, as well as how individuals are defined. Within this highly rigid language, laying down arms is coded not as a transformation, but as “withdrawal” or “defeat.”

Language does not merely express reality; it also determines which reality is acceptable. Therefore, the primary need in resolution processes is not to produce a new vocabulary, but to transform the meaning carried by existing concepts. Otherwise, even the most correct steps lose their meaning within a wrong language or are reversed. This transformation requires establishing a language that can frame, for example, laying down arms not as “defeat” but as “transition to a new political phase,” “liquidation” not as “transformation,” and “surrender” not as “transition to the civil sphere.” Otherwise, every word used generates a counter-meaning that weakens the step taken. Therefore, language and style become not merely a means of expression in such processes, but the most critical factor that directly determines the fate of the process.

The Transformation of Language into a Tool of Legitimacy

If a decision has been made regarding a process, a corresponding transformation of language is expected for the success of that process. If the decision taken has not been internalized, this is reflected in the language. In other words, the language used is directly proportional to whether the solution has been internalized or not. For instance, if decisions such as resolution, disarmament, or dissolution have not been internalized, the language hardens. This is done to fill the void created by the decision. Because the organizational mode of thinking transforms the language used into a battlefield for legitimacy. In fact, if one recalls the past resolution process and the language used in the statements made during that period, this issue becomes clearly evident. The language oscillated between maximalist demands and rigid definitions.

In fact, the problem here is not only the difference in the words used, but also the hierarchy and power relations implied by these words. Language constructs the form of the relationship between the parties. A language that speaks from a position of authority, issues judgments, or declares outcomes aims to push the opposing side into a passive position. This locks the process psychologically, even if it progresses technically. Therefore, a lasting solution requires producing reciprocity not only in content but also in the tone of the language.

The effects of the discursive framework do not remain only at the political level; they also deeply affect individual psychology. For individuals who have been part of the organization for a long time, laying down arms is also interpreted as a “dissolution of identity.” In order to manage the impact created by years of propaganda, the organization needs to develop a new language. The idea that what is happening is not a “defeat” or “loss” but a “transition to political struggle” can only be internalized through the language used in this process. Otherwise, the tendency to sabotage the process may strengthen. This can turn into a collective psychology. The correct approach is not to repeat the organizational language used in the 1990s by adding the concept of “peace,” but to develop a new language that refers to the future and political struggle.

The Nature of the Organizational Mindset

Of course, language alone is not sufficient to explain the problems that arise in such processes. The second and deeper axis is the organizational mode of thinking. Organizationalism is not only an organizational model but also a closed, self-reproducing mental framework. This mindset interprets the world through sharp dichotomies. Concepts such as “us and them,” “loyalty and betrayal,” and “obedience and dissolution” are defining. Within this framework, the individual ceases to be a subject in their own right and is reduced to a functional unit, that is, the “cadre.” Value is derived not from producing thought, but from conforming to the prescribed line. Over time, this situation weakens critical thinking, eliminates the capacity to evaluate alternative possibilities, and removes gray areas.

More importantly, this mindset sustains its existence through a constant perception of threat. It feeds not on flexibility, but on rigidity and harshness. For this reason, change is interpreted not as an internal renewal, but as an external dissolution and weakening. This generates structural resistance to transformation and resolution processes. The most critical feature of this resistance is that it is often not a conscious choice. The mindset we are referring to becomes a set of reflexes that operate independently of individuals’ decisions. Therefore, even if the organization ceases to exist, the mode of thinking that made it possible does not dissolve on its own, but continues to exist by adapting to new conditions.

Mental Impasse in the Dissolution Process

The most critical bottleneck in disarmament and dissolution processes is that the process is still interpreted through the organizational logic we have mentioned. Discussions often get stuck on questions such as “Who won?”, “Who lost?”, or “Which position will be preserved?” However, dissolution, by its nature, is a threshold at which these questions lose their meaning. Because dissolution requires not the preservation of positions, but their disappearance and acting in accordance with the new position. The resistance that emerges at this point is often not ideological; it stems from the shaking of the ground on which identity is based. Even if not expressed explicitly, the following question is strongly felt in the background of the process: “If this structure is gone, who are we?” This question expresses not only a political uncertainty, but also the dissolution of the ground on which identity rests.

The interviews conducted with members of ETA following the organization’s decision to lay down arms in 2011 described exactly this existential void. A significant portion of individuals who had defined their identity through “struggle” for decades resisted not the existence of the organization, but the disappearance of the ground on which their own identities were based. In other words, despite the decision to dissolve the organization, a mental transformation had not taken place. For this reason, in such processes, resistance becomes not a strategic choice, but a reflex of existence. This also explains why processes are prolonged or become blocked.

The most critical feature of the organizational mindset is that it continues to exert its influence even if the organization itself disappears. The end of the formal structure does not mean that these mental patterns automatically dissolve. Hierarchical reflexes, expectations of absolute loyalty, and informal disciplinary mechanisms may be carried into the civil sphere. This creates an intermediate space in which violence appears to have ended, but behavioral patterns remain unchanged. The pluralism required by the civil sphere, the ability to cope with uncertainty, and the capacity to live with differences directly conflict with the organizational mindset. Therefore, the end of violence alone is not sufficient. For example, in the absence of a healthy transformation of mindset, you may symbolically burn weapons, yet continue to “dig up” the mountain. In short, the civil sphere must truly become civil, that is, it must be cleansed of hierarchical shadows.

Conditions for True Transformation

At this point, two dangers should be given particular attention. The direct transplantation of organizational language and its set of concepts into the civil sphere puts pressure on that space and militarizes it. On the other hand, the transfer of the same organizational hierarchy and discipline into the civil-political sphere after dissolution dominates political and social activities. When these two operate together, they produce a structure that lacks weapons but thinks within a militarist paradigm. This leads to the squandering of a significant opportunity.

For all these reasons, these processes involve dynamics that are far more complex than they appear. These processes are not merely matters of security or politics. Success largely depends on the reconstruction of language and overcoming the organizational mode of thinking. If transformation cannot be achieved in these two areas, even if the organization disappears, the mindset and discourse that produced it will continue to exist in different forms. This determines the difference between the end of conflict and the realization of genuine transformation. For a lasting solution, it is not enough for the guns to fall silent; minds and language must also change.

Therefore, unless language and the organizational mindset transform, the problem itself will not change. This is precisely the issue that Türkiye is currently facing.