The First Year of the Revolution in Syria: State Building and Contested Sovereignty

The new period that began on December 8, 2024, with the collapse of the Assad regime can be read not merely as a change of power, but as the beginning of an ontological struggle over the nature of the state. This process has not been limited to the reconstruction of war-damaged institutional structures; it has turned into a multilayered transformation in which center–periphery relations and legitimacy regimes are redefined. While the transitional government led by Ahmed Shara attempts to repair the institutional wreckage it inherited within the paradigm of a “unitary nation-state,” some structures on the ground created by 13 years of civil war resist this vision. Therefore, the current situation should not be evaluated solely as a “transition process” but rather as an asymmetric and continuous power struggle between the Damascus-centered “recentralization strategy” and the “de facto autonomy practices” on the periphery. This struggle fundamentally unfolds along three intertwined strategic fault lines: (i) de facto autonomy practices in the north and south, (ii) the problem of centralizing the security architecture, and (iii) the role of external actors.

Center–Periphery Tension: The Northeastern and Southern Axes

The biggest structural crisis faced by the new administration is the spatial distribution of sovereignty, especially in the northeastern axis. Contrary to the process frequently romanticized in the literature as the Kurds’ “transition to federalism,” the Damascus administration does not accept the de facto autonomy of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a model; on the contrary, it codes it as an existential threat to the unitary structure. While the autonomous administrative and security structure shaped by the SDF continues in the northeast, the Shara administration keeps only the formula of “administrative decentralization” on the table as a means of resolving the Kurdish issue, rather than a political status or federation. From Damascus’s perspective, increasing the powers of local administrations is an acceptable concession, whereas granting constitutional status to autonomous structures is rejected as “the road to partition.” In this context, the current situation between Damascus and the SDF is not one of building a partnership, but rather a “hostile truce”, which both sides must maintain because they cannot eliminate one another, and which will remain in effect until the balance of power changes.

In this context, the memorandum signed on March 10, 2025, between Ahmed Shara and Mazloum Abdi represents an important normative threshold. The agreement includes principles such as recognizing the Kurdish community as one of Syria’s native components, guaranteeing full citizenship and constitutional rights, ensuring a nationwide ceasefire, and guaranteeing the safe and voluntary return of the forcibly displaced. These articles strengthen the claim of the new state to evolve into an inclusive political structure. However, the practical implementation of the agreement has remained quite limited. The formula that stipulates the details of the agreement will be shaped through committees by the end of 2025 reflects the institutional fragility and uncertainty of the process. Although the integration of the SDF into the national army is accepted in principle, the organization’s insistence on preserving the autonomy of its military structures indicates that the transition process will be difficult. The future of this issue is directly linked to Türkiye’s security and foreign policy priorities. Therefore, the institutional reconciliation that the Shara administration will establish with the Kurds will be a decisive test ground not only for internal peace but also for the strategic coordination that is being sought to be re-established along the Ankara-Damascus line.

A similar asymmetry is experienced in the south. It remains unclear how the demands of the Druze community centered in Sweida will be integrated into the new state structure. The current situation between the Damascus government and the Druze community can neither be described as a complete conflict nor a complete reconciliation; rather, it is a state of “de facto coexistence” in which the parties are forced to accept each other’s existence. The July 2025 security operation in the region was met with local resistance, prompting the central government to pursue a more cautious and gradual strategy instead of military imposition. In this context, the administration views autonomous structures and local militias in the south not as threats to be eliminated in the short term, but as “local realities” to be managed in a transitional period during which state authority is limited. This internal deadlock is deepened by Israel’s “Weak Neighbor Doctrine.” Instead of a strong army on its borders, Tel Aviv desires a Syria with a weak, flexible federative structure and surrounded by buffer zones (Golanization). Israel’s instrumentalization of Druze autonomy as a “safety valve” objectively limits Damascus’s sovereignty capacity.

Security Architecture: Capacity and Legitimacy

This political deadlock also manifests itself in the arena of security architecture, which represents the state’s attempt to re-establish the monopoly on violence. The Damascus administration sees security-focused centralization as necessary to ensure stability and presents the dissolution and integration of all armed groups under the Ministry of Defense (demobilization and integration) as a condition of sovereignty. On the other hand, in reality on the ground, the fragmentation of de facto sovereignty within the country continues and armed groups maintain their existence. Both the SDF and the local forces in the south demand “autonomous integration” while preserving their own command structures, whereas Damascus insists on dissolving these structures and incorporating their members individually into the army. The impasse between the regime’s insufficient military capacity and the resistance of these armed groups prevents the state from reclaiming the monopoly on violence, turning security into a constant subject of negotiation.

The new security structures established in this context—primarily the Police Force, “General Security,” and the Intelligence Directorate—are notably run by former cadres who previously served within HTS in the Idlib region. This choice allows for a twofold interpretation: on one hand, it is a functional method for rapidly building institutional capacity and establishing security discipline on the ground; on the other hand, due to these actors’ past human rights violations, it carries a serious risk for the social legitimacy of the new structure. The threshold that most clearly exposed the fragility of the transition process emerged in March 2025. After an ambush carried out by pro-Assad elements, retaliatory attacks targeting Alawite communities in the western coastal region resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians and sharply called into question the transitional government’s capacity to exercise control over security.

The government’s clear condemnation of attacks on civilians, its statements that those responsible will be held accountable, and its announcement of the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into the events can be interpreted as a show of “ownership” in terms of political willpower. However, the failure of various armed groups to comply with the directives of the central authority clearly reveals that the Shara administration has not yet established full operational control across the country. Similarly, clashes between Druze communities, Bedouin tribes, and security forces once again confirm that “minorities” constitute the most sensitive barometer of the transition process. In this context, the most balanced evaluation of the Shara government’s security performance can be made through a threefold framework: intent, mechanism, and implementation. The administration is seen to adopt an inclusive legitimacy discourse and to take steps toward establishing a new security mechanism; however, discipline in implementation is weak, and control remains fragile.

The Positioning of External Actors: Searching for a New Balance

These internal lines of tension gain a more complex dimension through the strategic alignments of external actors. In particular, Türkiye’s security priorities and its concerns regarding a “terror corridor” act as a decisive catalyst in the Shara administration’s increasingly rigid stance toward autonomy demands in the northeast. Its core objectives – the return of refugees, the narrowing of SDF/PYD-YPG-centered Kurdish autonomy, the permanence of influence, and economic revitalization – have become theoretically more attainable. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SMA) capture of Tel Rifaat and Manbij has increased Ankara’s bargaining capacity on the ground. Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 call for the dissolution of the PKK and the group’s positive response to the disarmament appeal have generated a new context that could allow Türkiye to pursue a more flexible framework with Syrian Kurds. This also constitutes an important diplomatic advantage for the Shara administration: coordination with Türkiye becomes a key external variable for ensuring a conflict-free integration process with the SDF.

The position of the U.S. and the Western Bloc functions as a “braking mechanism” balancing Ankara-Damascus rapprochement. Washington has interpreted the collapse of the Assad regime as a strategic window of opportunity to shrink Iran’s influence and erode Russia’s regional position. In this context, the continuation of the U.S. military presence in Syria preserves its counter-ISIS capacity through the SDF while also serving as leverage over the new Damascus administration in negotiations regarding SDF integration. However, the truly distinctive aspect of U.S. policy is its gradual adoption of a “conditional normalization” line throughout 2025. This approach gained a more structural framework when President Donald Trump signed an executive order on June 30, 2025, aiming to lift most sanctions on Syria; thus, the U.S. adopted a perspective that reads economic recovery alongside security and political-transition agendas as essential for the sustainability of the post-Assad order. Diplomatic contacts between Trump and Shara during this period generated a transformative dynamic in bilateral relations. Shara’s November 10, 2025 meeting with Trump at the White House can be read as the symbolic apex of a transition from “cautious engagement” to a more permanent and institutionalized framework.

It appears that the Shara government harbors intentions to invite Russia to Syria as a balancing power against the U.S. Despite the loss of reputation and field capacity, Russia is pursuing a narrowed-down strategy that prioritizes preserving its naval base in Tartus and the Hmeimim air base, while Damascus is increasingly demonstrating its willingness to renegotiate the terms of this relationship. The clearest indicator of this trend is Shara’s first official visit to Moscow on October 15, 2025, during which he met with Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin’s indication of a broad agenda for the talks—including the future of bilateral relations, trade and economic topics, current developments in the Middle East, and the status of Russia’s military facilities in Syria—simultaneously reflects Moscow’s aim to secure its minimal strategic gains on the ground through its bases, while also mirroring Damascus’s search to create a bargaining space by drawing Russia into the field regarding reconstruction, external legitimacy, and security dossiers.

A similar alignment paradox is being experienced on the southern front with Israel. Israel is exploiting the post-Assad vacuum by expanding its “preventive security” doctrine. The moves to establish a buffer zone around the Golan Heights, the pursuit of control over the Mount Hermon line, and the intense airstrikes targeting Syria’s military capacity all indicate that Israel views the new Damascus administration with caution, even skepticism. This approach carries the potential to transform sovereignty and security crises in southern Syria into a long-term dossier. At the same time, Israel’s use of its protection of the Druze community narrative to justify intervention has turned local tensions in Sweida into part of a broader regional rivalry. In addition, Israel has also increased its engagement with the SDF in the north.

On the other hand, the relationships built with Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) emerge as a balancing factor within the administration’s southern strategy. By aligning itself with the Gulf vision of “integrating Syria into the Arab system,” Damascus uses the financial support provided to rehabilitate state institutions. In areas where its military capacity is insufficient, the administration seeks to generate legitimacy through Gulf-backed economic projects and public-service initiatives. This strategy can be read as an attempt to gain leverage through economic tools (economic statecraft) in the face of Israel’s security-focused constraints. Among the Gulf monarchies, a remarkable realignment is taking place. With the overthrow of Assad and the rise of a new HTS-centered government, Qatar has achieved a result that confirms the success of its “post-Arab Spring” line. In contrast, the UAE is experiencing a strategic retreat: although it welcomes the weakening of Iran, the establishment of an Islamist government in Damascus conflicts with Abu Dhabi’s ideological sensitivities, particularly given its earlier leadership in normalizing relations with Assad. Saudi Arabia adopts a more pragmatic stance; while it views the rollback of Iran and Hezbollah positively, it also demonstrates a clearer willingness to pursue controlled engagement with the new administration.

Conclusion

The first year after Assad can be evaluated as a fragile yet directionally clear transition period in which Syria has attempted to rebuild state authority and pursue societal reconciliation simultaneously. The Ahmed Shara administration has succeeded in rapidly containing the power vacuum created after the regime’s collapse, generating centralized decision-making capacity, and reorganizing the country’s fragmented security spaces within a minimal framework. This practical governability is a political signal that strengthens the psychological threshold of a war-weary society that “the state can return.” For this reason, despite all its limitations, the Shara government’s first-year record constitutes a realistic starting point in Syria’s re-statization process. The relatively positive atmosphere can be understood across three dimensions. The first is that, on the domestic political level, the emphasis on providing security for minorities and keeping the door open to negotiations with the SDF serves as a counterbalance to the new order’s evolution into an exclusionary politics of revenge. Secondly, on the security level, the will to melt different armed actors under a single national roof offers a direction that is compatible with the goal of re-establishing the state’s monopoly on violence in the long term, even if it requires harsh and centralized means in the short term. Thirdly, on the foreign policy level, the transitional administration has begun to position itself as a “contactable” interlocutor in the international arena, thanks to the expansion of multilateral diplomacy and conditional normalization channels.

The first year of Syria after Assad does not signify a transition to an idealized democratic constitutional order; rather, it indicates a condition of “Contested Sovereignty”, in which central authority has not yet been fully established. The structure led by Ahmed Shara appears determined not to recognize demands for autonomy; however, due to the lack of sufficient military and administrative capacity, it tries to manage the deadlock caused by its inability to change the de facto situation. This picture shows that the future of Syria will be shaped not by constitutional texts but by the arm-wrestling in these strategic arenas on the ground.

Furthermore, Syria’s economic situation remains the most decisive factor for the success of the transition. With 90% of the population living in poverty, over 16 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, an 80% decline in energy production, and severely collapsed water and sewage infrastructure, rebuilding state capacity is not only a political goal but also a socio-economic necessity. For this reason, the lifting of U.S. sanctions has been defined as a critical threshold. The interest shown by neighboring and regional actors such as Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the reconstruction equation increases Syria’s potential for “geographic proximity-based” economic integration. However, while the emphasis on privatization and foreign investment offers short-term advantages for attracting capital, unresolved disputes over property rights and wartime forced displacements could heighten the risk of social tension. Therefore, economic recovery will remain fragile unless it progresses in coordination with security and justice.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İsmail Sarı graduated from the Department of History at Istanbul University in 2001 and obtained his master’s degrees in history and international relations from the same university. Awarded the prize for best doctoral dissertation in international relations for his Ph.D. thesis completed in 2016, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sarı worked as a post-doctoral researcher at Columbia University with a TÜBİTAK scholarship between 2018 and 2019, and during his studies in the United States, he also served as a visiting faculty member at Missouri State University.

His research focuses on Iranian foreign policy, American foreign policy, the modern Shia secularization process, the intellectual origins of the regime and opposition in Iran, and contemporary Iranian and U.S. politics. Fluent in English and Persian, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sarı continues his academic work as a faculty member at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University.