The End of Political Victimization: The Elimination of the YPG in Syria

Issues such as the Kurdish question, political Alevism, and minority rights are often presented in Western academia and media discourse through universal narratives of “freedom” and “equality”; however, in reality, these topics are shaped under the shadow of politics. By the very nature of the social sciences, many issues are not purely academic but are directly constructed on political ground. In the case of Syria, this becomes particularly striking: for 61 years under the Baath regime, Alawite elites systematically excluded and massacred the Sunni Arab population—yet this prolonged domination never became a serious subject of research in international academia; on the contrary, it was deliberately ignored. It was only when the regime fell in Syria in December 2024 and the popular revolution succeeded that the Western-centric academic and media establishment suddenly turned its attention to topics like “minority rights” and “preserving Kurdish identity.” For example, operations against groups that had taken up arms against the Syrian army in Suwayda were portrayed in Western media as “ethnic pressure on the Druze minority”; yet the rationale for the operation was not ethnic identity, but rather an armed uprising. Similarly, the Kurdish issue has also been incorporated into this manipulative framework.

In northern Syria, every military intervention targeting the PKK/YPG/SDF structure—which holds armed power—is labeled as an “attack on the Kurds” or a “purge of minorities,” thereby deliberately equating the terrorist organization with the Kurdish people. At this point, the role of the circles shaping Western academic and political reflexes is significant. Some groups residing in countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, and the United States—many of whom receive financial support from these structures and maintain direct or indirect ties with terrorist organizations—position themselves as “liberal academics” or “defenders of minority rights,” yet in reality, they carry out propaganda that serves Western interests under the guise of scholarship. The PKK’s media and academic extensions in Europe, along with its financial networks and diaspora, both legitimize and amplify the organization.

Data from the field in Syria, UN reports, and numerous independent human rights documents clearly show that the PKK/SDF structure does not represent the Kurdish people; it systematically violates human rights by recruiting child soldiers, turns women’s rights into an ideological showcase, and finances itself through criminal economies such as drug and human trafficking. Nevertheless, criticizing the PKK/YPG in academic circles is often labeled as “anti-Kurdish,” thereby suppressing scholarly inquiry. Thus, breaking these repressive narrative molds and directly analyzing the military and political breakdown that occurred in Syria after 2024 is crucial to understanding why the project presented under the label of the “Rojava revolution”—largely constructed on a narrative of victimhood—collapsed at social, ideological, and strategic levels.

Field Realities and Military Collapse

The PKK/YPG’s area of control in Syria entered a rapid process of contraction and collapse following developments after 2024. Successive military blows on the ground significantly reduced the territory the organization could hold. One of the most striking turning points occurred in January 2026, when the Syrian army launched an operation targeting the Sheikh Maksoud and Ashrafiyya neighborhoods in the center of Aleppo. These neighborhoods had been under YPG control for years, and their recapture represented not merely a local setback for the organization but the beginning of a broader collapse. Indeed, following its forced withdrawal from these two critical areas, the YPG/SDF lost approximately 40% of its territory in northeastern Syria in a short span of time.

Signs of military collapse had already begun to emerge throughout 2024. Arab tribes in the eastern Syrian region of Deir ez-Zor repeatedly rose up against YPG/SDF rule, inflicting severe damage on the organization. Between late 2023 and throughout 2024, tribal forces succeeded in temporarily clearing more than 30 villages from YPG/SDF control in rural areas of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Hasakah provinces, as well as around the town of Manbij in Aleppo province. This development made clear that it was unsustainable for the SDF to maintain control over large swathes of territory where the Kurdish population was a minority by means of force. Although the tribes later withdrew and entered negotiations following U.S. mediation, the reality on the ground demonstrated that the YPG could not maintain a long-term presence in these areas.

As a result of this military pressure, the SDF, affiliated with the PKK/PYD, was forced to fully withdraw from strategically significant regions such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor by 2025. The line of conflict was pushed back to the borders of Hasakah province in northeastern Syria. At this stage, the organization has been effectively confined to only a portion of Hasakah and the area around Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) near the Turkish border. Having lost the majority of its territorial control, the YPG/SDF has also forfeited access to Syria’s most important energy resources, water basins, and agricultural lands. Losing dominance over the oil fields and fertile farmlands stretching east of the Euphrates River, the group has been deprived of both key revenue sources and strategic leverage. For instance, the YPG/PKK, which once seized oil from Deir ez-Zor’s wells and sold it through illegal channels, has now largely lost that opportunity.

Another factor that has accelerated the group’s military decline is the loss of legitimacy surrounding its “fight against ISIS” narrative. For a time, the supposed threat of ISIS served as a justification to gain international support, but this rationale no longer holds weight. With ISIS failing to reemerge as a significant force in Syria after 2024, the international pretext legitimizing the presence of the YPG/SDF has effectively vanished. As support from the U.S.-led coalition declined, the PKK/YPG found itself militarily exposed and unable to withstand its regional adversaries. In summary, the 2024–2025 period marked the military unraveling of the PKK/YPG/SDF structure in Syria, as it lost vast areas of territory and the project entered a phase of physical collapse.

Ideological and Moral Disintegration

The ideological rhetoric of the PKK/YPG structure has also suffered a serious loss of credibility alongside its disintegration on the ground. The narrative of the so-called “Rojava revolution,” which the organization claimed to have built in northern Syria, was from the outset an ideological construct lacking any real historical or social foundation. Although it was promoted under the name of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” as if it were a structure formed through the voluntary and equal participation of different ethnic and religious groups, this portrayal proved to be baseless. The PYD/YPG was never able to generate a common political will in the areas it controlled, nor could it establish lasting legitimacy in the public consciousness. The “revolution” balloon—artificially inflated by external support and temporary alliances—quickly deflated due to the absence of a genuine social base.

This ideological and moral erosion within the organization also manifested itself in practice. While the YPG/PKK sought to present itself as a women’s rights movement and a libertarian force to garner international sympathy, it did not hesitate to forcibly recruit children into its ranks. The reality of “child soldiers,” as documented in United Nations reports, has laid bare the gap between the organization’s discourse and its actions. Likewise, there are serious cases of exploitation concerning the use of female militants. The organization used the rhetoric of “women’s liberation” as a tool of propaganda, drawing in large numbers of young girls with promises of revolution and equality. However, many of these female fighters—celebrated by Western media—were ultimately killed in clashes or suicide attacks; in other words, women were reduced to disposable tools by the organization.

The rigid secular/Marxist ideology of the PKK/PYD has also created deep sociocultural discord in the region. Conservative Kurdish and Arab communities, in particular, have been disturbed by the organization’s anti-religious and tradition-defying practices. The PYD’s ideological stance does not represent a significant portion of the Kurdish population in the region. Indeed, in areas from which the organization has withdrawn, a substantial number of local Kurds have welcomed its departure—revealing just how unfounded the claim that “the YPG represents the Kurds” truly is.

Moreover, the organization’s reliance on illegal methods for financing has further eroded its moral legitimacy. It is reported that the group earns between $1.5 and $2 billion annually from the production and trafficking of narcotics within Syria. These activities, which paint a clear picture of “narco-terrorism,” stand in stark contrast to the so-called revolutionary ethics the PKK/YPG claims to uphold. In conclusion, the structure that portrays itself as a “libertarian” movement has undergone serious ideological and moral disintegration—both due to its exploitation of human resources and its entanglement in criminal economies.

Social Reactions and External Connections

The disintegration in Syria has become even more evident through the reactions of the local population and the shifting positions of international actors. The Arab population under PKK/YPG control ultimately reached the point of open rebellion after years of oppression and discrimination. The order established by the organization east of the Euphrates placed Arab tribes under heavy social and economic pressure. Practices such as forced conscription, the recruitment of children, the monopolization of local resources, and the disregard for religious values provoked widespread outrage among the Arab community.

Indeed, in 2023–2024, uprisings by Arab tribes erupted in many regions—particularly in Deir ez-Zor—and these revolts led to the removal of the SDF from certain areas. These developments clearly demonstrate that the PKK/YPG does not possess a broad local support base and cannot maintain control over the region without relying on coercive force.

Similarly, the organization’s claim to “represent the Kurds” has proven to be unrealistic. Although the PYD/YPG suppressed Kurdish groups that rejected its ideology or pursued a different path for years, a significant portion of the Syrian Kurdish population refrained from supporting the PYD administration. In fact, the visible relief among many Kurds following the YPG’s withdrawal from certain areas demonstrates how limited the organization’s legitimacy truly is in the eyes of the Kurdish people. In short, the PKK/PYD is isolated not only from the Arab majority but also within the Kurdish community it claims to represent.

Conditions have also turned against the organization on the external relations front. The support it previously received—particularly from the United States—has noticeably declined since 2024. Washington, which once viewed the SDF as a useful proxy in the fight against ISIS, is now moving toward limiting its backing. This shift in U.S. policy has caught YPG leadership off guard, abandoning the group iin the field. In reality, the relationships global powers forge with local proxies are rarely built on lasting loyalty. For the U.S., its cooperation with the YPG was always a temporary partnership tied to the fight against ISIS—destined to end once the conditions changed.

Likewise, Israel’s tacit support for the YPG has not played a decisive role in the Syrian equation. The Tel Aviv administration has not taken any concrete steps to prevent the collapse of the YPG project. Regionally, as the Syrian government regains strength and Turkey maintains its firm stance, the PKK/PYD has been left increasingly isolated on the international stage.

Finally, the group’s sources of funding have also begun to dry up. Territorial losses have significantly diminished the PKK/YPG’s illicit revenue streams from narcotics production and oil smuggling. In particular, Turkish cross-border operations have delivered heavy blows to these smuggling networks. Similarly, the cessation of foreign aid and donations, along with intensified pressure on financial networks in Europe, has further constrained the group’s financial capabilities. Under these conditions, the PKK/YPG is no longer financially sustainable.

In conclusion, the PKK/PYD/YPG structure has, by this point, suffered major losses militarily, ideologically, and socially within the Syrian context. The project once marketed as the “Rojava revolution” is now nothing more than a shattered dream. A series of battlefield defeats has nearly erased the organization’s zones of control, while internal ideological rifts and moral failures have eroded its resilience. Never truly supported by the Syrian people, and now abandoned by external powers such as the United States and Israel, the organization has effectively been removed from the Syrian equation. All indicators now point to the same conclusion: the most reasonable path forward for the organization is to dissolve its structure and submit to Syrian national authority. This process, which must be led by the KCK as the core structure of the organization, should aim at dismantling all affiliated terrorist networks—not only to achieve a terror-free Turkey, but a terror-free Syria, Iraq, and Iran as well, thereby advancing the broader project of a region liberated from terrorism.