Syria-Türkiye-US Trilateral Talks and SDG Integration

Ahead of the expected Sharar-Trump meeting in Washington, it was announced that Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan had also been invited due to Türkiye’s active role in Syria and regional dynamics. Thus, the Syria-Türkiye-US trilateral talks have become a significant milestone in the diplomatic dossier of the Syrian crisis, which has remained stalled for over a decade. The main agenda of the talks was the integration of the SDG (Syrian Democratic Forces/SDF) into the Syrian army. This issue lies at the center of a multilayered geopolitical debate—ranging from Syria’s internal balances to Türkiye’s security concerns, US regional strategies, the future of Syrian Kurds, and the renewed power consolidation in Damascus.

SDG–Damascus Rapprochement: Agreement in Principle and Difficult Questions

It was announced that a principle agreement had been reached between the Damascus administration and the SDG for the gradual integration of the group’s armed elements into the Syrian army and state institutions. Within this framework, it was stated that a committee would be established, ceasefire mechanisms would be expanded, and joint security structures would be introduced in certain areas. Statements by Mazloum Abdi indicate that the process represents a “search for legitimacy and assurance” for the SDG. According to Abdi, reaching an agreement with Damascus is an inevitable step for the group’s future and for regional stability.

Issues concerning the political status and rights of Syrian citizens of Kurdish origin are already at the heart of “New Syria” discussions and will be shaped by the collective will of all Syrians. These matters, which directly concern the country’s future, also constitute one of the main agenda items of the newly formed provisional parliament. As one of the active parties in the process, Ankara emphasizes that Kurds should enjoy equal rights with all other Syrians. Therefore, it is essential not to postpone discussions concerning the political status of social groups.

Türkiye’s Position: A Unitary Syria and a Single Army

Türkiye is closely monitoring the process, and Ankara’s initial response reflects a balance between cautious optimism and strategic calculation. The integration of the SDF into the state army is a long-anticipated development from Türkiye’s perspective. The transformation of the group from a semi-autonomous military structure into one subordinated to central state authority aligns with Ankara’s long-standing emphasis on “Syria’s territorial integrity” and a “single army” model. However, should this arrangement amount merely to a “rebranding” (a change in name and status) on the ground, and if the SDF maintains its armed institutional presence in another form, this would be unacceptable to Türkiye.

In this context, three fundamental questions emerge from Ankara. First, how will the SDF’s command structure be reorganized? Second, what positions will individuals with a YPG (People’s Protection Units) background assume in the state army? Third, will concrete mechanisms be established to address Türkiye’s concerns regarding border security? Ankara’s participation in the talks in Washington was also part of its effort to seek answers to these questions. Another reason for Türkiye’s sensitivity on these issues is the risk posed by potential unforeseen clashes in the border region. Ankara does not wish to face the strategic fragility that such a possibility could generate.

The Role of the US: Mediator and Observer

The US’s participation in the trilateral talks demonstrates that the process is reshaping not only the Damascus–SDG relationship but also the broader regional equation. It is clear that Washington’s involvement signifies both overseeing the integration process and producing a counterbalance to the Russia–Iran-dominated power structure in Syria. The US position reflects three simultaneous objectives. First, to contribute to Syria’s reconstitution as a state by integrating the SDF into the system. Second, to open space for détente in relations with Türkiye. Third, to prevent Syria’s fragmentation and reduce the risk of a new wave of conflict.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that certain elements within the US are attempting to continue the long-standing relationship with the SDF in a different format. This possibility entails the emergence of various risks. The US must refrain from initiatives that would trigger new crises or render meaningless the role it has assigned itself in Syria as a “mediator-observer.” Otherwise, Syria may once again be drawn into a conflict-laden atmosphere driven by multiple dynamics. This is because two divergent lines exist within US Syria policy: the Pentagon’s approach of maintaining a “tactical partnership with the SDF” and the State Department’s approach favoring “balanced relations with Türkiye and integration of the SDF into the state system.” The trilateral talks can also be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the discord between these two lines.

The Kurdish Perspective

The Kurdish perspective can be interpreted on two different grounds. The first is the supportive approach toward the process. This is the position held by the majority of Syrian Kurds. They view the current process positively, as the integration of the SDF into the state army is seen as a means for Kurds to become a legitimate and institutional actor in Syrian domestic politics. They regard this as an opportunity in terms of long-term security and recognition.

On the other hand, some Kurds—mostly those who are not Syrian—see the integration with Damascus as a liquidation of the SDF’s armed and administrative gains. Some even interpret it as assimilation. In fact, the essential issue here is not the technical aspects of integration but the legal and political guarantees. Türkiye’s stated position on Syria and the Syrian Kurds should serve to alleviate these concerns, as all statements made in Ankara have clearly emphasized the political and legal status of all segments of the population living in Syria.

Realities on the Ground: Why Is Implementation Difficult?

In a highly fragmented conflict zone like Syria, any integration plan can only succeed through the alignment of three key elements on the ground. The first is the local balance of power—that is, the harmony between integration and societal structure. In this regard, the stance of tribes, local militias, and economic networks is crucial. The second is priorities. While one can speak of Türkiye, the US, Russia, and Iran in this context, the central player is Ankara. This is due to both a long shared border and kinship ties with the region. Türkiye’s support for the integration process is therefore essential. The third—and perhaps most important—element is Syria’s state capacity. This refers to Damascus’s ability to rebuild, implement political integration, internalize social differences, and ensure the country becomes a safe and stable place. In short, its capacity to manage the process. For this reason, although the initial talks are a strong step, the “agreement in principle” will take time to translate into implementation, and the process will take shape based on the outcomes of subsequent negotiations.

Of course, the roles of Russia and Iran are also critical at this point. Russia supports the integration of the SDF as a step that will strengthen Damascus’s central authority. Iran, on the other hand, is more cautious due to the possibility that it could limit the influence of its own militia networks. The success of the trilateral talks is directly related to the stances of these two actors. For Moscow, integration is a means of increasing the Syrian army’s footprint on the ground and thereby maintaining its own military presence at a lower cost. Iran, however, is observing the process from a controlled distance, concerned that the SDF’s alignment with Damascus could weaken the influence of its militia networks.

Economic Reality: The Unseen Determinant of Integration

The fate of SDG–Damascus integration in Syria will be determined not by military arrangements, but by the question of who will manage the resources—and how. Control over oil fields, border trade, customs revenues, and local economies transforms this process from a political negotiation into a struggle for economic power-sharing. Damascus needs these resources to rebuild its state capacity. Under ongoing sanctions and a lack of external financing, it is extremely difficult for any political agreement to be implemented on the ground without accompanying economic arrangements. Therefore, the unseen determinant of integration will not merely be the economy itself, but the political power of the economy.

Progress in matters of security and politics can only become permanent if this power-sharing is established within a fair and viable framework. Consequently, any advancement in security and political domains must be reinforced with an appropriate economic framework.

A New Chapter for Syria or a Tactical Interim Period?

The central question here is whether the talks will open a new chapter for Syria or merely represent a tactical interim period. It is a valid question. However, the Syria–Türkiye–US trilateral meeting signals a type of diplomatic rapprochement not seen in Syria for a long time. The integration of the SDF into the army, if supported by the right mechanisms, could present a significant opportunity for regional stability. Nevertheless, this process also involves certain fragile balances.

The first delicate balance to be managed is the handling of social differences. In this context, it is crucial that the rights of all social groups living in Syria are constitutionally guaranteed and that their political representation is anchored in legal norms. Another matter is the sound management and resolution of Türkiye’s border security concerns. The third point of fragility is Damascus’s centralist approach. Here, a subtle yet vital detail must be noted: Syria must not be drawn into a political governance crisis similar to what post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq experienced. Once this risk is acknowledged, managing the balance between a centralist model and empowered local governance can be achieved through the collective will of the Syrian people.

Another key issue is the US’s regional repositioning strategy. This strategy entails reducing its direct military presence in the Middle East while preserving its ability to influence political and military processes, and shifting its focus toward new geopolitical priorities (China and the Asia-Pacific). Without fully withdrawing from the Syrian equation, the US aims to integrate the SDF into the system without losing it, improve relations with Türkiye, limit Russian–Iranian influence, and remain a center of diplomatic gravity. This can be framed as a “search for low cost and high control.”

Ultimately, it is more useful to view the current stage not as an “outcome,” but as a transitional period in which the new Syrian architecture is being debated. The final balance will likely depend on the success of implementation on the ground, progress based on mutual trust between the parties, and how international actors shape the process. It is clear that actors from Ankara operating in Syria have a very important role to play in this phase.