The Benevolent State: A Return to the ‘Common Home’

Note: This article was originally published on the website www.haber10.com in 2007 and was later included in the author’s book Teolojinin Jeopolitiği.

 

A SHARED STATE, A SHARED HOMELAND, AND A SHARED NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

In ancient times, armies would keep cities under siege for months, waiting until the city was brought to the point of being forced to surrender through a form of psychological warfare. Cities that resisted until transportation, food, and all kinds of life necessities ran out would eventually fall or surrender after short-last clashes.

The tactic of the Spanish commander Cortes who conquered Mexico and destroyed the Aztecs in the 16th century, was to secure the support of tribes rivaling the ruling tribe and to seize a country entirely unfamiliar to him by leveraging intelligence and moral support alongside the necessary military force. By augmenting his force of roughly 500 soldiers with nearly 10,000 indigenous tribal warriors, he defeated the Aztecs and invaded Mexico.

A similar military strategy was at work during the Mongol invasions, when several Anatolian principalities sided with the Mongols against the Ottomans. Thanks to the cooperation of these Turkish beyliks (principalities), Timur was able to defeat Bayezid.

The British conquest and administration of India likewise succeeded through the same method.

Following the Cold War, the global fascist coalition implemented its strategy of expanding across the world by employing these age-old methods of warfare. It advanced not only by occupying territories but also by placing virtually the entire world under a form of psychological siege through its financial power and its dominance of the communications and entertainment industries. Many of the world’s peoples, much like the rival tribes that had internal conflicts with the Aztecs and the Ottomans, pursued a policy of allying with this aggressive force or at least remaining passive observers of the occupation based on the logic that, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. In this sense, the success of global aggression owes much to the policies of local status quo forces that have exasperated their own peoples.

This tragic reality, which we witnessed openly in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, also applies to Türkiye. Faced with the projects and impositions of the global coalition, the stance adopted by opposition groups and circles differed little from that of Native American tribes, the Anatolian principalities, or the tribes of Iraq and Afghanistan. The established order ultimately pays the price for its own past wrongdoings by finding itself abandoned at critical moments.

The process we are living through continues as the outcome of precisely this tragic game of war.

The dialectic of this process is simple: The status quo attempts to regenerate its own legitimacy by citing the encirclement caused by external dynamics as a pretext. Opposition elements, meanwhile, abandon their own grounds of legitimacy by using the status quo’s past transgressions as a pretext and theorizing that external dynamics will create opportunities for change.

 

The Simultaneous Erosion of Religion and the State

The problem is not merely one of legitimacy. At a deeper level, the very foundations of the collective subconscious begin to shift. Religion, as the language representing social identity, and the state, as its space, often wane, lose their effectiveness, and become trivialized in a manner that undermines the sentiments of trust, belonging, and asabiyyah (social solidarity) that the public had attributed to them, even contrary to their own intentions. In this sense, the state begins to lose perhaps the only positive social function it performs at a deep level, one that lies far beyond the realm of day-to-day politics. Religion, meanwhile, falls into the paradox of a counterfeit religiosity, in which spiritual security and moral virtue have been hollowed out, while the external shell of religion grows ever more elaborate, serving only to conceal this loss of substance. The inevitable consequence is that society loses both its self-confidence and its collective solidarity (asabiyyah). The collapse of the socialist system in the former Eastern Bloc provides a revealing historical example of such a crisis. In these countries, the powerful Soviet-led state and socialism that acting as an ideology substituted for religion, entered a parallel crisis; against this backdrop, societies whose trust and social cohesion had been shattered rushed readily and eagerly toward capitalism. Even decades after the Cold War, the crises of power that played out in Georgia and Ukraine were the latest examples of the kind of crisis of state and ideology and its societal impact, to which we are referring. The democratism show staged by a few non-governmental organizations and media outlets financed by oligarchs such as the finance-capital priest George Soros, has gone down in history as easy examples of mass manipulation, having surpassed deep-rooted social values and perceptions.

Türkiye experienced a comparable process, particularly between the events of 28 February 1997 and 2007. This process, carried out through more refined and gradual social engineering methods rather than sudden, chaotic manipulations, continued with critical turning points such as the August 17 earthquake, the 2001 economic crisis, and the AKP’s rise to power. Thanks to the media and other instruments of public opinion formation, society has been virtually hypnotized; the collective psyche that exhausted by the internal conflicts of the last thirty years, has fixated on the dream of EU membership and effectively accepted defeat. Virtually every issue has been trivialized and turned into fodder for demagogic media debates involving a handful of sanctioned intellectuals, each representing a specific lobby, while significant problems have been hollowed out and, through social engineering techniques, left in a state of irresolution.

On one hand, there is an atmosphere of inertia and uncertainty, as if everything were left to its own devices and unfolding spontaneously; on the other, sophisticated measures are being implemented, demonstrating the application of the most detailed economic, social, political, and psychological programs.

This controlled disarray is an indicator of the crisis between religion and state, that is, the exhaustion of social trust and asabiyyah, manifesting as the state, as an entity and religion, as a system of overarching values, coming to the fore through their exaggerated outward shells, while remaining ineffective and inconsequential in terms of substance. It is this mediocrity that has rendered Türkiye incapable of debating its problems, resolving them, or moving forward. For the sake of convenience, we may describe this condition as a Second Tanzimat Era. The original Tanzimat was, after all, a process of change imposed by external forces. Yet our history, setting aside certain practices of the Republican Era, is replete with examples of an inability to change through internal dynamics, of remaining captive to the status quo, and of a state of paralysis. Unfortunately, in most instances, Türkiye, or rather, the state in this context, opens the door to the impositions of external dynamics with its own hands as a way out of the state of paralysis stemming from the fear of losing what it already possesses.

Again, if we take the Tanzimat Era as our point of reference, we find that throughout the last two centuries the ruling elites first sought to derive power and legitimacy by securing the approval of foreign consulates and opposition movements subsequently adopted the same method, advancing their demands and objections by aligning themselves with external powers. Without taking into account Mustafa Reşit Pasha’s pro-British orientation, Ali Pasha’s and Fuat Pasha’s pro-French policies, Mahmud Nedim Pasha’s pro-Russian stance, or the alliances pursued by Abdülhamid II and later the Committee of Union and Progress with Germany, how consistent is it to condemn or even question the cooperation of the Balkan peoples or the Arabs with Western powers during their revolts against the Ottoman Empire? If the central issue is survival, legitimacy, and modernization through reliance upon the West, then there is nothing surprising about these peoples choosing to pursue that path independently rather than through Türkiye as an intermediary.

A similar process unfolded in Russia. As Russian elites increasingly turned toward cooperation with the West during the 1990s, they simultaneously regarded the independent efforts of their former satellite states to pursue Western integration as acts of betrayal. Yet if there was a betrayal, it belonged first and foremost to those who had opened that path in the first place.

 

‘Treaty of Sevres’ Implemented by the State Itself

Türkiye now finds itself at the latest stage of this history of dependence on the West, oscillating between the United States and the European Union, between Westernization and its consequences, at a critical historical juncture. In this critical period, the state, as the representative of the collective self and asabiyyah, is effectively paying the price for the ‘Treaty of Sevres’ policies it implemented with its own hands. There is no other name for the ceaseless exclusion, discrimination, and branding as internal threats, whether done in turn, all at once, or by pitting one group against another, of leftists, Islamists, Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, and even the Idealists deemed overly nationalist, than application of Treaty of Sevres, that is, the partitioning of the country and the nation. It is therefore hardly convincing to witness the architects of these policies, the oligarchic elite who have long regarded the state’s institutions as their own private fiefdom, shedding crocodile tears in the face of foreign pressure while suddenly presenting themselves as defenders of national unity, the homeland, the country, and the state. In its struggle for survival, the establishment seeks to restore its legitimacy through paranoid analyses that mix a few truths with many falsehoods, and through reflexes that appear anti-imperialist but in reality merely express its fear of losing power. Leftists, Islamists, and even some Idealists, who never once entertained the thought of questioning this country’s independence, existence, survival, unity, and integrity, yet who rebelled against the flawed order, unjust distribution of resources, Westernism, and discrimination to wage a practical opposition for genuine democracy, have come to watch this process with dismay.

Methods of suppressing uprisings, tactics for silencing the opposition, military coups, blacklisting, censorship, exile, purges, systematic torture, the burning of books and films… We must discuss these issues without forgetting for a moment that the history of Türkiye is filled not only with the construction of schools, mosques, dams, and roads, but also with such oppression and torment. For the collective memory of society is by no means as weak as is often supposed; it merely appears to have forgotten, owing to an intelligence distilled from historical experience that prefers sidestepping trouble to engaging in a brawl, yet it voices its reaction through its general orientation at the first opportunity. This is the principal reason behind the enthusiasm that once surrounded the European Union. This is the primary reason for the interest in the EU at one time. Expectations regarding the EU at the societal level are essentially an expression of these accumulated reactions. Almost every segment of society that has suffered blows at the hands of the state now seeks to hold it accountable, albeit indirectly, or at the very least demands the establishment of the necessary framework to prevent a recurrence.

The status quo-oriented oligarchy has weakened both the state and the military by behaving as though they were its private property. At the same time, it attempted to legitimize dependence on Western governments and institutions such as NATO in the name of realpolitik. Through what may be called a politics of Treaty of Sevres, it divided the nation into hostile camps and set them against one another. Today, it attempts to portray all of this as though it were merely the result of conspiracies orchestrated by the United States or the European Union. Those who governed Türkiye as though it were their own estate on behalf of the West, and who made dependence upon the West the foundation of their system of rule, now seek to absolve themselves by placing the entire blame on the West itself. Through various machinations, the aim is for the oligarchy to remain in power tomorrow as well. In other words, the anti-Westernism, anti-imperialism, anti-US sentiment, anti-EU stance, and so-called nationalism stemming from the oligarchy are all sham; they are just as unpatriotic as Westernism, Americanism, pro-Europeanism, or pro-Israeli sentiment.

In that case, to resolve the dialectic mentioned at the outset, we can emphasize the following: while the status quo seeks a new basis for legitimacy, it is necessary to isolate it and allow its collapse to proceed; conversely, the opposition must be steered away from the path of ‘cut off one’s nose to spite one’s face’ that is, from abandoning legitimate ground and becoming easy prey for the West.

 

Ethnic nationalism is the ideology of colonialism and is divisive!

As the modern form of warfare among Western peoples, ethnic nationalism plays the role of the Grim Reaper in these lands. It is well known that, following the collapse of the Roman Empire, the peoples of barbarian Europe proved unable to forge a common political identity. The French Revolution transformed this inability into the doctrine of nationalism, while the Peace of Westphalia recognized the principle that every people constituting a majority within a given territory possessed the right to establish its own state. Napoleon later carried this idea eastward under the banner of Romanticism, and Western national bourgeoisies embraced it enthusiastically as a means of protecting customs barriers and escaping economic competition.

From the late nineteenth century onward, nationalism became the principal instrument of British imperial divide-and-rule strategy. Joined by France and Russia, this policy ultimately brought about the disintegration of both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The peoples who broke away from the Ottoman Empire indeed acquired states of their own, but in reality they became satellites of new imperial powers; Britain, France, or Russia. In essence, therefore, ethnic nationalism has always functioned as an ideology of fragmentation, division, and destruction.

Throughout its history, the Eastern world acknowledged the political authority of many different peoples and dynasties, yet it never produced nationalism in the modern ethnic sense. Whether one calls it tribalism, ethnic chauvinism, or racism, ethnic nationalism has no indigenous roots in the East. Despite its many shortcomings, the Ottoman millet system (system of nation) represented one of the most advanced models of democratic pluralism and coexistence among diverse communities during the agrarian age, and it endured for centuries. The nationalisms that destroyed the Ottoman Empire continue today to play the role of the Grim Reaper for regional peace throughout the Balkans and the Middle East. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, Turkishness, Kurdishness, Circassian, and Arab identities as names of peoples and cultural codes from, on the other, ethnicist nationalisms, which serve as divisive and fragmenting colonialist tools. Let us state at the outset that, in the context of our subject, the Ottoman Empire is the name of a vast geographical and political ‘whole’ that is today divided into some 25 states. In other words, Ottoman administration, the regime, or state policies lie outside the scope of our discussion. What we need today is not the Ottoman Empire’s antiquated remnants, but precisely this political and geographical integrity. For the root cause of our problems lies in the absence of this integrity.

The statelets established by Britain and France shattered this larger whole, transforming the former Ottoman lands into a region of persistent ethnic conflict. Yet throughout history the fundamental dialectic of this geography has always revolved around the tension between political unity and fragmentation. Rome, the Great Seljuk Empire, and the Ottoman Empire represent periods of great unity, while the eras during which these states collapsed, lasting between 80 and 100 years, represent periods of interregnum. In other words, this region has never existed as a collection of separate, small states for any extended period. Either external invasions brought about changes in peoples and religions, or an indigenous dynamic assumed a unifying role and restored integrity to the region. The Ottoman Empire represented the last such period of integration. Now, however, a state of fragmentation-an interregnum-is being experienced due to the artificial nation-states established by colonialists and the rise of ethnic nationalism. The ancient historical dialectic remains at work, awaiting the emergence of a new indigenous force capable of reconstructing the larger political whole. Most of the states established in the region after the Ottoman Empire are artificial, and each is a colony, plantation, or fiefdom of an colonialist power.

This is why those who discuss domestic and international problems without viewing them from this broader perspective fail to produce genuinely effective solutions. For as long as this fragmentation is accepted, and dependency relationships with the West are presented as immutable, unquestionable realities, the zero-sum game will continue, regardless of what is said.

The Republic of Türkiye represents the innermost fortress left standing after this fragmentation. For this reason, it possesses the quality of being the primary driving force behind the recovery. At this juncture, rather than perceiving the tactic of retreating to the inner citadel as a permanent stance, it is necessary to regard the great unifying dynamic inherent in the essence of the Republic as the fundamental element, and to view its current form merely as a temporary breathing spell.

The policy of reuniting, into a single, unified state, the artificial regional states that were hastily established during the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration process should be brought to the agenda. This alone constitutes the legitimate framework within which the region’s problems can be discussed and resolved. It should not be forgotten that during the conquest of Byzantium, the Christianity of Eastern Anatolia (Armenianness) became divided from and entered into conflict with the Byzantine Greek center. As a consequence of that division, Christianity lost Anatolia, and the Eastern Roman Empire was conquered. Today, too, the natural consequence of driving wedges between Muslim communities and pitting them against one another is that Islam loses Anatolia, followed by the collapse of the only remaining genuine state.

 

The First Step Toward a Common State: A Shared Homeland and a Shared National Consciousness

Many of the concepts that played a negative role in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire must today be redefined with entirely different, constructive meanings so that they may serve the cause of regional reunification. During the Tanzimat Era, concepts borrowed from the West, such as liberty, equality, homeland, nation, constitution, and even the state in the modern nation-state sense, were interpreted and defined under the initiative of colonial powers. Indeed, despite all their good intentions and just struggles against despotism, the struggle waged by the Young Turk generations on the basis of these concepts ultimately led to a fragmentation that was the exact opposite of the aim to renew the Ottoman Empire, because they overlooked the main objective of the colonialist program being pursued, which was to dismantle and partition the military-agrarian empires. In particular, the two fundamental economic and political formulas articulated by Prince Sabahaddin’s group, Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi (Individual Initiative) and Adem-i Merkeziyet (Decentralization), appeared, when considered in isolation, to be significant formulas for reform and renewal. Yet the colonialist powers ultimately realized their own objectives precisely through these formulas, creating both a class of entrepreneurs dependent upon the West and a collection of Western-dependent statelets that had broken away from the Ottoman Empire under the illusion of self-government.

Today, the forces of the global coalition continue to stage the same operation under the pretext of local problems, employing the language of democracy, human rights, and the free market. In reality, it is indeed necessary for all dictatorships in our region to disappear, for a genuine rule-of-law order to prevail, and for both statist and capitalist monopolies to give way to truly competitive market conditions. The objective of colonialism, however, is not this, on the contrary, it seeks once again to renew a colonial order based on dependence by exploiting precisely these concepts and demands.

Being aware of this fact, we must now have learned that determining the content and purpose of concepts is more important than the realities meant through those concepts.

The concepts of homeland, nation, state, republic, and liberty, which acquired their deepest meanings through figures such as Namık Kemal, Mehmet Akif, the Unionists, and Mustafa Kemal during the Constitutional and Republican periods, should be restored to those original meanings and they should be freed from their Western interpretations and employed instead in a way that embraces the brotherhood and well-being of the entire region.

 

The Benevolent State

The Mesopotamian–Mediterranean basin is, in reality, a single country. And its natural geography constitutes a single homeland. All peoples who possess a consciousness of belonging to this homeland together form one nation. Throughout history, the symbol of this shared belonging and common national consciousness has been a common state. This homeland, state, and nation possess neither an ethnic nor a religious identity. Throughout history, every state that successfully governed this region did so by embodying precisely this inclusive consciousness. A state belonging exclusively to one ethnic or religious group has amounted to little more than a tribal or feudal principality and has therefore failed to gain the acceptance of the region’s other peoples. In this sense, the only legitimate criterion for statehood within this common homeland, whose broadest historical expression was represented by the territorial extent of the Eastern Roman and Ottoman Empires, is to be the state of everyone and of every part of the country. A state serving only one community or one region can neither endure for long nor be regarded as legitimate, not only by those whom it excludes but eventually even by its own subjects. Accordingly, the path toward a shared homeland and a shared nation necessarily passes through a shared state. Such a state must, by necessity, be organized around principles of popular sovereignty, social justice, and the common good. Pluralism, decentralization, and a legal order founded upon individual freedoms constitute the minimum requirements for ensuring that such a state functions on the basis of justice. This state of justice is the benevolent state; and loyalty to it, no less than its belonging to everyone, is loyalty to the nation and the homeland. Beyond fidelity to such a state, there can be no other condition for genuine brotherhood. For this reason, the indispensable foundation for the peaceful coexistence of countless religions, languages, sects, traditions, and ethnic communities is this conception of a benevolent and just state. This notion of the state, historically organized as a military-agrarian empire, must be updated and reimagined today as a space for regional peace, an anti-capitalist, public-oriented, and sharing-based economy, and a call for universal brotherhood. The history of civilization has bequeathed to us a wealth of experience in this regard, and by examining periods of decline and learning lessons about what we should not do, and how, we have the opportunity to build a better world. In the state of this shared homeland and nation, there can be no question of any ethnic or religious group holding an inherent position of superiority that solely on the basis of its ethnic or religious identity. True superiority consists only in advancing the values of humanity and excelling in service to humankind. No other doctrine of superiority or domination possesses legitimacy. Whether as individuals or as communities, the only valid competition is the competition to do good. Those who contribute most to establishing this shared and cooperative order may naturally enjoy greater public esteem and, provided such esteem is not exploited or transformed into a permanent badge of privilege, may assume a leading role in founding and governing the common state. Beyond this, however, no one possesses the right to predetermine the character of the homeland or the nation on the basis of prior ethnic or religious claims.

The concept we refer to, that of a shared homeland and a common state for the nation, should be presented to all the peoples of the region as an ideal, and every avenue for reuniting must be explored. Türkiye, representing the historical heritage of this common state, should take the lead and, with the consciousness of being an inner citadel, should make it the foundation of all its domestic and foreign policy to assume a leadership role that embraces the surrounding extensions of all the peoples it hosts and extends the hand of brotherhood.

 

The Path to the Common Home

Türkiye’s regional mission should be the construction of this ‘Common Home’ that is, of a single common state. The first steps toward achieving this objective should be:

1. Economic and political reforms that will end dependence on the West, including the dismantling of oligarchic rule and the empowerment of the nation in every sphere;
2. Beginning with the former Ottoman lands and extending outward through the surrounding region, establishing-on the basis of mutual consent with each neighboring country-a Seljuk-Ottoman Afro-Eurasian geopolitical framework through customs unions, strategic alliances, regional organizations, confederations, and other forms of special cooperation;
3. Pursuing a multipolar foreign policy and, within the United Nations, serving as an advocate for the countries of the region, the Islamic world, and the oppressed peoples of the world.

 

Only by pursuing such a policy can Türkiye overcome both its internal divisions and its fear of the future. National integration and regional integration should therefore be understood as two inseparable aspects of the same political strategy and advanced simultaneously. Regional integration will reinforce national unity, while national unity will, in turn, enable regional integration to proceed on a stronger and healthier foundation.

Such a profound historical transformation is possible only by rediscovering the founding spirit and original objectives of the Republic. The principles of National Sovereignty (Hakimiyet-i Milliye), the National Oath (Misak-ı Milli), Complete Independence (İstiklal-i Tam), and the aspiration to surpass the level of contemporary civilization should once again be understood according to their original meanings and, likewise, the concept of nationhood should be grounded in its constitutional definition; a civic bond uniting citizens to the common state. Yet today, all these ideals and principles of the Republic have been twisted to convey almost the exact opposite meanings; a state hostile to its own people and their beliefs, a conception of Turkishness antagonistic toward diverse ethnic identities, and a pathetic, so-called goal of modernization-bent on becoming Western-have taken the state and society captive. It is therefore hardly surprising that an oligarchic conception of governance, one that remains in conflict with its own Kurds, women who wear headscarves, Alevis, and non-Muslim citizens, and that has come to speak through Western political frameworks, should have little interest in either national or regional integration. For this oligarchic elite is fully aware that its political, ideological, and economic privileges have been secured as the reward for keeping Türkiye, the Republic, and the state alienated from their own people and dependent upon the West.

For this reason, whenever Türkiye takes steps toward regional rapprochement-no matter how romantic, naive, or even childish-whether toward the Turkic world, the Islamic world, or cooperation on axes such as the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, this elite immediately begins to set the tempo with a propaganda chorus full of mockery and contempt, and then, if the project has begun to materialize, assassinations, postmodern coups, or smear campaigns through the media follow. The period through which Türkiye passed from the end of the Cold War in the 1990s until the early 2000s offers numerous examples of this pattern. As a consequence, Türkiye found itself unable to pursue an independent and genuinely national policy toward either the Turkic world, other Muslim countries, or its neighboring states without such relations being mediated by Western-sponsored projects or strategic frameworks such as the Greater Middle East Project (BOP) or the European Union.

For this reason, the first step toward national integration must be a program of national democratic restoration and reconstruction. Unless such a fundamental transformation of both political power and political mentality is achieved, none of Türkiye’s national or regional objectives can be realized. The problems of this country can be solved only by those whose minds have remained free from subordination either to the domestic oligarchy or to the West.

Imperialist encirclement is neither insurmountable nor invincible. Yet in a country whose shared ideals and common values have been systematically eroded, where an illegitimate oligarchic order confronts opposition movements that are themselves rapidly losing legitimacy, the only outcome of such confrontation will be collective exhaustion.

The common sense of this country must organize and speak through a new movement of reconstruction-one that preserves the understanding of history and nationhood, and upholds the values ​​of God, homeland, and freedom. Within such an understanding, there exists no irresolvable conflict between Kurds and Turks, Turks and Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis, believers and secular citizens, Armenians, Greeks, or Syriac Christians. This, indeed, reflects the character of the overwhelming majority of the Turkish nation. It is also a fact that our country, under siege, is continually subjected to psychological warfare designed to keep it under the constant threat of internal conflict and civil strife. Yet the way to break this encirclement is not to become a party to these manufactured conflicts, but rather to clear the path for genuine transformation.

Türkiye must abandon its perpetual dance of choosing between competing global powers and instead undertake a decisive transformation that removes the obstacles to genuine renewal from within. An exclusive focus on preserving internal unity leads only to the restoration of the status quo, that is, to fascism. If it is merely opening outward, it leads either to subcontractor policies such as exporting security to the USA (fake Ottomanism or fake Turanism) or to neutralization by abandoning all claims, as in EU membership. Internal and external consolidation can achieve their true objective only if pursued as parallel policies of a single strategy, namely, integration through growth. To this end, the Republic of Türkiye, the people of Türkiye, and the Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, and all other fraternal and fellow-citizen communities should place the reconstruction of this common state and common homeland at the forefront of their political agenda throughout Turkish Eurasia and the Mesopotamian-Mediterranean basin.

To speak in terms of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Albanians, Bosniaks, Shiites, Sunnis, secularists, and religious believers is to speak the language of colonialism… All these expressions are the result of an imperialist discourse aimed at tearing apart the nation, a nation that has now become an alloy inextricably fused by these very expressions. The operation that divided the people of Iraq into Shiites, Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens is, in reality, merely the continuation of the great campaign of fragmentation that began a century ago. Whether then or now, suddenly discovering that one is different from one’s brother and succumbing to the desire for a separate state, a separate homeland, and a separate nation will ultimately benefit no one. Fragmenting the nation and setting its peoples against one another serves only to satisfy the ambitions of tribal and factional leaders who hope to gain power and status from division.  In the past, such leaders rebelled against the Ottoman state by inciting their own people against neighboring communities, thereby facilitating the establishment of colonial domination throughout the region. Today, the same game is being played once again in almost exactly the same manner and style.

In this context, all the intertwined peoples of the region should remember that there is no legitimate cause other than striving to organize a single state for a single nation on the foundations of justice and the rejection of servitude to human beings (İ’la-yı Kelimetullah).

It should become a common habit to avoid every form of ethnic language and rhetoric, and to continue condemning every form of ethnic nationalism, chauvinism, and fascism.

In order to bring an end to their own ethnic conflicts, Western societies developed ostensibly scientific theories after the Peace of Westphalia claiming that they all shared common origins. The Indo-European language-family thesis and the myth of the Aryan race were ‘invented’ in the early nineteenth century. These theories of race, language, and history were modern fabrications. Nevertheless, they proved effective, creating a powerful sense of collective solidarity (asabiyyah) for European unity. Today, Europeans and white Americans alike largely perceive themselves as sharing a common civilizational and racial heritage.

We, too, must develop new theses, theories, and intellectual projects capable of expressing a common identity by presenting Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Bulgarians, Persians, Armenians, Syriacs, Georgians, Crimean peoples, Albanians, Greeks, Bosniaks, Roma, Hungarians, Poles, Circassians, Chechens, Abkhazians, Serbs, and all the peoples of the region as the diverse branches of a single shared cultural civilization.

Although they do not inhabit the same geography, Indigenous peoples of the Americas, Black peoples, and the peoples of the Indian subcontinent also belong within this broader human vision. The essential task is to construct, within the context of Turkish (Ottoman) Eurasia, a new common future and a new system of human values grounded in a theology of freedom. Everything should be reinterpreted and endowed with new meaning in pursuit of this objective, the triumph of what is good.

We must all return to ‘the Common Home’, filled with the noble and beautiful memories of the deep history that has made us who we are. This represents a regional democratic union capable of bringing peace and prosperity to the entire region.

The Common Home-Beyt’ül Millet, embodies the ideal of our shared humanity. And as a great whole, in the sense of the widest borders of the Seljuk and Ottoman empires, the summary of the common values and principles of the shared home of ‘this country’ and, in the sense of everyone living within these borders, of ‘this nation’ is God, homeland, and freedom. Humanity must become reacquainted with the historical message of well-being from this geography.

The Benevolent State, the State of Justice and the Rule of Law, the Sublime State (Devlet-i Aliyye), The Gate of Bliss (Dersaadet), the Abode of Peace (Dar al-Salam), and the House of the Nation (Beyt’ül Millet)… Those who remain unaware of the meaning and significance of these concepts neither possess, nor ever will possess a sound and organic understanding of this country, its state, or its future.

 

Source: Teolojinin Jeopolitiği-Allah Vatan Özgürlük, Ahmet Özcan, Yarın Yayınları, 2010