The Future of Syria, the SDF, and Türkiye

The PKK’s decision to dissolve itself opens a historic window of opportunity for Türkiye. If the process concludes successfully, it would mean Türkiye freeing itself from shackles both at home and abroad. A Türkiye rid of the burden of terrorism can restructure state-society relations on a healthier basis internally, while externally it gains the ability to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. Therefore, this process transcends parties, identities, and ideologies, it is a national process. It should be approached with the utmost sensitivity and seriousness. Short-term political opportunism or poll-driven manipulation must not be allowed to overshadow its historic significance.

Many serious field studies, especially those conducted during the periods when the symbolic “Burning of the Weapons” incident took place, when Öcalan openly called for disarmament, when Erdoğan and Bahçeli championed the process with the strongest expressions, and when the CHP declared its support, reveal that the nation strongly supported the process. There is no serious reason, at least for now, for this popular conviction to shift. This is a matter for all the individuals who make up the nation. It’s a state project. It’s a struggle for a country entering its new century to close the books on the past century and make a fresh start.

The “Syrian Mound”

What Mesut Yeğen conceptualized as the “Rojava Mound” can also be described as the Syria mound. As the PKK’s disarmament and dissolution process advances, one of the most frequently raised issues are Syria and the SDF structure in Syria. Formed under U.S. guidance, financial backing, provision of equipment, and tribal mobilization, the SDF’s main decision-making mechanism is controlled by the PYD, a sub-organization of the KCK. Representatives of the tribes integrated into the SDF are absent from the upper structure where decisions are made; the decision-making mechanism is entirely composed of PKK cadres. Kurdish and Arab tribes have positions in local councils that they are responsible only implement the decisions taken and instructions given. This, combined with the SDF’s insistence on keeping arms as an instrument of power, poses a major problem for Syria’s future.

The language used by the organization against the new Damascus administration that overthrew the Baath regime also deepens this problem. Phrases such as “jihadist gangs” serve both to send signals to Western Islamophobic sentiments and to convey messages to Israel, the terrorist state destabilizing the region. There are two outcomes they hope to achieve through this stance. The first is to perpetuate the domination they have established over Kurdish and Arab tribes with US support. The second is the de facto division of the country through parallel armies, even if it maintains its formal unity. Ilham Ahmed’s remark in an interview with Rûdaw “Disarmament is not on our agenda, definitely not” clearly reflects this position.

Moreover, an important point to keep in mind is that there are three structures that struggle in different ways against the desires of the broad masses who raised their voices against the oppressive regime that has been continuing for decades in Syria during the Arab Spring. Ultimately, all three of these structures stood against the legitimate demands of the Syrian people. They may not have been able to prevent the Syrian revolution, but they directly and actively contributed to its delay, at a heavy cost paid by Syrian people. These actors were none other than PKK-SDF, ISIS, Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia.

Issues Concerning the SDF That Must Be Discussed

The process that has begun in Türkiye offers the opportunity to discuss almost all issues as openly as possible. Therefore, we don’t need to play with words or letters when discussing the SDGs. Within this framework, it would be beneficial to discuss some issues that can be grouped under seven headings.

First, we all know well that the PKK has ‘political’ and armed structures in four countries. Their leadership and manpower needs are supplied from a common pool. Therefore, PYD/YPG is the Syrian branch of the organization formed from the PKK ideology and common personnel pool. Consequently, all top decision-making structures in Syria like TEV-DEM, YPG/YPJ, SDF command, are controlled by PKK cadres. The aim of these structures is to preserve the organization’s paradigm and cement dominance over emerging local dynamics.

Second, the PKK’s transfer of its pre-1980 Türkiye experience to Syria. Two topics can be addressed under this heading. First, the fact that the PKK eliminated all Kurdish organizations in the region and forced them to migrate in order to establish its regional dominance. The Kurds know this best. Some recent conferences have been attended by organizations those main actors have been purged and that have pledged allegiance to the PKK. The second is the struggle waged by Kurdish and Arab tribes against the PKK sub-organization in 2010 and 2011. We all witnessed this in recent Syrian history. Additionally, there have been numerous clashes in recent history against the PKK umbrella, which was established under US influence.

Thirdly, the YPG and SDF’s alignment and relationship with the regime during the period from the emergence of social opposition against the Baath regime and the beginning of the civil war after the massacres until to the overthrow of Assad. Their avoidance of clashes with the regime, and even the voluntary handover of some areas by regime to them, remain in the Syrian people’s memory. While hundreds of thousands were slaughtered, chemical weapons were used, and millions displaced, the YPG/SDG did not show the slightest reaction. For the sake of Syria’s integrity, these complicity actions are not questioned, but the organization ignores such good intentions.

Fourth; issues such as the local councils established in Syria, the issue of participation, ethnic balances, and the contradiction between theory and practice. The text, theoretically referred to as the “Rojava Constitution,” envisions local councils, cantons, and a confederal structure. In practice, decisions are made at the top and imposed downward. Local councils serve only to implement those decisions. The co-chairmanship system means that even local councils are controlled and managed by the organization’s staff. This reveals that claims such as “democratic nation” or “democratic republic” are not only unreal, but also that a model led by party cadres, rather than grassroots participation, is preferred.

Fifth, sociological structure and ethnic balances. While the majority of the SDF’s armed forces are Arabs, nearly all of its leadership are PKK members. While tribes have local influence, they have no representation at the highest levels of political-military decision-making. This stems from the PKK’s mistrust of tribes and insistence on the primacy of the organization. This applies equally to Kurdish and Arab tribes. Another factor is the organization’s imposition of “revolutionary vanguardism”. In other words, the masses participate, but the decision-making mechanism is guided by “conscious vanguards”. There’s no public here, only organization.

Sixth, the contradiction between theory and practice. In theory, there’s a democratic nation, pluralism, and equal representation. In practice, there’s a centralization of decisions based on factors such as security priorities, PKK cadre pressure and control, and a sense of organizational leadership. What begins as a promise of “people’s democracy” devolved into “cadre domination.” This situation can be interpreted through two factors. The first is the vanguard party approach. In other words, the PKK’s Marxist-Leninist organizational culture is based on the guidance of leading cadres rather than participation. The other is the acceptance that it’s wrong to trust social structures. In fact, the understanding that tribes lack the concept of a democratic nation and therefore it’s inevitable that organizational cadres will manage the process.

When the subject of Syria and the SDF arises, we are asked to believe these realities do not exist and that a democratic structure prevails. This is untrue and leads to false conclusions. To see what the structure really is, one only needs to recall who immediately said after the February 27 declaration, “This statement does not cover Syria.”

Ankara’s Stance

Ankara seeks to resolve its internal issue while also protecting the rights of Kurds in neighboring states. It has demonstrated this in Iraq against the central government and repeatedly conveyed the same to Damascus regarding Syria. Ankara advocates an end to terrorist activities, disarmament of the organization, and a transition to democratic politics. This line upholds Kurdish rights everywhere in the world and embraces equal citizenship domestically. The only factor disrupting this stance is weapons. Disarmament, participation in politics, and the democratic transformation of the state are the main priorities of the government and the current process.

Ankara’s stance is also valuable in terms of its vision for regional peace. It represents a vision that prioritizes diplomacy and social peace over language and attitudes that glorify weapons in Syria. The Syrian policy pursued is aimed at ensuring that all elements in Syria freely represent themselves, implementing the principle of equal citizenship, and establishing Syria’s territorial integrity and regional stability. This stance also reinforces Ankara’s international legitimacy.

Negative Campaigns Against Hakan Fidan

Recently, two negative campaigns have targeted Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The first originates from PKK circles. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is someone who sees the above-mentioned PKK/SDF schemes and is in a position to understand their intentions, and who openly expresses this situation. Fidan explains the organization’s position in Syria. This is why Fidan is being targeted. In fact, the language used is a manifestation of the ontological crisis these organizations are experiencing. Ankara’s proposal is for all groups in Syria to become legitimate founding actors of the new Syria and part of the region’s social fabric. The current mindset of the organization is to seek help from outside sources and become part of games that will alienate it from the region, geography or history. In short, it either becomes a legitimate actor in the new Syria or remains an archaic organization that misses the new era. But it’s impossible to be both at the same time. Instead of confronting the crisis it is experiencing and making a clear decision in favor of legitimacy, the organization is both deepening its own crisis and alienating itself even further from the region by attacking Fidan.

The second campaign comes from the main opposition party, CHP. What is striking is that these criticisms reveal nothing about CHP’s foreign policy vision. On the contrary, their baseless attacks on Fidan expose CHP’s lack of foreign policy. They do not say what Türkiye represents or should represent globally. On the contrary, the baseless statements targeting Fidan constitute an attack on the AKP’s strongest asset. Foreign policy is the government’s strongest asset. Foreign Policy of Türkiye commands more approval than the combined votes of the People’s Alliance. Various public opinion polls confirm this. By attacking this policy and the symbol figure of its success, the opposition can neither overcome the crisis of its lack of a foreign policy nor understand the emerging global order. Especially, chasing after a former diplomat who uses FETO-like tactics and expresses his personal hostility will not benefit the CHP in any way.

What Does Hakan Fidan Say?

Thanks to his previous roles and deep knowledge of the organization, Foreign Minister Fidan articulates Ankara’s stance clearly. Taken as a whole, his statements show his position on the Kurds is consistent. What he said in his interview with UTV on April 7, “After the last call, we hope, we wish, we want this call to be heeded and the organization will convene a congress, just as its own leader requested, and decide to dissolve itself and lay down arms. If it does so, both the Kurds in Iraq, Türkiye, and Syria and the peoples of the region will truly benefit. A terrorist element will have evolved into a different structure. The organization must now understand this: We are ready to accept all unarmed stances in Iraq, Syria and Türkiye, but when there is an armed terrorist threat, no one can allow this,” is the expression of the line I mentioned.

Fidan’s line can be summarized as “The key to regional peace: diplomacy and statecraft.” Those seeking a genuine assessment rather than cherry-picked statements may be advised to read the statement following the meeting between Fidan and Şeybani on August 13th. Fidan’s remarks, like “New Syria must be a Syria in which all the peoples, beliefs and cultures that make up Syria are preserved and can live together, in unity and integrity. As Türkiye, we are carrying out our suggestions, recommendations and work in this direction together with our friends,” reveals the vision we are talking about.

The only problem for Ankara is the presence of armed elements, the territorial integrity of its neighbors and border security. Any issue can be discussed and debated as long as no problems arise on these issues. But when the risk factors are evident and the willpower to take action on these issues is not demonstrated, it is not right to be disturbed by Ankara’s expression of these risks. By keeping channels of dialogue open during the resolution process, Hakan Fidan made critical contributions to Türkiye’s confidence-building approach to the issue. The constructive attitude he displayed during this period showed that he had not only a security perspective but also a perspective of political and social solutions. Meanwhile, Fidan’s diplomatic language also reveals that Ankara is taking into consideration the sensitivities of the people of the region in the fight against all armed structures both at home and abroad.

It is clear that some actors within the Syrian structure are disturbed by Ankara’s perspective of “a shared future with Kurds in peace, free from terrorism.” Ankara expresses its position through Foreign Minister Fidan, and this line represents that the future we are talking about is possible. Ankara’s approach, based on equal citizenship and democratic politics, has a strong foundation that cannot be overshadowed by negative campaigns. This stance includes equal citizenship and advocating for the rights of Kurds abroad. However, it also prevents anyone from engaging in politics by displaying their weapons.

What the Aim of the Negative Campaign?

However, it is possible to talk about three separate aims regarding the discussions carried out by the CHP, especially regarding Fidan.

First, to make him politically controversial and, if possible, discredit him. Because, Fidan has held critical government positions for many years. He has fought against numerous forces both domestically and internationally, and continues to do so. Because of these struggles, he is a key target for many political opponents. Indeed, Israel’s unease about Fidan is well known. In the first days of his tenure as MIT Undersecretary, Israel carried out an international campaign against Fidan. The campaign launched by Israel and FETO’s targeting of Fidan coincide with the same dates.

Second, to undermine trust within the state. Reliability in intelligence and foreign policy is crucial both domestically and internationally. It is clear that the aim of the negative campaigns, especially those run by the CHP, is to question Fidan’s credibility and try to shake it.

The third is to create a negative perception internationally. Ankara has been carrying out serious regional projects in recent years. Due to his position, all international projects are being implemented through Fidan. This campaign aims to weaken Fidan’s negotiating power with foreign countries.

Meanwhile, it is clear that some of the discussions carried out by the organization within the context of the SDF and some of the assessments made on the occasion of these discussions serve the function of, on the one hand, limiting the PKK’s disarmament and dissolution process to Türkiye, and, on the other hand, concealing the PKK’s maximalist demands.

Focusing on the Future

Considering Ankara’s foreign policy approach over the last two years, the three justifications I mentioned, and the evaluations based on the lack of full understanding of the explanations, it becomes clear that the issue falls into a political and geopolitical context. In particular, the diplomacy and peace vision displayed in response to the SDF’s imposing, insulting statements towards the Damascus government and its weapons-centric approach is the most realistic path not only for Turkey’s future but also for the future of the region. We are on the threshold of a historic opportunity. Having established social peace, Türkiye will not only strengthen its internal structure but also become a more assertive actor abroad. This is a trans-partisan cause and an indicator of Türkiye’s path in the new century. We must approach this process with this seriousness and sensitivity. We must build the future with a new language and a new vision.